ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE 
AND  DEMOCRACY 


BY  THE 

REV.  EDWARD  F.  MURPHY,  M.  A., 

Society  of  St.  Joseph  for  Colored  Missioris 


DISSERTATION 


Submitted  to  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy  of  the  Catholic  Uni- 
versity of  America  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  require- 
ments for  the  Doctorate  in  Philosophy. 


Jr5M97 


Catholic  University  op  America 
Washington,  D.  C. 
MCMXXI 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE 
AND  DEMOCRACY 


BY  THE 

EEV.  EDWARD  F.  MURPHY,  M.  A., 
Society  of  St,  Joseph  for  Colored  Missions 


DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy  of  the  Catholic  Uni- 
versity of  America  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  require- 
ments for  the  Doctorate  in  Philosophy. 


Catholic  University  of  America 
Washington,  D.  C. 
MCMXXI 


ERRATA. 


Page      i — Millennium. 

V — "Though"  for  "through"  (lint  4). 
11 — Rational.    Note  100:  totum,  omnia. 

14 —  "Individual"  for  "individuals"  (line  13). 

15 —  "From"  for  "for"  (1st  line). 

16—  Odious. 

24 — Expedience. 
45 — Plausible. 

48 —  Insert  "not"   between   "has"  and   "only"    (line   11);  "be 

exercised"  for  "be  excused"  (line  12). 

49 —  Nullo  modo. 

55 — Insert  "in"  between  "is"  and  "the"  (line  10). 
60 — Transpose  lines. 

62 —  Opprobrious. 

63 —  "Neat"  for  "near." 

72— "Com.  Eth."  for  "Coth.  Eth." 
75 — Vagabonds. 
77 — "Statues"  for  "statutes." 
83 — Counsellors. 

86—  Judicial. 

87 —  "Becomes"  for  "become." 
"      94 — "Signifies"  for  "signified." 

97 — Equally.    Insert  "as"  (line  35). 
100 — Reconstruction. 

105 — Feugueray — Pensee — Gouvernement. 
"     106— Enhanced. 
"     107— Feu— . 
"     108— Royalty. 
"     109— Guage. 

117 — Carthaginian. 

124 — Disparage. 

129^ — Principantes. 
"     131— Delete  lines  1,  2,  4,  11,  14,  17. 

150 — "Make  it  impossible"   (line  19). 

167 — "Ever"  for  "even"  (line  17). 

179 —  Insert  "but"  between  "not"  and  "be  democratic"  (line  12). 

180 —  Procuring. 

"     188 — "For  then"  for  "for  them"  (line  8). 
"     206— Shibboleth. 
"     209— Subjects. 

210 — "Unavoidably"  for  "avoidably." 
"     216— "Exculpate  it"  (line  29). 

"     222 — "Ignoring"    for    "ignorant"     (line    21).      "Imperil"  for 

"imperial." 
"     226 — Affection. 
"     261— Bluntschli's. 

262 — Sicut  principale.  Assumebatur. 
"     266— Ultimately. 

272— Ecclesiastical. 

276 — Conscience. 
"     279— Actual. 
"     294— Tournai. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https://archive.org/details/stthomaspoliticaOOmurp_0 


CONTENTS 

Introduction   i-xiv 

Chapter  I. — Origin  of  Society  and  State   1 

Chapter  II._Power— The  Motor   26 

Chapter  III. — People — The  Sourer  of  Power   57 

Chapter  IV.— Rulers— The  Wielders  of  It   81 

Chapter  V. — Governments — The  Method  of  It   99 

Chapter  VI.— Purpose— The  Object  of  It   139 

Chapter  VII. — Right  and  Liberties — To  be  Protected  by  It.  179 
Chapter  VIII. — Menaces  and  Problems — To  be  Met  by  It.  213 
Conclusion   266 


ST.    TIIOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AXD  DEMOCRACY 


1 


INTRODUCTION 

Though  the  political  panacea  of  the  day,  democracy  is  still 
insufficiently  understood  by  the  many  whom  it  affects  most. 
The  qualities  of  it  are  better  known  than  are  the  qualifications 
for  it ;  the  ends  than  the  means.  It  is  airily  esteemed  the  great 
emancipation,  the  crown  of  the  glorified  people,  the  tomb  of 
autocracy,  the  gate-way  to  the  millenium,  etc.  But  its  demands 
are  proportionate  to  its  favors ;  and  there  can  be  no  true  concept 
of  democracy  which  ignores  the  preliminaries  which  induce 
it  and  its  success. 

The  meaning  of  the  word,  from  the  time  of  Thucydides^ 
who  first  used  it,  until  now,  is  popular  rule.-  As  one  reviewer 
says,  "Democracy  is  the  state  of  an  autonomous  people".'^ 
Still,  if  a  people  are  not  intellectually  and  ethically  equipped 
for  self-government,  a  democratic  regime  would  not  be  demo- 
cratic at  all.  It  would  be  demagogic,  or  '^the  government  of  the 
people  by  the  boss  of  the  group."  It  would  be,  save  by  miracle, 
or  through  the  discipline  of  experience  and  time,  a  species  of 
chaos. ^  Tyranny  and  its  equally  odious  opposite — lack  of  all 
rigor — are  none  the  less  political  calamities  when  they  obtain 
in  the  many.  The  definition  of  democracy  would  be  improved 
by  the  linking  of  the  adjective  '^qualified''  to  "autonomous.'' 

Democracy  is  an  ideal  form  of  government;  but,  like  all 
ideals,  it  has  not  always  proved  the  best  for  practical  purposes. 
For  nations  have  not  invariably  measured  up  to  its  require- 
ments, and  hence  have  not  always  been  prepared  for  its  privi- 
leges. Since  it  is  a  system  which,  in  a  manner,  makes  rulers 
of  the  many,  it  demands  that  the  many  have  the  mental  and 


II,  15. 

2  "Demos",  people,  and  "kratos",  rule. 

3Borrell,  Art.  L'Idee  de  Democratie,  Revue  de  Philosophie,  XII, 
p.  114. 

4  This  is  why  democracy  is  criticized  as  a  disintegrating  force  which 
"dissolves  communities  into  individuals,  and  collects  them  again  into 
mobs."  Criticism  should  more  justly  be  reserved  for  the  abuse  of 
democracy  and  the  disqualification  of  certain  peoples  for  its  reign. 
The  fault  is  not  in  democracy,  but  in  democrats.  Cf.  Croiset,  Les 
democraties  antiques,  p.  335. 


ii     ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 

moral  virtues  requisite  to  regency.  Until  a  people  have  evolved 
to  the  due  political  degree,  democracy  could  only  be  a  Pan- 
dora's box  in  their  possession.  If  it  is  the  best  of  the  forms 
of  government,  its  place  in  political  progress  is  last;  and  the 
belief  that  it  is  the  best  for  the  future  implies  at  least  a  conces- 
sion that  it  may  not  always  have  been  the  best  in  the  past. 

Athens  was  ready  for  a  democratic  era  only  in  the  Golden  Age 
of  Pericles  (445-431  B.  C.)  ;  and  even  then  her  particular 
brand  of  popular  rule  which  Lloyd  calls  "the  most  pure  and 
the  most  important  democratic  government  the  world  had 
ever, — nay  has  ever  seen",^  was  far  from  ideal.  Theoretically, 
the  people  ruled ;  practically,  Pericles.  His  spirit  and  influence 
leavened  the  whole  polity,  as  in  a  form  of  monarchy.  The 
Demos  discussed  and  decided;  but  it  was  only  a  segment  of 
the  population.  In  a  city-state  where  one  regarded  it  a  real 
hard-ship  to  have  to  live  with  less  than  half  a  dozen  helots  at 
beck  and  call,  and  the  number  of  free  citizens,  Attic-born  and 
bred,  who  alone  enjoyed  the  right  of  suffrage,  was  a  startling 
minority,  democracy,  in  our  modern  sweeping  sense,  was  far 
from  regent.^  But  the  truth  is  that  to  support  even  this  narrow 
democracy,  w^hich  was  really  but  a  broad  aristocracy,  Athens 
needed  a  citizenry  with  brains.  That  she  happened  to  have 
it,  is  the  great  reason  why  the  era  was  golden,  Galton  declares*^ 
that  the  average  ability  of  the  Athenian  race  was  at  the  very 
lowest  estimate  two  grades  higher  than  our  own ;  and  this,  if 
so,  means  that  the  Hellenes  intellectually  surpassed  us  quite 
as  much  as  we  ourselves  out-step  the  African  negro  to-day. 
He  recalls  as  evidences  of  the  nimble  intelligence  and  keen 
aesthetic  sense  of  the  Attic,  the  elaborate  works  of  literature 
and  art  w^hich  were  presented  as  a  matter  of  course  by  their 
creatoi's  for  his  criticism  and  appreciation.   If  Athenian  morals 

5  The  Age  of  Pericles,  Vol.  II,  p.  97. 

6  Wilson  in  The  State,  p.  600,  mentions  the  difference  between  ancient 
and  modern  democracy,  (a)  The  former  was  immediate;  modern 
is  immediate,  or  representative,  (b)  In  the  former  the  officers  were 
the  State — unimpeachable,  and  accountable  only  after  their  term; 
in  the  latter,  all  officers  are  representative,  (c)  Ancient  democracy 
was  really  a  glorifiea  aristocracy;  in  modern,  citizenship  is  co-extensive 
with  population  and  suffrage  is  as  wide  as  qualified  citizenship.  (d^-In 
former,  the  individual  lived  for  the  State;  in  modern,  the  State  exists 
for  the  individual. 

7  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  342. 


ST.    THOMAS    POLITICAL   DOCTRINE   AND   DEMOCRACY  111 

measured  up  to  Athenian  minds,^  perchance  the  fate  of  the 
most  famous  of  ancient  democracies  would  have  been  less  swift 
and  tragic.  This  classic  example  is  of  much  modern  political 
importance. 

The  need  for  democracy  is  not  solely  rule  by  and  for  the 
people,  but  much  else  which  this  entails.  The  faculty  of  reason 
must  be  strong  and  active  in  the  people;  without  it  there  can 
be  no  genuine  autonomy.  Secondly,  a  sense  of  responsibility 
must  animate  the  populace ;  else  law  and  order  would  be  tossed 
to  death  on  the  crest  of  passion's  wave.  Thirdly,  there  must 
be  a  constant  increase  in  personal  intellectuality  and  powers 
of  determination,  for  knowledge  is  never  exhausted,  nor  is 
moral  judgment  ever  too  perfect.  The  field  for  advancement 
in  these  regards  is  vast.  And,  besides,  the  difference  between 
a  democracy  and  a  pure,  or  ideal,  democracy  admits  of  a 
myriad  degrees.  The  individual  must  be  awakened  as  never 
before,  his  mind  wide  open  to  the  day,  his  heart  strong,  his 
arm  ready;  otherwise  the  theor}^  of  self-government  were  fan- 
ciful. Democracy  means  the  rise  of  the  individual  to  a  kind 
of  kingship.  It  is  not  primarily  a  political  scheme  of  votes, 
privileges,  exemptions,  or  reforms;  but  rather  a  spiritual 
force  arousing  the  individual  to  self -consciousness,  apprecia- 
tion, ambition,  expression,  and  service  in  civil  society  and  state 
affairs.  It  does  not  equalize  men  in  the  concrete.  What  could 
do  that  but  a  dream,  and  who  but  a  dreamer?^  But  it  does 
make  them  equal  in  a  legal  sense,  and  does,  as  Tocqueville 
would  have  it,  equalize  opportunity.  Maumus  writes  that 
democracy  necessitates  an  application  to  the  social  order  of 
four  principles: 

1 —  The  equality  of  all  citizens  before  the  laws. 

2 —  The  possibility  of  all  citizens  attaining  civil  honor  and 
service  without  any  title  other  than  personal  merit. 

3 —  The  proportional  division  of  public  charges,  or  relative 
equality  in  the  matter  of  taxation. 

4 —  The  right  of  all  to  be  heard,  directly  or  through  repre- 


8  Cf.  Idem,  p.  343. 

9  (l)See  Hill's  Ethics,  p.  265.  Cf.  Montesquieu's,  L'esprit  des 
lois,  VIII,  2. 


IV      ST.    THO-MAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AXD  DEMOCRACY 

sentatives,  when  there  is  question  of  legislation  or  of  the  form 
of  govern ment.^° 

The  nature  of  these  principles  indicates  the  need  of  morality 
and  intelHgence  for  their  realization  in  civil  society.  Just 
laws  require  just  legislators.  The  offices  of  the  State  should 
be  open  only  to  the  competent;  and  if  they  are  to  be  open  to 
all,  all  must  be  competent.  Only  the  voice  of  truth  has  a 
right  to  be  heard  in  the  State;  and  if  all  voices  enjoy  such  a 
right,  all  should  be  ethical. 

Hence  democracy  seems  primarily  moral,  then  social,  and 
at  last  political.  It  must  first  arouse  the  individual  to  a  keen 
knowledge  and  sense  of  right  and  wrong,  and  a  robust  ap- 
preciation and  pursuit  of  right.  It  thus  renders  him  an  im- 
portant item  of  the  group-life  in  which  he  moves;  an  asset  to 
the  sum  and  quality  of  its  thought;  an  increase  to  its  power. 
The  greater  the  number  of  rightly  thinking  minds  and  rightly 
feeling  hearts  in  society,  the  greater  is  the  practicability  of 
a  popular  form  of  government.^^ 

And  so  a  defintion,  accrediting  all  this,  might  be:  Democ- 
racy is  the  state  of  a  people  who,  individually  qualified  by 
intellectual  and  moral  progress,  and  eager  for  further  advance- 
ment, rule  themselves  either  by  themselves,  or  through  their 
representatives.  A  corollary  would  be  that  such  a  people 
with  such  a  regime  enjoy  "the  maximum  of  self-expression 
with  the  minimum  of  restraint,"  or,  as  Pasteur  expresses  it, 
''the  true  democracy  is  that  which  permits  every  individual 
to  put  forth  his  maximum  strength. 

10  LVgrZise  et  la  drmocratie,  pp.  18-19. 

11  Cf.  Nelson— How  Christ  ivould  organize  the  world,  p.  23:  "Democ- 
racy is  an  ideal,  which  must  develop  and  exist  in  the  hearts  of  a 
people  before  it  can  become  an  established  principle  of  their  gov- 
ernment." 

12  Other  corollaries  could  be  drawn  also,  and  pass  for  definitions, 
such  as  Mr.  Gilette's  sociological  appreciation:  "I  shall  therefore 
proceed  to  define  democracy  as  the  right  of  the  masses  to  participate 
m  all  the  essential  satisfactions  of  life  and  of  their  future  right  to 
control  the  social  agencies  by  means  of  which  those  satisfactions  are 
d^istributed."— Publications  of  the  American  Sociological  Society,  Vol. 
XIV,  Art.  Dem,ocracy  and  Partisan  Politics,  p.  39;  and  Mr  Bailey's 
politico-psychological  concept:  "Democracy  is  a  state  of  society  It 
is  such  a  constitution  of  the  social  order  as  allows  each  member  to 
develop  his  personality  to  the  full  and  at  the  same  time  to  participate 
in  public  affairs  on  his  own  motion."— WTiai  is  Democracy^  p  35 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  v 


Thus  understood,  democracy  is  far  from  conflict  with 
Catholic  conceptions.  The  Church  has  never  forgotten  the 
practical  side  of  life  in  her  appreciation  of  the  spiritual  and 
ideal.  Through  her  fundamental  teaching,  ^'upon  which  in 
the  last  analysis",  a  writer  obsen  es,  '^all  advance  of  democracy 
must  be  based'V^  dignifies  each  man  as  the  image  of  his  Maker 
and  claims  for  all  men  the  same  purpose  of  existence,  she 
has  ever  recognized  that  there  is  a  wide  twilight  zone  of  human 
individual  differences  between  this  common  origin  and  end. 
She  has  consistently  hoped  and  allowed  for  racial  progress. 
She  has  never  committed  herself  to  a  policy  of  thrusting 
governments  into  the  control  of  multitudes  unprepared  to 
receive  them,  appreciating  that  the  people  must  be  guided 
until  such  time  as  they  are  capable  of  guiding  themselves; 
but  she  has  never  discountenanced  that  a  people,  individually 
or  collectively,  should  evolve  their  powers  to  the  fullest.  For 
to  deny  or  combat  this,  would  have  been  to  discount  her  very 
doctrine  that  men  must  tend  to  their  end  which  is  excellence 
itself — God.  And  so  we  find  her  wielding  her  influence  in 
medieval  and  modern  times  to  promote  the  advance  of  indi- 
vidual and  society,  warning  against  temerity  indeed,  but  in 
season  welcoming  any  theory  of  government  which  honestly 
precludes  peril  and  promises  success.^^  She  has  never  frowned 
on  democracy  as  such,  and  could  not.  Rather  she  has  ex- 
haled it-s  spirit  in  her  teaching  from  the  start :  so  much  so 
that  it  is  no  longer  considered  absurd  to  suggest  that  back  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  in  the  calm  of  the  cloisters,  long  before 
Protestant  monarchs  snapped  their  fingers  at  Rome,  and,  as 
some  writ-ers  say,  it  became  expedient  for  Catholic  scholar 
to  wither  royalty  in  order  to  water  the  Pope,  the  doctrine  of 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people  was  born. 

One  ought  not  forget  that  kings  did  not  rise  to  supreme 
power  in  Europe  until  the  Medieval  Era  had  almost  passed. 
In  the  period  of  the  Popes,  feudalism  was  tempered  by  the 


i3Chas.  B.  Macksey.  Sovereignty  and  Consent,  p.  1. 

14  In  his  encyclical,  Immortale  Dei.  Pope  Leo  XIII  asserts  that 
"the  right  to  rule  is  not  necessarily  bound  up  with  any  special  mode 
of  government,"  and  that  "it  may  take  this  or  that  form,  provided 
only  that  it  be  of  a  nature  to  ensure  the  general  welfare." 


vi       ST.    THOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AND  DEMOCRACY 

Muild  system.  The  people  were  in  process  of  formation  for 
self-government;  only  their  own  handicaps,  incidental  to  their 
late  emergence  from  barbarism,  delayed  the  inevitable  day  of 
their  return  to  their  civil  birth-right. 

But  theories  of  government,  contrariwise  to  Catholic,  came 
to  dim  the  prospect;  notwithstanding  that  the  Reformation 
is  wrested  by  some  of  its  fervent  admirers  to  explain  the 
l)irtii  of  modern  democracy.  The  Wittenburg  friar's  wanton 
injunction  to  princes  as  to  the  treatment  of  the  underlings — 
^'drive,  beat,  choke,  hang,  burn,  behead,  break  upon  the 
wheel"!-'^ — appears  to  express  a  pathological  hostility,  if  any- 
thing, to  the  democratic  ideal.  Calvin,  around  whom  swirled 
popular  blood  in  Geneva;  high-handed  Henry  and  equally 
autocratic  Elizabeth:  these  betray  little  regard  for  the  people 
and  less  interest  in  releasing  political  power  to  them.  Royal 
might,  in  the  sixteenth  century,  seized  on  the  ecclesiastical; 
and  under  this  unbridled  assumption  the  masses  seemed  more 
menaced  than  ever.^^  Stemmed  was  the  promising  tide  of 
civil  liberty,  and  weakened  was  the  hitherto  increasing  con- 
sciousness of  responsibility  which  animated  Christian  rulers. 


i-.Werke.  Erlangen  Ed.,  15(2),  276.  Quoted  by  Rahilly,  Studies, 
Art.    The  Catholic  Origin  of  Democracy,  Mar.,  1919,  p.  4. 

in  John  Neville  Figgis,  From  Gerson  to  Grotius.  p.  81:  "In  fact,  the 
religion  of  the  State  superseded  the  religion  of  the  Church.  Its  first 
form  was  the  Divine  Right  of  Kings.  Luther  and  Machiavelli  were 
two  of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  change."  The  extravagant 
mental  juggling  which  Figgis  indulges  to  justify  this  extreme  claim 
of  "divine  right"  by  kings  is  of  interest:  "The  only  way  to  escape 
from  the  fetters  imposed  by  traditional  methods  was  to  assert  from 
the  old  standpoint  of  a  Scriptural  basis  and  to  argue  by  the  accus- 
tomed fashion  of  Biblical  quotations,  that  politics  must  be  freed  from 
theology  and  that  the  Church  must  give  up  all  attempts  to  control 
the  State.  The  work  of  the  Reformation  was  to  set  men  free  in  all 
departments  of  thought  and  inquiry  from  subjection  to  a  single 
method  and  a  single  subject.  In  the  case  of  politics  the  achievement 
of  this  result  was  possible  only  through  claiming  at  first  theological 
sanction  for  the  non-theological  view  of  politics.  Only  when  the 
result  is  achieved  will  politics  be  free  to  develop  theories  which 

shall  be  purely  philosophical  or  historical  Politics  were  able 

to  enter  upon  their  modern  age,  only  because  the  theory  of  Divine 
Right  having  done  its  work  had  emancipated  them  from  medieval 
fetters  and  had  in  so  doing  become  obsolete  itself.''  The  passage  is  a 
classic  of  subterfuge,  and  abundantly  speaks  for  itself.  See  Figgis, 
The  Divine  Right  o'  Kings,  pp.  259-260.  Rahilly  disallows  any  ne- 
cessity of  seriously  refuting  "this  practical  joke  which  converts 
Henry  VIII  and  James  I  into  far-seeing  democrats." 


ST.    THOMAS     POLITICAL   DOCTRINE   AND   DEMOCRACY  VU 

To  minimize  Rome,  Protestantism  magnified  monarchs;  and 
the  disastrous  slogan  ''The  king  can  do  no  wrong"  rang  out 
the  death-knell  of  the  democratic  promise  and  possibility  of 
medieval  political  principles.  The  goodly  solidarity  which  a 
common  Faith,  doctrine,  and  spiritual  leadership  had  afforded 
Europe,  was  shattered.  A  synthetic  force  yielded  to  one  of 
disintegration.  Individualism  was  doubtless  thus  enhanced 
and  the  purpose  of  future  democracy  served ;  but  the  crowning 
glory  of  Medievalism,  ''individuality  through  communal  uni- 
ty'which  could  not  but  induce  a  most  desirable  type  of 
democracy,  had  vanished.  The  civil  power,  become  minotaur, 
had  devoured  all. 

Saurez,  as  also  his  twin  gladiator,  Bellarmine,  essayed  to 
slay  the  injurious  pretension  with  the  sword  of  Catholic  tradi- 
tion.Standing  in  the  morning  of  the  Modern  Age,  this 
celebrated  later  Scholastic,  in  the  spirit  and  tone  of  the  ecclesi- 
astical era,  indeed  in  the  very  voice  of  the  Angel  of  the 
Schools,  vindicates  the  rights  of  the  people  and  thus  preambles 
the  long  and  mighty  drama  of  popular  emancipation.  He 
maintains  that,  fundamentally  there  is  no  reason  why  one 
man  should  have  political  jurisdiction ;  also  that  the  subject 
of  political  power  is  not  the  individual,  nor  any  number  of 
individuals,  but  the  community. In  order  that  such  power 
might  pass  by  just  title  into  the  hands  of  one  man,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  people  consent.^^ 

Alfred  Rahilly  has  attested  the  heavy  debt  which  democracy 
owes  to  its  correct  and  courageous  exposition  by  the  doctrinal 
aggressor  of  King  James  and  able  representative  of  medieval 
political  theory.  He  sees  it  struggling  to  life  in  the  unrest 
and  aspirations  of  the  English  Whigs  and  Puritans  and  burst- 
ing into  rich  blossom  in  our  own  American  Declaration  of 
Independence,  whose  principles  of  natural  equality  and  pop- 


17  Cram,  The  Great  Thousand  Years,  p.  47. 

18  Figgis,  The  Divine  Right  of  Kings,  p.  104:  "Doleman,  Bellarmin 
and  Suarez  are  the  betes  noires  of  Anglican  divines.  Against  them 
as  the  preachers  of  resistance  and  inventors  (?)  of  the  theory  of 
original  compact,  the  heavy  artillery  of  the  royalist  pamphleteers 
is  always  directed." 

19  De  Legibus,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  Ill,  1. 

20  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  IV,  2. 


Viii  ST.    THOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AND  DEMOCRACY 

ular  consent,  intentionally  or  not,  are  unmistakably  Suare- 
zian.2i  And  the  doctrine  has  re-flowered  in  the  famed  and 
familiar  utterances  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  in  a  manner  to  fill 
the  race  with  enthusiasm. 

If  it  is  true  that,  tracing  back  the  rise  of  modern  democracy, 
we  at  length  find  ourselves  clasping  the  hand  of  a  Spanish 
Jesuit,  it  is  also  a  fact  that  the  latter  represents  the  writings  of 
one  Thomas  of  Aquin,  and  in  this  wise  links  the  modern 
period  with  medieval  political  doctrine.  Much  as  is  the  in- 
debtedness of  the  son  of  St.  Ignatius  to  the  son  of  St.  Dominic, 
however,  some  mild  protest  must  be  made  against  Dr.  William 
Dunning's  possibly  semi-facetious  assertion  that  'Svhere  Aquin- 
as is  unclear  or  incomplete,  it  is  Suarez's  aim  to  clarify  and 
supplement;  where  Aquinas  takes  an  untenable  position,  Su- 
arez  reverently  and  with  the  subtlest  distinction  and  discrimina- 
tions proves  that  the  master  must  have  meant  something  dif- 


i-'l  See  Art.   Suarez  and  Democracy.  Studies,  Vol.  VII,  No.  25,  Mar.  18. 

Equally  interesting,  too,  is  the  assertion  of  Mr.  Gaillard  Hunt,  of 
the  Library  of  Congress,  that  Thomas  Jefferson  was  a  borrower  of 
Bellarmine.  See  Catholic  Historical  Review,  Oct.  1917,  p.  286,  Art. 
"Virginia  Declaration  of  Rights  and  Cardinal  Bellarmine."  As  Rahil- 
ly  observes:  "Filmer's  Patriarcha  was  certainly  well  known — Jefferson's 
own  copy  of  it  still  exists  in  the  Library  of  Congress."  And  Sir 
Robert  Filmer  translates  and  quotes  a  particularly  popular  paragraph 
which  he  declares  to  comprise  "the  strength  of  all  that  he  had  ever 
read  or  heard  produced  for  the  natural  liberty  on  the  subject."  The 
paragraph  might  well  have  been  written  by  a  sincere  American  colon- 
ial sire.  It  is  certainly  a  pre-expression  of  the  patriotic  minds  of 
Mason  and  Jefferson.  See  Studies,  June,  1919,  Art.  The  Sources  of 
English  and  American  Democracy,  pp.  206-207.  Also  J.  A.  Ryan's 
Catholic  Doctrine  and  the  Right  of  8  elf -Government,  p.  13.  Filmer's 
quotation  from  Bellarmine  is  to  be  found  in  Ch.  I  of  his  Patriarcha, 
Henry  Moreley's  edition  of  Locke's  Two  Treatises,  p.  14.  Filmer  is  as 
alien  to  the  Cardinal,  as  America  had  to  be  to  Filmer.  He  finds  it 
convenient  to  spatter  ink  at  Rome  and  vents  the  now-tiresome  com- 
ment (p.  14):  "Late  writers  have  taken  up  too  much  upon  trust  from 
the  subtile  schoolmen,  who  to  be  sure  to  thrust  down  the  king  below 
the  pope,  thought  it  the  safest  course  to  advance  the  people  above  the 
king,  that  so  the  papal  power  might  take  the  place  of  the  regal. 
Thus  many  an  ignorant  subject  hath  been  fooled  into  this  faith,  that 
a  man  may  become  a  martyr  for  his  country  by  being  a  traitor  to 
his  prince;  whereas  the  new-coined  distinction  of  subjects  into  royal- 
ists and  patriots  is  most  unnatural  "    Filmer's  doctrine  would 

make  our  Revolution  look  like  a  sacrilege.  If  the  political  princi- 
ples which  yielded  the  world  its  greatest  example  of  representative 
democracy  be  Romanism,  then  there  is  naught  for  us  but  to  say,  with 
apologies  to  Patrick  Henry:  "If  this  be  Romanism,  make  the  most 
of  it!'" 


ST.    TilOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE   AND   DEMOCRACY  ix 

ferent  from  what  he  said.--  The  Jesuit  was  a  worthy  medi- 
um of  the  message  of  the  former.  Aquinas  hardly  took  posi- 
tions which  Suarez  found  ''untenable/'  and  among  his  pro- 
nounced merits  in  his  Treatise  on  Laws  are  clarity  and  com- 
pleteness. 

St.  Thomas  of  Aquin  came  into  the  world  of  thought  when 
Europe  was  in  a  critical  stage  of  transition  (1227-74).  Towns- 
folk were  then  seeing  their  rights  more  clearly  and  were 
wringing  recognition  from  feudalism  in  the  form  of  charters. 
Many  of  the  cities  glistened  as  tiny  gems  of  democracy.  Quick- 
ened by  their  industrial  associations,  which  in  some  particular 
cities  numbered  as  many  as  fifty,  the  masses  were  feeling 
their  muscles.  In  St.  Thomas'  own  Italy,  medieval  muni- 
cipalities enjoyed  particular  advancement.  The  Lombard 
League,  the  victory  of  Legnano,  and  the  Peace  of  Constans, 
are  brilliant  spots  in  the  history  of  the  principle  of  liberty  and 
self-det«rmination.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  independen- 
cies used  their  powers  against  each  other  in  a  series  of  midget, 
but  sanguinary,  wars.  It  was  in  this  clangor  of  petty  arms 
that  St.  Thomas  appeared  and  was  educated.  The  necessity 
of  toning  down  prevalent  politics  to  the  possibility  of  true 
liberty,  by  submitting  it  to  the  directive  influences  of  charity 
and  justice,  must  have  been  paramount  in  the  thought  of 
the  scholar.  The  situation  in  our  Saint's  day  was  similar  to 
that  which  now  confronts  the  world.  The  solutions  which  he 
presents  in  his  political  theories  perhaps  have  some  of  the 
same  pertinence  to  the  present  as  to  the  medieval  past. 

He  saw  democracies  rise  and  ride  to  ruin.  He  studied 
the  reasons:  ignorance  and  dearth  of  moral  restraint.  He  be- 
held tyranny  grasp  when  and  where  the  popular  grip  weak- 
ened— Hellas  repeating  itself!  He  travelled  in  Germany  and 
France,  with  little  political  detail,  we  may  well  imagine,  es- 
caping his  eye.  Over  and  above  the  vivid  obser\'ations  of  his 
own  intense  life-time,  he  could  and  did  advert  to  the  political 
knowledge  of  his  predecessors.  Just  as  Azpilcueta,  Molina, 
Lessius,  Bannez,  and  Suarez  would  lat^r  draw  on  his  mind,  so 


22  William  A.  Dunning,  A  History  of  Political  Theories,  from  Luther 
to  Montesquieu,  p.  136. 


X        ST.    THOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AND  DEMOCRACY 

(lid  lie  supplement  his  own  intellectual  treasury  with  the 
riches  of  preceding  centuries.  He  indeed  fills  his  lamp  with 
the  oil  of  the  past;  but  it  glows,  by  his  own  genius,  with 
principles  which  serve  for  the  whole  future.  He  joins  the 
Medieval  with  the  Ancient.  He  takes  the  thought  of  paganism 
and  burnishes  it  with  Christianity.  Filtering  through  the 
mind  of  Aquinas,  Aristotelian  notions  are  separated  from 
their  coarser  elements. 

Especially  valuable  is  his  teaching,  in  that  it  not  only  holds 
aloft  ideals  for  the  guidance  and  perfection  of  the  State,  but 
also  prescribes  practical  remedies  for  its  sores;  thus  winning 
a  place  above  the  purely  abstract  systems  which  Figgis  would 
call  ''the  besetting  sins  of  politics  from  Dante  to  Karl  Marx." 

In  our  study  of  the  political  mission  and  message  of 
the  Angelic  Doctor,  we  shall,  of  course,  have  much  recourse 
to  his  De  Regimine  Principum.  There  is  well-founded  sus- 
picion that  this  work  is  spurious  from  the  middle  of  the 
second  book  to  the  end ;  but  the  probability  is  that  the  treatise 
was  finished  by  a  hand  and  mind  skilled  and  sympathetic 
in  the  discipline  of  Aquinas.  Likely  the  Doctor  himself  left 
material  which  Tolomaeus  of  Lucca,  his  disciple,  arranged 
and  amplified.23 

The  aurora  of  political  enlightenment,  which  is  the  Com- 
mentary on  the  Politics  of  Aristotle,  surely  need  not  be  re- 
nounced as  unrepresentative  of  Thomistic  thought.  It  is  not 
all  the  personal  effort  of  the  Saint,  for  Tolomaeus  himself 
says  so,  and  Peter  of  Auvergne  is  mentioned  as  concluding 


23Crahay,  La  politique  de  saint  Thomas  d'Aquin.  Introduc,  p.  XXIII: 
"plusieurs  manuscrits  tres  importants  portent — ils,  apres  le  4-e  chapi- 
tre  du  Il-e  livre,  des  annotations  analogues  a  celle-ci:  Qui  finisce 
secondo  il  beato  Tommaso  d' Aquino,  poscia  compiuto  da  Fra  Tolomaeo 

da  Lucca  (Mss.  du  pape  Alexandre  VII)."    See  Jouradin,  t.  I., 

Philosophie  de  S.  Thomas,  pp.  146-7: 

"II  resulte,  en  somme,  de  I'ensemble  des  investigations  auxquelles 
on  s'est  livre: 

1* — que  saint  Thomas  n'avait  conduit  le  traite  du  Gouvernement 
des  Princes,  que  jusque  vers  le  milieu  du  seconde  livre; 

2* — que  I'ouvrage  fut  ensuite  continue  selon  toute  apparence,  des 
materiaux  laisses  par  I'auteur  " 

See  Mandonnet's  catalogue  of  the  works  of  St.  Thomas,  according  to 
the  Vatican  manuFcript,  lat.  3847:  Les  ccrits  authentiques  de  saint 
Thomas  d'Aquin,  Revue  Thomiste,  1909,  III,  p.  268. 

See  Zeiller,  LHdce  de  Vetat  dans  saint  Thomas  d'Aquin,  pp.  5-11. 


ST.    TPIOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE    AND    DEMOCRACY  xi 


the  enterprise.2^  But  it  is  all  in  the  Master's  vein.^s  And  the 
fact  that  it  mirrors  the  mind  of  the  Philosopher,  is  no  proof 
that  it  does  not  reflect,  at  least  moderately,  the  thought  and 
sentiment  of  Saint  Thomas  himself.  Although  the  latter 
very  probably  failed  to  be  as  perfendd  as  an  Averroes,^^  who 
reverenced  i^ristotle's  doctrine  as  supreme  truth  and  his  intel- 
lect as  the  human  pinnacle,  he  must  have  succumbed  to  the  spell 
which  filled  the  thirteenth  century\  In  politics,  the  greatest 
of  the  Greeks  was  preeminence  itself.  It  was  he  who  endowed 
the  study  with  the  character  of  an  independent  science,  by 
distinguishing  it  from  ethics.  His  investigations  covered  prac- 
tically all  the  Hellenic  and  barbarian  systems  of  government.^ 
Aquinas  would  have  been  less  great,  had  he  been  blind  to  a 
greater.  The  strong  indication  is  that,  save  in  notes  decidedly 
dissonant  with  Christianity,  our  Saint  is  very  much  in  har- 
mony with  the  "Philosopher."  We  may  believe  with  Bau- 
raann^^  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  would  have  hesitat-ed  to  com- 
ment the  Politics,  if  he  could  not  quite  commend  it.  He  was 
seriously  making  it,  through  his  commentary,  mental  pabu- 
lum for  his  age.  The  proof  of  his  approval  and  appropriation 
of  its  lessons  is  his  frequent  references  to  them  throughout  his 
Summa.  As  for  his  De  Regimine,  it  is  largely  a  reflex  of  the 
more  sterling  principles  of  the  Politics.  But  we  should  be 
warned  by  the  cautious  opinion  of  such  as  Antoniades  and 
Jourdain^  not  to  identify  the  Saint  with  the  Stagirite,  and 


24  Jourdain,  Philosophie  de  S.  Thomas,  1,  p.  88. 

25  Crahay  writes:  "L'on  peut  conjecter  toutefois  que  le  continua- 
teur  a  termine  I'ouvrage  d'apres  des  notes  laissees  par  saint  Thomas, 
et  par  consequent,  il  n'est  peut-etre  par  interdit  d'utiliser  les  quar- 
tre  livres,  dans  une  mesure  restreinte."    Op.  cit.,  introduc,  p.  XVIII. 

26  Cf.  Com.  de  Coelo  et  Mundo,  Lib.  I,  lec.  22. 

27  Cf.  Dunning,  Political  Theories,  Ancient  and  Modern,  p.  50. 

28  Baumann,  Die  Staatslehre  des  h.  Thomas  von  Aquino,  p.  103:  "Wo 
daher  Thomas  mit  Aristoteles  nicht  stimmt,  und  es  gab  solche  Punkte 
namenlich  in  der  Religion,  da  sagt  er  es  ausdriicklich." 

Ibidem:  "Das  Mittelalter  eignete  sich  den  stgiriten  an,  in  dem  es 
ihn  erklarte." 

29  Antoniades,  De  Staatslehre  des  Thomas  ah  Aquino,  p.  3:  "Allein 
das  Bild,  welches  uns  in  dem  thomistichen  Commentar  zu  Aristoteles' 
Politik  entgegentritt,  reprasentirt  nicht  die  thomistiche  Lehre." 

Jourdain,  Philosophie  de  S.  Thomas,  p.  84:  "Telle  est  cependant  la 
reserve  de  saint  Thomas  qu'il  se  contente  d'analyser  le  texte  d'Aris- 
tote  sans  se  permettre  ni  une  critique,  ni  une  approbation  motivee, 
ni  meme  un  developpement  de  quelque  etendue." 


ST.    THOMAS'    POLITICAL    DOCTRINE   AND  DEMOCRACY 


always  to  remember  the  narrow  but  deep  Christian  chasm 
between  their  mentaHties.  Anent  the  legitimacy  of  accredit- 
ing Aquinas  with  thoughts  which  are  expressly  the  Philoso- 
pher's, it  is  well  to  recall  that  the  doctrine  which  the  world 
freely  attributes  to  Plato  is,  on  the  Broad-Browed's  own  testi- 
mony, Socrates' ;  and  St.  Thomas  is  to  Aristotle  w^hat  Plato  was 
to  Socrates.  As  for  the  unauthentic  four  books,  we  shall  use 
them  in  the  "restrained  measure"  w^hich  Crahay  deems  per- 
missible, since  they  were  possibly  composed  from  the  Doctor's 
notes  and  are  the  work  of  one  w^hom  Tolomaeus  calls  his  most 
faithful  disciple.30 

The  tract  de  Legihu^^  in  the  Siimma  will  be  of  much  im- 
port^mce  to  our  purpose. 

Here  and  there  in  the  other  w^orks  of  the  Angelic  Doctor, 
teachings  of  political  value  flash.  These  too  shall  be  duly 
noted  and  utilized. 

The  trend  of  democratic  thought  will  be  traced.  Much  that 
the  modern  mind  might,  at  first  blush,  find  repugnant  to 
popular  favor,  may  be  indicated  in  the  pages  of  the  Master. 
A  closer  scrutiny,  however,  will  invariably  reveal  that  it  is 
really  the  distortions  and  misconceptions  of  democracy,  and 
not  the  principle  itself,  which  are  disrelished  and  criticized. 
In  this,  Aquinas  but  accords  wdth  the  best  thought  of  all 
time.  Plato  could  see  no  wisdom  in  having  uninstructed 
masses  rule.^^  Aristotle  placed  democracy  in  his  list  of  the 
corrupt  forms  of  government  but  by  it  he  understands  the 
abuse  of  popular  rule,  and  not  popular  rule  itself.  The  latter 
idea  he  calls  Polity  (politeia)  and,  quotes  it  with  approval. 
Cicero,  w^hile  admitting  the  merits  of  democracy,  was  wide-eyed 
to  its  dangers.34  Dante  thought  it  shameless;  Mill,  impracti- 
cable; and  Rousseau  believed  that,  in  its  purity,  it  w^as  fit  for 


30  Hist.  Eccles..  Lib.  XXIII,  c.  XI:  "Sed  hos  libros  complevit  magister 
Petrus  de  Alvernia  fidelissimus  discipulus  ejus."  Quoted  by  Jour- 
dain,  op.  cit.  p.  88.    See  also  Turner's  History  of  Philosophy,  p.  382. 

31  la,  2ae,  qu.  XC— CVIII. 

32  Rep.,  V,  473. 

33  Politics,  III,  7.  St.  Thomas  (De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  I)  himself  fol- 
cratia'  nuncupatur. " 

34  De  Republica,  I,  29. 

lowing  Aristotle,  says:  "Si  vero  iniquum  regimen  per  multos,  'Demo- 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  xiii 

gods  and  not  for  men.'^'*  Aquinas  manages  to  avoid  all  heat 
and  to  present  a  cool  opinion.  And  who,  considering  certain 
countries  of  the  world  today,  more  aroused  by  democracy 
than  ready  for  it,  convulsed  in  problems  of  their  own  creation, 
grappling  desolation  to  their  souls  and  deluding  themselves 
that  it  is  self-determination,  would  judge  the  prudence  of  the 
Angel  of  the  Schools  as  prejudice? 

Still  the  amount  and  merit  of  the  democracy  to  be  found 
in  his  doctrine  are  remarkable.  Then  again,  they  are  not; 
for  the  very  rule  under  which  he  lived  gave  his  mmd  a  certain 
democratic  turn.  ''It  is  a  fact  beyond  all  doubt  and  beyond 
all  question,"  obsen-es  M.  F.  Morris,  ''that  the  first  distinct 
and  positive  illustration  of  constitutional  government  is  to  be 
found  in  the  monastic  orders.  The  very  word  Constitution 
in  the  technical  sense  in  which  we  now  use  it,  was  iirst  em- 
ployed by  them,  and  Constitutionalism  in  government  may 
in  fact  be  said  to  have  originated  with  them.  The  Constitu- 
tutions  of  Saint  Anthony,  and  Saint  Augustine,  and  Saint 
Francis  of  Assisi,  and  Saint  Dominic,  and  subsequently  the 
Constitution  of  St.  Ignatius  of  Loyola,  Saint  Francis  de  Sales, 
and  others  were  the  first  schemes  on  record  of  strictly  con- 
stitutional government. ''-^^  Sifted,  this  sentence  still  shows 
much  truth.  And  the  government  of  the  Dominican  Order, 
of  which  Aquinas  is  the  great  luminary,  was  a  model  of  the 
representative  democracy  which,  we  shall  see,  met  his  favor 
for  the  State  and  has  been  adopted  by  the  progressive  modern 
age.  The  Order  was  governed  by  a  master-general;  the  prov- 
ince by  a  provincial  prior ;  the  convent,  by  a  conventual  prior. 
The  last  was  elected  by  the  friars  of  the  convent :  the  provin- 
cial prior,  by  a  provincial  chapter  composed  of  the  conventual 
priors  and  tivo  friars  from  each  convent  elected  hy  a  full  meet- 
ing of  all  the  friurs  of  the  convent;  the  master-general,  by  a 
general  chapter  composed  of  the  provincial  priors  and  two 
friars  from  each  province  elected  by  the  provincial  chapter.-^' 
AVhen  in  subsequent  pages  we  find  St.  Thomas  claiming  for 
all  the  citizens  in  the  State  some  share  in  the  government. 


35  Cf,  Irish  Ecclesiastical  Record,  Jan.,  1921.  p.  77. 

History  of  the  Developvient  of  Constitutional  and  Civil  Liherty, 
p.  57. 


xiv    ST.    THOMAS'    POLITICAL   DOCTRINE   AND  DEMOCRACY 

and  giving  for  his  reason  that  such  a  polity  is  better  loved,  and 
hence  better  served,^  we  suspect  that  his  devotion  to  the  Order 
of  his  choice  is  not  altogether  silent.  In  fact,  we  shall  find 
througliout  his  doctrine  that  his  church-relations  in  nowise 
prevent,  but  rather  promote,  the  popular  tendencies; 
we  shall  understand  with  Mandonnet  w^hy  post- Reformation 
absolutistism  could  show  ^'little  sympathy  for  the  democratic 
constitution  of  the  Preachers." 


37  Barker,  The  Dominican  Order  and  Convocation,  pp  14-15 

1919^  pp  io^f"  ^^'^  ^""^^^^^^^  Origin  of  Democracy,  Studies,  March, 

Cf.  H.  O.  Taylor,  The  Medieval  Mind.  1,  361-3 

38  la,  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  1 


CHAPTER  I 

ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SOCIETY  AND  STATE 

Deep  in  man's  nature,  St.  Thomas  seeks  and  finds  the  seed  of 
society .^^  The  first  chapter  of  his  De  Regimine  Principum  is 
a  page  of  Social  Psychology  in  which  the  earnest  servdtors  of  a 
science  which  we  are  inclined  to  fondle  as  the  child  of  the  par- 
ticular genius  of  our  own  day,  would  find  much  interest. 

It  is  characteristic  of  Aquinas  that  he  should  gaze  beyond  the 
external  circumstances  which  assuredly  occasioned  and  accelera- 
ted the  rise  of  particular  societies.  He  does  not  obtrude  on  the 
field  of  the  historian,  but  focusses  on  the  fundamental  causes, 
human  and  divine,  of  society  as  such. 

He  regards  society  as  a  union  of  many  individuals  in  the 
pursuit  of  a  common  end.^^  Civil  society,  or  the  State,  is  a  more 
specialized  form  in  which  men  by  means  of  law  and  order  seek 
a  degree  of  temporal  happiness  w^hich  would  be  unattainable 
by  individual  effort.^^ 

CAUSES  OF  SOCIETY 
1. — The  Philosophical  Explanation 

St.  Thomas  discerns  three  causes  as  operative  in  the  origin  of 
society.    First,  the  big  individual  and  human  motive."*-  For 


39  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1:  "Naturale  autem  est  homini  ut  sit  animal 
sociale  et  politicum,  in  multitudine  vivens,  magis  etiam  quam  alia 
animalia." 

40  Schwalm,  Lecons  de  philosopMe  sociale,  t.  I,  p.  2. 

41  Com.  Evang.  Matt.,  c.  XII. 

42  And  as  a  writer  critizing  William  McDougall's  latest  book,  The 
Group  Mind  (New  York,  G.  P.  Putman's  Sons,  1920),  remarks:  "one 
can  safely  assert  that  no  collective  psychology  will  go  far  or  go  deep 
which  starts  from  the  group  as  a  whole  rather  than  from  the  disposi- 
tion individuals  to  form  groups."  Walter  Lippman,  in  the  Neiv  Repub- 
lic, Vol  XXV,  No.  315,  p.  86. 


2         ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


the  individual,  isolation  would  have  meant  limitation.  Wants 
would  have  been  stan-ed ;  growth,  stunted;  existence  itself,  prob- 
lematic. Man  is  endowed  with  instincts  and  reason :  both  must 
have  combined  to  articulate  his  interests  with  those  of  his  fellow- 
men  ;  the  latter  convincing,  the  former  compelling.  His  instinct 
for  self-presen-ation  was  stronger  than  his  means.  Brutes  with 
their  natural  equipment  were  fitter  for  the  vital  contest.*-^  Too, 
they  knew  by  nature  the  dangerous  and  the  safe,  while  man's 
enlightenment  was  empirical  and,  if  he  remained  apart  from  his 
fellows,  it  could  have  been,  at  most,  meagre."^  More  markedly 
than  the  lesser  animals  had  man  a  disposition  to  communication 
and  self-revelation,  of  which  his  gift  of  speech  gives  evidence. 

His  mental  power  must  have  enabled  him  to  find  the  way  of 
satisfying  the  urge  into  which  his  instincts  merged.  By  vers- 
means  of  his  reason  he  must  have  seen  that  reason  was  a  liability 
as  well  as  an  asset,  a  hindrance  as  well  as  a  help :  for,  while 
inferior  animals  without  it  fared  well,  he,  with  it  and  on  account 
of  it,  was  thrown  on  his  own  resources.  It  was  a  light,  in  which 
he  percieved  his  weakness  and  wonderful  possibilities  of  strength. 
It  discovered  to  him  that  he  could  not  achieve  a  sufficient 
amount  of  knowledge  alone  and  that  he  required  the  comple- 
ment of  other  intelligences  and  experiences.^"^ 

Still  more  elemental,  however,  than  reason  and  the  tenden- 
cies mentioned,  as  causes  of  society,  was,  in  all  probalnlity, 
man's  paternal  instinct.  It  gave  rise  to  the  family,  which,  as 
we  shall  later  see,  St.  Thomas  esteemed  the  unit  of  society.  It 
doubled  the  individual's  interests  and  problems.  It  brought 
him  into  intimate  relation  with  a  fellow  creature.  In  a  word, 
it  ser\^ed  to  waken  his  other  instincts  and  his  reason ;  for  it  in- 
spired a  sense  of  responsibility  and  power.^*^ 

Thus  it  would  seem  that  St.  Thomas  chiefly  attributes  society 
to  the  instinct;  and  the  higher  form  of  society  called  the  State 


43  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

44  Ibidem. 

45  Cow.  Eth.,  Lib.  II,  Lec.  1;  Summa  TJieoH.  2a  2ae,  qu  LII  a  1  ad  1- 
Contra  Impug.  Relig.,  Cap.  Ill;  De  Verit..  qu.  II,  a.  1.  Aquinas  speaks 
also  of  intelligent  foresight— Com.  Perih..  Lib  I  lec  '> 

4«  Com.  Pout  Lib.  I.,  lec.  2;  Com.  Eth..  Lib.  VIII,  lec.  12.  Cf.  Cicero's 
De  Ojg^ciis,  I,  17. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


8 


to  reason.4^  To  the  former,  the  origin ;  to  the  latter,  the  evohi- 
tion. 

Such  conchisions  in  Aquinas'  doctrine  are  not  too  broad  nor 
abrupt ;  for  his  premises,  though  brief,  are  pithy.  In  them  are 
to  be  found  a  serious  investigation  and  appreciation  of  phycho- 
logical  values.  He  sees  not  only  the  positive  in  man,  but  the 
negative  as  well ;  not  merely  qualities,  but  likewise  the  require- 
ments which  qualities  create.  He  considei^  man  not  only  as 
struggling  for  existence,  but  also  for  the  perfection  of  existence."*^ 
He  finds  him  both  fitted  for  social  life  and,  in  a  manner,  forced 
by  his  very  fitness  into  it.  The  advantages  of  such  a  state  of  exist- 
ence are  magnetic.  Human  thoughts  are  increased  by  being 
shared ;  hearts  are  eased  by  being  emptied  into  each  other.^^  In- 
teriorly and  exteriorly,  a  man's  nature  finds  invitation  and  stim- 
ulation to  association.  He  cannot  but  be  in  relation  to  others. 
No  life  is  lived  to  itself .'^^ 

Society  is  so  natural*"*^  that,  even  had  original  sin  never 
obtained,  and  the  primal  state  of  innocence  and  perfection  re- 
mained, man  still  would  have  been  social.-^-  Such  an  authority 
as  Bluntschli  deludes  himself  that  Catholic  theologians  regard 
the  State  as  a  consequence  of  man's  fall  from  grace."'*'^  For 
Aquinas  clearly  expresses  the  opposite  view ;  as  do  also  the  great 
thinkers  of  the  sixteenth  century,  Suarez"*^  and  Bellarmine.^^ 
St.  Augustine  saw  sin  as  causal  in  civil  society.-''^'  Gregory  XII 
was  certainly  of  this  sombre  conception. John  of  Salisbury, 
too,  could  be  cited  as  a  scintillant  predecessor  of  St.  Thomas, 


47  We  are  not  adopting  Hegel's  distinction  between  State  and  Civil 
Society,  by  which  he  views  the  former  as  a  complete  organic  unity  in 
which  individuals  as  such  do  not  exist,  and  the  latter  as  the  relative 
totality  of  individuals.  There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  notion  akin  to 
this  in  the  politics  of  St.  Thomas.  We  feel  justified  in  using  the  words 
"state"  and  "civil  society"  interchangeably. 

48  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 

49  Com.  Eth.,  Lib.  IX. 

no  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  130. 

Antoniades,  Die  Staatslehre  des  Thomas  ah  Aquino,  p.  13 
•■>2  Summa  TheoL,  la.  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4. 
53  Vareilles — Sommieres,  principes  fondamentaux,  p.  67. 
^De  Opere  Sex  Dier.,  Lib.  V,  cap.  7. 
5")  De  Laicis,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  6. 

56  De  Civitate  Dei,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  5;  Lib.  XV,  cap.  1;  Lib.  XIX,  cap.  15. 

57  Lib.  VIII,  ep.  21,  Migne,  Tome  148. 


4  ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


who  held  the  State  a  necesary  evil  rather  than  a  necessary  good.^s 
But  Aquinas  luis  the  courage  to  wave  aside  such  authority  and 
to  express  the  opinion  which,  despite  Dante,  has  since  remained 
common  in  Catholic  thought. 

From  his  psychological  exposition  of  the  birth  of  society,  we 
j)iiss  to  St.  Thomas'  teleological  explanation.  In  the  former 
he  applied  the  great  Aristotelian  principles  of  Potency  of  Act  to 
a  concept  of  social  genesis ;  seeing  man  endowed  with  powers  and 
inbued  with  needs  which  could  find  expresion  and  gratification 
only  in  intercourse  with  other  mortals.  Now  he  uses  the 
Philosopher's  principle  of  Finality,  and,  through  it,  beholds 
a  mightier  urge  than  the  personal,  at  work  to  effect  and  affect 
not  only  the  rise  of  society  but  also  its  course.  It  is  plain  that 
man  must  have  had  a  purpose  in  forming  and  entering  society. 
His  reason  demanded  this.^  But  his  object  was  not  exclusively 
the  naked  necessities  of  life.  A  whole  chapter  in  the  Commen- 
tary of  Thomas  on  Aristotle's  Politics  convincingly  teaches  that 
civil  society  is  formed  not  so  much  out  of  the  lower  needs  of  na- 
ture as  for  the  attainment  of  the  higher.^^  And  he  adverts  to 
God  as  the  ultimate  beginning  and  end  of  man.  He  teaches  that 
the  rational  creature  is  subject  to  the  Providence  of  the  Deity  in 
a  most  excellent  way :  being  a  partaker  of  Providence  by  being 
provident  both  for  himself  and  others.^^  Having  a  natural  in- 
clination to  his  proper  act  and  end,  man  has  a  share  in  the  Eter- 
nal Reason. Thus  human  reason  is  a  reflection  of  the  divine, 
as  is  also  human  providence.  And  civil  society,  growing  out 
of  both,  is  heavenly-human  in  origin.  St.  Thomas  offei*s  no 
deistic  concept  of  the  world.  He  sees  God  brooding  over  his 
creation,  operating  on  and  in  it,  seeking  His  human  ones  and 
desiring  to  be  sought  by  them,  inviting  and  urging  them  to 
Himself,  the  Supreme  Good.  God  is  good  ''per  essentiam"; 
but  all  else  is  good  only  ''per  participationem."    Nothing  is 


Polycraticus  Lib.  VIII,  cap.  17. 
•'•9  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 
fio  Ibidem. 

61  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  7. 

62  Summa  TheoK  1  a.  2ae,  qu.  XCI  a.  2. 
Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  5 

good  save  in  so  far  as  it  possesses  some  semblance  to  the  divine 
goodness.    God  is  the  '^good  of  all  good."^ 

From  these  principles  it  is  clear  that  man  could  never  have 
remained  indifferent  to  his  human  en\dronment,  without  re- 
maining indifferent  to  his  God,  Who  is  reflected  in  His  crea- 
tures..^ With  a  common  Author,  a  common  Master,  and,  most 
significantly,  a  common  Destiny,  mankind  could  not  but  have 
felt  and  appreciated,  from  the  start,  an  impulse  to  union.  The 
paternity  of  the  Divinty  implies  the  fraternity  of  humanity.^^ 

True,  St.  Thomas  is  no  ontologist  nor  traditionalist.  He 
teaches  plainly  that  the  concept  of  God  is  neither  innate  nor 
primary,  but  that  it  is  acquired  through  creatures.^"^  But  when 
it  is  attained,  surely,  in  its  light,  one  can  understand  much 
which  would  have  remained  mysterious.  Whether  the  first 
founders  of  society  realized  it  or  not,  God  was  working  in  and 
through  them,  that  mankind  might  work  for  and  to  Him.^^ 
Man's  body  may  be  content  with  lower  gratifications,  but  his 
spirit  craves  higher  objects  and  relations,  and  these  lead  on  to 
the  Supreme  Good.. 

In  this,  his  teleological  view,  St.  Thomas  could  not  have  pene- 
trated more  deeply  into  the  origin  of  society.  His  psychologi- 
cal explanation  brought  us  into  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  in- 
dividual ;  this  second  elucidation  carries  us  beyond  to  the  Being 
Who  is  the  Alpha  and  Omega  of  the  individual's  existence  and 
Who  implanted  in  humanhood  both  reason  and  instinct.  With 
Creator  and  creatures  clearly  in  mind,  Aquinas  sees  two  sets 
of  relations ;  those  of  men  to  God,  and  those  of  men  to  men.^^ 
The  means  by  which  God's  human  creatures  should  and  do 
perpetuate,  if  not  originate,  a  union  are  no  less  ethical  than 
psychological.  If  God  is  fii^t  and  last,  and  men  come  from 
and  must  return  to  Him,  mankind  constitutes  a  vast  brother- 
hood under  the  Divine  Plan.'^o    The  inter-relations  which  such 


64  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  I,  cap.  40. 

65  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  19. 

66  Summa  Theol.,  2a,  2ae,  qu.  CLXXXVIII,  a.  VIII,  ad.  5.  Here  is  the 
best  basis  for  that  international  understanding  which  Wells  seeks  in 
his  The  Outline  of  History.    He  gives  Kant  credit;  why  not  Aquinas? 

67  Summa  Theol.,  la,  qu.  LXXXVIII,  a.  3. 

68  Idem,  1  a,  qu.  XII,  a.  12;  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill,  cap  19. 

69  Com.  Eth.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1. 

70  Summa  Theol.,  la,  2ae,  qu.  XCI,  a.  1. 


6 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


11  condition  entails  suggest  the  ethical  foundation  of  society 

St.  Thomas  is  not  content  with  teaching  the  mere  social  good 
which  association  affords.  If  this  were  the  main  cause  of  con- 
gregation, it  is  conceivable  that  civil  society  might  not  have 
arisen ;  for  primitive  men  in  Rousseau-manner  might  have  pre- 
ferred to  tend  to  individualism.  But  Aquinas,  in  his  ethical 
explanation,  says  that  men  must  come  together,  for  they  have 
duties  towards  their  Maker  and  each  other.  To  accomplish  the 
former,  they  require  mutual  aid,  intellectual  and  moral.'^  Their 
mutual  obligations,  namely,  charity  and  justice,  are  facilitated 
by  inclinations. 

It  is  natural  for  them  to  love  the  Source  of  their  blessings'-^ 
and  all  that  suggest  it.  An  elementary  conscience  directs  them 
that  they  must  not  use  badly  what  is  good.'*  Thus  the  love  of 
neighbor  and  justice  toward  him  are  sufficiently  primary  forces 
to  shed  light  on  the  question  of  social  origin.  They  involved 
relations  which  required  association.  And  so  we  find  Aquinas 
observing  that  individuals  are  united  in  society  by  love  and  that 
the  true  nature  of  the  bond  among  the  members  of  a  community 
is  virtue.'' 5  Love  is  a  general  virtue  which  proposes  and  promotes 
the  others.'^  The  others,  without  it,  are  ineffectual.'^'  It  en- 
sures justice.  It  is  at  once  a  bond  and  corner-stone  of  civil 
society;  and  the  indication  is  that  it  must  have  been  one  of  the 
strongest  factors  in  the  origin  thereof. 


71  De  Reg.,  Lib.  1,  cap.  14. 

~2  Contra  Gen.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  128.  To  be  able  to  do  without  the  in- 
estimable aid  of  his  fellow-creatures,  man  would  have  to  be  a  beast — or 
a  God.  (See  Com.  on  Aristotle's  Politics,  Lib.  I,  lec  1.)  It  is  only  the 
genuine  exception  among  mortals  who  can  live  apart  from  the  multi- 
tude, neither  asking  nor  receiving.  As  such,  St.  Thomas  cites  John 
the  Baptist  and  Anthony  the  Anchorite.  {Com.  Polit.  Lib.  I,  lec.  1.) 
But  he  evidently  appreciates  that  only  the  average  individual  is  to  be 
regarded  in  a  theory  of  society.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1:  "et  sic 
homini  auxiliatur  multitudo  civilis — non  solum  quantum  ad  corporalia 
— sed  etam  quantum  ad  moralia — ." 

7"5  Siimma  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIV,  a.  2. 

'i^  Contra  Gen.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  128. 
De  Caritate,  qu.  I,  a.  1. 

76  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  6. 

n  Contra  Gen.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  130. 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 


7 


2. — The  Actual  Rise  of  Society 

So  far  we  have  considered  the  philosophical  explanation  of 
society  and  the  State,  according  to  St.  Thomas.  We  have  seen 
the  psychological,  teleological,  and  ethical  basis  of  his  teaching. 
We  must  next  attend  to  his  account  of  the  actual  appearance  of 
the  phenomenon  of  civil  society. 

There  is  some  controversy  as  to  whether  man's  nature  or  his 
consent  was  the  primar\^  cause  in  the  orientation  of  the  State. 
St.  Thomas  recognizes  the  element  of  consent.'^^  And  we  have 
already  seen  how  essentially  suited  to  society  he  considered 
manJ^  We,  therefore,  conclude  that  he  believed  man's  nature 
to  have  urged  him  into  civil  life  and  consent  followed. 

In  primitive  society  agreement  came  as  a  matter  of  coui*se. 
Man  was  born  into  domestic  relations,  and  his  nature  took  as 
smoothly  to  association  with  his  kind  as  a  swan  to  a  pond.^^ 

But  doubtless  volition  figured  more  vitally  in  the  rise  of  civil 
society ;  for  here  a  question  of  sacrifice  was  involved.  The  in- 
dividual was  to  invest  himself  in  a  communiity ;  the  procedure 
would  at  once  limit  and  enlarge,  restrain  and  enrich  him  ask 
much  but  give  more.  Thought  was  required.  Reason  lit  the 
way,  and  will  followed.  Here  volition  may  have  been  more  or 
less  explicit.^-  St.  Thomas  is  not  categorical  on  the  question ; 
for  so  natural  is  it  for  man  to  live  in  society,  that  deliberation  in 


78  See  Costa-Rosetti,  Philosophia  Moralis,  p.  579.  Too,  the  Angelic 
Doctor  implies  consent  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  first  book  of  his  De 
Regimine.  St.  Augustine  teaches  the  origin  of  civil  society  by  consent: 
"generale  quippe  pactum  est  societatis  humanae  oboedire  regibus 
suis — ;"  Confessionum,  Lib.  Ill,  8.  Also  in  Ep.  138,  and  in  De  Civ.  Dei. 
Lib.  XIX,  21,  and  Lib.  IV,  4.  Thus  St.  Thomas  continues  the  doctrine 
of  his  great  predecessor.  And  Suarez  (De  Op.  Sex.  Die?-.,  Lib.  V,  7) 
continues  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas. 

79  Cf.  Lactantius,  Divin.  Instit.,  Lib.  VI,  cap  10. 

80  This  follows  from  the  doctrine  of  man's  sociability.  And  hence 
His  Holiness,  Leo  XIII,  in  his  Encyclical  Diuturmim.  pronounces  against 
Rousseau's  maintenance:  "Sed  magnus  est  error  non  videre,  id  quod 
manifestum  est,  homines  cum  non  sint  solivagum  genus,  citra  liberam 
voluntatem  ad  naturalem  communitatem  esse  natos;  ac  praeterea  pact- 
um, quod  praedicant,  est  aperte  commentitum  et  fictum — " 

81  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1. 

82  In  his  Com.  on  Aristotle's  Politics,  Lib.  I.,  lec.  1,  St.  Thomas  states 
the  Stagirite's  opinion  that  men  have  a  natural  tendency  to  society  as 
to  virtue,  and  that  as  a  virtue  is  acquired  by  exercise,  so  are  states 
founded  by  the  work  of  men. 


8  ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

the  matter  is  not  pronounced.  A  man  can  refuse  to  breathe, 
if  he  wishes ;  but  nature  sanctions  no  such  folly.  So  is  the  case 
of  society. 

Vareilles-Sommieres  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  original  ap- 
proach of  men  to  each  other  was  voluntary ;  but  that,  once  as- 
sociated, they  were  in  civil  society,  willy-nilly.*^-^  He  does  not 
appear  to  distinguish  sufficiently  between  primitive  and  civil 
society.  The  former  was  indeed  potentially  the  latter ;  but  the 
latter  is  an  improvement  and  development  of  the  former.  A 
horde  of  barbarians  temporarily  banded  together  to  sack  a  city, 
is  an  example  of  an  association  that  is  not  civil.  When  they 
submit  to  a  permanent  and  more  or  less  regulated  existence,  a 
State  is  truly  started.^*  And  it  would  seem  that  their  consent 
must  be  present  either  tacitly  or  expressly.  Consent  does  not 
cease  to  be  such  because  it  is  gradual  and  complies  with  a  natural 
tendency.  We  may  hardly  deduce  from  the  fact  that  St. 
Thomas  describes  man  as  ''social"  and  "political,''  that  he  be- 
lieves civil  society  to  have  been  absolutely  forced  by  nature  on 
the  race.  He  teaches  that  natural  necessity  does  not  preclude 
volition.^^  Individual  states  may  be  born  in  violence  through 
the  powers  of  some  great  personality  or  other  circumstance ;  but 
if  consent  does  not  follow,  we  can  hardly  picture  a  very  durable 
institution.  The  elements  of  state  would  fall  apart  as  soon  as  the 
hand  of  the  founder  became  gripless  in  death,  or  as  speedily  as 
the  causal  condition  would  dissolve.  Consent  is  social  cement ; 
and  without  it,  the  general  fact  of  civil  society  is  inexplicable.^^ 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  St.  Thomas,  who  appreciated  human 
values  so  highly,  considered  it  a  main  power  in  the  actual  for- 
mation of  the  State. 

The  voice  of  the  thirteenth  century  harmonizes  with  modem 


83  Op.  cit.,  p.  62. 

84  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  2.  Artistotle's  Politics,  VII,  8.  Cf.  Locke's 
Two  Treatises  of  Government,  Bk.  II,  ch.  2,  p.  128. 

85  Summa  Theol.,  la  qu.  LXXXII,  a.  1,  ad  1.  We  are  minded  here 
of  Hegel's  doctrine  of  Objective  Spirit,  in  which  he  avers  that  man's 
inner  life  finds  outlet  in  external  institutions,  which  at  first  seem  for- 
eign to  the  individual,  and  yet  are  but  expressions  of  his  true  self. 

86  Janet,  Paul.  Historic  de  la  Philosophie  morale  et  politique,  t.  II, 
p.  288:  "La  societe  est  naturelle,  cela  est  incontestable;  mais  la  societe 
politique  implique  evidemment  certaines  conventions." 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  9 


doctrine,  as  to  the  first  unit  of  society .^"^  McDougall  refers  to 
Prof.  Keane,  in  the  latter's  Ethnology,  as  declaring  that  the 
issue  of  the  hvely  discussion  on  the  origin  of  society  is  that  the 
family  was  the  earliest  form.^    This  is  St.  Thomas'  conclusion. 

He  considers  a  society  perfect  in  proportion  to  its  ability  to 
supply  the  requirements  of  life.^^  The  family  furnishes  inti- 
mate and  immediate  necessities,^^  and  is  therefore  primary.  He 
notes  three  kinds  of  domestic  relation:  that  existing  between 
parent  and  child,  between  husband  and  wife,  and  between  ser- 
vant and  master.^i  The  character  of  these  relations  indicates 
an  institution  at  once  distinct,  sacred  and  invioable.^-  The 
family  cannot  be  lost  in  any  larger  community  for,  as  St. 
Thomas  clearly  offers,  it  has  functions  which  are  essential  and 
peculiar  to  itself.  It  is  a  vital  integer,  capable  of  union  with 
others  of  its  kind,  but  not  of  absorption.  Families  cluster  and 
form  a  village ;  and  many  villages  joining  themselves  into  one 
society  constitute  a  state.  The  justification  of  the  State  is  that  it 
assures  the  needs  that  give  it  birth;  and,  doing  this,  it  is  the 
perfect  community .^-^  The  consummate  community,  however, 
is  the  kingdom,  or,  as  we  should  say  today,  the  nation.  Though 
Aquinas  certainly  w^ould  not  have  subscribed  to  the  sinking  of 
the  State  totally  in  a  greater  society,  it  seems  that  he  would  have 
favored  no  ineffectual  aggregation  of  petty  independencies  such 
as  our  Thirteen  Original  Colonies  constituted  under  the  Articles. 


87  The  meaning  of  the  word  family  has  suffered  much  shifting.  The 
Hebrew  expression  seems  to  be  derived  from  a  word  signifying  a  head, 
prince  or  lord.  The  Greek  term  is  oikos,  suggesting  house.  Aristotle 
thinks  a  family  is  that  society  which  nature  has  established  for  daily 
support.  Charondas,  before  him,  considered  as  a  family  (homosipuoi) 
those  who  fed  together  out  of  the  same  pannier.  Epimenides  regard- 
ed those  who  sat  by  a  common  fire  (homokapnoi)  as  a  family.  (Cf.  Sir 
Robert  Filmer's  Patriarcha,  p.  25).  Also  Aristotle's  Politics,  Bk.  I,  Ch. 
II.    St.  Thomas  follows  Aristotle,    He  uses  the  word  "domus." 

88  See  Social  Psychology,  Wm.  McDougall,  p.  274. 

89  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

90  Ibidem. 

9100771.  Evang.  Matt.,  C.  XII;  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  2. 

92  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  VII,  ad  2.  McDougall  remarks 
that  "all  who  have  given  serious  attention  to  the  questions  are  agreed 
that  the  stability  of  the  family  is  the  prime  condition  of  a  healthy 
state  of  society  and  of  the  stability  of  every  community" — Social 
Psychology,  p.  274.    This,  too,  is  the  Thomistio  thought  and  teaching. 

93  (7am.  Evang.  Matt.,  c.  XII. 


10        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


of  Confederation. 9^  AVhere  there  were  fear  of  foe,  says  he, 
there  could  be  no  enduring  state.  Therefore,  it  is  requisite 
that  there  be  a  community  of  many  states  making  one  kingdom. 
In  this  opinion  he  exceeds  the  concept  of  the  Philosopher. 
The  greatest  of  the  Greeks  saw  the  city-state  as  the  acme  of  social 
evolution  i^^^  the  Angel  of  the  Schools  gazes  more  keenly, 
and  farther.  He  introduces  ''regnum'"  fully  into  political  phil- 
osophy. Evidently  Christianty  afforded  his  vision  a  more 
synthetic  quality  and  a  finer  sweep.  Dante,  who  reverently 
breathed  the  intellectual  atmosphere  of  Aquinas,  dreamed  in 
his  De  Monarchia  of  a  universal  Christian  empire;  much  the 
same  as  the  best  thought  of  the  world  today  is  weaving  a  League 
of  Nations.  Who  can  say  to  what  degree  the  medieval  poet  was 
indebted  to  the  Master  for  his  magnificient  fancy 


3. — The  Democratic  Value  of  Thomistic  Theory 

In  the  ideas  of  St.  Thomas  which  have  thus  far  been  exposed, 
an  ingredient  of  democratic  thought  is  constantly  present  and 
apparent.  We  find  that  man  is,  not  because  the  society  and 
State  are;  but  they  are,  because  he  is.  The  individual  is  con- 
ceived and  regarded  as  prior  to  all  organization.  It  is  for  his 
advantage,  material  and  spiritual,  that  communities  are  formed. 
Out  of  his  nature  and  needs  they  rise.  Just  as  Aquinas  pre- 
serves the  family  in  his  theory  of  State,  and  the  State  in  his 
idea  of  ''regnum,"  so  does  he  safe-guard  even  in  a  more  earnest 
manner,  the  individual.  This  concept  of  the  individual  as  the 
efficient  and  final  cause  of  society,  under  God,  is  a  solid  foun- 
dation for  a  truly  democratic  polity.  If  such  is  "one  based 
upon  the  knowledge  and  dignity  of  man,  and  on  the  right  which 
he  possesses  of  enjoying  a  certain  amount  of  liberty  conformable 


94  Ibidem. 

05  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  Lec.  1:  "est  civitas  principalissimum  eorum  quae 
humana  ratione  constitui  possunt." 

06  Suarez,  the  interpreter  of  St.  Thomas,  touches  this  question  of 
union  in  his  De  Lege  Humana  et  Civili,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  II,  6.  He  does 
not  think  that  all  men  should  unite  in  one  political  community.  This 
would  be  neither  practical  nor  necessary.  But  all  states  should  be 
united  by  mutual  aid  and  pledges  to  promote  peace  and  justice. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  11 


to  reason  and  justice, we  may  well  conclude  that  St.  Thomas 
of  the  thirteenth  century  was  quite  as  modern  as  the  intelligent 
expondent  of  Democracy  today.  His  consideration  of  man  is 
complete,  because  it  ends  in  man's  Maker.^^  His  thought  goes 
l)eyond  the  animality  of  humanity  to  the  spirituality ;  and  his 
investigation  ceases  only  in  the  first  and  final  Reality.  In  this  he 
surpasses  Aristotle  and  perhaps  all  other  political  thinkers,  with 
the  exception  of  Augustine  of  Hippo  and  his  own  followers; 
being  more  ready  to  render  to  God  the  things  that  are  God's.^'^ 
His  speculations  on  elementary  politics  are  deeper,  for  they  go  to 
the  First  Cause ;  more  reasonable,  for  they  seek  conformity  with 
the  Author  of  Reason ;  more  fruitful,  for  they  discover  for  the 
race  an  infinite  ideal.  He  sees  man  in  relation  to  his  Maker,  and 
hence  in  greatest  diginity.  He  can  endorse  no  political  doctrine 
which  would  tarnish  that  glory.  He  does  not  envisage  the  State 
as  a  mammoth  frakenstein,  gulping  down  the  individuals  who 
create  it,^^^  but  he  beholds  it  as  a  creation  of  purpose,  interest, 
love  and  duty,  in  which  each  one  adjusts  himself  to  the  common 
good  instead  of  the  particular,  or  rather  makes  the  two  weals 
concentric. He  even  ensures  the  individual's  standing  to  the 
extent  of  allowing  that  private  good  may  sometimes  be  superior 
to  public. He  does  not  see  society  as  a  spawn  of  Chance  and 
man  as  a  blind  and  negligible  social  atom.  He  detects  a  plan, 
wholesome,  rationel,  and  operative  in  humanity ;  and  every  indi- 
vidual is  safe-guarded  by  the  natural  law  of  love  and  justice, 
according  to  which  no  man  may  be  ignored  or  annihilated,  but 


97  Balmes'  Protestantism  and  Catholicity  Compared  in  their  Effects 
on  the  Civilization  of  Europe,  p.  364. 

98  Considering  man  in  relation  to  his  Creator,  the  medievalist  draws 
a  very  democratic  conclusion.  God  did  not  create  two  Adams  from 
whom  respectively  descended  nobles  and  plebians.  De  Erud.  princ,  I, 
cap.  4.  Cf.  Dante  and  Catholic  Philosophy,  by  Frederick  Ozanam,  p.  321. 

99  John  Locke,  too,  manifests  this  spirit  strikingly.  According  to 
him,  as  to  Aquinas,  men  are  "all  the  workmanship  of  one  omnipotent 
and  infinitely  wise  Maker;  all  the  servants  of  one  sovereign  Master,  sent 
into  the  world  by  His  order  and  about  his  business:  they  are  His  prop- 
erty, whose  workmanship  they  are  made  to  last  during  His,  not  another's 
pleasure."  Two  Treatises  on  Government,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  1,  p.  194. 

100  "Homo  non  refertur  ad  communitatem  politicam  secundum  se 
totem  et  secundum  omnit'  sua."    Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XXI,  a.  3. 

101  Summa  Theol.,  2a,  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  X,  ad  2. 

102  Idem,  qu.  CLII,  a.  IV,  ad  3. 


12     ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 


each  must  be  acknowledged  and  aided.  He  believes  that  so- 
ciety owes  the  individual  a  sufficiency  of  temporal  goods,  just 
as  the  individual  owes  society  a  life  of  virtue.^*^'^  Thus  in  the 
very  beginning  of  his  politics,  Aquinas  both  discovers  the  indivi- 
dual, and  champions  him.  Than  this  nothing  could  be  more 
democratic. 

4. — Contrast  with  Other  Theories 

The  democratic  value  of  hisi  doctrine  on  the  origin  of  society 
and  the  State  is  sparklingly  evident  from  a  terse  contrast  with 
the  teachings  of  his  predecessors  and  successors  on  this  topic, 
so  potent  in  influencing  the  ideals  and  practical  tendencies  of 
the  world's  political  thought.  Plato  indeed  prizes  men's  desires 
and  needs  as  a  primary  social  cause.^^"^  He  soon  slips  from  the 
psychological,  however,  into  a  conception  of  civil  society,  at 
once  beauteous  and  symmetrical,  but  patently  artificial,  in 
which  the  individual  fig-ures  no  more  vitally  than  a  brick  or  a 
dash  of  mortar.  To  realize  this  ideal  of  State  Absolutism,  he 
would  render  the  individual  unreal.  Democracy  is  as  far  from 
his  aristocratic  brain  as  the  Thirteenth  Century  from  the  Age 
of  Pericles.  The  difference  between  his  thought  and  that  of 
St.  Thomas  is  vast.  Though  the  bulk  of  his  political  doctrine 
deals  vdih.  the  State  not  as  it  is,  or  was,  but  as  it  should  be,  it  is 
easy  to  discern  from  his  aspirations  the  anti-democratic  character 
of  his  pre-conceptions.^^^ 

Aristotle's  speculations  are,  to  be  sure,  quite  consonant  in 
many  respects  with  those  of  Aquinas.  But  Thomas  regards 
man  more  earnestly  than  does  the  Philosopher.i^^^    The  latter 

103  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  15. 

104  RepiiUic,  II,  366.  Cf.  Dimning's  Political  Theories,  VoL  I,  p.  28. 
lOo  Cf.  Acton,  History  of  Freedom,  p.  71:  "Plato  would  not  suffer  a 

democratic  polity — .  The  prodigious  vitality  of  his  writings  has  kept 
the  glaring  perils  of  popular  government  constantly  before  mankind; 
but  it  has  also  preserved  the  belief  in  ideal  politics — .  There  has  been 
no  fiercer  enemy  of  democracy;  but  there  has  been  no  stronger  advocate 
of  revolution." 

106  Aristotle  painfully  presses  the  inequalities  of  human  nature.  In 
the  first  book  of  his  Politics,  ch.  IV,  he  speaks  of  "the  born  slave."  And 
Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  feels  called  on  to  retort:  "S'il  y  a  done  des 
esclaves  par  nature,  c'est  parce  qu'il  y  a  en  des  esclaves  contre  nature. 
La  force  a  fait  les  premiers  esclaves,  leur  lachete  les  a  perpetuus; — " 
Contrat  Social,  Lib.  I,  ch.  II. 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  13 

lacks  in  his  Paganism  an  appreciation  of  the  later  Christian  mes- 
sage of  brotherhood,  and  so  is  inferior  in  thought  to  his  own 
follower.  He  neither  sees,  nor  expresses,  nor  defends  the  in- 
dividual so  clearly  as  does  the  Angel  of  the  School.^O'  He  is 
blind  to  man's  deep  spiritual  significance,  and  to  the  spiritual 
bond  among  men,  of  which  any  merely  political  scheme  of 
union  were  but  a  shadow  and  effect.  He  did  not  know,  as  Aqui- 
nas so  well  realized,  that  humanity  had  a  personal  as  well  as  a 
single  Source,  and  was  therefore  one  great  family;  that  the  race 
of  men  must  ever  have  experienced  an  attraction  one  to  another 
and  each  to  all ;  that  because  each  was  the  image  of  that  Author, 
all  must  reverence  Him.  In  Athens,  four  centuries  before  the 
Dawn  in  Bethlehem  of  Judea,  even  such  an  intellect  as  Aris- 
totle's could  but  grope  in  darkness. 

Lucretius  (91-51  B.  C.)  view^s  man  as  originally  belligerent, 
rather  than  social  or  political.  For  him,  society  and  Sate  are 
expediencies  rather  than  natural  expressions  and  requirements. 
His  conception  of  man  is  less  noble  than  that  of  St.  Thomas ;  he 
sees  him  fighting  against  his  fellows  and  finally  reacting  into 
ways  of  peace;  in  other  words,  degenerating  into  reason  and 
virtue.  According  to  him,  civil  society  appears  as  a  protest  and 
protection  against  anarchy  and  despotism.  His  premise  is 
pernicious  to  any  political  theory;  for,  if  man  is  naturally 
hostile  to  man,  civil  society  must,  theoretically  at  least,  be  an 
unnatural  restraint.  This  idea  induces  a  logical  return  to  the 
anarchism  which  the  Latin  poet  declares  the  State  appeared  ex- 
pressly to  oppose.  His  image  of  man  as  the  natural  son  of  Mars 
is  extreme.  It  does  not  explain  the  origin  of  civil  society  so 
well  as  it  suggests  the  mysterj'^  of  it  and  warrants  the  dissolution 
of  it.  It  inspires  no  democracy ;  for  it  makes  the  source  of  so- 
ciety a  fever.  The  law  of  fraternity,  justice  and  love,  which  St. 
Thomas  so  plainly  beholds  as  elemental  in  the  race,  does  not 
even  remotely  suggest  itself  to  the  mind  of  the  mouth-piece  of 
Epicureanism. 

Polybius  (167-151  B.  C.)  evinces  an  equally  unflattering  esti- 
mation of  man.    He  does  not  see  him  as  fire,  but  as  clay.  In 

107  In  his  Ethics,  he  condems  democracy,  even  with  a  property  quali- 
fication; though  in  his  Politics  he  amends  his  views.  Cf.  Acton,  op. 
cit,  pp.  71-72. 


14       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


iiian's  meek  sulmiission  to  the  rule  of  the  strongest  and  the 
boldest,  "even  as  it  is  among  bulls,  bears,  and  cocks,"  lies  the 
ex])lanation  of  the  earliest  civil  society.i^s  He  is  just  a  pawn, 
moved  by  the  law  of  reaction  from  one  form  of  civil  society  to 
another/  Unmistakably  Polybius  fails  to  find  the  individual 
so  dynamic  as  a  democratic  trend  of  thought  demands  and 
Aquinas  freely  concedes. 

Cicero  (106-43  B.  C.)  is  more  at  harmony  with  St.  Thomas 
in  ascribing  society  to  man's  social  instincts  and  require- 
ment^.i^'>  He  finds  in  nature  a  law  of  justice.iio  and  a  dispo- 
sition to  love.ii^  -Qyj^i  expressions  are  general.  He  speaks 
of  the  people;  for  him  "res  pubHca"  is  "res  populi."ii-  The 
individuals,  however,  seems  to  slip  from  his  mental  grasp.  This 
may  be  because  his  conception  of  nature  and  the  natural  law, 
as  A.  J.  Carlyle  observes,  does  not  lack  ambiguities  and  inco- 
herencies.ii'^  St.  Thomas  far  excells  Cicero  in  his  analysis  and 
use  of  these  ideas. 

Christianity  poised  man's  minds  above  the  earth  and  enabled 
them  to  realize  more  fulh^  than  even  the  best  representatives  of 
Stoicism  could  enunciate,  the  oneness  of  humanity.  It  inter- 
preted the  erstwhile  mysterious  yearnings  of  mankind,  of  which 
all  forms  of  society  were  an  evidence  and  expression.  It  pointed 
to  God  as  the  Origin  and  the  End  of  humanity,  and  revealed  the 
wondrous  rays  of  Providence  between.  Saints  Ambrose,  Augus- 
tine, and  Gregor\'  the  Great  are  the  chief  writers,  before  Aqvn- 
nas,  to  view  political  facts  through  Christian  concepts.  The 
practical  democratic  value  of  Christianity  finds  early  indication 
when  the  holy  Bishop  of  Milan  beards  autocratic  Theodosius 
and,  with  the  principles  of  the  new  religion,  saves  the  people 


lOSSee  Wm.  A.  Dunning's  Political  Theories,  p.  115;  also  Sir  Robert 
Filmer's  Patriarcha,  p.  23. 

101)  Z)e  Repuh.,  I,  25.  But  Cicero  conceives  a  lower  estimate  of  human 
nature;  weak,  idle,  craven,  lustful,  albeit  containing  the  divine  spark 
This  corruption  originates  and  necessitates  conditions  and  distinctions 
that  may  be  somewhat  unnatural.  (Cf.  Carlyle's  History  of  Mediaeval 
Political  Theories.  Vol.  I,  p.  12.) 

noDe  Leg.,  I,  14-16. 

111  Ibidem,  I,  15-43. 

112  De  Repulica,  I,  25.  See  Carlyle's  A  History  of  Mediaeval  Political 
Theory,  Vol.  I,  p.  1-18,  and  Dunning's  Political  Theory,  Vol.  I,  p.  118-125. 

iia  See  A  History  of  Mediaeval  Political  Theories.  Vol.  I,  p.  18. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  15 

from  him,  and  him  for  himself.  But  it  is  St.  Augustine  (354- 
430)  who  applies  religion  directly  to  political  thought.  His 
results,  however,  do  not  prove  so  happy  as  do  later  achievements. 
Heresy  restoring  choas  to  the  religious  world;  Alaric  and  his 
Visigoths  tearing  Rome  and  terrifying  civilization;  Augustine's 
own  early  subjections  to  the  world  and  the  flesh ;  these  sombre 
facts,  even  apart  from  theological  impressions,  must  have  served 
to  darken  his  views.  He  is  deeply  impressed  with  sin  and  its 
consequences.  He  teaches  that  in  the  original  order  of  things 
men  would  have  been  free  and  equal.^^*  But  the  Fall  brought 
what  Seneca  conceived  as  the  Golden  Age  of  humanity  to  an 
abrupt  close.  Man  passed,  by  ensuing  necessity,  into  the  con- 
ventional institutions  of  society.  These  afford  a  discipline  by 
which  his  new  and  evil  tendencies  are  corrected.  Augustine 
sees  the  State  essentially  as  a  correction  of  man ;  Aquinas,  as  an 
expression. 

Gregory  the  Great  (590-604)  declares  that  men  are  equal. 
And,  for  him,  this  condition  is  neither  hypothetical  nor  past; 
it  is  of  present  and  living  import,  a^  is  evinced  by  his  admoni- 
tion to  masters  to  remember  that  their  slaves  are  as  themselves, 
inasmuch  as  they  share  the  same  nature.  But  this  doctrine, 
which  is  of  paramount  significance  in  a  democratic  theory  of 
society,  will  be  found  much  better  advanced  in  the  writings  of 
St.  Thomas. 

In  the  galaxy  of  political  authors  whom  the  Modern  Age  has 
produced,  Hobbes,  Grotius,  Suarez,  Locke  and  Rousseau  are 
among  the  most  brilliant  names.  Some  of  these  seem  to  have 
been  influenced  by  the  tradition  of  Aquinas,  directly  or  indirect- 
ly, in  their  doctrine  on  the  origin  of  society  and  State.  None  of 
them  presents  principles  of  more  truly  democratic  value.  The 
Angel  of  the  Schools  is  no  less  heartily  democratic  than  modem 


114  De  Civ.  Dei,  XIX,  15.  Cf .  A.  J.  Carlyle's  History  of  Mediaeval  Po- 
litical Theory,  Vol.  I,  p.  114. 

115  But  again  we  must  notice  that  St.  Augustine  was  a  supporter  of 
the  contract  theory  of  society.  In  his  De  Givitate,  XIX,  21,  he  refers 
to  Cicero's  definition:  "Res  Publica  res  populi.  Populus  autem  non 
omnis  hominum  coetus  quoquo  modo  congregatus  sed  coetus  multitu- 
dinis  juris  consensu  sociatus"  (De  RepuMca,  I,  25).  And  in  cap. 
XIX,  17,  he  speaks  of  human  society  as  involving  a  "compositio  vol- 
untatum." 


16       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

thinkers,  because  he  is  more  rationally  so;  not  less  sincerely, 
because  more  restrainedly. 

Thomas  Hobbes  (1588-1679)  takes  all  that  his  ancient  pred- 
ecessor Lucretius  has  to  give.  For  him  man  is  primarily  not 
a  social  but  a  martial  animal,  inclined  to  throttle  his  fellow- 
being  rather  than  to  respect  his  rights  or  enlist  his  aid.^^^ 
As  we  have  already  observed,  such  a  t€net  is  pregnant  not  with 
democracy  but  anarchy.  Hobbes'  doctrine  of  the  dawn  of  civil 
society  is  purely  Epicurean  up  to  a  point  where  he  surpasses  his 
patron  saint  and  slays  every  hint  or  hope  of  democracy.  He  is 
deservedly  praised  for  his  precise  and  explicit  theory  of  social 
contract ;  but  his  total  surrender  to  state  absolutism  in  his  teach- 
ing that  power,  once  yielded  up  to  a  sovereign  prince  or  body, 
can  not  be  recalled,^^^  is  as  odius  to  the  twentieth-century  brain 
as  it  would  have  been  to  the  thirteenth.  He  makes  the  most  of 
the  individual,  only  to  obliterate  him.  He  lets  him  enter  the 
State,  never  to  return.  How  democratic  the  Thomistic  doctrine 
seems  in  comparison  with  this  image  of  ci\dl  society  as  the 
bourne,  from  which  no  individual  returns!  Aquinas  refuses 
to  allow  the  individual  to  be  lost,  which  may  be  one  of  the 
reasons  why  he,  in  these  later  days,  has  been  rediscovered.  It 
is  well  known  that  Thomas  Hobbes  in  Paris  enjoyed  the  ac- 
quaintance of  Gassendi  and  Decartes.  From  the  former  he 
probably  adopted  his  Epicurean  views;  by  the  latter,  he  must 
have  been  brought  into  intimate  contact  with  Scholastic  princi- 
ple. Rene  Decartes,  educated  by  the  Jesuits,  ever  esteemed  them 
and  never  forgot  La  Fleche ;  and,  at  this  time,  the  political  views 
of  that  very  distinguished  son  of  the  Order,  Suarez  were  particu- 
larly important  in  the  world  of  thought.  Hobbes'  mind  could 
be  swayed,  as  his  sympathy  for  royalty  and  his  consequent 
teaching  on  the  irrevocability  of  the  social  contrast  suggest. 
There  is  as  much  reason  to  deduce  that  he  might  have 
drawn  some  of  the  better  bits  of  his  doctrine  from  Scholastic 
sources  as  that  he  accepted  his  Epicurean  elements  from  Gas- 
sendi. 

The  mingling  of  Epicurean  and  Scholastic  thought  results 


llfi  Leviathan,  De  Homine,  cap.  IV. 
117  Idem,  De  Civitate,  cap.  XIX. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  17 

in  a  hybrid  political  theory  more  or  less  alien  to  either  source. 
The  social  contract  as  found  in  St.  Thomas,  does  not  affect  so- 
ciety as  such,  but  civil  society.  Men  were  led  by  their  own  social 
nature  into  association ;  it  is  only  in  civil  life  that  a  contract  po- 
tently figured.  But  Hobbes  would  posit  the  agreement  as  the 
explanation  both  of  society  and  the  State. 

As  for  his  conceit  on  the  adamantine  character  of  the  con- 
tract, St.  Thomas  could  never  subscribe  to  it.  We  shall  later  see 
that  he  teaches  the  right  of  subjects  to  revolt  and  considers  those 
enactments  of  rulers  which  outrage  reason,  not  binding. 

The  intellect  of  Hugo  Grotius  (1583-1645)  must  also  have 
been  stirred  by  the  dispute  between  James  of  England  and  the 
dauntless  Jesuit  Suarez,  and  by  the  latter's  scholarly  triumph 
over  regal  pretensions.  The  views  of  the  Protestant  Nether- 
lander on  the  origin  of  society  and  State  are,  to  a  degree,  Suar- 
ezian  and  Thomastic.^^^  He  repeatedly  adverts  to  the  social 
nature  of  man,  and  seems  to  hold  that  society  is  due  to  instinct 
and  the  State  to  contract.  Finally,  he  teaches  that  transferred 
rights  may  be  recalled.  However,  his  doctrine  is  democratic- 
ally marred  by  concessions  to  absolute  monarchy. 

Suarez  (1540-1617)  is  in  the  closest  intellectual  accord  with 
Aquinas.  He  sees  all  men  free  by  nature.  He  reconciles  this 
fact  with  the  further  fact  of  society  and  State  by  teaching  that 
man  is  a  social  being.  He  beholds  a  fundamental  unity  in  the 
race,  the  source  of  which  is  the  social  instinct.^^^  He  recognizes 
the  importance  of  the  indi\ddual  but  does  not  sacrifice  the  com- 
munity to  him;  nor  does  he  immolate  the  individual  to  the 
community. He  strikes  the  balance  which  suits  a  sanely 
democratic  ideal.  For  him  the  State  is  the  creation  of  a  com- 
pact on  the  part  of  the  people.  Not  individually  but  collectively 
are  they  the  depositary  of  civil  power;  else  there  would  be  no 
community  and  hence  no  State.     As  a  community,  they  can 

118  Cf.  Wm.  A.  Dunning's  His.  of  Polit.  Theories,  Vol.  II,  pp.  171-186, 
and  Dr.  Albert  Stockl's  Grundriss  de  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  p.  206. 
See  De  jure  belli  et  pads  (tr.),  Bk.  I,  ch.  IV.,  par.  7:  "But  we  must 
observe  that  men  did  not  at  first  unite  themselves  in  Civil  Society  by 
any  special  Command  from  God,  but  of  their  own  free  Will,  out  of  a 
Sense  of  the  inability  of  separate  Families  to  repel  Violence;  whence 
the  Civil  Power  is  derived — ." 

119  Traotatus  de  Legibus,  Lib.  II,  cap.  XIX,  sec.  9. 

120  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  II,  sec.  4. 


18       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  | 

change  the  form  of  their  society.  Their  pledge  is  not  immut-  i 
able.121 

John  Locke  (1632-1704)  is  enshrined  and  incensed  as  the 
founder  of  the  poHtical  philosophy  from  which  modern  demo- 
cracy was  born.  He  sees  man  primarily  as  rational  and  dis- 
posed to  good ;  contrariwise  to  Hobbes'  pessimistic  picture  and 
concordantly  with  the  doctrine  of  Aquinas.  The  natural  law 
precedes  civil  society,  which  is  consequent  to  contract.  The 
people  determine  the  State.  The  individual  is  not  absorbed; 
his  natural  rights  limit  the  power  of  the  community,  just  as  they 
diminished,  in  ''state  of  nature,"  the  power  of  other  indivi- 
duals.^ AVhich  is  but  a  more  modern  expression  of  St.  Thomas' 
simple  doctrine  of  justice.  Locke  studied  at  Oxford  when 
Scholasticism  was  still  very  much  alive  there.  Suarez  was  dead ; 
but  the  memory  and  the  efiPect  of  his  vigorous  encounter  with 
the  English  Monarch  were  still  green  in  the  intellectual  world. 
The  Two  Treatises  on  Government  are  a  refutation  of  the  idea 
of  iron-clad  monarchy  which  Suarez  antagonized  and  Filmer 
sustained.  The  politics  of  Aquinas  could  not  have  been  un- 
known to  the  talented  Englishman,  who  is  no  more  original 
in  his  democratic  principles  than  Suarez  who  claims  no  origin- 
ality at  all.  Certainly,  too,  he  is  indebted  to  Grotius,  whose 
treatise  De  Jure,  Belli  et  Pacis  widely  affected  ethical  and  poli- 
tical speculation.  "The  idea  of  a  law  of  nature,  which  forms  the 
background  of  Locke's  political  theories,"  writes  Ritchie,  "and 
which  from  Locke  passed  on  to  Rousseau,  and  to  the  fathers  of 
the  American  Replublic,  comes  to  Locke  mainly  from  Grotius 
and  Pufendorf.     The  other  writer  whom  he  most  quotes,  is 


121  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  Ill,  sec.  7,  et  8.  N.  B. — It  must  not  be  neglected, 
however,  that  Suarez  opposed  unstable  government.  He  believed  that 
a  people  and  their  posterity  should  be  true  to  a  chosen  polity,  unless 
the  rulers  break  faith  with  them  and  seriously  abuse  their  powers. 
But  of  course  there  would  be  little  reason  for  them  to  be  false,  if  the 
government  remain  faithful  to  the  popular  interests.  Suarez  is  like 
St.  Thomas  in  granting  the  right  of  revocation  of  power,  but  only  for  a 
good  reason.  Hobbes'  theory  of  rigid  irrevocability  is  dismally  dif- 
ferent. 

122  "The  State  of  Nature  has  a  law  of  Nature  to  govern  it,  which 
obliges  every  one,  and  reason,  which  is  that  law,  teaches  all  mankind 
who  will  but  consult  it,  that  being  equal  and  independent,  no  one  ought 
to  harm  another  in  his  life,  health,  liberty  or  possessions."  Two  Treat- 
ises of  Oovemment,  Bk.  II,  ch.  II,  pp.  193-194. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  19 


Hooker ;  and  Hooker  is  the  medium  through  whom  the  ethical 
and  poHtical  philosophy  of  Thomas  Aquinas  finds  its  way  into 
English  popular  thought. "^^^ 

And  so,  is  it  unwarrantable  to  view  St.  Thomas  as  passing 
through  some  of  the  best  minds  to  a  mighty  modem  influence? 
What  is  democratically  commendable  in  their  respective  teach- 
ings on  the  origin  of  society  and  State,  is  to  be  found  at  least 
germinally  also  in  his.  On  a  scholar's  answer  to  the  initial 
question  of  the  foundation  of  man's  civil  existence,  depends  the 
character  of  his  consequent  political  theories.  Lucretius  and 
Hobbes,  with  their  doctrine  of  original  intensive  idividualism 
and  natural  w^arfare,  founded  the  State  on  a  volcano.  It  is  pa- 
thetic to  discover  the  author  of  Leviathan  endeavoring  to  elude 
the  anarchistic  logic  of  his  own  teaching,  by  tying  up  his  sav- 
ages in  an  eternal  contract.  It  is  only  in  the  light  of  the  fact 
that  man  is  a  social  being  that  the  State,  with  its  complex 
system  of  regulations  and  limitations,  can  be  seen  as  something 
better  than  an  imposition.  It  is  only  on  this  firm  fact  that  the 
stabilit}''  of  civil  society  could  ever  be  assured.  It  is  because 
man  is  a  rational  animal  that  he  can  never  be  content  with  the 
separatism  of  the  brutes,  but  finds  his  best  self-expression  in  his 
relations  with  his  fellow-men.  The  democracy  which  would 
chop  up  society  into  squirming,  mutually-opposed  segments  is 
bedlamism.  The  democracy  which  aims  to  establish  the  indi- 
vidual as  an  entity  with  a  mind  and  a  heart  of  his  own,  but  not 
without  moral  duty  and  natural  necessity  of  adjusting  them 
to  others,  is  the  helpful  and  wholesome  type  which  plainly 
appears  in  the  pages  of  the  Angel  of  the  Schools  and  in  the 
thought  of  all  who  have  written  under  his  aegis. 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  so  far  as  the  valuable 
portion  of  his  message  is  concerned,  teaches  nothing  new.  The 


12S  Natural  Rights,  p.  39.  See  also,  Macksey,  Sovereignty  and  Con- 
sent, p.  9:  "Though  Hooker  may  seem  unaware  of  the  chorus  of  Cath- 
olic theologians,  who  in  his  time  were  defending,  against  the  Divine 
Right  of  Kings,  the  origin  of  society  by  consent  and  the  primary  recep- 
tion of  sovereignty  by  the  people  (i.  e.,  to  whole  community)? 
his  indebtedness  to  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  is  freely  admitted."  See  Ra- 
hilly  The  Sources  of  Eng.  and  Am.  Democracy,  Studies,  June,  1919: 
"Hooker's  Ecclesiastical  Polity — a  striking  tribute  not  only  to  the 
Catholic  conception  of  the  Church  but  to  the  Schoolmen's  teaching  on 
natural  laws  and  civil  government." 


20       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


ideas  of  social  contract  and  natural  equality  were  very  venerable 
at  his  birth.  But  he  rejuvenated  them  with  a  few  mental  move- 
ments which  at  once  carressed  and  crushed  democracy.  He 
finds  man  naturally  good,  orderly,  and  just;i24  hence  quite  per- 
fect. His  difference  from  Hobbes  in  this  is  so  violent  as  to  sug- 
gest that  both  he  and  the  Englishman  may  be  somewhat  mis- 
taken. St.  Thomas,  more  realistically,  sees  man  not  as  perfect 
but  perfectible.  The  individual  being  so  excellent,  however, 
according  to  the  author  of  the  Contrat  Social,  there  is  little  need 
of  society  to  improve  him.^^  The  first  land-grabber  who  found 
folk  foolish  enough  to  believe  his  ''This  is  mine,"  was  the 
founder  of  ci\dl  society  a  peculiarly  pessimistic  deduction 
from  the  extremely  optimistic  premise  of  man's  perfection !  It 
is  hard  to  consider  human  beings,  so  richly  endowed  as  Rous- 
seau pictures,  being  corralled  into  states  like  ''dumb,  driven 
cattle,"  by  petty  schemers.  St.  Thomas'  explanation  is  much 
more  psychological  and  at  harmony  with  human  diginity  But 
this  great  inconsistency  of  Rousseau's  is  followed  by  greater. 
Like  Hobbes,  he  magnifies  the  individual  only  to  pulverize  him. 
He  sees  in  his  ideal  state  the  total  alienation  to  the  whole  com- 
munity of  each  associate  with  all  his  rights.^^^  Yet  we  know 
that  man  cannot  part  with  his  natural  rights ;  they  are  inalien- 
able, if  our  Declaration  of  Independence  and  the  doctrine  of 
St.  Thomas  count  for  aught.^^     Rousseau  later  concedes  to 


124  Lettre  a  Mgr.  De  Beaumont:  "rhomme  est  un  etre  naturellement 
bon,  aimant  la  justice  et  I'ordre."  Cf.  Crahay,  op.  cit.,  p.  16.  St. 
Thomas  taught  a  natural  law,  but  did  not  conclude  from  the  existence 
of  the  law  to  the  perfection  of  its  subjects. 

125  "Je  voudrais  bien  qu'on  m'expliquat  quel  peut  etre  le  genere  de 
misere  d'un  etre  libre  dont  le  coeur  est  en  paix  et  le  corps  en  sante." 
Discours  sur  Vorigine  de  Vin^galiU  parmi  les  hommes.  Cf.  de  Vareilles- 
Somi^res,  op,  cit.,  p.  73. 

126  See  Discours  sur  Vorigine  de  Tinegalite,  seconde  partie.  Crahay 
op.  cit.,  p.  12. 

127  Contrat  Social,  I,  6:  "Ces  clauses,  bien  entendu§s,  se  reduisent 
toutes  k  une  seule;  savoir,  I'alienation  totale  de  chaque  associe  avec 
toutes  ses  droits  k  toute  la  communaute."  Thos.  Hobbes'  contract  differs 
from  Rousseau's.  He  sees  the  rights  of  the  individual  alienated  to  a 
sovereign  individual  or  to  sovereign  individuals.  His  form  of  contract 
is  this:  "Ergo  huic  homini,  vel  huic  coetui,  authoritatem  et  jus  meum 
regendi  meipsum  concedo,  ea  conditione  ut  tu  quoque  tuam  authorita- 
tem et  jus  tuum  tui  regendi  in  eundum  transferas."  Leviathan,  De 
Civitate,  cap.  XVII.  But  Rousseau  would  alienate  the  rights  of  the 
individual  to  the  whole  community,  and  not  to  any  sovereign. 

128  Summa  Theoh,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5,  ad  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  21 

the  individual  the  rights  for  which  the  State  has  no  use ;  but  this 
doctrinal  generosity  comes  too  late.  The  whole  contract  theory- 
is  discredited ;  for,  if  men  alienate  themselves  in  toto,  how  can 
they  keep  a  contract  and  how  can  they  receive  rights?  Besides, 
Rousseau's  contract  is  unlike  St.  Thomas',  in  being  purely  con- 
ventional, arbitrary,  and  artificial,  with  no  human  impulse  in 
it,  nor  throb  of  natural  law.  He  declares  that  the  earliest  and 
only  natural  society  is  the  family,  and  that  even  the  family  is 
kept  together  only  by  a  convention.i^^  And  so  his  singular 
brand  of  social  agreement  would  require  renewal  in  each  genera- 
tion^ and  the  continuity  of  the  State  would  be  hardly  better  than 
a  much  broken  chain.  Whereas  Hobbes  founded  society  on  a 
volcano,  Rousseau  rears  it  on  shifting  sands.  St.  Thomas  is 
safer,  for  his  basis  is  man's  rational,  moral,  social,  and  poli- 
tical nature. 

Again,  it  may  be  observed  that  what  is  soundly  democratic 
in  Rousseau's  doctrine  perhaps  owes  itself  to  the  influence  of 
Locke.  The  effect  of  England  on  the  French  enlightenment 
in  the  eighteenth  century  was  signal.  Rousseau  could  hardly 
have  been  proof  against  a  charm  which  completely  enslaved  his 
illustrious  contemporaries,  Voltaire  and  Montesquieu.  The  best 
notes  of  his  message  are  old  enough  to  be  echoes;  the  rest  are 
so  discordant  with  the  best  democracy  that  they  cannot  but  be 
discarded  by  such  thinkers  as  incline  to  the  reasonable  and  safe. 

To  these  opinions  of  the  most  celebrated  political  thinkers, 
thus  summarily  presented,  we  may  well  append  a  brief  consid- 
eration of  the  traditionalist  theory ;  and,  in  conclusion,  we  shall 
review  a  typical  twentieth-century  answer  to  this  fundamental 
question  in  politics  as  to  the  principiants  of  society  and  State. 

Louis  Gabriel  de  Bonald  (1754-1840)  denies  the  social  con- 
tract.^^^  He  finds  in  man's  gifts  of  language  an  indication  of 
the  naturalness  of  society.  He  teaches  that  is  is  necessary  for 
man  to  think  his  words  before  he  expresses  his  thought ;  that  is, 
man  cannot  think  without  words.  Then  language  must  have 
been  God-given ;  and  the  fact  of  language  demands  the  existence 


129  Gontrat  Social,  Livre  I,  ch.  II. 

i30Th6orie  du  pouvoir  politique  et  religieux.  Of.  Dr.  Albert  Stokl's 
Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  p.  317;  and  Dr.  Wm.  Turner's 
History  of  Philosophy,  p.  603. 


22       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


of  some  sort  of  social  organization  from  the  start.  But  St. 
Thomas  regards  language  only  as  the  symbol  of  that  instinct  of 
communication  from  which  society  so  largely  fiowered.^-^^  It  is 
certain  that  he  did  not  esteem  language  the  great  solution  of 
society,  as  does  de  Bonald.  He  mentions  it  only  incidentally ; 
while  he  carefully  emphasizes  man's  social  nature.  De  Bonald's 
conclusion  from  the  primitive  necessity  and  existence  of  lan- 
guage that  society  was  not  contractual,  is  logical ;  but  his  further 
idea  that  civil  society  likewise  lacked  contract  does  not  follow. 
He  might  find  Aquinas  friendly  in  his  first  opinion ;  hardly  in 
his  second.  Aquinas  preserves  the  more  democratic  view-point 
which  treates  men  as  human  beings,  not  as  automata,  and  would 
attribute  the  origin  of  the  State  to  a  human  act.  His  fer\^ent 
faith  in  God  did  not  at  all  mar  his  philosophy  of  man. 

The  latest  explanations  of  the  origin  of  society  and  State  are 
obviously  affected  by  the  industrial  character  of  the  day.  Main- 
ly the  causes  are  found  not  within  man,  but  without.  Not  the 
urge  of  his  nature,  so  much  as  the  press  of  objective  circumstan- 
ces, explains  his  social  and  political  condition.  Psycholog}^ 
must  walk  behind  economics.  Dr.  Franz  Oppenheimer  is  a  good 
representive  of  the  school.^^^  Platonic  and  Marxian  absolutism, 
Manchester  liberalism,  the  contract  theory  of  Rousseau,  and  the 
robber  elucidation  of  Carey:  all  these  conflicting  views  weary 
him,  for  from  them  it  is  impossible  to  draw  a  fixed  principle. 
Naturally  he  neglects  to  turn  to  the  pages  of  a  medievalist  for 
the  solidity  he  seeks.  He  repudiates  the  idea  that  man's  social 
nature  is  the  fount  of  society.  He  obsen^es  that  every  state  is  a 
class  state  and  that  such  a  state,  with  its  different  layers  of  power 
and  dignity,  superior  and  inferior  social  groups,  is  not  a  natural 
but  an  artificial  organization.  Thus  far  is  he  faithful  to  the  cult 
of  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau.  He  fastens  his  eye  on  the  form  of  the 
State  and  misses  the  main  issue,  which  is,  an  investigation  of 
the  underlying  causes  thereof.  He  declares  that  the  state,  as  an 
example  of  caste,  could  not  have  originated  otherwise  than 


131  He  observes  that  brutes,  too,  express  their  feelings  mutually,  but 
declares  that  man's  tendency  in  this  regard  is  stronger.  Com.  Pol., 
Lib.  I,  lec.  1. 

132  His  book,  The  State,  is  translated  into  English  by  John  M.  Gitter- 
man.  Ph.  D.,  L.  L.  B.,  and  published  by  Bobbs-Merrill,  Indianapolis,  1914. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  23 

through  conquest  and  subjugation.  He  need  not  go  so  far  as 
Aristotle  and  hold  that  some  men  are  natural  slaves,  in  order  to 
feel  the  fallacy  of  his  position.  It  would  be  sufficient  for  him 
to  acept  the  Christianized  version  of  the  Philosopher's  view, 
which  St.  Thomas  presents.  In  human  rights,  men  are,  accord- 
ing to  Aquinas,  equal :  but  their  personal  and  social  capabilities 
and  capacities  are  evidently  not  so.  It  is  natural  for  a  man  to 
accept  the  position  to  which  he  is  best  suited,  at  least  till  he  has 
qualified  himself  for  a  better.  Oppenheimer  theorizes  on  the 
assumption  that  state  classes  are  the  creations  of  force ;  whereas 
they  can  be  quite  the  natural  expression,  intellectual  and  voli- 
tional, of  different  grades  of  ability.  "The  State,  completely  in 
its  genesis,  essentially  and  almost  completely  during  the  first 
stages  of  its  existence,"  he  maintains,^^^  "is  a  social  institution, 
forced  by  a  victorious  group  of  men  on  a  defeated  group,  with 
the  sole  pupose  of  regulating  the  dominion  of  the  victorious 
group  over  the  vanquished,  and  securing  itself  from  revolt  from 
within  and  attacks  from  without."  Truly  there  is  an  absence 
of  psychology  in  a  view  which  gives  man  credit  for  but  one  crav- 
ing— power.  Thomas  Hobbes  was  munificent  enough  to  con- 
cede two  aspirations :  power  and  liberty.^^^  St.  Thomas'  searches 
more  deeply  than  either  Hobbes  or  Oppenheimer  and  finds 
as  many  instincts  at  work  in  the  generation  of  the  State  as  would 
a  modern  social-psychologist.  He  does  not  visualize  man  as 
a  lustful  creature,  animated  solely  with  the  desire  of  climbing 
to  material  success  on  the  outraged  backs  of  his  fellow-men 
and  deriving  a  diabolic  joy  from  it  all.  There  is,  however 
dimly,  a  law  of  love  and  justice  in  every  human  life,  which  the 
materialist  does  not  perceive  but  which  ever  guided  and  clarified 
the  politicial  thought  of  Aquinas. 

"Everywhere,"  Oppenheimer  gloomily  avers,  "we  find  some 
war-like  tribe  of  wild  men  breaking  through  the  boundaries  of 
some  less  war-like  people,  settling  down  as  nobility  and  founding 
its  state.  "1^^    He  does  not  seem  to  realize  that  a  war-like  tribe, 

1.33  The  state,  p.  15. 

134  "Quod  homines,  libertatis  et  dominii,  per  naturam  amatores — 
Leviathan;  de  Civitate,  cap.  XVII. 

135  The  State,  p.  16,  Cf.  Edward  Jenks'  idea  that  the  origin  of  the 
State  is  to  be  found  in  the  progress  of  War.  Law  and  Politics  of  the 
Middle  Ages,  pp.  72-73. 


24       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

which  can  conquer  another,  may  be  already  an  organized  so-^ 
ciety,  having  a  degree  of  permanency  and  order,  and  that,  there- 
fore, the  explanation  of  its  organization  may  lie  farther  back 
than  its  exploitation  of  its  less  bellicose  victim.  The  difference 
in  political  thought  between  the  thirteenth-century  writer  and 
the  twentieth,  is  that  the  former  essayed  to  explain  the  origin  of 
civil  society;  while  the  latter  offers  what  really  amounts  to  an 
explanation  of  the  enlargement,  localization,  or  development 
of  states.  And  even  as  such,  the  explanation  is  too  sweeping. 
States  have  not  infrequently  in  History  been  the  outcome  of 
pacts,  instead  of  conquests.  Our  own  Thirteen  Original  Colo- 
nies united  themselves  in  a  manner  which  Oppenheimer  appears 
to  have  forgotten.  Besides,  the  pioneers  in  our  country  did  not 
exploit  the  Indians  and  thereby  found  a  class  state;  they  ex- 
ploited their  own  energies  and  built  up  a  free  one.  They  were 
more  eager  to  expell  the  aborigines  than  to  exploit  them. 
Oppenheimer  may  mention  in  support  of  his  theory  of  the  ori- 
gin of  the  State  the  instances  of  Babylonians,  Persians,  Mongols, 
the  Doric  States,  Ostrogoths,  Visigoths,  Saxons,  etc.  These  are 
examples  which  may  be  answered  with  other  examples.  Unlike 
Aquinas,  Oppenheimer  confuses  an  effect  or  an  occasion  of  states 
with  the  cause;  an  expendience  with  a  necessity;  a  re-formation 
with  a  formation.  His  statement  that  "the  basic  justification 
of  the  state,  its  raison  d'etre,  was  and  is  the  economic  exploita- 
tion of  those  subjugated, refutes  itself  as  a  theory  of  the 
origin  of  civil  society.  The  origin  of  the  state  is  its  foundation 
and  not  its  justification. 

His  theory  of  civil  society  suits  an  economic  age  better  than 
it  interprets  the  facts.  Aquinas  seeks  the  source  of  the  State 
within  the  human  beings  who  make  and  constitute  it,  appre- 
ciating that  historical  explanations  are,  at  most  and  best,  super- 
ficial. History  cannot  sound  deep  causes.  Philosophy  is  in- 
dispensable to  an  understanding.  History  gives  particular  facts ; 
philosophy  looks  behind  them  and  finds  general  processes. 

Significantly,  there  is  no  democratic  savor  to  this  typically 
up-to-date  doctrine  of  civil  society,  which  Oppenheimer  presents. 
In  it,  we  find  the  faults  of  preceding  views,  plus  new  ones. 


136  The  state,  page  30. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  25 

The  unflattering  implication  is  that  men  are  but  thistle-down 
on  economic  winds;  their  subjective  powers  are  far  exceeded 
by  objective  and  adverse  forces;  they  are  not  the  stuff  of  which 
democracy  is  made.  But  Aquinas  finds  reasons  to  credit  man 
with  the  possession  of  potentialities  which,  evolved,  can  render 
him  God-like.  At  the  same  time,  he  beholds  the  race  express- 
ing itself  in  society,  rather  than  society  repressing  the  race. 
These  two  views  ai'e  premises  with  promises.  In  the  vista  of  the 
first,  logically  Aquinas  must  detect  final  democracy,  or  self- 
rule,  provided  that  individuals  take  care  to  advance  toward  the 
Ideal.  In  the  second,  he  sees  the  justification  of  law  and  order ; 
for  it  were  folly  for  man  to  decry  a  goodly  expression  of  his  own 
rational  nature,  such  as  the  State  is,  and  to  renounce  the  positive 
advantages  that  accrue  to  him  from  a  civil  status.  Even  as 
Herbert  Spencer,  is  St.  Thomas  conscious  that,  while  in  the 
body  the  parts  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  whole,  in  society  the 
whole  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  parts.^^"^ 

His  theory  of  State  is  solid  because  his  principles  are  deep  and 
grounded  not  in  any  such  variable  as  economics,  but  in  the 
very  constancy  of  human  nature  itself.  It  should  be  acceptable 
to  the  twentieth  centur^%  for  it  presents  the  best  and  most  ra- 
tional basis  for  democracy. 

Having  seen  St.  Thomas'  primary  political  doctrine  both  in 
itself  and  in  contrast  to  the  efforts  of  later  and  allegedly  greater 
authorities,  we  may  pass  to  a  consideration  of  his  idea  of  State. 


1S7  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  IX,  ad  3:  "Bonum  commune 
est  finis  singularum  personarum  in  communitate  existentium,  sicut 
bonum  totius  est  bonum  cuiuslibet  partium." 


2(3       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


CHAPTER  II 
POWER 

Saint  Thomas  teaches  that  the  individual,  if  able  to  live 
by  himself,  would,  under  God,  be  his  own  king.^-"^  The  ne- 
cessity for  rulers  would  be  nil.  The  hypothetical  character 
of  the  assertion  saves  Aquinas  from  sounding  like  Rousseau.  It 
is  because  the  human  being,  w^ith  an  endowment  of  reason,  ap- 
proaches the  divine,  that  the  Angelic  Doctor  has  some  of  the 
enthusiasm  with  which  Democritus  of  old,  regarding  man  a 
god,  glowed.  The  Deity  governs  according  to  reason,  and 
His  rational  creatures  share  in  His  regime.  Reason  is  the 
principal  of  human  acts,  their  rule,  and  measure.^^^  It  is  there- 
fore fundamental  in  the  State. 

We  need  look  for  nothing  radical  in  St.  Thomas'  doctrine. 
Its  constant  aspiration  to  reasonableness  precludes  any  comfort 
to  either  the  bolshevist  or  the  ultra  conserv^atist.  Because  he 
devotes  so  much  consideration  t-o  the  rational  aspects  of  man, 
he  can  never  forget  the  individual's  powders,  prerogatives,  and 
place  in  the  divine  plan.  Every  reasonable  human  w^ant  is  of 
the  utmost  importance;  for  all  spring  from  a  nature  that  is 
god-nke.140 

1. — Ethical  Aspect  of  Power 

In  the  preceding  chapter,  an  ethical  element  in  his  answer 
to  the  primary  question  of  politics  w^as  observed.  Very  im- 
portant in  his  conception  of  the  foundation  of  the  State,  this 
same  moral  aspect  is  even  more  so  in  his  idea  of  its  structure. 
We  have  seen  his  explanation  of  the  appearance  of  civil  society. 
Now  his  thought  practically  tends  more  and  more  to  the  ideal. 

r.iS  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.2. 

140  He  warns  ua,  though,  that  in  adjudging  what  is  natural  to  man, 
we  must  consider  those  things  which  are  strictly  according  to  his 
nature  and  are  not  corruptions  of  it.    Com  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  27 

Being  a  psychologist,  however,  he  does  not  soar  off  to  any  such 
beautiful  but  unreal  realms  as  Plato's  Republic,  Campanella's 
City  of  the  Sun,  Moore's  Utopia,  or  Bacon's  Atlantis.  He  stands 
firmly  in  reality,  though  ever  pointing  to  a  noble  purpose  for 
which  the  State  was  conceived  and  by  which  it  must  be 
guided. 

He  sees  man's  human  relations  revolving  on  the  four  car- 
dinal virtues.  For  him,  as  J.  Martin  Littlejohn  notes,  'Tolitical 
ethics  may  be  characterized  as  individual  ethics  extended  to 
the  political  domain. "^^^  His  whole  science  is  impregnated 
with  the  morality  of  which  man's  rational  nature  is  the  norm, 
and  without  which,  as  up-to-date  thinkers  are  coming  to  realize, 
democracy  is  sheer  fancy. Littlejohn,  however,  is  wrong  in 
his  further  opinion  that  St.  Thomas  bases  his  politics  entirely  on 
abstract  principles  of  human  nature  and  has  no  concern  with 
the  facts  of  the  external  world.  The  intimacy  of  Aquinas  with 
the  eminently  empirical  Aristotle,  whose  researches  covered  so 
many  constitutions,  and  his  varied  contact  ^^dth  the  intense 
times  in  which  he  himself  lived,  must  have  rendered  him  keen 
to  the  actual.  His  writings  prove  that  he  was.^*^  He  peers 
so  closely  into  the  human  heart  and  mind  because  he  realizes 
that  right  here  is  the  source  of  the  actual ;  he  is  equally  inter- 
ested in  the  ethical,  because  it  leads  to  the  ideal.  He  is,  first  and 
last,  but  never  solely,  a  philosopher. 

Among  the  practical  sciences,  Aquinas  finds  ethics  the  first ; 
and  in  ethics  a  most  important  department  is  politics,  inasmuch 
as  it  considers  the  ultimate  and  perfect  good  in  things  human. 
Morals  are  great  agents  in  St.  Thomas'  construction  of  the 
State;  in  this,  he  differs  from  the  Machiavellian  separation  of 
the  political  virtues  from  the  moral.    He  rejects  the  idea  of 


141  The  Political  Theory  of  the  Schoolmen  and  Grotius.  p.  58. 

142  See  Vol.  XIV  of  the  Publications  of  the  American  Sociological 
Society,  The  Pi'ohlem  of  Democracy ;  Art.  on  A  Woi^king  Democracy. 
by  Frank  W.  Blackmar:  "But  in  reality  democracy  is  something  more 
than  a  form  of  government.  It  is  the  co-operating  spirit  life  of  the 
people  working  in  harmony  to  establish  justice  among  all  for  all."  P.  4. 

143 We  find  in  the  prologue  to  his  Com.  on  Aristotle's  Politics:  "ne- 
cesse  est  banc  scientiam  (i.  e.,  politicam)  sub  practica  philosophia  con- 
tineri,  cum  civitas  sit  quoddam  totum,  cuius  humana  ratio  non  solum 
est  cognoscitiva,  set  etiam  operativa." 

144  Prologus  ad  Com. 


28       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  that  there  is  only  an  extrinsic 
bond  uniting  the  community.  He  bases  the  State  on  natural 
law  and  a  common  social  nature,  and  therefore  sanctions  it 
both  extrinsically  and  intrinsically,  physically  and  ethically. 

2.— Law 

In  any  state,  the  most  prominent  feature  is  law.  From  the 
very  purpose  of  law  is  evinced  its  necessity;  and  St.  Thomas 
gives  the  topic  abundant  attention.  "To  the  medieval  mind," 
Carlyle  observes,  "the  law  was  the  practical  form  of  justice, 
and  it  is  in  the  due  maintenance  of  law^  that  men  found  the 
security  for  justice  and  for  all  good  in  life.''^^^  The  justice  which 
law  expresses  and  which  Aristotle  calls  "the  political  good." 
since  it  is  "in  the  interest  of  all"  (Politics,  III,  12),  is  demo- 
cratically defined  by  Aquinas  as  a  constant  and  perpetual  will 
to  concede  every  man  his  rights.^*^  At  the  bottom  of  the  law, 
Aquinas  places  love.  He  sees  all  men  striving  toward  the  same 
goal,  and  hence  a  union  existing  among  them.  Mutual 
sacrifice,  aid,  and  forbearance  are  imperative.  And  law  is 
regulative  of  these  important  relations  which  love  either  inspires 
or  confirms.^^^  It  is  the  result  and  cause  of  organization  and, 
as  Dante  calls  it,  "the  bond  of  society."  The  democracy  of 
the  Angelic  Doctor's  teaching  on  the  common  destiny  of  men 
is  equal  only  to  the  beauty  of  it.  Aristotle  is  more  impressive 
than  adequate  when  he  declares  that  "law^  is  an  agreement, 
and  as  the  sophist  Lycophron  says,  a  pledge  between  the  citi- 
zens of  their  intending  to  do  justice  to  each  other"  (Politics, 
III,  9) .  Aquinas  comprehends  and  expresses  in  his  writings  the 
highest  reason  and  motive  for  such  an  agreement. 

In  no  part  of  his  politics  is  he  in  finer  accord  with  the  fairest 
democratic  sentiment  than  in  his  treatise  on  Laws.  His  text 
is  warm  with  a  popular  message.  The  people  are  both  protected 
and  enriched  by  the  principles  which  he  proposes. 

i45iTis.  of  Med.  Polit.  Theory,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  37.  Cf.  St.  Augustine,  De 
Civiiate  Dei,  lib.  IV,  c.  4:  "Remota  itaque  justitia,  quid  sunt  regna 
nisi  magna  latrocinia?" 

146  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  1. 

147  Summa  Theol.,  2a  or  2ae,  qu.  XCIV,  a.  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  29 

Primarily,  law  must  be  reasonable.  For  as  reason  is  a  par- 
ticipation of  the  eternal  law  of  God,  so  is  human  law  but  a 
derivation  from  reason.  Each  man  has  reason;  each  man 
shares  in  the  eternal  law.  A  necessary  conclusion  from  St. 
Thomas'  fundamental  proposition  on  the  necessary  reasonable- 
ness of  law  is  that  each  individual  has  implicit  part  in  the 
formation  of  the  human  law,  as  each  has  a  share  in  the  natur- 
^1 148  r^Y^Q  vigor  legis  is  not  in  the  particular  pleasure  of  any- 
body, but  in  the  rational  nature  of  the  people.  A  decided 
advance  indeed  on  the  autocratic  maxim  of  the  Digest:  "The 
pleasure  of  the  prince  is  the  strength  of  the  law."^^^  Decrees 
may  be  fulminated  by  sovereigns,  but  if  these  enactments 
violate  the  reason  with  which  every  man  is  endowed,  they  are 
unjust  and  not  binding.^^^ 

True,  law  may  be  enforced;  but  only  when  and  because  it 
is  truly  just.  As  such,  it  is  not  a  diminutor  of  human  liberty, 
but  a  director  and  protector.  It  is  not  required  for  those  who 
are  using  their  liberty  in  society,  so  much  as  for  those  who 
are  abusing  it.  It  makes  the  path  clearer  for  the  good;  it 
brings  the  bad  back  into  the  path.  Its  restrictive  quality  is 
exercised  per  accidens,  i.  e.,  when  one  departs  from  the  way 
which  represents  the  best  of  human  reason  and  experience  and 
is  manifested  by  the  law  itself.  The  virtuous  act  freely  accord- 
ingly to  rule  and  reason,  and  law  therefore  is  no  circumscrip- 
tion to  them.i^i  rpj^g  gyj}^  injuring  themselves,  must  not  be 
allowed  to  spread  their  misdeeds  to  others.  It  is  the  perversity 
in  man  that  rebels  against  law,  not  the  rationality. 

The  first  lesson  of  the  natural  law  is  that  no  one  has  a  right 
to  do  wrong.i^-  Human  law,  by  preventing  wrong,  helps  the 
individual  to  do  right.  St.  Thomas  sees  nothing  unnatural  in 
what  is  but  a  concrete  reflection  and  expression  of  rational 
nature.  In  this  he  is  antithetical  to  such  as  Hippias  of  Elis, 
who  maintained,  according  to  Plato,  that  law  is  a  tyrant  out- 


148  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.  Ill,  ad  1. 

149  See  P.  Janet,  Histoire  de  la  philosophie  morale  et  politique,  Vol. 
I,  p.  315. 

150  Summa  'Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCI,  a.  IV,  ad  3. 

151  Contra  Gen.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  128. 

152  Cf .  Fox,  Religion  and  Morality,  p.  183. 


30       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


raging  nature.  Men  of  good  will  are  generally  of  good  reason ; 
and  these,  the  normal  representatives  of  the  race,  would  find 
it  easier  to  agree  with  Aquinas  than  with  the  cynical  Greek 
sophist. 

License  is  gripped  and  crushed  by  human  law,  but  under  a 
just  sceptre  or  constitution,  liberty  is  as  free  as  ever.^^^  St.  An- 
selm,  over  a  century  before  St.  Thomas,  had  worked  out  the 
problem  of  law  and  liberty  on  ethical  grounds  in  his  De  Libero 
Arbitrio  and  De  Concordia  Praescientiae  cum  Libero  Arbitrio, 
showing  that  freedom  does  not  consist  in  the  power  of  sinning 
and  that  no  will  is  more  free  than  a  good  man's.  Hegel  gives 
it  a  modern  presentation  in  his  doctrines  that,  according  to  the 
law  of  development,  freedom  is  realized  through  its  opposite, 
necessity.  But  Aquinas  himself  expresses  the  consonance  of 
liberty  with  law  better  than  both,  when  he  writes  that,  as  to 
restraint  and  co-action,  the  just  are  not,  so  to  speak,  under  law 
at  all.  They  are  a  law  unto  themselves.  They  are  free — 
"in  eos  non  habet  lex  vim  coactivam  sicut  habens  in  injustos.''^'** 
This  is  the  reason  for  Aristotle's  contention  that  "the  govern- 
ment of  free-men  differs  from  the  government  of  slaves  not 
less  than  slavery  and  freedom  differ  from  each  other  in  their 
nature."^^ 

The  element  of  force  in  St.  Thomas'  idea  of  law  is  tempered 
to  a  nicety.  The  law,  for  him,  is  primarily  doctrinal  and  direc- 
tive, not  disciplinary^  It  represents  a  balance  of  good  will 
in  the  community.  It  means  the  rationality  of  the  majority 
against  the  unreasonableness  of  a  minority.^^^  It  should  induce 
rather  than  coerce.^-^'''  It  should  be  a  gradual  rather  than  a 
sudden  force,^^  and  neither  inhumanly  rigid  nor  absolute. 
Charity  often  requires  that  the  law  itself  be  judged  before 
judgment  be  passed  according  to  the  law.^^^  Finally,  he  does 
not  consider  its  scope  universal:  it  must  not  essay  to  abolish 
all  vices,  but  only  the  more  grevious,  and  especially  those 


153  Cf.  Cicero,  De  RepuhHca,  1,  2  ;  also  Pro  Cluentio,  par.  XLIII. 
i'>4  Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  V,  ad  1. 
loo  Politics,  VII,  3. 

156  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XVI,  a.  II,  ad  2. 
ir)7  Idem,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCV,  a.  1,  ad  1. 

158  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  II.  ad  2. 

159  De  Dilectione  Dei  et  Proximi,  pars  2a,  XI. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  31 

which  are  of  injury  to  others  and  without  the  prohibition  of 
which  human  society  could  not  be  saved.^^  Accordingly,  too, 
he  believes  that  the  law  should  limit  itself  to  those  virtues  which 
are  ad  bonivm  commune.  Caesarism  and  socialism  find  no 
favor.  The  law  is  for  the  people,  even  as  is  the  State.  The 
convei*se  cannot  be  tolerated,  if  liberty  is  to  be  sustained  and 
psychology  respected. 

Over  and  above  its  reasonablenes,  the  law"  must  redound  to 
the  general  good.  The  State  is  instituted  for  the  benefit  of  its 
members;  it  is  by  law  and  consequent  order  that  this  purpose 
is  achieved.  No  ukase  w^hich  favors  individuals  or  a  class,  to 
the  detriment  of  others,  is  just.^^^  As  all  are  represented  by 
reason  in  the  State,  so  all  must  profit  by  the  reasonableness 
of  the  State's  rulings.  This  great  element  in  the  doctrine  of 
law,  ad  bonum  commune,  represents  St.  Thomas'  distinct  and 
democratic  contribution  to  jurisprudence.  Greek  philosophy 
had  considered  law  an  impersonal  conclusion  of  reason.  The 
Romans  saw  in  it  either  a  conclusion  of  reason  or  a  manifesta- 
tion of  will.  Aquinas  conjoins  it  directly  with  the  interests  of 
the  people  and  finds  its  chief  reasonableness  here. 

But  the  practical  difficulty  of  the  people  meeting  and  ruling 
themselves,  as  did  the  demos  of  glorious  but  diminutive 
Athens,!^-  must  have  appealed  to  St.  Thomas.  The  different 
grades  of  human  understanding  too  necessitated  a  difiFerent 
system.  Though  the  natural  law^  was  equal  for  all,  private  inter- 
pretation of  it  would  vary  according  to  the  acuteness  and  good 
will  of  different  individuals.  The  best  interpretation  would, 
of  course,  be  the  one  for  embodiment  in  human  law;  and 
naturally  this  could  be  expected  from  the  man  or  men  whom 
the  community  placed  before  itself  in  leadership — their  view 
being  larger  and  their  sympathy  broader.  Thomas,  therefore, 
sees  as  a  requirement  of  human  law  that  it  be  administ-ered 
by  those  in  charge  of  the  community.  A  corollary  of  this 
teaching  would  be :  accordingly  as  citizens  become  better  quali- 

1^0  gumma  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a  II,  ad  2. 

161  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1.  Cf .  Locke's  Two  Treatises,  Bk.  II,  ch.  XI, 
134. 

162  Aristotle  believed  that  the  State  should  be  small;  for,  if  it  is 
large,  "it  will  be  very  difficult  to  find  a  form  of  government  for  it." 
See  his  Politics,  VII,  4. 


'A2       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

fied,  mentally  and  morally,  to  deal  with  the  natural  law,  the 
need  of  rulers  for  that  pui-pose  would  be  less.  In  other  words, 
as  the  people  approach  the  ideal  of  equality  in  mental  and 
moral  superiority,  the  purer  the  resulting  democracy  can  be.i^ 

This  thought  is  vital  in  the  Angelic  Doctor's  politics,  that  law 
must  represent  the  best  interests  of  the  people  and  be  ordained 
for  the  people  either  by  the  people  or  by  those  who  represent 
the  people.i^  And  the  closing  line  of  that  tiny  masterpiece 
of  an  oration  with  which  Lincoln  comforted  our  sires,  half 
a  century  ago,  did  not  gleam  with  a  spirit  more  democratic 
than  this  doctrine  of  a  monk  of  the  thirteenth  century. 

Lastly,  he  teaches  that  law  must  be  brought  to  the  people 
whom  it  is  to  profit.  It  must  be  promulgated.  As  rational 
beings,  they  must  see  and  know  it  before  they  can  accept  it. 
An  assurance  of  its  reasonableness  seems  to  be  acceptance  by 
the  people.  If  custom  arises  counter  to  it  in  the  course  of 
time,  this  is  a  proof  at  least  of  its  inaptitude,  at  most  of  its 
injustice.^^^ 

St.  Thomas'  doctrine  of  law  leaves  no  room  for  despotism 
or  anarchy.  He  makes  it  at  once  potent  and  personal  to  all 
God's  human  creatures  by  associating  it  with  the  personal 
power  of  reason  in  each  and  tracing  its  justification  to  a  per- 
sonal God.  His  is  a  unified  concept  of  Law.^^^  The  eternal 
law  is  the  divine  reason  governing  the  universe;  the  natural 
law  is  a  reflection,  in  the  very  nature  of  creatures,  of  the 
divine;  positive  law  is  man's  interpretation  and  application  of 
the  natural  ;i^'^  positive  divine  law  is  God's  communication  of 
principles  of  the  eternal  law  to  creatures  by  revelation,  for  the 
purpose  of  leading  them  to  their  supernatural  end.^^  The 


163  Com.  Polit..  Lib.  II,  lec.  1.  Cf.  Laveleye,  Le  Gouvernement  dans 
la  Dcmocratie,  t.  I,  p.  28.  Anarchy?  No.  The  Thomistic  doctrine  is 
always  for  government,  but  tends  to  the  democratic  form  thereof. 
Dupont  White  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  activity  of  the 
State  increases  with  the  advance  of  civilization,  whereas,  in  the  primi- 
tive society,  liberty  is  nearer  to  absolute.  His  work  VIndividu  et 
ri^tat,  quoted  by  Laveleye,  op.  cit.,  pp.  28-29. 

l(H  Feugeuray.  Migne,  Dictionnaire  de  Theologie  Scholastique,  II, 
p.  1415. 

i(i">  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCII,  a.  Ill,  ad  2. 
160  Ibidem. 

167  la  2ae,  qu.  XCl,  a.  3. 

168  Cf.  Dante's  De  Monarchic,  III,  16. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  33 


last  is  an  illumination  and  guide  to  human  reason  and  to 
human  law,  and  of  inestimable  import  to  the  reign  of  justice.^^^ 
By  the  nautral  law  God  stoops  a  man;  by  human  law  man 
strives  to  God's  justice ;  by  divine  law  God  aids  him. 

It  is  axiomatic  with  Saint  Thomas  that  God  is  good  and 
wills  the  good  of  His  creatures.  His  eternal  law  is  the  height 
of  love  and  justice.  It  is  reasonableness  itself.  In  a  certain 
sense  all  law  comes  from  Godj^*^^  and  therefore  the  reason- 
ableness of  obedience  is  richly  manifest.  Human  enactments 
do  not  bind  in  conscience  insofar  as  they  are  human.  One 
man  has  no  right  to  command  another.  If  the  mandates 
of  mere  men  deserve  respect,  it  is  because  and  only  insofar  as 
they  are  derivations  of  the  eternal  law  and  hence  refer  to  God 
to  whom  alone  obedience  is  due.^'^ 

Men  are  not  trees  nor  stones,  and  God  does  not  treat  them 
as  such.  Even  the  insensate  things  of  creation  participate  in 
his  eternal  plan,  but  not  in  the  rational  way  which  is  vouch- 
safed to  men.  Things  are  largely  craven  to  the  laws  of  mechan- 
ism; men,  as  rational  beings,  govern  themselves.  And  thus 
St.  Thomas  posits  the  best  justification  for  a  democratic  polity 
which  can  be  conceived. 

God  not  only  endows  the  individual  with  reason  but  per- 
fects that  reason  with  the  extra  gift  of  grace,^'^^  ^^id  thus  ren- 
ders the  race  even  more  capable  of  self-government. 

Reason  is  the  same  for  all  human  beings;  and  in  this  re- 
spect all  men  are  equal,  for  all  have  reason.  It  is  in  the  capa- 
city for  development  and  exercise  of  this  faculty  that  individuals 
manifest  themselves  as  unequal.  All  men  are  wholly  subject 
to  the  natural  law ;  in  this  respect,  too,  their  equality  is  evident. 
King  and  slave  alike  must  bow.  Consequently,  in  St.  Thomas' 
view,  an  assertion  like  that  of  Hobbes  w^ould  singularly  lack 
point:  ''Outside  the  State  any  man  may  be  justly  robbed  and 
murdered  by  any  other  man ;  within  the  State,  by  one  only." 

This  condition  does  not  change  w^hen  the  natural  law  is  ex- 

169  Summa  Theol..  la,  2ae,  qu.  C,  a.  1. 

170  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  8:  "Mens  humana  universalis  boni  cognosci- 
tiva  est  per  intellectum,  et  desiderativa  per  voluntatem.  Bonum 
autem  universale  non  invenitur  nisi  in  Deo." 

171  Cf.  M.  H.  Feugueray,  op.  cit.,  p.  1415. 

172  Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCIV,  a.  3. 


34       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

pressed  in  the  human  positive  law.  If  men  are  equal  before 
the  former,  so  must  they  be  before  the  latter. 

Man's  reason  does  not  perfect  the  natural  law ;  it  detects  the 
perfection  of  it.  And,  then,  it  embodies  these  precious  obser- 
vations in  statements  which  are  the  substance  of  human  law. 
Natural  law  gives  us  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  ethical  field ;  hu- 
man law  attends  to  the  details.  Natural  law  offers  general 
principles;  human  law,  particular  applications.  Natural  law 
demands  that  the  rights  of  all  be  respected;  human  law  de- 
fines the  rights  and  enforces  the  respect.  Natural  law  is,  rela- 
tively to  Grod's  purpose,  complete  and  perfect;  human  law  is 
to  be  perfected  in  proportion  to  human  advances  in  the  under- 
standing of  the  natural  law-^*^^  Men  must  not  rely  solely  on 
the  beliefs  of  their  ancestors  as  to  what  is  good  and  bad  in 
law-making.  The  old  must  yield  to  the  new,  if  the  new  is 
better.i'''^  Incidentally,  here  Christianity  conferred  an  inestim- 
able benefit  on  the  race.  It  brought  a  beacon  of  ethical  light ; 
and  laws,  more  humane  and  in  harmony  with  reason,  appeared. 

Human  and  natural  law  need  a  complement;  for  the  end 
of  life  is  not  death.  Man's  lasting  city  lies  beyond.  A  regu- 
lated existence  here  helps  to  fit  him  for  his  destiny  ;  but  his 
destiny  being  above  earth,  a  word  from  heaven  is  necessary. 
It  comes  in  God's  Scriptures.  These  are  the  message  and 
test  of  justice,  revealing  the  perfection  of  it  and  the  supernatur- 
alization  of  it,  and  affording  the  highest  motive  and  sanction 
for  it.  Human  law  must  no  more  conflict  with  the  divine 
law  than  the  natural,  for  the  natural  is  but  the  dimmer  image 
of  the  divine.  In  case  of  apparent  clash,  human  law  dis- 
credits itself.  It  is  manifestly  erroneous  in  reason,  since  the 
Author  of  Reason  can  not  be  irrational  in  his  rulings.  Just  as  in 
the  natural  law  men  find  their  rights,  and  find  them  fortified 
by  duties,!^^  so  in  the  divine  law  do  they  discover  them  anew ; 
but  here  with  a  purpose  and  a  sanction  which  renders  them 
reasonable  beyond  expression.   Men  may  err  in  their  deductions 


nssumma  Theoh,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVII,  a.  3;  et  la  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  3. 

174  Kuhlman,  Der  Gesetzeshegriff  heim  St.  Thomas  von  Aquin  im 
Lichte  des  Rechtsstudiums  seiner  Zeit.  p.  180.  Baumann,  Die  Staats- 
lehre  des  h.  Thomas  von  Aquino,  pp.  80-81.    Com.  Polit..  Lib.  II,  lec.  12. 

175  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  V. 


ST.  THOmaS'  political  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  35 

from  the  natural  law;  the  divine  law  is  infallible,  and,  there- 
fore, can  ever  readjust  their  thought  to  the  good  and  true. 

Thus  St.  Thomas  not  only  exalts  reason  in  affairs  of  State, 
but  points  to  reason's  guide.  Civic  justice,  then,  is  doubly 
assured,^'^^  and  the  truest  foundation  for  democracy  securely 
laid.  A  doctrine  on  laws  which  claims  justice  for  all  and 
explains  how  it  may  be  secured,  is  both  critical  of  wrong  civic 
measures  and  constructive  of  right  ones.  It  is  democratic  in 
scope  and  spirit ;  it  regards  all  in  the  interest  of  each  and  each 
in  the  interest  of  all. 


3. — Source  of  Authority 

From  Saint  Thomas'  concept  of  law,  his  idea  on  the  source 
of  authority  is  evident.  All  law,  to  be  just,  is  modelled  on  the 
divine  reason.  If  just,  it  is  binding.  Its  authority  is  ultimate- 
ly from  God-i^"^  The  Angelic  Doctor  finds  himself  but  echoing 
the  teaching  of  St.  Paul:  that  all  power  is  from  God.^"^^  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  remark,  however,  that  Aquinas  does  not 
mean  that  illegitimate  power  is  also  from  God;  for  such  does 
not  partake  of  the  character  of  authority  at  all.  In  his  Com- 
mentary  on  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  chapter  XIII,  he  ex- 
presses himself  succinctly:  if  considered  in  itself,  power  is 
from  God;  as  to  its  possession,  it  is  likewise  from  God,  pro- 
vided it  is  acquired  not  by  perversity,  ambition,  nor  in  any 
other  unworthy  way;  and,  finally,  in  its  use,  it  must  be  godly 
and  be  wielded  according  to  the  principles  of  divine  justice. 
He  does  not  consider  it  the  creation  of  any  man  or  men.  God, 
the  Author  of  Justice,  is  the  primary  source  of  that  by  which 


176  Kuhn,  Die  Problevie  des  Naturi^echts  hei  Thomas  von  Aquin,  p.  32, 

177  In  the  De  Reg.,  L/ih.  Ill,  cap.  I,  we  find  proofs  of  this  proposition, 
Scriptural  and  rational.  Of  the  latter,  the  first  is:  "quia  oportet  omne 
ens  ad  ens  primum  reducere  sicut  ad  principium  omnis  entis,  ut  et 

omne  calidum  ad  calidum  ignis  "    The  second:   "omnis  ab  uno 

procedit,  et  per  unum  menstruatur  '     The  third:    "virtus  est 

proportionata  enti  cuius  est  virtus,  et  adaequatur  ei:  quia  virtus  fluit 

ab  essentia  rei  "    The  second  chapter  draws  a  proof  from  the 

axiom:  "omne  quod  movetur  ab  alio  movetur."  The  third,  from  the 
argument  of  finality, 

178  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  IV,  ad  1, 


36       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


justice  may  be  enforced.  This  doctrine  is  pregnant  with 
democracy;  for  St.  Thomas'  God,  like  St.  Paul's,  is  no  respecter 
of  persons,  but  is  equally  the  Author,  Provider,  and  Father 
of  All. 

But  since  it  is  natural  for  men  to  form  civil  society,  they 
must  have  from  the  Lord  of  nature  that  which  is  required  for 
its  support.  Civil  authority  is  necessary  in  the  State, just  as 
is  the  soul  in  the  body,  the  sun  in  the  heavens,  or  God  in  the 
universe.i^  And  whatever  has  parts  constituting  a  whole,  shows 
the  marks  of  some  one  thing  governing  and  another  gov- 
erned; e.  g.,  the  intellect  in  man,  or  the  father  in  a  family. 
Without  a  guiding  power,  each  member  of  society  would  seek 
gratification  in  his  own  way,^^^  and,  as  a  result,  the  State  would 
dissolve,  or,  at  best,  eke  out  a  violent  and  unhappy  existence.^^- 
Man  indeed  has  a  certain  aptitude  for  virtue,  but  still  he  needs 
to  be  disciplined  from  his  irrational  inclination  to  the  irration- 
al.^^ If  perfected  in  virtue,  man  is  the  best  of  terrestrial  beings ; 
if  separated  from  discipline,  he  is  the  worst,  for  his  very  gift 
of  reason  enables  him  to  devise  the  grossest  depravities  and 
a  perverted  will  would  have  him  execute  them.^^  In  regard 
to  necessary  rule,  he  is  hardly  self-sufficient,^^^  being  prejudiced 
in  his  own  favor  and  prone  to  seek  his  own  interest  at  the 
expense  of  others.  As  it  is  reasonable  that  there  be  law,  so  is 
it  reasonable  that  there  be  an  authority  to  administer  it.  Law 
is  the  channel  of  political  authority.  God  is  the  ultimate 
source. 

The  important  question  arises:  to  whom  does  the  Deity 
give  the  sovereign  power?  St.  Thomas  is  interpreted  by  such 


179  Cf.  Taparelli,  Naturel  Droit,  p.  138. 

180  See  De  Reg..  Lib.  I,  cap  1. 

181  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCV,  a.  1. 

182  So  necessary  is  power,  to  the  Angelic  Doctor's  mind,  that  he 
teaches  that  dominum  politicurn  would  have  come  into  existence  even 
in  the  state  of  innocence,  though  not  dominum  servile.  Cf.  Summa 
Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4. 

183  Cf.  Dante's  thought  that,  in  spite  of  reason  and  grace,  human 
passion  would  storm  disastrously,  were  not  men,  like  horses  astray 
in  their  brutishness,  held  to  the  road  by  bit  and  rein.  De  Monarchia. 
Ill,  16. 

184  Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCV,  a.  1. 

185  Ibidem. 

186  Le  Pouvoir  civil  devant  V ensignempnt  catholique.  pp.  3  et  4. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  37 

authorities  at  Feret,^^^  Costa  -  Rosetti/^'^  and  Vareilles  -  Som- 
mieres/^  as  responding  that  it  is  given  directly  to  the  people 
who  form  society.  This  would  be  the  Angelic  Doctor's  ob- 
vious answer;  for,  in  his  politics,  men  are  ever  esteemed  as 
rational  beings  and  all  his  thinking  is  relative  to  this  fact. 
After  endowing  men  with  reason,  God  may  not  be  conceived 
as  ignoring  His  own  gift  to  them  by  directly  placing  a  power 
over  them  which  would  move  them  as  so  many  puppets.  We 
have  seen  that  the  Doctor  taught  principles  from  which  logi- 
cally flowed  the  doctrine  of  social  compact;  also  that  laws  are 
but  the  concrete  statements  of  the  findings  of  man's  rational 
nature.  If  civil  society  comes  from  human  consent  as  well 
as  exigency,  and  laws  spring  from  human  reason,  the  indica- 
tion is  that  power,  too,  has  a  popular  source. 

We  have  direct  assertions  of  St.  Thomas. He  believes 
that,  since  authority  is  to  be  exercised  for  the  people,  it  is  of 
the  people.  The  purpose  is  the  people's ;  so  must  be  the  power, 
because  "to  order  to  an  end  is  the  property  of  him  whose  end 
it  is."^^^  The  power  behind  laws  is  either  in  the  people  or  in 
those  who  represent  them.^^^  This  question  of  the  immediate 
conference  of  power  to  the  people  by  God,  again  appears,  as  Cra- 
hay  notes,  in  another  question :  can  custom  achieve  the  force  of 
law?  In  his  answer,  St.  Thomas  distinguishes  between  a  re- 
public and  an  absolute  monarchy,  a  free  state  and  a  bound. 
In  the  former,  the  people  largely  reserve  the  power  to  their 
own  body  politic,  as  in  our  own  country;  in  the  latter  they 
surrender  it  to  their  monarch.  In  the  former  case,  a  custom 
counts  far  more  in  favor  of  a  particular  observance,  than  does 
the  authority  of  the  leader,  who  has  not  the  power  to  frame 
laws  except  as  the  people  decree.  And  even  in  the  latter,  a 
prevailing  custom  obtains  force  of  law,  insofar  as  it  is  tolerated 
by  those  to  whom  it  belongs  to  make  laws  for  the  people:  be- 


187  Philosophia  Moralis,  pp.  603-605 

188  Les  principes  fondamentaux  du  droit,  p.  349:  "Saint  Thomas  la 
(souver.  du  peuple)  prof  esse  dans  plusieurs  passages." 

189  E.  g. :  With  regard  to  the  dominion  of  princes  over  their  subjects, 
he  writes:  "quod  dominium  introductum  est  de  jure  gentium,  quod  est 
jus  humanum"  (Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XII,  a.  2) 

190  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu,  XC,  a.  3. 

191  Ibidem. 


38        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


cause  by  the  very  fact  that  they  tolerate  it,  they  seem  to  ap- 
prove.i^'-  This  does  not  mean,  as  Crahay  seems  to  think,  that 
St.  Thomas  holds  nothing  definite  with  regard  to  the  popular 
seat  of  power.1^3  Aquinas  could  not  but  have  much  regard  for 
the  popular  significance  of  custom.  To  the  medieval  mind, 
"law  was  primarily  custom,  legislative  acts  were  not  expres- 
sions of  will,  but  recognitions  or  promulgations  of  that  which 
was  recognized  as  already  binding  upon  men."^^*  Thus  custom 
largely  ante-dated  law,  and  law  in  large  measure  served  but  to 
perpetuate  custom.  This  fact  brings  one  very  close  to  a 
popular  and  rational  source. 

But  Crahay  concludes  somewhat  like  Gierke.^^*"^  He  sees 
in  the  Thomistic  text  merely  the  pronouncement  that  the 
people  may  have  the  civil  power  or  not;  hence  he  insinuates 
that  power,  according  to  the  mind  of  St.  Thomas,  is  not,  neces- 
sarily, immediately  in  the  people.  But  here  the  thought  of 
the  Angelic  Doctor  could  be  more  accurately  comprehended 
by  an  adversion  to  his  more  elementary  political  views.  It  is 
not  only  permitted,  but  it  is  necessary,  to  interpret  his  remarks 
in  the  light  of  his  principles.  In  the  veiy  beginning  of  his 
De  Regimine,  he  makes  the  democratic  utterance  which  we 
have  already  noticed:  that,  since  all  men  are  equipped  with 
reason  by  the  Creator,  each  one,  save  for  his  social  necessities, 
would  be  his  own  king.  Hence  men  naturally  are  free  and 
enjoy  the  power  that  freedom  entails.    Civil  association  would 


192  Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVII,  a.  Ill,  ad  3. 

193  La  politique  de  saint  Thomas  d'Aquin,  p.  49. 

l94Carlyle,  His.  of  Med.  Polit.  Theory,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  41.  See  also  p.  45: 
"The  first  element  In  the  conception  of  feudal  law  is  that  it  is  custom, 
that  it  is  something  not  made  by  the  king  or  even  by  the  community, 
but  something  which  is  part  of  its  life." 

19.")  Gierke  holds  that  St.  Thomas  attributes  sovereignty  sometimes 
to  the  people  and  sometimes  to  the  prince,  regard  being  made  to  the 
different  constitutions  of  different  states. — Political  TheoHes  of  Mid- 
dle Age.  p.  151.  De  facto,  this  is  so;  there  are  democracies  and  there 
are  monarchies.  But  the  question  here  is  not  of  this  common-place 
fact,  so  much  as  of  the  causation  and  operation  behind  it.  And  the 
Thomistic  thought  seems  to  be  that  the  People  have  power  and  can 
transfer  it  to  rulers.  In  this  idea,  Aquinas  would  be  at  one  with  the 
Roman  law:  "Le  loi  romaine  suppose  que  le  peuple,  vrai  souverain, 
delegue  son  autorice  h  I'empereur  par  une  sorte  de  pacte:  Populus  ei 
et  in  eum  omne  suum  imperium  et  potestntem  conferat:'  (Digest.,  lib. 
I,  De  Constitutionibus  principum,  tit.  IV,  Lugduni  MDCIIII,  p.  86). 
Montague,  Origine  de  la  societv,  Revue  Thomdste,  VI,  1898. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  39 

be  irrational,  if  it  demeaned  them  to  the  will  of  a  superimposed 
monarch  without  any  benefit  of  reference  to  their  own.  Since 
the  State  comes  from  the  people  and  is  not  clamped  down  on 
them  by  God,  the  power  in  the  State  is  the  property  of  the 
organized  people.  They  may  exercise  their  freedom  to  transfer 
it  to  a  sovereign  in  large  or  small  measure ;  but  not  wholly  nor 
absolutely,  for  this  course  would  appear  irrational. The  De 
Regimine  tells  us  that  sovereignty  is  to  be  limited.  ''This  limi- 
tation of  all  derivative  sovereignty,"  observes  Rahilly,  "is  ex- 
pressed in  various  ways  by  Catholic  writers.  The  people  retain 
authority  in  habitu  or  in  radice;  or  they  retain  its  possession  and 
alienate  only  its  exercise  or  use.^^"^  St.  Thomas  offers  no  explana- 
tion ;  but  it  is  enough  for  democracy,  that  he  teaches  an  amena- 
bility of  rulers  to  the  ruled.  On  Thomistic  ground,  Spinoza's 
social  contract  by  which  the  individual  surrenders  to  the  com- 
munity every  right,  except  that  of  thinking,  speaking,  and 
writing  freely could  not  be  justified;  much  less  Rousseau's 
magnificent  and  miserable  sacrifice  even  of  these;  and  least 
of  all  Hobbes'  total  and  eternal  extravagance.  Though  Aquinas 
does  consider  the  case  of  a  people  who  have  subjected  them- 
selves in  perpetuo}^  and  Suarez  believes  that  the  people,  once 
power  is  transferred,  may  not  revoke  it  at  will.  Both  the 
Angelic  Doctor  and  his  Jesuit  follower  hold  that  the  contract 
of  the  community  (as  a  moral  personality)  with  the  rulership 
should  be  observed,  even  by  future  generations,  unless  its 
conditions  be  violated  or  the  ruler  abuse  his  office  to  the  serious 
injury  of  the  people.^oo  The  presumption  is  against  change; 
wisdom  reverences  the  past  which  mothered  it.  Aquinas  and 
Suarez  are  not  advocates  of  rash  and  unreasonable  revolution ; 


196  On  Christian  principle  Aquinas  could  not  regard  as  ethical  such 
an  alienation  as  Plautus  describes  (Amphitryon,  Act  I,  Sc.  I,  v.  102, 
103),  and  Grotius  quotes  (De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis  (tr.)  Lib.  II,  ch.  V.  31). 

"Themselves,  and  whate'er's  divine  and  human. 
Their  town,  their  Children,  all  is  surrendered 
To  the  Thebans,  and  to  their  Discretion  left." 

197  Studies,  Art.  The  Sovereignty  of  the  People,  March,  1921. 

198  Cf.  Vareilles-Semmieres,  op.  cit.,  p.  105. 

199  De.  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

200  See  Rickaby's  Political  and  Moral  Essays,  p.  108,  and  Ryan's 
Catholic  Doctrine  on  the  Right  of  Self -Government,  pp.  20-21. 


40       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


and  neither  of  them  believes  that  the  people  have  a  right  to 
be  fickle  in  the  weighty  concerns  of  government ;  nor  do  they 
hold,  like  Rousseau,  that  authority  rests  inalienably  in  the 
people.  Suarez  calls  attention  to  custom,  and  so  at  least  indi- 
cates an  opinion  that  the  present  generation,  by  a  tacit  accept- 
ance of  the  polity,  implicitly  renew  the  contract  of  their  for- 
bears and  thus  are  not  so  much  bound  as  they  bind  them- 
selves.201  This  would  be  the  Thomistic  view,  too;  for  the 
principles  of  Aquinas  are  clearly  against  any  rigid  artificialism 
in  politics. 

But  that  the  people  have  the  power  to  transfer  power  is  the 
more  important  point  in  democratic  thought;  and  it  follows 
from  St.  Thomas'  teaching  that  they  have.  Which  would  be 
but  a  sequel  to  the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  civil  contract.^*'- 
This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  he  believed  sovereignty  to 
have  existed  in  the  individuals  prior  to  their  congregation  in 
civil  society.  Suarez,  of  whom  Bossuet  aptly  observes,  "In  him 
one  sees  the  whole  school,"  expresses  the  Scholastic  position 
clearly,  and  cites  St.  Thomas  and  Cajetan,  his  commentator,  as 
sponsors  of  it.^os  He  admits  that  since  the  State  rises  by  popu- 
lar consent,  it  would  seem  that  from  popular  consent  comes  the 
supreme  power  ;2^  but  he  maintains  that,  previously  to  politi- 
cal society,  political  power  is  non-existent,  wholly  or  partially, 
in  any  individual  or  individuals.-^^  This  declaration,  of  some- 
what anti-democratic  sound,  is  really  a  boon  to  democracy; 


201  De  Legihus,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  IV,  4. 

202  For  the  Scholastic  doctrine  of  contract,  see  Suarez,  De  legihus, 
Lib.  Ill,  cap.  Ill,  6,  et  cap.  IV,  2;  Op.  sex  dier.  Lib.  V,  cap.  VII;  Lib. 
Ill,  cap.  VIII;  Defensio  fidei.  Lib.  II,  cap.  II,  6,  7.  Cf.  Vareilles-Som- 
mieres,  op.  oit.,  pp.  106-113.  Suarez  holds  that  the  contract  is  bi-lateral 
and  does  not  exceed  the  intention  of  the  people  in  making  it:  "Haec 
est  veluti  conventio  quaedam  inter  communitatem  et  principem,  et 
ideo  potestas  recepta  non,  excedit  modum  donationis  vel  conventionis" 
— De  legibus.  Ill,  cap.  IX,  4.  He  declares  that  this  idea  is  not  new  and 
finds  it  implied  in  St.  Thomas,  and  also  in  the  Saint's  commentators 
and  adherents — Cajetan,  Victoria,  Soto  and  Molina.  See  Suarez  and 
Democ,  Alfred  Rahilly,  Studies,  Mar.,  1918,  p.  13.  Cathrein  (Philosophia 
Moralis)  admits  that  popular  sovereignty  was  the  doctrine  of  almost 
all  the  Schoolmen;  A.  J.  Carlyle,  too,  regards  its  place  important  in 
medieval  political  thought.  See  Ryan,  op.  oit.,  p.  6.  Zeiller,  Art. 
Uorigine  du  pouvoir  politique.  Revue  Thomiste,  vol.  XVIII. 

203  Le  legibus,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  IV,  2. 

204  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  Ill,  1. 

205  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  41 

for  it  reveals  the  belief  of  the  Schools  that  there  are  no  born 
kings.  Civil  authority  appears  only  with  the  appearance  of 
civil  society;  and  it  comes  from  God  immediately  to  the 
united  people  whose  consent  has  given  being  to  the  State.  Of 
themselves  the  people  have  nothing;  by  God  they  rise  in  glory. 
Power  does  not  come  from  individuals;  but  coming  to  the 
corporate  people  from  on  high,  it  is  regulated  by  the  corporate 
consent,  explicit  or  implicit,  and  so  may  be  transferred  in  any 
rational  degree  to  rulers.  St.  Thomas'  text  on  custom,  therefore, 
does  not  militate  against  the  democratic  idea  of  the  immediate 
sovereignty  of  the  people.  The  Angelic  Doctor  merely  con- 
siders two  cases:  one  in  which  the  power  has  been  transferred 
in  somewhat  Hobbish  fashion;  or  one  in  which,  rather  Rous- 
seau-like, it  has  not.2<>6 

Again,  St.  Thomas'  teaching  on  the  manner  of  dealing  with 
a  tyrant  manifests  the  democracy  of  his  doctrine  on  sovereignty. 
His  De  Regimine,  in  which  his  views  are  exposed,  and  which 
was  written  for  the  guidance  of  a  king  of  Cyprus,  is  of  sufficient 
force  to  shock  autocracy  and  regal  smugness.  It  would  bran- 
dish an  intellectual  sword  in  the  face  of  any  ruler  who  mis- 
represents the  empowering  people,  and  seeks  only  his  own 
interest.  Aquinas,  however,  would  not  have  the  arch-malefactor 
arraigned  by  the  private  presumption  of  any  citizen.-^"  He 
evidently  believes  that,  when  sovereignty  is  woefully  abused, 
it  returns  to  its  original  source,  the  political  body  of  the  people, 
even  if  they  have  surrendered  it  in  perpetuo;  for  the  contract 
(quod  ei  pactum  a  subditis)  is  broken  for  the  people,  if  the 
ruler  infracts  it  for  himself.-^  And  so  Aquinas  teaches  that 
by  public  authority  (auctoritate  publica)  the  reckless  regent 
is  to  be  met:  a  suggesstion  that  political  authority  is  in  the 

206Rahilly,  however,  offers  a  different  explanation:  "This  is  what 
he  (St.  Thomas)  calls  'a  free  people,'  not  in  contrast  to  a  people 
which  has  slavishly  alienated  all  its  power  to  an  assembly,  or  a  person 
(a  type  of  government  which  he  did  not  consider  rational)  but  rather 
as  distinguished  from  a  sub-community,  one  of  those  largely  autono- 
mous aggregations — duchy,  fief,  or  town — which  were  commoner  in 
the  federalistic  society  of  the  middle  ages  than  in  these  days  of  cen- 
tralized despotism."  Studies,  March,  1920;  Art.  The  Democracy  of 
St.  Thomas.  If  this  be  the  true  meaning  of  the  Saint's  text,  then 
the  immediate  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  enhanced  in  his  doctrine. 

207  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

208  Ibidem. 


42       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

community  and  not  in  the  individuals  composing  it.  Punish- 
ment is  the  privilege  of  the  whole  people  and  not  of  any 
particular  person;  for  power  is  of  the  whole  people.-^'-^  Too, 
when  St.  Thomas  mentions  as  a  characteristic  of  tyranny,  that 
the  king  rules  his  subjects  in  spite  of  them  {De  Reg.  I,  1.),  we 
have  further  indication  of  his  profession  of  popular  sover- 
eignty. 

St.  Thomas  uses  the  hypothetical  expression,  ''if  it  belongs 
to  the  right  of  a  people  to  choose  a  king"  (si  vero  ad  jus  multi- 
tudinis  alicujus  pertineat  sibi  providere  de  rege)2io  in  connec- 
tion with  the  justice  of  extreme  procedure  against  a  tyrant,  out 
of  reverence  for  the  exceptional  cases  where,  in  Holy  Writ, 
God  intervenes  and,  by  special  agent,  chooses  the  sovereign 
Himself,  as  exemplified  in  Saul  and  David.  St.  Thomas'  politi- 
cal thought,  of  course,  is  never  counter  to  Scripture.  All  his 
treatises  are  gemmed  with  appropriate  quotations,  which  prove 
his  deference  and  devotion. 

He  considers  also  the  case  in  which  the  people  have  yielded 
to  some  individual  the  right  to  provide  them  a  king.^n  Then 
to  their  representative  they  must  have  recourse,  if  the  received 
ruler  prove  tyrannical.  While  consistently  teaching  political 
liberty,  and  implying  popular  sovereignty,  Aquinas  careful- 
ly avoids  a  doctrine  of  ready  revolution  and  civic  turmoil ;  and 
so  stems  the  tragic  tide  of  abuses  which  scholars  like  St.  Al- 
phonsus  Liguori,^^^  see  swelling  from  such  a  democratic  con- 
cept. The  reasonableness  of  casting  aside  a  broken  contract; 
the  unreasonableness  of  any  individual  acting  independently 
of  the  body  politic  against  a  ruler;  the  necessity  of  the  moral 
personality  of  the  community  to  act:  these  are  the  items  in 
Thomistic  doctrine  which  at  once  enfold  equity  and  safety. 
Besides,  Thomas  is  quite  as  earnest  as  Bossuet  and  Taparelli 
in  counselling  piety  and  patience  in  the  face  of  the  irremedi- 
able.213    Prudence,  too,  even  when  success  promises,  is  his 

209  Aquinas  does  not  favor  tyrannicide,  but  a  more  restrained  re- 
sistance to  the  tyrannical  regime.  See  De  Reg.  I,  cap  6;  and  Summa, 
2a  2ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  2,  et  LXIX,  a.  4. 

210  Z)e  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap  6. 

211  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

212  St.  Alphonsus,  however,  is  an  apostle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people.   See  his  Theol.  Moralis.  de  legihus.  n.  CIV,  I.e. 

213  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


43 


prescription.  If  greater  evils  would  likely  follow  from  the 
overthrow  of  the  despot  than  from  the  toleration  of  him,  the 
latter  were  the  better  course.^i*  Aquinas  could  not  smile  an 
approval  on  soviet  Russia  today. 

Crahay  concedes  a  certain  value  to  the  thesis  of  the  sov- 
ereign people  in  the  Thomistic  text  already  referred  to:  ^^or- 
dinare  autem  aliquid  in  bonum  commune  est  vel  totius  mul- 
titudinis,  vel  alicujus  gerentis  vicem  totius  multitudinis" 
{Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.  III).  In  fact  he  considei^  this 
passage  the  only  one  in  Aquinas'  doctrine  which  is  of  impor- 
tance in  this  regard  '■^^^  for  herein  either  the  people  are  author- 
ized to  make  laws,  or  he  who  represents  them.  But  then  this 
writer  proceeds  to  criticize  such  an  appreciation  of  the  text 
and  proffers  the  possibility  that  a  conclusion  from  it  as  to 
the  immediate  power  of  the  people  may  be  too  broad.  He 
scrutinizes  the  expression,  ^'gerentis  vicem  totius  multitudinis,'' 
and,  though  seeing  in  it  the  meaning,  "holding  the  place" 
(tenir  la  place)  of  the  people,  he  does  not  gather  the  signifi- 
cance that  the  vicegerent  of  the  community  necessarily  de- 
rives his  power  from  the  people.^i^  It  would  seem  that  he 
bears  too  heavily  on  this  single  text  and  does  not  consult  the 
larger  spirit  of  St.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  it.  For  Aquinas,  civil  society  is  natural;  and, 
under  the  force  of  this  principle,  all  artificial  constructions  on 
his  teachings  are  inadmissible.    We  have  seen  the  glimmer 


214  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  5.  St.  Thomas  observes  that,  more  often  than 
not,  it  is  bad  men  who  undertake  to  slay  the  tyrant.  And  since  such 
are  opposed  to  a  good  monarch  as  well  as  to  an  evil  one,  the  recognition 
of  a  right  of  private  citizens  to  kill  would  be  hazardous  in  the  extreme. 
To  lose  a  king  need  not  mean  to  escape  a  tyrant.  Dunning  avers  that 
"the  anarchic  character  of  the  argument  for  tyrannicide  has  never 
been  more  clearly  exposed,  or  its  conclusions  more  concisely  refuted, 
than  by  St,  Thomas" — Political  Theories,  Ancient  and  Medieval,  p.  20. 
Cf.  Summa.  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  1,  ad  3.  Happily  in  the  Thomistic 
view,  we  find  lacking  the  venom  of  Jean  Petit,  who  held  that  a  tyrant 
might  be  killed  by  anyone.  The  Council  of  Constans  condemned  this 
dangerous  excess.    See  Zigliara,  Summa  Philosophica,  Vol,  III,  p.  257. 

215  Op.  cit,  p,  49. 

216  Idem,  p.  50:  "Mais,  pour  tenir  la  place  qu'occupe  normalement  la 
communaut^,  pour  exercer  une  fonction  dont  elle  est  incapable,  dans 
une  hypothese  donnee,  faut-il  n^cessairement  deriver  ses  pouvoirs  de 
la  communaute  meme  ?  Cette  deduction  depasserait  manifestement 
les  premisses." 


44       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

of  social  contract  in  his  pages.  We  must  accept  a  pari  that,  if 
God  granted  men  the  choice  of  forming  the  State,  He  hkewsie 
gave  them  to  appoint  their  rulers.  Else  where  would  be  His 
respect  for  that  rational  nature  in  men  which  is  the  image 
of  His  own?  Suarez  and  Bellarmine  saw  this,  and  read  the 
mind  of  Thomas  accordingly.  Moreover,  if  power  were  ever 
vested  immediately  by  God  in  rulers,  how  could  democracy 
be  sufficiently  justified?  And  yet,  as  will  later  appear,  Aquin- 
as mentions  democracy  under  the  name  of  "politia,"  as  one 
of  the  good  forms  of  government.  Finally,  if  popular  sov- 
ereignty were  foreign  to  his  politics,  how  could  he,  consistent- 
ly, admit  the  right  of  revolt?  If  the  people  can  take  away 
power,  the  correlative  notion  is  that  they  primarily  have  it 
and  can  give  it.-^^ 

The  theory  of  evolution  has  flung  a  cloud  around  the  ques- 
tion of  sovereignty  as  well  as  most  others.  From  an  agnostic 
view-point,  it  is  hard  to  see  a  condition  in  primitive  society 
so  finely  democratic  as  St.  Thomas'  opinion  postulates.  Man 
may  originally  have  been  as  simian  or  as  lupine,  as  Darwin 
or  Hobbes  might  wish.  From  such  a  base  beginning,  the  rise 
of  the  race  to  civic  status  could  be  logically  explained  only 
by  the  climbing  of  the  few  on  the  shoulders  of  the  many; 
and  sovereignty  would  be  of  him  who  could  ascend  rather 
than  of  him  who  deser\^ed.  It  would  be  natural  for  him  to 
be  head  of  the  people  who  could  be.  Power  would  be  identical 
with  force.    Might  would  be  right. 

St.  Thomas,  however,  regards  man  not  as  evolving  into  a 
rational  animal,  but  as  being  such  from  the  start.  Incident- 
ally, up-to-date  thought  is  inclined  to  reject  Spencerianism 
for  the  havoc  it  has  wrought  with  its  assumptions  in  scientific 
fields;  as  witnesses,  for  example,  Dr.  Lowie's  recent  work  on 
Primitive  Society And  the  pendulum  of  opinion  is  swinging 


217  Cf.  Locke's  teaching:  "For  all  power  given  with  trust  for  the 
attaining  of  an  end  being  limited  by  that  end,  whenever  that  end  is 
manifestly  neglected  or  opposed,  the  trust  must  necessarily  be  for- 
feited and  the  power  devolve  into  the  hands  of  those  who  gave  it,  who 
may  place  it  anew  where  they  shall  think  best  for  their  safety  and 
security"— Ti^-o  Treatises  on  Government.  Bk.  II,  ch.  XIII,  149. 

218  See  also  Creation  versus  Evolution,  by  Philo  Laos  Mills,  Wash- 
ington, 1920. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  45 

back  to  the  past.  It  is  conceded  as  possible  that  man  may  have 
been  man  from  the  early  morning  of  the  race,  and  rational 
man  at  that.  If  so,  a  rational  theory  of  the  State  and  itc3 
elements,  such  as  St.  Thomas  propounds,  is  of  valid  appeal. 
Not  only  of  the  ideal  State,  but  also  of  the  primitive.  Aquinas, 
politically,  reasoned  on  the  basis  of  the  best  that  was  in  man ; 
evolutionists  tended  to  be  impressed  with  the  w^orst.  With 
justice,  present-day  writers  are  reverting,  though  unconscious- 
ly perhaps,  to  a  Scholastic  starting-point  in  political  investi- 
gation and  estimation. 

There  are  four  ways  of  considering  sovereignty;  the  evolu- 
tionistic  explanation  by  force  j^^^  the  theistic,  in  which  God 
gives  power  directly  to  rulers,  conformably  to  the  seeming 
convictions  of  Dante,  the  majestic  dreamer ,220  and  the  auto- 
cratic sovereigns  of  modernity;  the  popular,  in  which  it  is 
given  immediately  to  the  people  and  thence,  by  the  people, 
to  rulers;  the  theistic-popular,  in  which  the  people  appoint 
their  rulers  and  God  empowers  them.  The  first  would  be 
more  plausable  in  an  atheistic  or  deistic  world;  also  if  the 
memory  of  Charles  Darwin  were  as  green  as  at  the  close  of 
the  nineteenth  century  and  the  name  of  Herbert  Spencer  were 
still  so  unmistakably  one  with  which  to  conjure.  The  second 
is  untenable,  as  the  soul  of  St.  Thomas'  doctrine  implies,  and 
as  Suarez,22i  and  Bellarmine,  in  tones  reverberating  down  to 
our  own  day  and  hour,  testify.  The  fourth  is  a  compromise 
between  the  second  and  the  third,  and  seems  a  strange  attempt 
both  to  grant  the  people  something  and  take  it  away.  If  they 
have  only  the  power  to  point  a  helpless  finger  in  the  direction 
of  the  individuals  of  their  choice,  their  might  is  scarcely  worth 
mentioning.  It  is  really  incredible  that  the  Absolute  should 
be  bound  by  the  beck  of  a  finger ;  and  nothing  could  have  been 
farther  than  this  idea  from  the  mind  of  St.  Thomas,  who  be- 


219  We  find  in  Woodrow  Wilson's  The  State,  this  view:  "The  essential 
characteristic  of  all  government,  whatever  its  form,  is  force.  There 
must  in  every  instance  be,  on  the  one  hand,  governors,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  those  who  are  governed.  And  the  authority  of  governors, 
directly  or  indirectly,  rests  in  all  cases  ultimately  on  force.  Govern- 
ment in  its  last  analysis  is  organized  force,"  p.  593. 

220  De  Monarchia,  III. 

221  Cf.  Suarez  and  Democracy,  Rahilly,  Studies,  March,  1918. 


46       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

held  man  as  the  fellow  of  God's  knowledge  and  providence  by 
intellect  and  will,  and  consequently  a  powerful  creature  of 
personal  responsibility.  Aquinas  saw  the  State  potential  in 
human  nature ;  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  beheve  that  he 
did  not  view  authority  as  potential  in  the  State — it  not  being 
God's  way  with  the  world  to  make  positive  institutions  or  do- 
nations, as  Suarez  would  say,  distinct  from  the  production  of 
human  nature.  The  third  concept,  by 'itself,  appears  to  be  the 
best  explanation  and  the  one  which  Aquinas  prefers. 

4. — Title  to  Authority 

More  light  on  the  views  of  St.  Thomas  regarding  this  signifi- 
cant question  of  sovereignty  is  shed  in  his  teaching  on  the  title 
to  power.  Briefly,  he  holds  that  a  supereminence  of  worth  is 
a  man's  recommendation  to  office.^^^  He  shares  the  common- 
sense  view  of  Aristotle :  the  best  flute  is  not  to  be  given  to  those 
who  are  of  the  best  family,  for  they  will  never  play  the  better 
for  that;  but  the  best  instrument  should  go  to  the  best  artist 
(Politics,  III,  12).  It  is  not  a  man's  merit  that  gives  him 
authority,  however;  it  is  the  office  to  which  his  merit  fits  him 
and  the  people  rationally  raise  him.  And  the  people,  having 
created  the  State,  also  create  the  positions  in  it.  We  cannot  find 
Aquinas  submitting  that  virtue  automatically  makes  a  man  a 
sovereign.223  With  the  phenomenon  of  self-regard  so  univer- 
sally present,  society  would  have  almost  as  many  monarchs  as 
members;  and  St.  Thomas,  psychologist  as  he  is,  could  counte- 
nance no  theory  which  would  lead  to  the  fatuous.^^*  Nullus  in 
eadem  causa  est  actor,  et  judex  (Summa  Theol.,  Sup.,  LXII, 
a.  3).  He  must  have  meant  that  the  worth  of  a  man  signals 
him  out  to  the  community  as  a  fitting  repository  for  power.  In- 
deed, fitness  for  rule  gives  a  certain  right  to  rule.  For  it  is  but 
reasonable  that  the  community  should  want  the  right  man  and 


222  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  10.   Cf.  also  Aristotle's  Politics,  I,  2. 

223  In  fact  St.  Thomas  refers  to  the  virtuous  as  lacking  a  just  power 
(Com.  Pol.,  Dib.  V,  cap.  I).  If  they  have  not  the  power,  it  is  because 
the  community  has  not  conceded  it  to  them. 

224  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  7. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  47 


that  the  right  man  should  have  a  right  to  be  wanted.^^^  And  so 
St.  Thomas  says  in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle's  Politics  that 
indisputable  captains  of  the  people  who  do  not  come  forth  in  a 
crisis  to  steer  the  ship  of  State,  are  guilty  of  sin.^-^  They  owe 
it  to  themselves  to  devote  their  gifts  to  the  common  cause.^^^ 
The  people  could  not,  with  reason,  refuse  to  have  the  best 
at  the  helm ;  and  the  common  good,  always  the  lode-star  of  St. 
Thomas'  political  thought,  demands  it.^^s 

The  judgment  is  current  in  these  opinions  of  Aquinas  that 
the  investiture  of  power  in  the  rulers  by  the  people  may  be 
either  expressed  or  implied.  An  ignorant  community  would 
transfer  authority  with  little  or  no  thought  and  less  formality, 
time  confirming  the  transaction,  and  their  own  will  in  the 
matter  becoming  ever  vaguer.  One  intellectually  awakened 
would  be  less  prodigal  of  concession;  like  the  Italian  cities  of 
the  Doctor's  own  day.  Applying  the  touch-stone  of  his  politics, 
reasonableness,  we  find  that  the  more  advanced  a  community 
becomes  in  mentality  and  morality,  the  less  need  it  has  of 
extravagantly  empowered  sovereigns.  And  in  proportion  as 
this  necessity  recedes,  the  democratic  form  of  government  may 
commendably  appear.229  The  spirit  of  democracy  is  always 
present  in  St.  Thomas'  political  ideals;  but  on  the  exigencies 
and  advantages  of  the  State,  and  therefore  of  the  people  who 
form  it,  depends  the  outward  form  of  its  expression. 

Aquinas  makes  this  important  emendation  to  his  doctrine 
on  the  sovereignty  of  the  people.  Since  the  State  is  conceived 
in  reason,  and  must  therefore  live  through  reason,  the  people 
constituting  it  must  be  the  kind  to  hearken  to  the  voice  of  reas- 
on and  therefore  to  that  of  virtue.  The  implication  is  that 
God  withholds  power  in  a  community  in  which  spiritual  and 
social  chaos  thrive.  The  State  must  first  be  formed  and  put  in 
order  before  it  can  become  authoritative.    A  people  absolutely 

225  Lib.  V,  lec.  1. 

226  Ibidem. 

227  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  IV,  ad  2. 

228  Aquinas  notices  that  excellence  and  fitness  are  not  always  so 
manifest  as  they  should  be  and  that  the  people  may  badly  deceive 
themselves  in  their  choice.  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  4.  So  he  would 
not  have  the  worthy  and  efficient  hesitant  in  coming  forward  with 
their  gifts  to  the  State. 

^9  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  8. 


48        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

beyond  the  pale  of  rational  and  political  purposes  and  ideals, 
are  not  sovereign.  But  this  is  mostly  a  hypothetical  case ;  for 
such  folk  would  not  have  instituted  a  civil  society  in  the 
first  place.  St.  Thomas  clearly  expresses  the  condition,  "if 
they  come  into  one"  (si  in  unum  conveniant).-^^  If  the  State 
is  an  organization  which  seeks  the  well-being  of  its  members 
in  an  orderly  way,  it  would  have  no  appeal  to  the  brutish 
among  men ;  and,  even  if  it  did,  it  would  reform  them.^si  As 
for  the  ordinary  community  in  which  reason  and  prudence 
predominate,  even  though  individuals  may  be  weighed  and 
sometimes  found  wanting,  authority  has  only  been  present  in 
it,  but  could  and  perhaps  should  be  excused  more  directly  by  it, 
rather  than  absolutely  through  a  few  men  of  integrity 

5. — Election 

Aquinas  approves  the  system  of  election,  but  with  reserva- 
tions. He  warns  that  the  public  trust  must  not  be  betrayed 
for  pecuniary  profit.  He  recognizes  the  temptations  which 
lurk  in  civil  station.  And  so  he  believes  that  a  poor  man 
would  be  at  a  decided  ethical  disadvantage  in  office,  and  con- 
sequently would  have  a  right  to  waive  aside  any  preferments. 
One  who  inclines  to  lucre  and  declines  from  virtue,  to  any 
degree,  cannot  be  the  ideal  statesman.  But  the  De  Regimine 
asserts  that  neither  w^ealth  nor  poverty  can  form  an  absolute 
impediment,  and  that  a  man's  personal  worth  is  what  really 
counts.233 

The  doctrine  of  election  well  show^s  the  democracy  of  Thomis- 
tic  politics.  But  the  Doctor  does  not  blind  himself  to  the  desira- 
bility of  a  certain  aristocracy  of  intellect  and  virtue.    He  re- 


230  Ibidem. 

231  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  9:  "et  manifestum  est  quod  istam  (multi- 
tudinem  bestialem)  non  expediate  domanari  aliquo  modo,  quia  sine- 
ratione  est  conjunctim  et  divisim."  Cf.  Ryan's  Catholic  Doctrine  on 
the  Right  of  Self -Government,  p.  16.  There  the  general  principle  is 
stated:  that  uncivilized  and  perhaps  partially  civilized  peoples  some- 
times lack  the  moral  right  of  self-government. 

232  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  9.   Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVII,  a.  1. 

233  De  Reg.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  20. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  49 

quires  that  the  best  should  be  the  civil  servants  of  the  people.^^* 
And  what  though  he  demands  a  mental  standard,-^^  in  those 
who  are  permitted  to  choose  the  fittest?  Lecky  and  a  hundred 
other  modern  writers  on  democracy  and  liberty  will  echo  him 
in  that.236  The  significant  fact  is  that  he  recognizes  the  relation 
between  power  and  the  body  politic,  between  the  governed 
and  the  governors;  and  so  does  his  share  to  pave  the  way  for 
later  medieval  and  modern  political  reform.^s^ 

Aristotle  favored  election  as  opposed  to  heredity,  in  that  the 
latter  system  often  placed  unworthy  princes  over  the  people, 
and  hereditary  rulers  leaned  to  excess,  forgetful  of  the  public 
good  because  independent  of  public  opinion.  But  Aquinas  is 
not  expressly  against  heredity.  The  white  gleam  of  King  Louis' 
saintly  reign  perhaps  gave  him  pause.  Maybe,  too,  his  was 
a  prudent  as  well  as  a  sentimental  abstinence  from  final  judg- 
ment. Rulers  of  his  time  were  hereditary,  and  his  De  Regimine 
was  written  for  such  a  regent.  That  Aegidius,  his  disciple, 
plainly  held  heredity  preferable  to  election,  hardly  determines 
the  mind  of  Aquinas  in  the  matter.  The  texts  in  favor  of 
popular  participation  in  governmental  affairs  show  that  the  Doc- 
tor was  of  the  opposite  opinion.  He  words  his  tenets  with 
care.  He  is  no  bearer  of  revolutionary  banners.  Of  course, 
we  miss  in  his  dispensation  the  loud  notes  which  later  apostles 
of  popular  rights  sound.  But  he  wields  principles,  instead  of 
a  sword.   He  is  more  a  scholar  than  a  reformer. 


234  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  5. 

235  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap  9. 

236  See  Lecky,  Democracy  and  Liberty,  Vol.  I,  pp.  90-92. 

237  He  writes  in  his  Commentary,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  9,  that  the  people 
should  retain  their  power  "saltern  quantum  ad  consiliativum  et  judica- 
tivum."  He  also  observes  the  dangers  that  lie  in  a  State  where  popular 
participation  in  government  is  wanting;  "Si  multitude  nulla  modo  par- 
tieipat  principatu,  sequentur  multa  mala,  sicut  seditio  et  turbatio 
in  civitate."  Ibidem. 


50       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


6. — Miscellaneous  Confirmations  of  St.  Thomas'  Belief 
IN  Popular  Sovereignty 

The  impression  one  derives  from  his  works,  Crahay  avers, 
is  that  he  did  not  probe  ex  professo  the  origin  of  power.  But 
truly  in  various  subtle  and  sometimes  frank  ways,  he  indicates 
the  penultimate  source.  In  his  sentences,  the  word  ''people" 
precedes  the  term  for  rulers ;  and  his  maintenance  is  strong  that 
no  private  person  is  authoritative  in  government;  that  the 
most  that  individual  influence  can  be,  is  admonitory ;  and  that 
coercive  power  resides  only  in  the  people  or  their  representative. 
Nor  does  he  consider  this  pubhc  vicegerent  self-appointed. 
He  speaks  of  the  public  office  as  being  committed  to  rulers; 
thus  revealing  his  idea  of  the  corporate  people  as  yielding 
power  to  regents.  To  use  his  own  similitude:  as  a  patient 
surrenders  the  care  of  his  body  to  his  physician,  in  such  wise 
has  the  state-appointed  sovereign  control  of  the  community. 
Through  it,  he  governs  it,  for  it.^^s 

As  an,  added  indication  of  St.  Thomas'  belief  in  popular 
sovereignty,  his  close  accord  with  Aristotle  is  important.  The 
stand  of  the  Philosopher  on  this  question  of  power  appears  in 
Dunning's  observation:  "But  above  the  officer  he  (Aris- 
totle) insists  must  be  the  impersonal  factors  in  the  constitution 
— namely,  public  opinion  and  customary  law."^^^  Too,  the 
Macedonian  holds  that  the  court  of  final  appeal  in  state  affairs 
(hence,  it  would  seem,  the  source  of  primal  power)  is  the 
people.  He  rejects  the  opinion  that  the  few  rather  than  the 
many  are  the  logical  sovereigns  in  the  sense  that  they  can  serve 
better  judgment  in  cases  of  election  and  censure  of  officials. 
Plainly  he  thinks  "the  verdict  of  the  general  public  is  valid 
in  politics  just  as  in  musical  contests  and  in  banquets;  not  the 
musician  and  cook,  but  they  who  hear  the  music  and  eat  the 
dinner  are  best  qualified  to  render  judgment."-*^  Under  such 
a  praeceptor,  the  mind  of  Aquinas  would  naturally  take  a 
democratic  mould. 


238  Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.  Ill,  ad  2. 

239  His.  of  Political  Theories.  Vol.  I,  p.  95. 

240  Idem,  p.  70,  also  Com.  Polit.,  Dib.  Ill,  lec.  9. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  51 

Again,  the  figures  of  speech  which  Aquinas  uses  in  his  De 
Regimine,^"^^  to  describe  the  necessary  presence  of  power  in  the 
State,  and  which  we  have  already  noticed,  suggest  that  he 
pictured  authority,  primarily,  as  diffused  in  the  body  politic. 
His  use  of  the  soul  as  a  comparison  is  especially  interesting; 
inasmuch  as  he  considers  the  soul  present  in  the  whole  body. 
God  is  in  the  whole  universe.  The  light  of  the  sun  is  in  the 
whole  visible  heavens.  May  we  not  then  judge,  in  the  spirit  of 
St.  Thomas'  rhetoric,  that  power  is  in  the  whole  people?  The 
idea  is  still  further  warranted  by  the  fact  that  he  holds  the 
people  responsible  for  governmental  excesses;-^  which  would 
hardly  be,  unless  he  were  convinced  that  power  were  primarily 
invested  in  them.  Impressively  he  declares  that  the  leaders 
act  by  the  authority  and  choice  of  the  people. 

Most  assuring,  too,  is  the  interpretation  which  Cajetan,  the 
distinguished  and  best  commentator  on  the  Summa,  makes  on 
this  point.  He  finds  Aquinas  teaching  that  the  people  them- 
selves are  the  primary  power  and  either  seek  the  common  weal 
themselves  or  commit  it  to  the  care  of  others.  Otherwise,  he 
proceeds  to  explain,  the  ruler  of  the  people  would  not  be  a  prince 
but  a  tyrant.243  And  Rahilly  places  the  popular  sovereignty 
in  St.  Thomas"  doctrine  beyond  cavil;  for,  resorting  to  thirty 
commentators,  he  convincingly  finds  that  all  hold  the  same 
view  as  Cajetan.^^  Too,  Cajetan's  observations  on  the  subject, 
"Utrum  regnativa  debeat  poni  species  prudentiae"(  Summa 
TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  L,  a.  1)  are  of  finely  popular  import;  he 
sees  in  the  thought  of  Aquinas  that  a  royal  regime  depends 
on  the  election  of  the  people  and  that  the  power  of  the  com- 
munity is  transferred  to  the  favored  one  in  such  a  way  that  the 
appointed  ruler  is  merely  the  representative  of  the  people  (  vices 
popuU)?"^^  The  roster  of  believers  and  teachers  of  popular 
sovereignty  among  the  later  Scholastics  is  long  and  glittering. 
Locke's  glory  must  pale  before  a  realization  that  his  central 
doctrine  was  well  propounded  and  preached  long  before  he 


241  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

242  Quodliheta,  XII,  a.  XXIII,  ad  1. 

243  Com.  la  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.  3.    Leonine  Ed.,  VII,  151. 

244  Studies,  March,  1921.    Art. — The  Democracy  of  St.  Thomas. 

245  Leonine  Ed.  VIII,  375. 


52       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


wrote,  and  was  sounding  all  the  time  he  was  writing.  The 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  rang  with  learned  voices. 
(Consult  Costa-Rosetti,  Philosophia  31  oralis,  pp.  607-609.) 

7. — Later  Doctrines 

That  these  democratic  ideas  were  of  Thomistic  origin  is 
again  suggested  by  the  fact  that  they  grew  with  the  spread  of 
his  political  doctrine.  At  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century 
(1297),  scarcely  more  than  two  decades  after  St.  Thomas'  death, 
we  find  the  "Model  Parliament"  in  England.  The  fourteenth 
century,  signallized  with  the  energetic  struggle  between  eccles- 
iastical and  secular  powers  (Boniface  VIII  and  Philip  the  Fair, 
John  XXII  and  Lewis  of  Barvaria),  brought  his  principles 
to  the  keenest  test.  We  find  Enghelbert,-^^  Abbot  of  Admont, 
writing  somewhat  in  the  tone  of  Aquinas,  between  1307  and 
1310;  and  also  Durandus  (1333).  Then  the  unmitigatedly 
democratic  Marsiglius  of  Padua,  whose  politics  did  their  full 
share  to  enliven  the  time,  may  have  drawn  some  inspiration 
for  his  sounder  thoughts  from  Thomas,  despite  their  antipodal 
separation  on  several  points  of  doctrine.  In  his  Defensor  Pacis 
he  leans  heavly  on  Aristotle.^*^  And  we  cannot  forget  that  it 
was  Aquinas  who  made  the  great  Greek  a  force  in  the  age  and 
through  whom  the  Philosopher's  democracy  passed  on  unadul- 
terated, indeed  enhanced. 

AVilliam  of  Ockam,  in  the  fifteenth  century,  appears  in 
political  relation  to  the  Angelic  Doctor  and  to  Aegidius  Ro- 
manus,  the  Saint's  faithful  disciple.  John  Gerson  (1429), 
John  Major,  and  Peter  Alliacensis  (1425)  likewise  present 
themselves.248  And  their  doctrines,  disengaged  from  the  ecclesi- 
astical setting,  were  of  the  highest  importance  to  the  destiny  of 


246  His  work  is  entitled  De  ortu  et  fine  Romani  imperii,  Goldast, 
Politica  Imperialis,  Francfort,  1614. 

247  See  Dunning,  Political  Theories,  Vol.  I,  p.  239.  Also,  Zeiller, 
Uidee  de  Vctat  dans  St.  Thomas  d'Aquin,  pp.  179-180. 

248  Costa-Rosetti,  op.  cit.,  p.  605.  Rahilly,  indeed,  has  personally 
and  at  first  hand  verified  the  doctrine  ot  popular  sovereignty  in  the 
writings  of  no  less  than  sixty  Scholastic  predecessors  of  Suarez.  See 
Studies,  Art.  The  Sovereignty  of  the  People.  March,  1921. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  53 

modern  political  philosophy.  They  perpetuated  the  popular 
note  which  Aquinas  trumpeted,  amplified  it,  and  made  it 
vibrate  into  the  dawn  of  the  new  era.  And  when  in  the  six- 
teenth century  we  behold,  for  example,  the  Catholic  League  in 
Paris,  resisting  Henry  IV,  and  anticipating  many  of  the  fea- 
tures of  the  French  Revolution  of  1789,  we  realize  to  w^hat  a 
degree  democracy  had  leavened  the  mass  mind.^^^  The  message 
of  these  early  champions  of  the  people  is  a  sort  of  microscope, 
which,  applied  to  the  politics  of  Aquinas,  reveals  the  potential- 
ities of  his  principles.  The  merits  of  their  teaching  may  be 
called  his;  the  exaggerations  and  misapplications  are  their 
ow^n.  For  it  must  be  freely  acknowledged  that  he  was  calm 
and  careful  in  his  political  enunciations.  These  qualities  pre- 
vented any  untoward  statements  with  regard  to  the  glorification 
of  the  populace.  His  was  a  time  when  the  firm  hand  of  leader- 
ship was  most  necessary  in  every  state.  Emerging  and  stum- 
bling from  darkness  into  light,  the  people  of  the  thirteenth 
century  would  have  been  sore  afflicted,  had  Aquinas  happened 
to  be  a  Voltaire  or  a  Rousseau.  It  were  much  better  at  that 
point  of  European  story  that  the  terms  of  the  civil  contract 
be  more  severe  than  a  modern  democratic  sense  would  approve. 
And  Aquinas,  seeing  the  excesses  to  w^hich  medieval  democracy 
was  prone,  restrained  himself  from  a  too  frank  statement  of 
the  popular  opinions  which  he  so  plainly  implies. 

Or,  again,  it  may  be  that  Thomas  was  impressed  with  a 
truth  which  AVoodrow  Wilson  expresses:  "Authority  was  not 
independent  of  the  consent  of  those  over  whom  it  was  exercised ; 
and  yet  it  was  not  formulated  by  that  consent.  Consent  may 
be  said  to  have  been  involuntary,  inbred.  It  was  born  of  the 
habit  of  the  race.  It  was  congenital.  "^'^^^  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Aquinas  held  that  it  was  as  natural  for  mankind  to 
have  leaders  as  to  have  the  State;  but  if  the  State  has  its  life 
from  the  natural  consent  of  the  people,  so  have  the  rulers  their 
political  place  and  all  that  goes  with  it  therefrom.  The  crux 
is  that  consent  is  so  natural  that  it  may  often  have  the  com- 
plexion of  compulsion.  And  this  in  part  accounts  for  the  many 

249  Art. — The  Guild  State,  by  G.  R.  S.  Taylor,  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century. 

250  The  State,  p.  595. 


54       ST.  THO^EAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

clouded  views  on  the  subject  of  sovereignty  and  the  primacy 
of  the  people. 

The  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  shocked  with  the 
spectacle  of  revolution  which  brought  the  age  of  the  Encyclo- 
pedists to  a  tragic  end,  witnessed  a  certain  reaction  against  the 
Thomistic-Suarezian  tidings  of  popular  sovereignty.  Distorted 
and  abused  by  Rousseau,  it  had  served  for  woe  as  well  as  for 
weal.  Yet,  in  its  original  Scholastic  character,  it  w^as  as  stimu- 
lating as  noble,  and  as  safe  as  an  incorrect  conception  of  it 
was  dangerous.  In  the  clearer  atmosphere  of  our  own  day, 
this  appears;  and  we  are  in  a  position  mildly  to  criticize  the 
methods  by  which  ferv^ent  but  fearful  thinkers,  even  up  to  the 
close  of  the  last  century,  have  sought  to  minimize  the  multitude. 

De  Maistre  and  de  Bonald  behold  God  as  determining  the 
subject  of  power  by  directing  both  history  and  the  human 
will.2^1  Which  would  be  an  ill  answer  to  the  question,  why 
has  the  Deity  endowed  people  wdth  intellects  and  wills  of  their 
OTO?  And,  on  the  other  hand,  to  attribute  a  Caligula  or  a 
Nero  to  the  direct  operation  of  God  would  be  beyond  the  bounds 
of  reason  and  reverence;  but  such  a  course  seems  unavoidable 
with  such  a  premise.  It  is  meet  to  charge  up  the  mistakes  of 
history  to  humanity;  and  that  the  people  are  permitted  to 
choose  badly,  or  to  tolerate  unwisely,  is  at  least  an  evidence 
that  they  have  the  power  of  choosing  and  of  tolerating.  Having 
that,  how  could  they  have  lacked  authority?  No  one  gave 
more  humble  cognizance  to  the  pervasion  of  God's  influence 
in  the  universe  than  he  who  was  called  ^'no  less  the  most  learned 
among  the  saints  than  the  most  saintly  among  the  learned." 
Yet  the  tenor  of  the  politics  of  Aquinas  is  quite  apart  from 
these  Maistre  and  Bonald  convictions. 

Taparelli,  like  St.  Thomas,  considers  ability  and  fitness  (vir- 
tus) the  title  to  power.  Even  though  requiring  that  the  people 
accord  their  consent,  however,  he  denies  that  they  have  the 
primal  power.252  Since  he  goes  so  far,  one  cannot  but  see  and 
wish  that  with  a  mere  touch  from  the  De  Legibus  of  the  illus- 


251  See  Crahay,  op.  cit.,  p.  62,  and  Vareilles-Sommi§res,  op.  cit., 
pp.  407-418. 

252  See  Vareilles-Sommieres,  op.  cit.,  pp.  433-439;  and  Macksey,  Sov- 
ereignty and  Consent,  p.  26. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  55 

trious  Jesuit  opponent  of  King  James,  or  the  Suiinn  a  of  Aquin- 
as, he  might  go  a  bit  further.  Since  it  was  easy  for  a  monk  of 
the  thirteenth  century  to  be  so  democratic,  even  in  Italy,  it 
ought  not  to  have  been  too  difficult  for  a  keen  scholar  of  the 
nineteenth,  expressing  Catholic  thought,  to  be  at  least  equally 
so,  and  to  distinguish  more  clearly  between  the  merit  and  the 
abuse  of  popular  theory. 

M.  de  Vareilles-Sommieres  teaches  that  political  power  does 
not  come  from  the  people,  because  no  individual  originally  is 
invested  with  it,  and  hence  it  is  the  category  of  res  nulliusr''^ 
But  what  belongs  to  no  one,  can  be  justly  possessed  by  anyone 
who  finds  and  takes  it.  Power  then  goes  naturally  to  him 
who  is  superior  in  force,  aptitude,  or  merit ;  for  he  is  the  one 
to  meet  and  keep  it. 

The  defect  in  this  thesis  seems  to  be  that  power,  expressly 
according  to  Suarez  and  implicitly  according  to  St.  Thomas, 
is  not  res  nullius?^  It  is  the  property  of  the  community. 
Varielles-Sommieres  may  regard  the  proposition  ultra  that 
the  multitude  could  possibly  command  and  obey  itself,  as  a 
primary  tenure  of  power  would  entail.  He  merely  proposes  a 
fact  and  a  necessity  which  St.  Thomas  recognized:  that  authori- 
ty is  alienable. ^"^'^  Furthermore,  the  people  formed  civil  society 
not  to  obey  themselves  but  the  commands  of  reason ;  in  other 
words,  to  lead  a  more  rational  and  hence  more  profitable  exist- 
ence. Thus  the  Scholastic  concept  gives  to  authority  "a  local 
habitation  and  a  name:"  while  Vareilles-Sommieres  imagines 
it  as  a  vague  something  floating  aimlessly  about  somewhere 


25.3  Op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

254  With  regard  to  possession,  St.  Thomas  holds  that  the  community 
is  prime  {jus  naturale) ;  the  right  of  private  possession  is  conditioned 
by  reason  and  enactment  (secundum  humanum  condictum) ,  and  is 
therefore  jus  positivum.  (Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVI,  a.  II,  ad  1).  Here 
he  is  speaking  of  property;  but  his  idea  would  apparently  be  likewise 
in  the  case  of  power. 

255  Burri,  La  Teorie  politche  di  San  Tommaso.  p.  51.  One  gathers 
from  the  De  Reg.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap  4,  that  this  alienation  is  less  necessary 
according  as  three  virtues  are  present  throughout  the  State:  love  of 
country,  zeal  for  justice,  and  warmth  of  civil  benevolence.  The  writer 
claims  that  these  "meruerunt  dominium."  We  have  but  to  refer  back 
to  the  observation  of  both  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  that  there  are  more 
of  such  virtues  in  the  many  than  in  the  few  or  in  the  individual;  and 
so  can  we  clearly  see  the  natural  seat  of  power. 


56       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

somehow.  Of  these  two  views,  it  is  easy  to  judge  which  is  the 
more  natural  and  the  more  acceptable  to  a  rational  doctrine 
of  State. 

The  contrast  of  Aquinas  with  modern  thinkers,  therefore,  is 
apt  to  disclose  strikingly  the  quality  and  quantity  of  his  democ- 
racy. More  justification  for  modern  political  programs  may 
be  found  in  his  writings  than  in  many  a  nineteenth-century 
tome. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  57 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  PEOPLE 

1. — Meaning  of  the  Word  with  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas,  and 

Moderns 

Now  that  we  have  traced  power  to  its  primary  source  in  the 
doctrine  of  St  Thomas,  it  is  of  interest  to  ascertain  what  and 
whom  be  understood  by  "the  people."  First  one  should  gaze 
into  the  mind  of  his  Master,  x^ristotle  identifies  the  People 
with  the  citizenry  and  characterizes  a  citizen  as  one  who  has 
some  share  in  the  government. -^^  Children,  criminals,  and 
slaves  are  not  in  this  category.  They  are  wanting  in  qualifica- 
tion, mental  or  moral,  for  the  necessary  participation  in  affairs 
of  State.  Sojourners,  too,  are  barred ;  for  their  contribution  to 
the  communit}^  is  incomplete.  The  aged  are  beyond  politics, 
being  past  service.  Women  are  not  mentioned ;  possibly  because 
the  Philosopher  is  impressed  with  a  line  from  Sophocles  which 
he  sees  fit  to  quote :  "Silence  is  a  woman's  ornament. "^^"'^  In  the 
Grecian  democracy,  where  the  individual's  tongue  was  as  essen- 
tial as  his  brain,  a  member  of  the  gentle  sex,  if  silent,  would 
be  unserviceable,  and,  if  natural,  would  be  shocking. 

In  his  definition  of  a  citizen,  Aristotle,  despite  his  narrow 
use  of  the  word,  has  a  democracy  in  mind,  and  says  so.  One 
could  not  carp  at  his  exclusion  of  boys,  degenerates,  and  helots 
from  citizenship ;  resentment,  however,  may  be  stirred  by  his 
expressed  attitude  against  old  men  and  his  implied  political 
suppression  of  all  women ;  and  resentment  can  become  irritation 
in  the  modern  mind  when,  almost  with  the  same  breath  in  which 
his!  proclamation  of  democracy  sounds,  he  calmly  questions  the 
inclusion  of  mechanics  as  citizens.  For  him,  these  were  what 
the  great  industrial  and  self-supporting  class  are  for  us.  He 
mentions  without  criticism  and,  it  seems,  with  commendation, 

256  Politics,  III,  1.      Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  4 

257  Politics,  I,  13. 


58        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


a  law  at  Thebes,  whereby  no  one  might  share  in  the  government 
before  having  retired  from  gainful  labor  for  ten  years.^^  He 
observes  that  in  the  best  states,  laborers  are  political  nonentities. 
So  that;  democratic  as  he  was,  it  is  patent  that  his  democracy 
was  rather  a  puffed  aristocracy.  His  concession  that  trades- 
men may  be  admitted  to  civil  rights  in  a  polity,  especially  if 
they  become  rich,  is  large.^^^ 

Still,  justice  to  the  Philosopher  requires  an  appreciation  of 
the  reasons  for  his  restrictions.  He  saw  citizenship  as  more  than 
a  name.  It  necessitated  a  personal  and  active  service  in  the 
Athenian  common-wealth,  where  every^  member  of  the  demos 
had  a  voice  and  used  it.  It  demanded  much  more  from  its  pos- 
sessor than  does  modern  citizenship  in  our  mammoth  democra- 
cies which  the  boldest  Hellenic  fancy  would  not  have  bodied 
forth  and  which  representative  government  has  brought.  Edu- 
cation, in  Aristotle's  day,  belonged  only  to  the  upper  class;  and, 
reasonably  enough,  he  regarded  only  the  educated  fit  to  rule. 
Though  a  Macedonian,  he  apparently  fostered  the  average 
Athenian's  horror  of  hoi  barbaroi  and  the  ignorance  which 
symbolized  them.  His  Greek  education  would  have  been  in 
vain,  had  not  exclusiveness  entered  his  concept  of  democracy. 
But  he  is  impatient,  nevertheless,  as  artificial  standards  of 
citizenship,  and  both  disproves  and  discards  the  Attic  idea  of  a 
citizen  as  a  person  who  has  at  least  one  parent  a  citizen.  If 
he  exalts  wealth  as  a  requirement,  it  is  not  because  of  riches  in 
themselves  but  by  reason  of  the  culture  and  leisure  which  they 
can  secure  and  assure. 

Aquinas  is  influenced  by  whatever  merit  these  opinions  of  the 
Philosopher  manifest,  but  he  appears  proof  against  the  note  of 
excess  in  them.  A  Christian  and  saint,  he  founds  his  concep- 
tion of  the  people  not  on  citizenry  but  on  the  divinely  human 
value  of  man's  nature,  and,  secondly,  on  the  general  purpose 
of  the  State.  Civil  society  is  the  creation  of  reason  with  which 
every  man  is  endowed.  And  it  exists  solely  for  the  common 
good  in  which  each  individual  has  some  part.    These  tw^o  prin- 


258  Politics,  III,  5. 

2")9  III,  5.  But  he  also  expresses  a  doubt  with  regard  to  the  mono- 
polization of  citizenship  by  the  rich.    Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  III.  lec.  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  59 

ciples,  of  democratic  sound  and  soul,  reveal  that  the  People 
are  all  those  who  constitute  a  state  and  live  under  its  laws,  ir- 
respectively of  their  direct  share  in  the  government  of  it  or 
not. And  St.  Thomas  identifies  the  constituents  of  a  state  with 
those  who  aid  each  other  in  the  right  living  for  the  attainment  of 
which  civil  society  exists  f^'^  those  who  are  served  by  the  state  and 
who  conserve  its  existence.  We  do  not  find  him  drawing  cir- 
circles  around  cla^jses,  like  Aristotle.  No  doubt  he  believed, 
with  the  Philosopher,  that  activity  in  governmental  concerns 
was  the  mark  of  citizenship ;  but  such  citizenship,  to  his  mind, 
was  the  active  sort.  He  sees  also  a  passive  variety,  which  Aris- 
totle, apparently,  did  not  wholly  grasp.^^-  All  who  form  a  state 
are  represented  in  it  by  the  reasonablenes  which  reigns  in  it; 
in  this  sense  all,  as  rational  beings,  share  in  the  polity,  and 
all  are  citizens. 

Aquinas  does  not  look  to  Greece  for  his  image  of  the  People. 
Christianity  drew  his  glance  in  an  oriental  direction.  Too, 
his  Latin  sensibilities  quivered  at  a  civil  prospect  in  which 
the  sword  of  slavery  sliced  the  population  in  two,  never  to  be 
joined;  where  the  voice  of  work-men  affected  the  sway  of 
politics  no  more  than  the  surge  of  the  Aegean  on  the  sands  of 
Piraeus;  where  a  few  fortunate  families  had  risen  to  the  top, 
rich  with  the  very  substance  of  all  below.  St.  Thomas  was  by 
no  means  hostile  to  aristocracy,  when,  as  the  best  of  the  people, 
is  sought  the  best  for  the  people.  But  an  aristocracy  passing  for 
a  demorcracy,  yet  lashing  slaves  up  to  the  construction  of 
the  glittering  Acropolis  in  record  time,  and  ignoring  the  rights 
of  the  industrial-power  of  the  state,  save  to  press  it  the  more, 
could  not  find  favor  in  the  scholar's  head  nor  the  saint's  heart. 
Here  was  a  situation  quite  opposed  to  his  ideal  of  the  common 
good.    Consistently  with  his  political  premises  and  his  psycho- 


200  Summa.  Theol.,  la,  qu.  XXI,  a.  1,  ad  2:  "Populus  enim  est  multi- 
tudo  hominum  sub  aliquo  ordine  comprehensorum."  Vide  la  2ae,  qu. 
CV,  a.  2;  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  2;  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  3,  ad  2. 

261  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14.  True  he  adds,  "Si  enim  propter  solum 
vivere  homines  convenirent,  animalia  et  servi  essent  pars  aliqua  con- 
gregationis  civilis."  But  this  merely  means  that  he  does  not  consider 
slaves  an  active  part  of  the  polity.  Their  share  in  the  State  is  indirect, 
and  so  their  political  standing  is  negligible. 

262  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  1.    De  Regimine.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 


60       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

logy,  Aquinas  turned  his  eyes  reverently  to  the  Hebrews.  In 
the  story  of  these  chosen  ones,  he  found  his  democratic  dream 
more  fairly  realized.-^'^  Israel  knew  no  aristocracy  of  race.  All 
her  sons  were  equal  in  their  descent  from  their  father  Abraham ; 
just  as  all  Christians  were  one  in  their  splendid  origin  from  Him 
of  AVhom  x\braham  was  only  a  meek  and  weak  type.  All  her 
children  were  of  the  same  blood ;  and  St.  Thomas  thrilled  that 
all  mankind  were  unified  in  the  impartial  blood  of  the  Redeem- 
er. Each  Israelite  had  his  share  in  the  land,  and  so  was 
assured  of  the  life-necessities  which  Aquinas  demanded  for  every 
member  of  the  State.  With  the  Hebrews,  labor  was  not  con- 
temned as  in  proud  Hellas.  By  the  rule  of  Thebes,  no  Jew 
would  ever  have  attained  citizenship ;  for  all  vrorked. 

In  his  selection  of  Israel  for  his  political  model,  the  demo- 
cracy of  St.  Thomas'  idea  of  the  People  is  placed  above  a  doubt. 
When  he  mentions  the  People,  as  Feugueray  notes,  he  means  the 
he  has  in  thought  only  a  portion  of  the  People.  Aquinas  en- 
true  people.-^-*  When  Aristotle,  on  the  other  hand,  thus  speaks, 
dows  the  term  with  a  new  and  potent  significance  in  political 
philosophy.  This  is  the  direct  result  of  his  Christian  valuation 
of  the  individual.  "A  fugitive  glance  at  Medieval  Doctrine," 
says  Gierke,  ''suffices  to  perceive  how  throughout  it  all,  in  sharp 
contrast  to  the  theories  of  Antiquity,  runs  the  thought  of  the 
absolute  and  imperishable  value  of  the  Individual...."265  Too, 
one  recalls  Hegel's  assertion,  in  his  Philosophy  of  Mind,  that 
"according  to  Christianity,  the  individual,  as  such,  has  an  in- 
finite value  as  the  object  and  aim  of  divine  law."  St.  Thomas, 
no  more  than  his  times,  could  forget  ''the  least  of  these"  with 
whom  the  God-Man  identified  Himself;  and  this,  perhaps,  is  the 
best  explanation  and  proof  of  his  democratic  appraisal  of  the 
People,  whom  he  refuses  grossly  to  regard  as  a  monster  with 
countless  heads,  to  whom  Burke  would  "never  consent  to  throw 


263  Cf.  M.  H.  Feug-aeray — Migne,  Encyclopedic  Theologique.  Ill,  Serie 
22,  t.  II,  p.  1414.  (The  Jews  indeed  admitted  slavery,  but  only  the  hu- 
mane form.) 

264  Idem.  St.  Thomas  uses  the  word  "populus"  to  include  both  rulers 
and  subjects,  as  well  as  in  the  restrictive  sense.  Cf.  Summa  Theol., 
la  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  4. 

2(>o  Political  Theories  of  Middle  Age,  p.  82. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  61 


any  living  sentient  creature  whatsoever,  no  not  so  much  as  a 
kitHng,  to  torment." 

We  are  not  surjorised  to  find  his  thought  expressing  itself 
in  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle's  Politics,  where  he  emphasizes 
rather  the  potential  than  the  actual  participation  in  government 
as  the  mark  of  citizenship. Even  Aristotle  concedes  a  cer- 
tain citizenship  to  those  whom  he  excludes  from  it,267  by  recog- 
nizing their  civil  potentiality ;  which,  after  all,  indicates  at  least 
an  elementry  democracy  of  the  pure  type.  This  w^as  something 
for  the  Angelic  Doctor  to  grasp  and  weave  into  a  broader  con- 
cept. It  is  the  Philosopher's  definition  of  a  citizen,  rather 
than  his  idea,  which  is  fatal  to  a  full  appreciation  of  the  People. 
If  participation  in  civil  concerns  were  the  essence  of  citizenship, 
then,  in  a  monarchy,  citizens,  theoretically,  would  be  either 
reduced  to  a  minimum  or  annihilated  as  a  class,  and  the 
''people"  wwld  be  only  a  poltical  fiction.  St.  Thomas,  on  the 
contrary,  safeguards  the  People  just  as  well  in  a  monarchy  as  in 
a  democracy ;  his  basis  of  estimation  being  different.  Aristotle 
places  the  characteristic  of  the  ''people"  in  an  accident — the 
tenure  of  civic  station  or  the  eligibility  to  it ;  Aquinas  finds  it  in 
human  dignity  and  prerogative. 

This  difference  in  views  meant  much  to  the  course  of  political 
science.  Under  the  old  Aristotelian  idea,  the  democratic  spirit 
was  too  cramped  for  a  healthy  growth;  in  the  new  broad- 
mindedness,  the  final  triumph  of  democracy  became  certain.^^s 

In  its  catholicity  and  sympathy,  St.  Thomas'  idea  of  the 
People,  when  compared  with  modern  notions,  appears  even  more 
democratic  than  when  juxtaposed  to  Aristotle's.  In  the  English 
world,  it  seems,  the  word  "people"  has  always  preserved  much  of 
the  nobility  with  which  writers  like  Aquinas  gifted  it ;  but,  as 


266  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  1. 
2(57  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  4. 

268  The  word  "people"  is  a  generalization  of  "person."  The  charac- 
teristics of  person  are:  1)  unity  and  2  ) rationality.  Cf.  Philippe  Bor- 
rell.  Revue  de  PhilosopMe,  XII,  p.  114.  St.  Thomas  fully  recognizes 
these  notes  of  unity  and  rationality  in  the  body  politic.  So  that  his 
concept  of  the  people  appears  perfect.  He  never  forgets  the  indivi- 
dual and  his  rights;  and  so  he  anticipates  that  political  development 
v,'hich  Dunning  calls  distinctly  English:  the  closer  definition  of  people 
in  terms  of  the  individuals  composing  the  aggregate,  and  a  more  precise 
ascription  of  rights  to  each.    Cf.  Political  Theories,  Vol.  II,  p.  220. 


62       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


^^^th  Aristotle,  its  scope  was  narrowed.  With  the  British,  how- 
ever, it  served  to  express  the  lower  and  the  middle  class ;  while 
to  the  Stagirite,  it  signified  the  upper.^eo  To  St.  Thomas,  it 
included  all.  In  the  continental  countries,  the  term  was  dragged 
in  political  mire,  and  became  a  thing  of  horror  and  reproach. 
It  was  the  power  that  pierced  the  arteries  of  France  in  1789. 
Napoleon,  identifying  himself  with  the  People,  vaunted:  "Je 
suis  moi-meme  sort!  de  la  canaille."  It  meant  for  distraught 
Europe  what  the  ochlo-s  (rabble),  in  contradistinction  to  demos, 
meant  to  the  Greeks.  The  German  volk  and  nation  were  as 
approbrious  as  the  French  canaille  and  peuple?'^^  And  a  cer- 
tain centempt  for  the  Russian  bolsheviki  is  one  of  today's  many 
commonplaces.  It  will  be  seen  that  St.  Thomas'  concept  of  the 
People  approaches  that  which  has  come  to  be  formed  in 
America. 


2. — Equality  and  Inequality  ;  Order 

Aquinas  teaches  unequivocally  that  men  are  equal  in  na- 
ture.2''i  But  he  does  not  mean  thereby  that  civil  society  is  to  be 
conceived  as  a  dead  level.-^^  jj^  refers  to  the  metaphysical  notes 
in  the  essence  of  humanity :  animality  and  rationality.  These 
are  alike  for  all,  and  are  the  nature  of  all.  But  physically,  the 
fact  is  different.  Men  are  the  products  not  only  of  nature,  but  of 
long  series  of  circumstances.^^^  The  race  is  a  unit  and  hence  a 
sort  of  channel  for  all  the  helps  and  harms  of  the  past.  Just  as 
equality  obtains  in  the  ideal  order,  so  is  inequality  a  fact  in  the 

269  still  the  Philosopher  was  not  so  partial,  doctrinally,  as  he  may 
seem  Cf.  Acton,  op.  cit.,  p.  72:  "he  (Aristotle)  would  admit  even  the 
poorer  citizens  to  office  and  pay  them  for  the  discharge  of  the  public 
duties."     Not  as  a  right,  however,  so  much  as  an  expedience. 

270  Cf.  Civil  Liberty  and  Self -Government,  by  Francis  Lieber,  pp.  346- 
347.  We  may  neglect  such  caustic  characterizations  of  the  People  as, 
for  example,  Mr.  Heir.zen's:  "The  real  peple  is  in  America,  as  well  as  in 
Europe,  little  more  than  a  voting  and  paying  machine" — What  is  real 
democracy? — p.  62 

2712  Sent.,  d.  6,  qu.  I,  a.  4,  ad  5. 

272  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  1:  "si  tollatur  dissimulitudo  civium  non 
erit  civitas."  Which  is  equivalent  to  Jean  Bodin's  assertion  that  there 
never  was  even  a  democratic  polity  in  which  the  citizens  were  quite 
equal  (De  Repuhlica  I,  6). 

273  Cf.  Montesquieu,  De  VEsprit  des  Lois,  VIII,  3. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  63 

ralm  of  reality.  Different  degrees  of  physical  and  psychical 
favors  in  the  people  are  too  evident  to  require  much  emphasis ; 
although  modem  political  theories,  with  more  heat  than  light, 
too  often  ignore  the  obvious.  St.  Thomas  never  forgets  the  two 
facts,  equality  and  inequality ;  and  his  politics  presents  as  near 
an  articulation  of  the  conclusions  accruing  from  each,  as  does 
his  harmonization  of  liberty  and  law. 

Leaders  there  are  and  must  be.  The  State  demands 
themj^"**  and  individual  inequalities  supply  them.  Those  who 
are  best  fitted  to  work  should  work;  just  as  those  who  are  best 
fitted  to  rule  should  rule,-'^^  which  is  indeed  a  higher  but  also  a 
harder  kind  of  work,  especially  in  the  face  of  St.  Thomas'  dem- 
ocratic demand  that  self-interest  be  suppressed  and  the  common 
good  solely  sought.-^^ 

The  briefest  consideration  reveals  that  the  plan  of  things  does 
not  run  on  a  plane  surface.  In  harmony,  there  is  ever  a  tonal 
dominant ;  in  man,  the  soul  is  superior  to  the  body ;  among  the 
brutes,  there  is  always  a  ''first."  Nature  is  constantly  running 
up  and  down  a  scale  of  power,  ability,  or  merit.  Thomas  defers 
to  her  whimsies,  and  sees  that  his  theories  do  not  offend  them. 

Carefully,  however,  he  draws  the  line  between  equality  and 
inequality,  that  there  may  be  no  over-lapping  of  the  provinces 
and  hence  no  cause  for  civil  injustice,  rancor,  or  strife.  His 
division  is  one  of  the  most  notable  lessons  in  his  politics.  The 
better  part  of  man — the  mind — is  always  sm.  juris;  and  in  this 
all  men  are  equal.-~  Over  those  things  which  appertain  to  the 
intimate,  interior  life  of  the  rational  being,  the  soul  is  exempt 
from  civil  sway.  God  alone  is  king.-^^  It  is  only  in  the  externals 
of  life,  which  constitute  the  empire  of  evident  inequalities,  that 
man  defers  to  man.-^^  And  even  there,  in  such  matters  as 
appertain  to  the  nature  of  the  body,  e.  g.,  nourishment  and  gen- 


274  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  1. 

275  Ibidem.   Prolog,  in  Metaph. 

276  De  Reg.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  23. 

277  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5.  Cajetan  comments  that  the 
equality  may  consist  in  this:  no  one  has  power  over  another  in  those 
things  which  relate  to  nature.     See  Summa,  Leonine  Ed.,  IX,  391a. 

278  Ibidem. 

279  Cf.  Laski,  The  Prol)em  of  Sovereignty,  p.  67 :  "A  state  that  de- 
mands the  admission  that  it  sconscience  is  supreme  goes  beyond  the 
due  bounds  of  righteous  claim." 


()4       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


eration  of  off-spring,  the  individual  is  beholden  only  to  his 
Maker.  The  political  liberty  of  the  people  was  evinced  and 
respected  in  the  contract  by  which  concessions  were  made  to  law 
and  order  and  the  State  was  formed;  it  is  still  recognized  in  the 
essential  reasonableness  of  government.  That  order  may  pre- 
vail in  the  State,  however,  subordination  is  most  necessar}^ 
With  all  as  rulers,  there  would  be  no  rulers  at  all,  and  no  State. 
According  to  St.  Thomas,  subjection  is  threefold:  to  reason,  to 
regents,  and  to  God.^so  xhe  People's  activities  and  endurances 
are  to  be  inspired  and  directed  by  their  noblest  faculty.  "Where 
there  is  rationability,"  Scotus  Erigena  had  written,  ''of  a  neces- 
sity there  is  liberty."  Aquinas  is  of  the  same  conviction.  He 
elevates  the  people  by  subjecting  them  to  the  best  that  is  in  them. 
Any  other  measure  would  be  a  degradation.  To  bend  to  God 
is  to  rise  in  the  clean  and  sturdy  manhood  by  which  democracy 
can  and  must  be  reared.  His  laws  are  essentially  reasonable; 
the  Source  of  Reason  is  He.  Again,  St.  Thomas  submits  in  his 
Summa  the  doctrine  of  his  De  Regimine:  God  and  Reason 
would  be  sufficient  guides  for  man,  if  solitude  were  natural  to 
him.281  Each  man,  alone,  would  be  his  own  king  under  Hea- 
ven. The  inequalities  which  social  and  political  life  and  for- 
tune bring  into  prominence  would  not  so  strikingly  appear.^^s 
But  it  is  nature's  decree  that  this  should  not  be,  and  a  sea  of 
vivid  disparities  stretches  before  us.  Being  evident,  they  can 
be  more  readily  controlled.  The  revelation  of  them  which  the 
State  makes  is  really  a  blessing.  Civil  society  does  not  create 
them ;  it  finds  and  evinces  them.  It  must  be  formed  according 
to  them.  The  best  should  be  first.  And  just  as  Aquinas  would 
have  men  subject  themselves  to  the  best  that  is  in  themselves, 
and  to  the  best  above  them,  which  is  God,  so  would  he  have  them 
defer  to  the  best  among  them.  Reason  finds  fittest  expression  in 
the  State,  with  the  best  in  the  highest  places.  The  spirit  of 
equality  if  not  at  war  with  wisdom.  As  Montesquiu  observes, 
there  is  the  difference  of  heaven  and  earth  between  true  equality 
and  extreme  equality. 


280  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  LXXII,  a.  4. 

281  Ibidem. 

282  Cow.  in  Joh,  cap.  Ill,  lec.  2. 
2^3  De  VEsprit  des  Lois,  VIII,  3. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  65 

The  Angelic  Doctor  applies  the  principle  of  order  to  the  life  of 
the  comunity,  and  shows  both  its  naturalness  and  its  necessity. 
Even  in  the  unit  of  society,  the  family,  all  are  not  and  cannot  be 
equal  as  regards  authority.  In  many  respects  the  rule  of  the 
father  must  be  supreme.  Wife,  children,  and  servants  bow  to 
him ;  it  is  best  for  the  home  and  hence  for  those  who  constitute 
it.284  Husband,  father,  and  master,  a  man  is  to  be  in  his  own 
immediate  little  world.  In  the  expansive  civic  constitution, 
which  in  a  manner  presents  a  picture  of  a  magnified  family, 
there  is  a  proportionate  need  of  system;  and  so  distinction  is 
made  between  rulers  and  the  People  though  the  former  are  of 
the  latter,  just  as  the  father  is  part  of  the  family,  and  the  dis- 
tinction must  never  amount  to  a  separation;  inasmuch  as  sov- 
ereigns derive  their  power  from  the  People,  and,  wielding  it,  they 
are  only  expressing  the  rational  will  of  the  community  of  which 
they  are  a  part.  Thirdly,  the  People  have  innumerable  rela- 
tions to  each  other,^^^  in  which  superiority  and  inferiority  are 
constantly  aired.  Finally  the  People  of  a  state  comport  them- 
selves superiorly  to  out-siders  ;-'^"  chastising  enemies,  conde- 
scending to  receive  strangers,  et  cet.  All  this  arrangement  spells 
an  ordered  existence;  and  equally  it  expresses  the  inequality 
with  which  those  who  live  and  think  in  a  world  of  reality  must 
always  reckon,  and  which  even  the  most  fervad  political  vision- 
aries of  ancient  or  modern  times  have  not  been  able  absolutely 
to  dream  away. 

Concentrating  on  civil  system,  Aquinas  finds  that,  without  it, 
the  People  would  be  the  losers ;  for  the  common  good  could  never 
be  achieved.  The  different  species  and  degrees  of  capability 
in  the  citizenry  make  it  natural.  The  different  needs  of  the 
citizenry  render  it  necessary.  Such  demands  as  a  judiciary,  a 
soldiery,  artificers,  and  a  farm-force  are  vital  to  a  plan  of 
state.-^  But  no  matter  how  many  orders  are  exigent  and  cre- 
ated, all  may  be  reduced  to  three :  the  lowest,  the  middle,  and  the 
highest;  infimi,  medii,  and  suprefmi.    Here  St.  Thomas'  inclu- 


'2MSumma  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CIV.  a.  4. 
^S5  It) idem. 
28G  Ibidem. 
287  Ibidem. 

'2SS  gumma  Theol.,  la,  qu.  CVIII,  a.  2;  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  6. 


66       ST.  THOMAS'  rOLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


sion  of  all  classes  in  his  concept  of  the  People  is  again  mani- 
festo^ This  division  of  society  into  grades  may,  despite  his 
efforts  to  show  it  natural,  seem  slightly  at  variance  with  his 
doctrine  of  fundamental  equality.  But  he  hastens  to  lay  down 
a  democratic  principle  which  proves  how  little  he  thought  of 
order  as  an  end,  and  how  earnestly  as  a  means.  The  more  a 
being  can  communicate  his  ability  or  the  achievements  of  it  to 
others,  the  higher  the  order  to  which  he  belongs.  One  can  as- 
cend, accordingly  as  one  can  sen^e.  The  highest  class,  in  a 
sense,  should  be  more  sendle  than  the  lowest.  Here,  as  every- 
where in  Thomistic  politics,  the  common  good  is  sought  and  the 
democratic  note  sustained. 

There  is  order  in  heaven.  Aquinas  beckons  Dionysius 
forward  to  tell  us  of  Seraphim,  Cherubim,  and  Thrones,  in  the 
first  celestial  choir ;  of  Dominations,  Virtues,  and  Powers,  in  the 
second;  of  Principalities,  Angels,  and  Archangels,  in  the 
third.  And,  the  more,  must  he  see  the  existence  of  order  jus- 
tified on  earth.  It  is  one  recipe  for  aiding  earth  to  be  heavenly. 
It  is  of  the  supernal  entities  he  speaks  when  he  expresses  the 
utilitarian  principle  of  superiority  to  which  we  have  already  ad- 
verted.291  But  he  evidently  intends  his  observations  on  the 
empyrean  state  to  parallel  his  political  theories ;  for  half  of  the 
article  is  devoted  to  the  terrestial. 

In  the  angelic  society,  he  believes,  all  spiritual  favors  are 
in  common ;  but  some  of  them  are  more  excellently  posessed  by 
certain  spirits  than  by  others.  The  power  to  communicate  the 
gift  is  a  guage  of  the  perfection  of  it.^^^  In  the  human  order,  the 
corresponding  thought  would  be  that  the  great  gift  of  reason 
is  in  all  men,  but  that  some  have  it  more  excellently  than  others, 
inasmuch  as  they  can  exercise  it  for  the  good  of  others  more 
effectively;  and  consequently  theirs  is  a  more  exalted  place  in 
political  domain.  The  best  elements  of  aristocracy  are  to  be 
used  to  perfect  democracy. 

St.  Thomas  is  a  friend  of  the  middle  class,  calling  it  "the 
honorable  people."    To  him,  as  to  the  sober  minds  of  to-day, 


289  Summa  Theol..  la,  qu.  CVIII,  a  2. 

290  Ibidem. 

291  Ibidem. 

202  Summa  Theol.,  la,  qu.  CVIII,  a.  II,  ad  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DE^EOCRACY  67 


it  represents  the  back-bone  of  the  nation.  To  crush  it  would 
be  suicidal;  civil  order,  on  which  alone  the  ascent  to  general 
prosperity  can  be  made,  would  be  ruined.  The  nature  of  so- 
ciety would  be  outraged.  Aquinas  maintains  that  inequality 
is  so  indigenous  to  order,  and  order  is  sb  natural  to  men,  that 
even  had  there  been  no  Fall,  inequalit}'^  would  have  been  pre- 
sent.^'^  In  fact,  order  is  a  form  of  justice.  Thomas  holds 
with  Augustine  that  it  consists  in  assigning  each  object  its  due 
position  (sua  cuique  loca  tribuens  dispositio)  ;  and  in  reference 
to  men,  this  principle  would  merely  mean  that  it  is  meet  for  the 
right  persons  to  be  in  the  right  places:  the  best  first,  the  least 
last,  but  the  last  first  in  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  best.  The 
common  good  demands  that  no  elements  of  discontent  seethe  at 
the  bottom  of  society.  Each  person  in  the  State  has  the  same 
ultimate  end  as  his  fellow.^^*  All  must  be  considered  and  aided, 
else  the  purpose  of  civil  society  is  perverted.  And  the  fittest 
leaders  will  attend  to  the  least  in  the  State  first,  who  naturally 
need  the  help  of  the  State  most.-^^ 

Another  plea  for  order  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  good  in  the 
State  must  be  used  for  the  State.  The  superiority  of  science, 
justice,  etc.,  which  some  possess,  should  be  exercised  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  others.-^^  Not  to  have  it  so,  were  waste  and  worse. 
The  use  can  be  made  authoritatively  only  in  office;  hence  a 
hierarchy  in  politics,  to  suit  degrees  of  merit,  is  required.  The 
objection  that  order  endangers  the  People  by  inducing  oligarchy 
and  tyranny,  is  weak  to  Aquinas,  for,  with  him,  only  the  just 
are  eligible  to  elevation  in  the  State ;  and,  according  to  him  and 
Augustine,  the  just  rule  not  in  lust  of  power  but  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  purpose  for  which  the  State  exists.^^^ 

The  original  human  differences  which  signify  inequality  and 
necessitate  order  are  divided  by  Thomas  into  those  of  body 


293  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  3. 

294  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 

295  This  point  will  be  more  apparent  in  the  following  Chapter  on 
Rulers. 

2msumma  Theol.,  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4 
297  Ibidem. 


68        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

(sex,  age,  strength,  etc.,)^^  and  those  of  soul.  In  the  latter  he 
sees  many  degrees  of  knowledge,  justice,  and  executive  abil- 
ity. All  men  have  free  will  with  which  to  apply  their  powers 
to  the  acquisition  of  facts,  virtues,  and  arts.  Differences  in 
effort  and  in  native  ability  mean  differences  in  results.^^  Since 
these  disparities,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  would  have  occurred 
even  in  the  state  of  innocence,  much  more  must  they  manifest 
themselves  now.  And  a  regime  which  ignores  them  is  so  ideal- 
istic as  to  remain  only  a  dream,  or  unreasonable  enough  to  strike 
the  State  into  ver^^  real  confusion. 


3. — Virtue 

We  are  led  by  the  subject  of  ability  into  a  consideration  of 
what  Aquinas  intends  by  the  quality  which  he  demands  in  all 
those  who  essay  to  play  a  role  in  the  rule  of  civil  society: 
virtus.^^  Feugueray  expounds  the  Scholastic  sense  of  the  w^ord. 
Virtue  in  general  is  the  quality  which  rendei^  the  man  good  w^ho 
possesses  it,  and  the  deed  good  which  he  does.  Political  virtue 
is,  therefore,  that  which  makes  a  citizen  and  his  civic  sendee 
commendable.  And  since  the  interplay  of  authority  and  obedi- 
ence is  constant  in  the  State,  political  virtue  is  the  kind  which 
enables  one  both  to  give  and  receive  orders,  with  dignity  and 
effect,  according  to  occasion.  Feugueray,  analyzing  it,  dis- 
covei-s  the  elements  of  knowledge,  and  a  certain  liberal  culture 
of  soul,  by  which,  in  all  probability,  he  wishes  to  signify  a 
psychological  insight  and  a  sense  of  ethical  values.  He  declares 
that  the  term  may  be  compared  to  the  word  ''capacity.''^^^  Ra- 


29Sin  an  interesting  sentence,  St.  Thomas  teaches  the  influence  of 
nature  on  the  body:  "Et  sic  nihil  prohibet  dice  re,  quin  secundum  di- 
versam  dispositionem  aeris,  et  diversum  situm  stellarum,  aliqui  robus- 
tiores  corpore  generarentur,  quam  alii,  et  majores.  et  pulchriores,  et 
melius  complexionati."     Summa.  la.  qu.  XCVI,  a.  3. 

2f)9Swwi7na  Theol.  la,  qu.  XCVI.  a.  2. 

300  Aristotle  believed  that  Liberty,  Wealth,  Virtue  and  Good  Birth, 
were  the  contestants  for  supremacy  in  the  State.  He  reduces  Good 
Birth  to  long-standing  Wealth  and  Virtue.  (Cf.  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  Vol. 
I,  p.  75)  St.  Thomas  rightly  selects  Virtue  as  the  just  claimant.  For 
Virtue  ensures  Liberty  and  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  Wealth. 

301  See  op.  cit.    Cf.  Crahay,  op.  cit.,  pp.  50-51. 


ST.  THOMAS'  rOLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  69 

hilly  succinctly  translates  it  as  ''merit."^^^  gt.  Thomas  him- 
self reveals  his  own  meaning  at  length  in  the  Summa.  There 
we  find  him  explaining  virtue  under  different  headings.  First, 
he  regards  it  as  a  habit.  A  psychical  power,  unlike  a  physi- 
cal one,  is  in  nowise  determined  to  a  particular  purpose.  It 
must  be  directed  by  the  light  of  reason;  but  it  freely  follows 
on.303  It  becomes  a  human  act;  and  resulting  in  many  acts, 
it  develops  into  habit — a  virtue.  The  Angelic  Doctor  also  sees 
in  it  a  form  of  order.  It  implies  love  for  an  ethical  standard 
and  a  consequent  subordination  of  act  to  it.-^^  Thus  in  \drtue 
St.  Thomas  beholds  an  ideal,  cognition,  volition,  deed,  and 
repetition.  These  are  found  in  every  rational  creature ;  each  has 
virtue,  and  inasmuch  as  political  virtue  is  but  the  application 
of  ordinary  virtue  to  the  interests  of  the  State,  each  can  be  a 
force  in  civil  society.  Here  the  basic  democracy  of  Thom- 
istic  politics  is  again  evinced.^^^  But  his  teaching  on  inequali- 
ties, which  holds  true  here,  must  be  recalled.  For  he  would  not 
admit  anyone  and  everyone  to  the  care  of  the  State.  All  the 
members  of  civil  society  potentially  are  leaders  of  it;  whereas, 
actually,  a  very  small  percentage  are  or  can  be.  Thus  demo- 
ocracy  is  sustained  and,  at  the  same  time,  order  is  saved. 

Next  Aquinas  speaks  of  virtue  as  a  practical  habit.  It  is  not 
solely  a  thing  of  thought  or  an  immanent  power.  It  has  an 
executive  character.    It  is  a  doing,  as  well  as  a  being  able  to 

306  The  Doctor  notices  the  occasional  mistake  which  super- 
ficial people  make  in  judging  some  visible  favor  of  a  person  as 
a  virtue.  They  take  a  quality  of  body  for  one  of  soul,  and  for- 
get that  virtue  is  a  principle  of  operation  as  well  as  of  being.-^^ 
Aquinas,  in  seeking  leaders,  would  look  not  at  the  surface  of 
men  but  at  the  power  within  and  the  inner  ability  to  project  it 
without.    And  here  the  best  interests  of  democracy  are  served. 

Thirdly,  St.  Thomas  insists  that  virtue  is  and  should  be  a 
good  habit.    Every  evil  implies  a  defect  of  object,  or  of  sub- 


302  studies,  March,  1920.      Art.  The  Democracy  of  St.  Thomas. 

303  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  LV,  a.  1. 

304  Ibidem. 

30oCf.  Burri.,  Le  teorie  politiche  di  San  Tommaso,  p.  59. 

Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  LV,  a.  2. 
307  Ibidem. 


70       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


ject.  Virtue  is  guided  by  reason  and  fired  by  will.  It  is  a 
power  and  a  perfection. ^os  if  it  is  wrested  to  express  anything 
evil,  the  sense  is  metaphorical;  e.  g.,  a  good  thief  or  robber.^oa 
Therefore,  the  xlngelic  Doctor  in  placing  virtue  as  the  pre-re- 
quisite  of  the  servers  of  the  State,  ensures  the  reign  of  justice  in 
which  each  man  receives  his  due  and  the  deepest  and  truest 
democracy  is  sensed. 

In  the  Comme7itai-y,  he  presents  a  concept  of  political  virtue, 
opening  up  the  mind  of  Aristotle.  The  question  whether  the 
virtue  of  a  good  man  is  identical  with  that  of  a  good  citizen 
advenes.  There  can  be  a  difference.  A  person  censurable 
enough  in  private  life,  may  perform  his  civic  duties  perfectly 
and  therefore  be  accounted  a  good  citizen.  While  the  thoroughly 
good  man  is  consistently  so.  But  the  good  citizen  who  is  also 
a  good  man,  is,  of  course,  superior  to  the  merely  good  man ;  for 
to  the  ordinary  virtues,  he  adds  political  temperance  and  jus- 
tice.310  The  State  is  concerned  more  with  external  action  than 
with  internal  dispositions ;  and  yet,  since  the  former  depend  so 
intimately  on  the  latter,  the  virtue  which  St.  Thomas  describes 
in  his  Summa  seems  essential  to  a  polity.  Aristotle's  idea  is  not 
so  full  and  ethical  as  the  Angelic  Doctor's;  which  is  evident 
when  he  tells  us  that  the  virtue  of  a  good  man  consists  in  being 
able  to  command,  but  that  of  a  good  citizen  renders  him  equally 
fit  for  commanding  and  obeying.^i^ 

When  the  Angelic  Doctor  requires  virtue  in  the  wielders  of 
political  fortune,  he  asks  more  than  Aristotle,  because  he  con- 
ceives deeper.  He  asks  not  only  efficiency,  but  the  morality  on 
which  the  highest  efficiency  is  founded  and  guaranteed.  The 
"\drtus"  of  his  description,  is  not  to  be  seen,  in  notable  degree, 
in  every  member  of  the  commonwealth ;  and  only  those  who 
possess  it  sufficiently  should  be  factors  in  statecraft.  The  others 
are  better  represented  by  their  betters  than  they  could  be  by 


Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  LV,  a.  3. 

309  Ibidem. 

310  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  3 

311  Politics,  III,  4. 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  71 

themselves. '^12  It  may  be  objected,  against  Aquinas,  that  de  facto 
this  has  not  been  so  in  political  history ;  that  those  who  held  the 
power  of  State,  used  it  to  crush  the  helpless.  The  retort  is  that 
St.  Thomas,  requiring  virtus,  requires  goodness  which  is  essen- 
tial to  it;  and  that,  therefore,  he  considers  those  who  exercise 
authority  unjustly,  as  lacking  a  title  to  it.  Theoretically,  he 
strips  the  monarch  or  the  assembly,  abusing  the  popular  trust, 
of  the  means  of  excess.  When  the  People  are  oppressed,  they 
arise,  the  stronger;  fortified  with  the  power  which  rulers,  lacking- 
virtue,  forfeit.  The  moral  force  which  the  Doctor  gives  the 
word  is  a  first  aid  to  democracy.  He  makes  it  a  term  that 
teaches  justice  to  the  People,  for  which  genuine  democracy 
stands.  Aristotle's  meaning,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  so  clearly 
safe  and  acceptable.  He  uses  the  expression  phronesis, 
signifying  practical  wisdom  or  caution,  and  sometimes,  in  a  bad 
sense,  pride  or  presumption.  Walford  opines  that,  applied  to 
the  private  citizen,  this  word,  according  to  the  Philosopher, 
expresses  that  which  enables  one  to  perform  one's  duty  or  task 
(ergon)  ;  but  that,  when  he  (Aristotle)  uses  it  in  reference  to  a 
ruler,  he  intends  a  moral  value.^^^  This  however,  is  not  so 
plain  as  in  the  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas;  and  the  probability  is 
that  the  Philosopher  prescribed  a  cunning  prudence  rather 
than  any  moral  norm  for  those  in  power.  Common  welfare 
is  not  so  much  assured  by  a  crafty  carefulness  in  rulers  as  by 
an  ethical  code  with  rigid  sanction  above  them.^^*  The  'Virtue" 
of  Aquinas  seems  as  superior  to  Aristotle's  as  Christianity  to 
Paganism. 

It  is  significant  that  St.  Thomas  places  knowledge  and  good- 
will, the  two  essentials  of  virtue,  so  prominently  in  his  plan  of 
citizenry.     The  necessity  of  public  education,  religious  and 


312  This  subordination  of  the  right  of  suffrage  to  the  conditions  of 
intelligence  need  not  signify  that  St.  Thomas  believed  the  right 
itself  of  suffrage  to  be  hypothetical,  as  Crahay  deduces  (op.  cit.  pp. 
105-107).  It  may  mean  rather  that  the  right  to  exercise  the  right  is 
dependent  on  those  qualifications.  Or  again,  suffrage  is  not  a  natural 
but  a  civil  right;  and  the  State  has  a  right  to  protect  itself  by  with- 
holding this  weapon  from  the  obviously  incompetent,  Cf.  Laveleye, 
Le  Government  dans  la  Democratie,  t.  II,  p.  49. 

313  Note.    Translation  of  Aristotle's  Politics  and  Economics,  p.  88. 

314  St,  Thomas'  meaning  of  "prudence"  is  the  virtue  "ex  qua  omnes 
virtutes  morales  dependent."   Com.  Polit.,  Lib,  III,  lec.  3, 


72       ST.  THOMAS*  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

secular,  follows/^i^  Without  it,  the  bulk  of  the  People  are  hardly 
prepared  to  enter  into  their  own,  and  the  State  must  be  adminis- 
tered by  the  efficient  few.  When  the  Angelic  Doctor  wrote,  the 
Univei-sity  of  Paris  was  diffusing  its  rays  through  the  century ; 
all  roads  led  to  the  city  on  the  Seine.  The  medieval  world,  awak- 
ened to  learning  in  the  eighth  century,  was  re-aroused  in  the 
thirteenth.  The  voice  of  Aquinas  echoed  far.  With  Blessed  Al- 
bert and  St.  Bonaventure,  he  filled  his  day  and  did  more  for 
the  cause  of  education,  which  is  the  cause  of  modern  democracy, 
than  the  world  is  always  willing  to  grant.  His  facts  were  the 
natural  equality  of  men,  the  evident  inequalities,  and  the  ne- 
cessity that  the  best  guide  the  rest.  He  saw  that  education, 
mental  and  moral,  produced  the  best.  We  can  well  understand 
his  zeal  for  teaching.  Each  man,  w^on  to  education,  was  the 
State's  gain.  The  more  extensively  'Virtus"  appeared  in  the 
State,  the  greater  was  the  number  of  individuals  capable  of  shar- 
ing in  civil  rule.  In  the  vista  of  the  future,  with  the  onward 
march  of  mind  and  morals,  Aquinas  could  not  but  see  the 
democratic  spirit  of  his  doctrines  crystallizing  into  a  political 
fact.316 

But  he  was  writing  for  his  own  day  as  well  as  for  the  future. 
And  all  will  agree  that,  then,  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  the  uni- 
versal reign  of  the  People.  Feudalism  was  doomed  and  dying ; 
but  just  as  its  grow^th  was  gradual,  so  should  be  its  decline,  else 
its  departure  might  have  worked  more  mischief  tlian  its  pres- 
ence. The  Magna  Charta  had  been  signed.  The  English 
House  of  Commons  Avas  born.  The  Italian  Cities  glistened  in 
their  liberties ;  though  often  the  lustre  gloomed  into  ruby.  The 
time  was  replete  with  promise,  which  Aquinas  reinforced  with 
principle.  But  the  truth  remained,  that  ignorance  still  held 
large  sections  of  the  continent  in  shadow,  and  morality  too 
often  was  only  a  veneer.  Political  disparities  were  inevitable ; 
And  St.  Thomas  was  too  wise  to  waste  energy  against 
them.  Rather  than  be  perpetually  querulous,  he  often  seeks 
whatever  logic  there  may  be  in  a  situation  to  which  his  opinions 


3l5Cot7i  Eth.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  1.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  3.  Cf.  Bor- 
rell,  UId(^.e  de  D^mocratie,  Revue  de  Philosophie.,  XII,  pp.  117-118. 
Also,  "Pas  de  Democratie  sans  progres  moral,"  p.  117. 

31C  Cf.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  73 


seem  opposed,  and  makes  himself  temporarily  contented.  He 
is  a  better  philosopher  than  a  reforaier,  and  a  better  reformer 
for  being  such  a  good  philosopher.  His  mission  is  always  more 
of  peace  than  of  the  sword ;  but  his  arguments  are  the  kind  of 
which  effectual  weapons  can  be  forged. 

4. — Slavery  :  Due  to  Lack  of  Virtus 

Slavery,  so-called,  existed  in  St.  Thomas'  day ;  and  he  was  not 
the  one  to  deal  it  the  final  and  fatal  blow.  Christ  had  not 
preached  against  it  openly,  but,  in  the  subtlest  and  surest  man- 
ner, prepared  for  its  dissolution.  His  medieval  servant  follow^ed 
the  divine  example.  And  if  the  Galilean's  message  of  universal 
brotherhood  is  the  finest  expression  of  democracy,  then  the 
doctrine  of  Aquinas  is  well  attuned  to  the  democratic  ideal. 

The  Angelic  Doctor  could  not  take  slaves  for  granted,  as  did 
superb  Athens,  raised  aloft  on  the  thews  of  four-hundred  thou- 
sand of  them,  twenty  times  the  number  of  her  free  citizens.^^"^ 
He  would  have  repudiated  historical  slavery  as  vehemently  as  an 
abolitionist  on  the  eve  of  our  own  Civil  War.  For  him,  the  sys- 
tem could  be  condoned  in  Christendom  on  a  basis  of  charity. 
St.  Thomas  insinuates  this  into  his  commentary  on  "the  natural 
slave"3i8  It  is  but  charity  to  direct  those  who  cannot  direct 
themselves ;  and  this  seems  Thomas'  great  reason  for  acceding  to 
the  system.  He  does  not  call  the  unfortunate  a  "natural  slave," 
but  quasi  servus.  Nor  does  he  speak  of  him,  like  Aristotle,  as 
"having  no  share  in  happiness.  "^^^  But  the  Doctor's  tolerance 
and  faith  may  seem  slightly  amusing  to  those  who  advocate 
liberty-at-any-price  and  offer  pyrotechnics  instead  of  proofs. 
"Whatever  any  race  or  class  of  men  has  the  where- 
withal to  be,"  offers  a  discreet  speaker  on  democracy,  "it  must 
take  the  necessary  time  and  pay  the  average  price  of  working 
toward  its  salvation  through  the  intermediate  stages.  There 
is  no  spring-board  from  which  it  can  cover  at  one  leap  the  gap 
between  what  it  is  when  it  is  delivered  over  to  itself,  and  what  it 

317  Athenagoras,  Bk.  VI,  quoted  by  Montesquieu. 

318  Lib.  I,  lec.  3. 

319  Politics,  III,  9. 


74       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

has  tlie  potency  to  become.''32o  plume  ourselves  on  the 

Emancipation  Proclamation  which  flung  milUons  of  colored  peo- 
ple on  their  own  pathetic  resources;  nominally  we  granted 
them  liberty,  but  practically  they  have  had  the  problem  of  ac- 
quiring it  for  themeslves  ever  since.  Medievalism  did  more 
for  its  serfs:  not  by  freeing  them  with  the  mouth,  but  with  the 
truth  which  makes  all  men  free ;  not  by  flinging  them  aside  to 
whatsoever  fate,  but  in  guiding  them  through  the  stormy  night 
of  transition. 

Aquinas  admitted  inequality.  Slavery  was  but  the  lower  end 
of  the  admission.  Yet  the  lowest  in  his  political  theory,  is  not 
without  relation  to  the  highest  There  is  a  common  fibre  of  na- 
ture in  all,  which  religion  accentuates  and  strengthens.  It  is  to 
be  suspected  that  the  infimi  of  St  Thomas'  time  were  in  some 
respects  better  circumstanced  than  our  free  working-men  of  to- 
day. Certainly  when  one  honestly  considers  the  character  of 
the  Middle  Age,  they  were  better  off.  They  were  in  immediate 
connection  with  the  class  which  could  help  them  most.  Theirs 
was  not  the  woeful  separation  which,  in  modern  times,  has  done 
so  much  to  retard  social  progTess.  The  Church,  with  its  con- 
stant insistence  on  the  greatest  two  Commandments,  was  an  in- 
calculably democratic  force;  and  while  the  surface  of  medieval 
society  presented  more  spires  and  hills  than  the  modern  sense 
approves,  popular  leaven  was  steadil}^  at  work  in  the  medieval 
mass. 

Aquinas  helps  to  hasten  the  passing  of  the  system  of  slavery 
with  his  teaching  that  it  is  against  the  initial  decree  of  nature. 
He  considers  it  the  result  of  a  disorder  which  sin  brought  into 
the  world.321  ^he  conclusion  is  that,  accordingly  as  virtue  tri- 
umphs and  the  divine  place  is  repaired,  slavery  must  go.  The 
Fall  was  tragically  real  to  Aquinas.  Minds  of  a  materialistic  bias 
are  ready  enough  to  differ  from  him,  and  the  idea  of  Adam's 


320  Albion  W.  Small,  Pub.  of  Am.  Sociological  Society,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  59. 

321  Swmma  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCIV,  a.  5;  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4.  Aris- 
totle's "natural  slave"  (phusei  doulos)  is  not  of  St.  Thomas'  teaching. 
As  Rahilly  well  remarks:  "The  Aristotelian  conception  of  a  natural 
slave  is  as  incompatible  with  Christianity  as  the  Nietzschian  ideal  of 
a  super-man."  Studies,  March,  1920.  Art.  St.  Thomas  and  Democracy. 
Vide  Sent.  II,  dist.  44,  qu.  I,  a.  3;  Summa,  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4;  la  2ae, 
qu.  II,  a.  4. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  75 

transgression  is  widely  lampooned  as  a  bit  of  ''theological  moon- 
shine." On  the  other  hand,  many  are  repudiating  the  whole- 
sale demands  and  extreme  conclusions  of  Evolutionism.  So 
modern  thought  is  as  ready  to  consider  things  from  a  Thomistic 
point  of  view  as  from  any  other.  The  Angelic  Doctor  is  not 
singular  when  he  traces  ser^dce  to  sin.  He  has  more  than  six 
thousand  years  with  him  in  the  belief  that  the  outraged  Deity's 
decree,  "In  the  sw^eat  of  thy  face  shalt  thou  eat  bread  till  thou 
return  to  the  earth,  out  of  which  thou  wast  taken"  (Gen.  III. 
19),  is  of  the  most  solemn  import.  His  science  is  all  the  more 
solid  for  being  founded  on  the  rock  of  religion. 

Slavery  is  tolerable,  to  St.  Thomas,  not  in  itself,  but  in  the 
advantages  which  it  brings  to  its  subjects.^--  Pufendorf  has 
such  an  idea,  too,  when  he  criticizes  the  absence  of  slaver\^  among 
Christian  nations  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the  great  number  of 
thieves,  vagabands,  and  hardy  beggars.^^^  Aquinas  is  interested 
in  the  interests  of  the  servant,  as  in  those  of  the  master.^-*  He 
quotes  from  Proverbs:  "the  fool  shall  serve  the  wise"  (XI,  29)  ; 
for  it  is  wisdom  in  the  fool  to  do  so.^--^  Incidentally,  he  reveals 
his  belief  that  a  person  who  stands  out  from  the  socially  inca- 
pable class  logically  is  no  slave,^26  ^nd  that  masters  have  no 
right  to  be  such,  who  are  not  the  mental  and  moral  superiors  of 
those  beneath  them. 

The  system  of  slavery,  says  Thomas,  is  of  human  foundation. 
It  is  therefore  amenable  to  social  conditions,  advances  in  under- 
standing, and  growth  of  sympathy.  Human  institutions  are 
variable.    True,  that  which  is  natural  to  an  immutable  nature 

322  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCIV,  a.  5.,  et  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVII,  a.  Ill, 
ad  2:  "Utile  est  hunc  quod  regatur  a  sapientiori  " 

323  De  Jure  Naturae  et  Gentium,  Lib.  VII,  ch.  I,  4.  Dunning,  op.  cit., 
Vol.  II,  p.  321.  Cf.  Grotius,  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads  (tr),  Bk.  II,  ch. 
V,  par.  27,  n.  2:  "Now  perfect  and  utter  Slavery,  is  that  which  obliges 
a  Man  to  serve  his  Master  all  his  life  long,  for  diet  and  other  common 
Necessaries;  which  indeed,  if  it  be  thus  understood  and  confined  within 
the  Bounds  of  Nature,  has  nothing  too  hard  and  severe  in  it;  for  that 
perpetual  Obligation  to  Service  is  recompensed  by  the  Certainty  of 
being  always  provided  for;  which  those  who  let  themselves  out  to 
daily  Labour,  are  often  far  from  being  assured  of." 

324  Even  Aristotle  taught  the  idenity  of  interest  between  the  master 
and  the  slave.  Politics,  III,  6.  St.  Thomas  seems  to  go  so  far  as  to 
place  the  relations  of  the  slave  to  the  master  on  a  par  with  those  of  the 
son  to  the  father.     Summa,  2a,  2ae,  qu.  LVII,  a.  IV,  ad  2. 

325  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  81,  et  cap.  78,  3. 

326  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  10. 


76       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


is  without  change.  But  human  nature  is  not  immutable ;  and, 
even  that  which  is  natural  to  man,  may  sometimes  prove  an 
imperfection. 

Looking  more  deeply  into  the  mind  of  Aquinas,  we  find  an 
underlying  thought  which  all  but  the  extreme  radicals  of  to- 
day must  suspect:  the  necessity  of  a  senace-force  in  exery  state. 
This  truth  has  thrust  itself  into  the  modern  consciousness  as 
never  before,  in  the  industrial  stress,  with  its  innumerable  strikes, 
consequent  to  wartime  conditions.  The  community  equally 
requires  brains  and  bodies.  Aquinas  is  not  to  be  blamed  for 
considering  the  service  of  the  former  nobler  than  that  of  the  lat- 
ter. But  he  was  fully  alive  to  the  imperativeness  and  import- 
ance of  physical  labor ;  and,  realizing  that  the  God-man  was  the 
foster-son  of  a  carpenter,  he  must  have  appreciated  the  dignity  of 
it  too  .328 

He  does  not  teach  that  the  sen^ant-class  is  to  be  so  hedged 
about  that  no  member  of  it  can  escape.  Each  worker  is  an 
image  of  the  God  to  whom  all  men  must  tend,  and,  as  such,  has 
potentialities  which  are  not  to  be  repressed.  Manual  work  must 
be.  Jt  is  the  Lord's  mandate;  it  is  the  natural  need.  But  if 
the  spark  of  reason  in  a  humble  toiler  should  grow  into  great- 
ness, it  were  unseemly,  according  to  Thomistic  principle,  that 
the  State  should  not  profit  by  the  erstwhile  lowly  one's  ability, 
and  that  he  should  not  be  pennitted  to  rise.^^^  He  believes, 
too,  that  there  can  be  no  true  libeily  in  society,  without  virtue 
in  its  subjects,  and  that  virtue  is  the  occasion  of  liberty  and  its 
warrant.  Also,  he  frowns  on  class  distinctions  which  are  based 
not  on  nature  but  on  some  artificial  standard.^^*^ 

Aquinas  does  not  consider  the  slave  an  active  part  of  the 
polity.-^3i    For  the  State  is  a  work  of  reason  ;  and  reason  is  weak 

327  Summa  Theol.,  2a,  2ae,  qu.  LVII,  a.  2,  ad  1.  On  the  merit  of  the 
following  principle  too,  the  final  abolition  of  slavery  is  forecast:  "Jus- 
titia  quidem  perpetuo  est  observanda;  sed  determinatio  eorum  quae 
sunt  justa,  oportet  quod  varietur  secundum  diversum  hominum  statum" 
—Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  3,  ad.  1.  With  the  progress  of 
morality  in  the  masters,  and  of  intellectuality  in  the  slaves,  the  system 
would  pass. 

328  Com.  Pout.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  3. 

329  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  4.  It  is  significant  that  Aquinas  should 
link  "freedom"  with  "virtue."    Com.  PoUt..  Lib.  Ill,  cap  14. 

330  Co?/i.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  4. 

331  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I.,  cap.  14. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  77 


in  a  slave,  else  he  is  not  rightly  one.  Thomas  does  not  exclude 
him  from  the  polity.  His  incompetence  is  the  bar.  He  is 
better  served  by  the  reason  of  others  than  by  his  own.^^  The 
Angelic  Doctor  discerns  that  the  common-good  can  be  secured 
only  by  the  most  intelligent  enactments,  and  that  the  required 
intelligence  is  not  found  in  the  lower  levels  of  the  State.  He 
could  not  utterly  ignore  Aristotle's  mention  that  the  very  worst 
form  of  democracy  is  ''that  which  gives  a  share  to  every  citizen 
— a  thing  which  few  cities  can  bear."^^^ 

He  was  doubtless  impressed,  too,  with  the  effort  of  Aristotle 
to  place  slavery  on  a  rational  basis ;  for  he  himself  uses  the  Phil- 
osopher's arguments  on  the  inequality  of  human  nature  and 
the  utility  of  service.  But  he  Christianizes  them,  and  thus 
prepares  them  to  blend  into  the  larger  concept  of  liberty  which 
we  claim  to-day.  He  softens  the  Philosopher's  harsh  idea  that 
the  slave  is  a  living  possession  (res  possessa  animata)  or  instru- 
ment for  practical  purposes,  like  the  statutes  of  Daedalus  or  the 
tripods  of  Vulcan.^2*  He  will  not  forget  the  soul  which  is  in 
each  one  and  which  cannot  be  transgressed  by  another.^s^  If  St. 
Thomas  did  not  regard  slaves  as  persons,  in  reference  to  civil 
rights,  it  was  because  he  felt  that  they  were  better  represented 
in  the  wisdom  of  their  masters.  He  accredits  their  psychologi- 
cal and  ethical  personality.  And  he  is  refreshingly  far  ad- 
vanced from  the  Aristotelian  persuasion  that  they  have  no 
rights  against  their  masters,  and  that,  though  they  ought  not 
be  treated  cruelly,  the  wanton  lord  does  not  really  violate  their 
rights  at  all.  A  man  may  sell  his  muscles  to  another,  but  no 
more.^^    Any  measures  on  the  part  of  masters,  contrary  to 


332  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  3. 

333  PoZ.,  VI,  4. 

Politics,  I,  4.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  3;  Com.  in  Epist.  ad  Titum, 
cap.  Ill,  lec.  2. 

335  gumma  Theol.,  la.  2ae,  qu.  CIV.  a.  5.  Cf,  Dubray's  remarks  on 
Human  Personality,  Introductory  Philosophy,  pp.  509-10.  "Some  men 
are  not  persons  with  regard  to  certain  rights  (e.  g.,  outlaws)." 

336  Such  sentences  in  Thomas'  doctrine  as  "quia  quidquid  servus 
habebat,  et  etiam  ipsa  persona  servi,  erat  quaedam  possessio  domini" 
(la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  IV,  ad  3),  are  to  be  interpreted  by  his  doctrine  that 
souls  are  ever  free  and  bodies,  too,  in  their  natural  requirements. 
(2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5).  Slavery,  violating  these  liberties,  would  lack  all 
justification.  Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXXII,  a.  IV,  ad  3:  "est  autem  homo 
alterius  servus,  non  secundum  mentem,  sed  secundum  corpus." 


78       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

this  fact,  are  unjust.  And  inequalities,  to  the  mind  of  Aqui- 
nas, are  not  static,  so  far  as  individuals  are  concerned. 

He  manages  to  view  the  subject  of  slavery  democratically. 
He  teaches  that,  absolutely,  there  is  no  natural  cause  why  one 
should  be  a  slave  more  than  another.  The  strongest  justification 
he  offers  for  it  is  the  one,  which,  if  observed  in  this  era  of  free- 
dom, might  have  prevented  the  present  social  upheavals.  He 
finds  rationality  in  the  system  insofar  as,  by  it,  he  who  needs  a 
guide  gets  one.  The  master  must  take  a  personal  interest  in  his 
slave ;  else  he  is  unworthy  of  himP'^  The  relation  between  the 
former  and  the  latter  must  be  on  a  truly  Christian  basis; 
intimate,  cordial,  and  beneficiaL^-^^  The  word  "slave" 
has  been  so  be-smirched,  rolling  down  the  centuries,  that 
we  veer  from  it;  forgetting  that  intrinsically  it  is  not  so  for- 
midable after  all,  and  that,  on  the  lips  of  Aquinas,  it  is  almost 
as  innocuous  as  our  own  word  "servant"  to-day.  His  is  a 
concession  of  service  and  of  dependence,  rather  than  of  slavery. 
He  will  not  allow  the  personality  of  the  slave  to  be  destroyed. 
He  remembers  that  all  men  are  equal.  He  recalls  the  old  Hebrew 
law  which  required  that  slaves  be  treated  as  human  beings.^^^ 
He  demands  that  they  have  their  weekly  day  of  rest  and  devo- 
tion.340 

He  does  not  forget  the  natural  law  in  which  every  human 
being  has  a  share  and  from  which  natural  rights  flow.  He 
vindicates  all  the  natural  rights  of  the  low^ly.^^i  On  this  point 
Rahilly  remarks:  "We  have  here  a  clear  doctrine  of  equal  natur- 
al rights,  which,  while  it  is  fruitful  in  social  and  political  appli- 
cations, is  not  based  on  any  impossible  or  Utopian  hypotheses. 
Every  man  has  the  same  inalienable  right  to  spiritual  freedom 


337  Cf .  Phillips,  American  Negro  Slavery,  p.  307 :  "There  was  clearly 
no  general  prevalence  of  severity  and  strain  in  the  regime.  There 
was,  furthermore,  little  of  that  curse  of  impersonality  and  indifference 
which  too  commonly  prevails  in  the  factories  of  the  present  day  world 
where  power-driven  machinery  sets  the  pace,  where  the  employers  have 
no  relations  with  the  employed,  outside  of  work  hours,  where  the  pro- 
prietors indeed  are  scattered  to  the  four  winds,  where  tlie  directors  con- 
fine their  attention  to  finance,  and  where  the  one  duty  of  the  superinten- 
dent is  to  produce  a  maxim  output  at  a  minimum  cost." 

338  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  4. 

339  Summa  Theol.,  la.  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  4. 

340  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXXII,  a.  4,  ad,  3. 

341  Swmma  Theol,  Supplementum  qu.  LII,  a.  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  79 


and  to  the  exterior  conditions  of  human  existence,  whether 
proprietary,  personal  or  marital. "^^^  Thus  St.  Thomas  is  not 
faithless  to  democracy;  in  fact  he  is  more  consistent  with  it 
than  many  an  enlightened  modem. 

Jourdain  tells  us  that  the  Latin  language  had  only  the  word 
"servus"  to  cover  three  different  ideas :  first,  slavery  properly  so- 
called,  or  the  possession  of  man  by  man ;  secondly,  the  service  of 
the  soil,  which  was  a  milder  form ;  and  thirdly,  domesticity .^^ 
This  writer  warrantably  teaches  that  St.  Thomas  does  not  in- 
tend the  first  significance,  which  is  paganic,  so  much  as  the 
other  two.  The  Angelic  Doctor  uses  the  diction  of  Aristotle, 
but  not  the  thought.  He  thinks  for  himself,  and  he  is  a  Chris- 
tian. Feugueray's  complaint  that  the  Doctor  follows  Aristotle 
and  not  St.  Paul,  and  respects  antiquity  to  the  extent  of  forget- 
ting Christian  liberty  and  equality  would  seem  unjust.^^ 

Thus  though  St.  Thomas  did  not  view  slaves  as  active  citizens 
and  parts  of  civil  community,  he  granted  them  a  passive 


342  studies,  The  Democracy  0/  St.  Thomas,  March,  1920. 

343  La  Philosophic  de  Saint  Thomas,  t.  I,  p.  419.  Grotius,  too,  men- 
tions several  mild  significations  of  the  word  "slave."  See  De  Jure  Belli 
et  Pads,  Bk.  II,  ch.  V,  par.  XXX. 

344  Jourdain,  p.  422.  M.  Delecluse  (Gr^goire  VII,  saint  Francois  d' 
Assises  et  saint  Thomas  d'Aquin,  Paris,  1844,  t.  II,  p.  421,  et  suiv.)  is 
also  quoted  as  unfavorably  regarding  St.  Thomas'  view.  Both  Feugueray 
and  Delecluse  measure  the  mind  of  the  Angelic  Doctor  with  the  stan- 
dards of  a  remotely  modern  century  and  fail  to  consider  sufficiently  the 
character  of  his  age.  They  must  at  least  admit,  with  Jourdain,  that  Aqui- 
nas did  not  consider  slavery  a  political  expedient,  nor  a  means  of 
government,  and  that  he  did  cleanse  the  concept  with  Christianity. 
See  Schwalm,  Legons  de  Philosophic  sociale,  t.  I,  pp.  180-181,  for  a  clari- 
fication of  Thomistic  views. 

Cf.  Phillip's  American  Negro  Slavery,  p.  514:  "The  government  of 
slaves  was  for  the  ninety  and  nine  by  men  and  only  for  the  hundreth  by 
laws.  There  were  injustice,  oppression,  brutality  and  heart-burning  in 
the  regime,  but  where  in  the  struggling  word  are  these  absent?  There 
were  also  gentleness,  kind-hearted  friendship  and  mutual  loyalty  to 
a  degree,  hard  for  him  to  believe  who  regards  that  system  with  a  theo- 
ristic  eye  and  a  partisan  squint.  For  him,  on  the  other  hand  who  has 
known  the  considerate  and  cordial,  courteous  and  charming  men  and 
women,  white  and  black,  which  that  picturesque  life  in  its  best  phases 
produced,  it  is  impossible  to  agree  that  its  basis,  and  its  operations  were 
wholly  evil,  the  law  and  the  prophets  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 
Such  is  the  conclusion  of  the  latest  and  perhaps  the  ablest  critique  of 
slavery  as  an  American  fact,  from  a  conscientious  study  said  to  cover 
twenty  years  of  research.  And  yet,  the  slavery  of  St.  Thomas'  conniv- 
ance was  much  more  humane  in  principle  than  the  American  brand. 
It  demanded  freedom  for  the  subject  in  all  that  pertained  to  the  soul 
and  to  the  nature  of  the  body. 


80       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

share  in  it  and  found  a  place  for  them  in  his  broad  concept  of 
the  People.  He  sees  the  People  pressing  upward  to  the  heights 
of  virtue:  the  best  leading  on;  the  stronger  helping  the  weaker; 
the  weaker  supplying  the  stronger  with  ordinary  needs,  while 
the  latter  engage  in  the  greater  purposes  of  the  State.  When  a 
sufficient  number  attain  the  objective,  political  democracy 
may  begin ;  and,  acordingly  as  those  above  raise  up  those  below, 
it  is  perf ect.345  gt.  Thomas  knew  that  Christian  endeavor  would 
do  more  for  democracy  than  a  frenzied  theory,  whirling  destruc- 
tion and  enkindling  hate.  The  pure  Christianity  of  his  princi- 
ples is  the  greatest  merit  of  his  politics  and  his  best  contribution 
to  the  cause  of  liberty. 


Let  us  recall,  too,  that  the  revered  pioneers  of  liberty  in  our  own 
land  took  the  institution  of  slavery  for  granted:  and  that  political  ex- 
pediency was  a  primary  object  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  of 
one  of  the  kindest  and  fairest  souls  which  have  graced  the  story  of 
America.  No  more  may  we  impugn  the  politics  of  Aquinas  for  its 
tolerance  of  slavery  than  that  of  the  leaders  of  American  liberty;  and 
perhaps  less. 

345  He  does  not  believe,  however,  that  the  flow  of  democracy  is  to  be 
the  ebb  of  government.  His  idea  is  somewhat  like  that  expressed  by 
Dupont-White :  "Quant  a  votre  objection  que  la  moralite  croissante  des 
hommes  doit  se  resoudre  en  une  reduction  croissante  de  gouvernement, 
je  responds  que  le  fait  d'une  elit,  et  il  ne  puet  devenir  celui  des  foules 
que  sous  le  poids  d'une  forte  contrainte  (here  Aquinas  may  differ).  Au 
debut,  tout  progres  doit  a'imposer,  et  ensuite,  tout  progres  accepte 
donne  lieu  k  la  conception  d'un  progres  nouveau  parmi  les  natures 
superieures.  Autrement  a  quoi  servirait  leur  superiorite?  Tel  est  le 
jeu  des  inegalites  dont  le  monde  est  fait."  Quoted  by  Laveleye,  Le 
Gouvernement  dans  la  Democratie,  p.  35,  t.  I. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  81 


CHAPTER  IV 
RULERS 

The  lowest  levels  of  civil  society  suggest^  by  contrast,  the 
highest  points.  The  apex  of  the  State  is  its  ruler.^^^  Authority, 
in  the  degree  in  which  it  rises  up  from  the  State,  extends  down 
through  it.  The  democratically  erect  pyramid  properly  ex- 
presses the  ideal  political  vision  of  Aquinas ;  not  the  tipsily  in- 
verted one  of  some  other  medievalists  who  would  have  God 
empower  the  one  and  ignore  the  many. 

1. — Aristotle's  Views 

In  his  Commentary  on  the  Politics,  Aquinas  considers  with 
Aristotle  the  absolute  ruler  and  the  possible  unnaturalness  of 
his  position  in  the  State.  The  Philosopher,  however,  regards 
the  matter  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  Athenian  democracy 
in  which  all  the  citizens  were  as  nearly  equal  as  possible  and 
each  was  fitted  to  take  active  part  in  the  administration  of  the 
government,  even  to  the  holding  of  public  office,  as  appears  from 
the  custom  of  voting  by  lot.  In  the  case  of  only  a  few  military 
and  moral  positions,  w^hich  required  unique  qualification,  was 
there  recourse  to  the  ballot.^*"^  He  deems  it  unworthy  that  one 
citizen  should  have  control  over  so  many  equals,  for  two  rea- 
sons: first,  nature  requires  that  the  same  right  and  rank  exist 
among  equals  secondly,  just  as  it  is  harmful  for  those  of 
different  physical  constitutions  to  have  to  follow  the  same 
regimen,  so  it  is  wrong  that  those  who  are  equal  in  civic  merit 
should  be  unequal  in  civic  station. He  advances,  then,  that 

346  St.  Thomas  sees  the  necessity  of  rulers  in  the  exigencies  of  social 
life.  There  must  be  some  custodian  of  the  common  good,  since  each 
one  is  apt  to  be  too  interested  in  his  individual  inclination  and  welfare. 
Summa  Theol.,  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4.    See  also  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

347  Cf.  Philip  Van  Ness  Myers'  History  of  Greece,  pp.  255-256,  and 
Aristotle's  Politics,  III,  1,  2,  4. 

348  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  15. 

349  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  15. 


82        ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

law  should  govern,  instead  of  any  citizen.^^^  Whoever  is  ap- 
pointed to  office  in  a  democracy  is  only  a  guardian  or  ser^^ant 
of  the  law.  We  shall  presently  see  how  democratically  far 
Aquinas  agrees  with  these  statements,  even  when  their  substance 
is  applied  to  kingly  polity.  The  Philosopher  expresses  him- 
self like  a  good  medievalist  when  he  writes  that  to  make  the 
law  supreme  means  to  make  God  likewise.^^  He  somewhat 
sacrifices  truth  to  fervor,  however,  when  he  adds  that  to  en- 
trust the  sovereign  power  to  man  is  to  fling  it  to  a  beast.  He 
esteems  the  law  to  represent  the  intellect  dispassionately,  and 
hence  to  be  the  ideal  ruler;  for  appetites  and  passions  some- 
times vitiate  the  judgments  of  even  the  best  of  men.^-^^  St. 
Thomas  remembers  this  fact  and  weaves  it  into  his  treatise 
on  rulers. 

But  Aristotle  proposes  that  the  law  have  a  living  exponent. 
Of  itself,  it  is  cold  and  impersonal;  and  its  verv^  virtues  may 
prove  defects.  Perchance  a  man  who  knows  the  art  of  ruling 
and  brings  a  warmth  of  charity,  wisdom  and  justice,  to  the 
interpretation  and  application  of  the  statute,  would  make  the 
law  rule  much  more  effectively  than  it  could  by  itself.  As 
Aristotle  astutely  obser^-es,  the  sick  physician  does  not  depend 
on  his  medical  books,  but  calls  in  another  brother  of  the  profes- 
sion. Too,  the  law  is  limited.  It  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes;  but 
just  exigencies  and  exceptions,  for  which  it  does  not  provide, 
are  constantly  cropping  out.  The  human  element  is  needed  to 
supply  the  deficiencies.^  The  Philosopher  therefore  proposes 
the  perplexity :  is  it  preferable  that  the  best  man  should  govern 
or  the  best  law?  St.  Thomas,  it  will  appear,  opines  that  they 
should  go  together. 

Aristotle  suggests  the  irrationality  of  one-man  rule  with 
the  common-place  observation  that  a  single  person  cannot  see 
better  with  one  pair  of  eyes,  hear  better  with  two  ears,  nor  do 
better  with  two  hands,  than  many  can  with  many.^^  He  also 
offers  that,  since  a  supreme  magistrate  cannot  possibly  attend 


."ioODib.  Ill,  lec.  8. 

351  Cf.  Com.  Polit..  Lib.  III.  lec.  15. 

352  Ibidem. 
35.3  Ibidem. 
354  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  83 

to  all  his  duties  himself  and  simply  has  to  employ  several  sub- 
ordinates, it  would  have  been  just  as  reasonable  to  have  had 
many  rulers  in  the  first  place,  instead  of  one.^-^-"^  Again,  if  one 
man  is  able  to  rule,  two  would  be  so  much  more  so.  A  brace  of 
quotations  from  the  Iliad — 'Tet  two  go  together,"  and  ''Were 
ten  such  faithful  cousellors  mine  own!"^-^^  are  used  by  the 
Philosopher  gracefully  to  press  this  point.  Finally  he  observes 
that  a  monarch  delegates  part  of  his  power  to  friends;  but  a 
friend  is  an  equal  and  like  to  his  friend;  if,  therefore,  the 
king  concedes  that  his  friend  should  govern,  ipso  facto  he 
submits  that  those  who  are  his  equals  should  rule :  and  theoreti- 
cally monarchism  softens  into  liberalism. -^^^ 


2. — St.  Thomas'  Views:  (1)  Qualifications  for  Rulers; 

(2)  Duties 

It  will  be  clear  in  the  following  pages  that  St.  Thomas  is  in- 
terested in  this  array  of  observations,  and  that  he  gives  them 
due  respect  in  his  thought  on  rulers.  He  does  not  appropriate 
them  wholly,  however;  for  they  are  as  unusual  as  the  Greek 
setting  which  inspired  them.  The  Athenian  democracy,  with 
a  citizenry  which  for  equality  was  unique  in  history,  had 
grown  dim  in  a  past  which  seemed  wholly  out  of  relation  to 
the  thirteenth  century.  Since  Pericles,  great  historical  events 
had  wrenched  the  world  from  the  classic  era;  and  St.  Thomas 
appeared  at  a  time  and  in  a  locale  as  different  from  those  in 
which  Anaxagoras,  Sophocles,  Euripides,  Aristophanes,  and 
Thucydides  flourished,  as  a  star  from  a  shadow.  The  city-state 
had  now  expanded  to  a  kingdom.  The  people  were  not  severely 
separated  into  the  ruling  and  the  enslaved  classes,  but  degrees 
were  present  between  and,  in  evidence  of  evolution,  were  con- 
tinually increasing.^^s    Proportionally,  there  were  infinitely 

355  Ibidem. 

^56  Iliad,  X,  224,  and  II,  371. 
357  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  15. 

358Rickaby,  Political  and  Moral  Essays,  p.  53:  "The  Greek  City  State 
was  fullblown,  and  had  no  future  before  it:  while  the  large  and  cum- 
brous masses  of  medievalism  had  in  them  the  potency  of  the  modern 
world,  a  world  at  once  better  and  worse  than  the  medieval,  but  any- 
how more  vast,  more  complex,  and  more  marvelous." 


84       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

fewer  perfect  citizens  than  in  the  Periclean  Age;  potentially, 
there  were  inconceivably  more.  Aquinas  thought  and  wrote 
for  the  Middle  Age,  even  as  Aristotle  for  the  Attic ;  though  their 
principles  were  perennial.  It  is  impossible  altogether  to  prevent 
the  character  of  the  period  in  which  one  lives  from  coloring 
one's  thoughts,  words,  and  deeds. 

In  his  De  Regimine,  the  Angelic  Doctor  writes  from  a  mon- 
archical point  of  view.  He  had  to  deal  with  crowns,  just  as 
the  Philosopher  had  to  consider  the  absence  of  them.  He  was 
writing  to  royalty. 

But  his  advices  to  kings  would  be  just  as  practical  in  many 
respects  for  presidents.  And,  for  that  matter,  Aquinas  himself 
no  doubt  realized  that  Pericles,  of  democratic  Athens,  was  much 
more  imperial  than  that  forgotten  little  ruler  of  Cyprus;  even 
as  the  head  of  the  United  Stat-es  today  is  much  stronger  than 
many  a  weak  monarch.  He  appreciated  that,  whatever  the 
form  of  government,  good  leaders  would  be  necessary.  Mont- 
esquieu declares  that  the  great  motor  of  the  people  is  their 
own  passions;  Cicero  complains  that  they  condemn  what  they 
do  not  understand;  Virgil  pictures  them  with  many  mouths, 
many  tongues,  throats  of  brass,  and  lungs  of  iron,  but  omits  the 
detail  of  a  head  of  brains;  Horace  judges  them  fickle.  Social 
Psychology  corroborates  these  findings  and  contributes  to  them. 
Even  when  it  is  recalled  that  true  democracy  can  exist  only 
when  all  the  populace  have  risen  above  the  rabble  level,  it 
must  be  appreciated  that  the  instincts  of  man  can  never  be 
cultivated  away  and  that,  where,  among  many,  each  has  a 
voice,  a  psychical  Vesuvius  is  ever  possible.  Even  the  Greek 
assembly  of  the  Golden  Age  was  boisterous,  and,  without  the 
dominating  personality  of  Pericles,  it  might  have  dissolved, 
of  its  own  energy.  As  for  the  modern  representative  democracy, 
obviously,  from  its  character,  it  requires  leadership.  A  mon- 
archy or  an  aristocracy,  strong  in  organization  and  tradition, 
could  bear  on  largely  by  its  own  momentum. But  a  popular 
government,  of  so  many  individuals  and  temperaments,  is, 
without  proper  direction,  a  prime  uncertainty. 


359  Cf.  Puh.  Of  Am.  Sociological  Soc,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  10. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY  85 

An  unguided  democracy  is  a  misguided  one.  Claudian's 
lines  have  their  political  truth : 

'Tallitur  egregio  quisquis  sub  principe  credit 
Ser\'itum ;  numquam  libertas  gratior  extat 
Quam  sub  Rege  pio  " 

And  the  words  of  the  Commentary  on  Aristotle's  Politics  are 
likewise  expressive:  *'To  live  according  to  the  State  is  not  to 
be  considered  slavery,  but  liberty  and  safety."^^ 

The  greater  the  role  of  the  people  in  the  government,  the 
more  vivid  must  be  the  standard  of  action  before  them.  A 
subjective  norm  ever  tends  to  be  a  selfish  one,  and  more  often 
than  not  leads  away  from  the  common  good.  An  objective 
directive  is  more  dependable;  and  it  best  appears  in  the  pur- 
poses and  principles  of  some  representative  person  or  persons 
apart  from  the  crowd.  The  popular  intelligence  and  good-will 
are  still  necessary,  even  under  leadership;  for  citizens  in  a 
democracy  hold  the  key  to  authority,  and  they  must  not  submit 
it  lightly.  They  should  be  critical,  and  select  only  such  as 
will  well  and  truly  represent  the  public  interest.  The  more  of 
mind  and  morals  among  them,  the  fairer  their  choice  of  a 
representative ;  the  better  their  choice,  the  more  prosperous  the 
State. 

Even  among  leadei*s  there  is  always  a  bell-wether. From 
Pericles  down  to  Wilson,  the  history  of  democracy  is  a  succes- 
sion of  them.  But  Aquinas  evinces  how  democracy  may  exist 
even  in  the  shadow  of  ''one  only  man,"  by  teaching  that  any 
supercargo  on  the  ship  of  State,  no  matter  how  powerful  he 
may  be,  does  not  really  rule.  Justice  is  king,  and  every  sov- 
ereign must  be  its  slave.^^  When  St.  Thomas  speaks  of  the 
king  as  above  the  law  (ruling  secundum  virtutem) ,  he  but 
means  what  we  should  concede  in  the  case  of  a  judge;  for, 
in  the  past,  royalty  exercised  the  judicial  power.  The  judge 
who  wields  the  law  is  above  it,  except  in  an  ethical  sense.  The 
Doctor  writes  that,  in  matters  touching  his  own  person,  a  man 
must  form  his  own  conscience  from  his  own  knowledge;  but 

360  Lib.  V.  lec.  7. 

361  Summa,  la,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4.    See  also  Contra  Gen..  IV,  76. 

362  Cf.  De  Reg.,  1,  12. 


80       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


ill  matters  concerning  public  authority,  conscience  must  be 
formed  in  accordance  with  knowledge  attainable  in  public  ju- 
cial  procedure. -"^^  He  would  have  the  king  no  more  arbi- 
trary than  a  just  judge.^^  This  subjection  of  the  ruler  to  jus- 
tice is  the  formula  of  freedom.  ''During  the  Middle  Age," 
Gierke  notes,  ''we  can  hardly  detect  even  the  beginnings  of  that 
opinion  which  would  free  the  Sovereign  (whenever  he  is  acting 
in  the  interest  of  the  public  good)  from  the  bonds  of  the  Law 
of  Nature."^^'^  He  also  declares  that  "medieval  thought  gave 
to  the  Monarch  a  representative  character.  However  highly 
his  powers  might  be  extolled,  the  thought  that  Lordship  is 

Office  had  remained  a  living  thought. "^^^   We  see  then, 

from  the  times  of  St.  Thomas  and  from  his  own  statements, 
what  slender  foundation  the  baser  autocracy  can  find  in  the 
ecclesiastical  era.  If  Aristotle  improved  the  politics  of  Aquinas, 
medievalism  did  not  injure  it. 

The  Angelic  Doctor  does  not  tolerate  the  shabby  ambitions 
and  purposes  which  too  often  stimulate  the  seeking  of  civil 
station.  His  candidate,  to  be  a  proper  servant  of  the  people, 
must  be  a  fit  serv-ant  of  God.  He  must  be  a  man  of  purest 
motive.  His  own  good  must  be  sought  only  in  that  of  the 
public.  Politically  he  exists  for  the  benefit  of  the  people  i*^^"^ 
and  any  direct  concessions  on  his  part  to  the  call  of  fame 
and  fortune  are  a  betrayal  of  his  trust.  Aquinas  knows  how 
nature  rebels,  even  in  the  best,  against  such  mortified  comport- 
ment. He  finds  the  tendency  to  self-seeking  universal.^^  Man 
must  have  a  reward.  And  so  Aquinas  points  his  finger  to 
Heaven  with  the  advice  that  "when  the  chief  shepherd  shall 
appear,"  the  "crown  of  unfading  glory"  shall  be  bestowed.-^^'^ 

sas  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVII,  a.  2. 

364  Cf.  Summa,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  V,  ad  3. 

365  Political  Theories  of  Middle  Age,  p.  86. 

366  Idem,  pp.  61-62. 

367  Cow.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  5.  Also  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap  1.  Cf. 
Moore's  Utopia,  Bk.  I,  p.  67. 

368  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  7. 

369  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  8  et  9.  But  in  Lib.  II,  cap.  XI,  of  the  De 
Reg.,  we  learn  that,  though  kings  are  to  receive  their  real  reward 
from  above,  they  are  not  to  be  denied  the  temporal  glories  and  trap- 
pings of  their  station.  These  aid  respect,  obedience,  and  confidence. 
In  the  authentic  part  of  the  book,  Lib.  II,  cap  V,  this  same  idea  is  in 
the  way  of  being  expressed,  when  the  hand  of  Aquinas  ceases  its  task 
forever. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  87 

Good  rulers  may  hardly  be  expected  from  the  ranks  of  the  irre- 
ligious, who  seek  office  not  so  much  for  what  they  can  bring 
into  it  as  for  what  they  can  get  out  of  it.  The  wages  the  world 
pays  for  the  service  which  governors  render,  is  always  small 
and  sometimes  cynical.  It  has  been  observed  over  and  over 
again  that  democracies  particularly  are  ungrateful.  A  material- 
minded  man  would  consider  himself  foolish  not  to  seize  on  the 
State  for  his  personal  aggrandizement;  and  the  public  good 
could  be  but  a  detail  or  an  incident  in  his  ministry.  St.  Thomas 
sees  six  reasons  why  the  people  should  be  careful  to  elect  a 
leader  who  looks  up.^^^  First,  the  worldly  individual,  not  satis- 
fied with  mere  honor  and  glory,  would  crave  wealth  and  luxur- 
ies. One  with  an  inferior  aim  is  apt  to  have  a  superior  appe- 
tite. Reason  is  silenced ;  impulse  rules.  Either  the  people  are 
relieved  of  their  money  through  unjust  taxes  or  burdened  with 
toil,  to  supply  the  dissipator's  unholy  cravings;  or  the  folly 
falls  on  neighboring  states  in  the  form  of  war,  for  which  the 
people  pay  not  only  in  property  but  in  blood.  Secondly,  there 
are  so  much  labor  and  care  entailed  in  just  rule  that  a  just  man, 
sustained  by  the  best  principles,  alone  would  serve;  especially 
for  the  natural  wages  of  the  position.  Since  nothing  is  frailer 
than  human  glory;  nothing  more  fickle  than  popular  favor. 
Thirdly,  the  danger  of  a  government's  degenerating  into  ^^poli- 
ties'' always  menaces,  if  merely  the  worldly  wise  hold  sway. 
They  are  beholden  only  to  those  whose  regard  they  covet ;  and 
the  common  good  is  forgotten  in  an  effort  to  exalt  those  few. 
A  ruler  should  be  able  to  stand  alone ;  and  this  he  cannot  well 
do  unless  fortified  by  God  with  Whom  he  always  constitutes 
a  majority. 3*^1  In  proportion  as  he  seeks  the  unjust  support 
of  others  and  sacrifices  principle  to  them,  he  is  inefficient  and 
faithless  to  the  State.  Each  favor  he  guiltily  accepts,  helps  to 
tie  his  hands.  His  liberality  become  less  and  less.  Fourthly, 
the  religious  man  is  not  a  politically  pernicious  seeker  of  re- 
nown. Though  in  this  very  fact,  he  has  it  the  more ;  according 
to  a  finer  sense  of  values.  Aquinas  quotes  Sallust's  eulogy  of 
Cato :  ^'The  less  he  sought  glory,  the  more  he  secured  it ;"  and 


370  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap  7. 

371  Cf.  Cronin,  Science  of  Ethics,  p.  603. 


88       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

also  the  assertion  of  Fabius:  ''He  who  spurns  glory  will  indeed 
possess  it."  Convincingly,  too,  he  refers  to  Christ's  disciples. 
Fifthly,  the  chase  of  fame  makes  hypocrites.  Again  Sallust 
speaks  through  the  lips  of  Aquinas  to  tell  us  that  ''ambition 
forces  many  men  to  be  false."  The  Angelic  Doctor  warns 
how  harsh  were  the  words  on  the  lips  of  the  gentle  Savior  Him- 
self, in  denunciation  of  this  peculiarly  despicable  vice  of  hypo- 
crisy. However,  he  believes  that  glory-seeking  is  more  par- 
donable in  a  ruler  than  a  quest  for  the  crasser  objects  of  wealth 
or  pleasure  would  be;  since  the  former  indicates  some  vestige 
of  virtue,  insofar  as  it  aims  at  the  approbation  of  good  people 
and  implies  an  unwillingness  to  offend  them.  Thomas  does 
not  deny  that  a  man  with  only  natural  good  qualities  might 
succeed  as  a  leader  of  the  people.  But  since  the  public  trust 
is  too  sacred  to  be  trifled  or  experimented  with,  and  the  com- 
mon good  so  essential  to  civil  society,  it  were  wisdom  to  have 
only  an  unmistakably  moral  man  at  the  helm  of  State;  and, 
to  the  Doctor,  ethics  has  its  best  sanction  and  assurance  in 
the  things  of  Faith. 

Primarily,  then,  a  man  fit  for  office  is  one  of  religious  persua- 
sion and  conviction.  He  must  be  the  eyes,  the  lips,  the  hands, 
and  the  heart  of  justice.  He  is  thus  the  servant  of  God  as  well 
as  of  man.3'^2  With  justice  equally  he  must  manifest  mercy. 
Tenderly  as  the  members  of  his  own  body,  must  he  regard  the 
individuals  of  the  State.^"^^  They  are  parts  of  the  political 
corpus  of  which  he  is  head.  No  more  should  he  needlessly 
hurt  the  least  of  these  than  himself.  These  qualities  of  equity 
and  clemency  are  the  two  great  instruments  of  rule,  and  in 
the  very  words  of  St.  Thomas  "the  especial  property  of  kings." 

The  work  of  the  State  should,  for  the  ruler,  be  a  labor  of 
love.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  poorly  performed  and  the  people 
will  have  to  bear  the  result.  And  he  who  loves  his  own  interest 
more  than  his  office,  will  be  only  too  ready  to  stoop  to  shame, 
losing  his  own  self-respect  and  the  reverence  of  his  subjects.^^- 

The  sympathies  of  the  ruler  must  be  democratic  and  spread 
through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land.    He  must  be  one 


372  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 

37.3  Ibidem. 

374  Lib.  I,  cap.  10. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  89 

with  the  people.^'^^  His  heart,  large  enough  to  hold  all.  His 
taste,  catholic.^'^^  He  must  rise  superior  to  party  interest. 

He  must  be  a  responsible  person.  Aquinas  would  favor  no 
executive  who  possessed  less  mentality  than  sentimentality. 
Prudence  is  paramount  in  government, and  it  implies  intelli- 
gent f ore-sight. ^"^^  On  the  other  hand,  intelligence  is  energized 
and  directed  by  moral  principles. 

The  ruler  should  comport  himself  as  an  example.  He  is  the 
visible  symbol  of  law  and  order  to  the  people.  The  government 
is  no  better  than  its  administrators.  St.  Thomas  could  no  morfl 
have  connived  at  the  royal  excesses  which  aroused  revolution  in 
Europe  in  modern  times  than  the  people  themselves.  The  doC' 
trine  that  the  king  can  do  no  wrong,  is  distinctly  not  his.  The 
ruler  must  walk  before  the  people  and  be  perfect;  but  that  he 
ought  to  be  perfect  does  not  mean  that  he  is.  He  must  bring 
virtue  to  his  position  and  exercise  it  there.  His  office  does  not 
give  it  to  him.  Civil  society  is  no  higher  than  its  head.  The 
better  the  example  of  the  ruler,  the  more  successful  will  be  the 
mission  of  the  State.  For  all  eyes  naturally  look  to  him,  and 
public  opinion  is  largely  formed  on  his  deeds  and  utterances. 
He  is  the  measure  of  the  successs  or  failure  of  the  polity.  He  is 
the  city  on  the  mountain,  which  cannot  be  hid.  And  man  is 
instinctively  an  imitator. 

It  is  most  important  that  the  ruler  have  a  sufficiency  of  power 
to  discharge  the  duties  of  his  station.  A  ruler  must  rule ;  else, 
he  is  a  political  superfluity  and  encumberance.  Ruling,  he 
must  have  free  hands.  Aquinas,  however,  does  not  plead  for 
plenteous  power  for  regents.  He  believes  that  their  authority 
should  be  proportionate  to  the  service  required  of  them.  In  a 
democracy,  the  sway  of  leaders  is  more  moral  than  political ;  the 
people  maintain  the  ultimate  mastery.  But  those  who  are 
chosen  by  the  community  for  definite  positions  of  State  would 


375  Dib.  I,  cap.  2. 

376  Cap.  1,  et  7;  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  X,  ad  2. 

377  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1.   De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  15. 

378  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  10.  See  the  De  Reg.  Prin- 
cipum  of  Egidius  Colonna  (Fr.  version,  Molenaer),  I,  7-9.  Cf.  Aris- 
totle's teaching  on  the  qualifications  for  governance.  He  finds  three 
essentials:  affection  for  the  established  constitution,  ability,  and  vir- 
tue and  justice.   Politics,  V,  9.   Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  V,  cap.  7. 


90       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

be  useless  without  that  particular  empire  which  gives  political 
service  a  meaning.  The  ruler  is  to  be  a  force ;  else  he  is  with- 
out reason  or  excuse  in  civil  society. 

But  the  State  must  always  be  bigger  than  its  head.  With 
this  teaching,  St.  Thomas  defends  democracy  in  any  form 
of  government.  He  would  have  adjudged  the  French  king 
demented  in  his  proclamation,  L'etat  c'est  moi.  For  him,  even 
the  absolute  monarch  is  no  more  the  State  than  the  cranium  is 
the  whole  body.  He  would  have  stamped  approval  on  the 
phrase,  der  Fiirst  ist  der  erste  Dierner  seiner  Staats.  It  is  plain 
enough  in  his  politics  that  a  king  is  only  the  chief  servant  of 
the  community ,3"^^  and  is  powerful  for  this  purpose.  One 
would  look  in  vain  through  his  pages  to  find  any  teaching 
which  even  vaguely  resembles  that  anti-democratic  dogma 
which  Alexander  Pope  aptly  expresses  as  ''the  right  divine  of 
kings  to  govern  wrong."  He  vindicates  the  eminence  of  sov- 
ereigns, but  the  dazzle  of  the  sun  does  not  blind  him,  like 
Bossuet,  to  the  spots  on  it.  His  politics  really  coronate  the 
community,  rather  than  the  king;  since  it  is  for  the  former 
that  the  latter  exists. 

The  duties  of  a  ruler  are  the  just  demands  of  the  State.  Or- 
dinarily, there  can  be  no  progress  without  peace.  And,  since 
the  State  was  formed  for  the  benefit  and  advancement  of  its 
members,  the  sovereign  must  see  that  dissension  within  and 
without  be  quelled.  Unity  is  prerequisite  to  concord.^^  The 
ruler,  from  his  very  position  as  chief,  helps  to  secure  it;  but 
he  must  be  actively  interested  in  its  further  attainment.  As 
far  as  prudence  will  permit,  he  must  endeavor  to  remove  class 
divisions.  He  must  purpose  motives  of  common  interest  and 
zeal,  and  promote  rational  patriotism.  Aquinas  does  not  pre- 
scribe that  rabid  love  of  country  w^hich  brooks  no  consideration 
of  the  unity  of  humanity  and  incites  the  people  to  trample 
on  the  rights  of  other  states  in  order  to  magnify  their  own. 
Still  he  is  not  a  pacifist  in  the  opprobrious  acceptation  of 
the  word. 


379  Surnma  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  5.  Cf.  Dante's  De  Monarchia, 
Lib.  I,  cap.  XII,  3. 

;iSO  Contra,  Gen.,  iv.,  76. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  91 

Not  only  must  the  ruler  strive  for  the  preservation  of  the 
commonwealth,  but  also  for  its  prosperity. 

He  is  a  '^smaller  world/'  because  in  him  is  found  a  type  of 
God's  providence  which  guides  creation.  Reason  is  in  man, 
as  God  is  in  the  universe:  authoritatively.  Accordingly 
as  a  ruler  is  reasonable,  his  rule  is  right.  And  reason  opens  up 
wonderful  vistes  for  his  political  endeavors.  Let  the  ruler 
realize  that  he  should  exercise  the  power  invested  in  him  as 
God,  in  similar  situation,  would  wield  it.  His  interest  must 
not  be  isolated  but  must  seep  through  the  whole  State;  for, 
according  to  Thomistic  description,  he  is  in  the  State  as  the 
soul  in  the  body  and  as  God  in  the  world.-^^^  These  strong  sim- 
iles show  how  sacred  and  import^mt  Aquinas  regarded  the  just 
authorities  of  the  commonwealth,  and  what  a  scope  and  signi- 
ficance he  saw  in  their  duty.  If  they  but  realize  that,  in  a 
sense,  they  represent  both  God  and  the  very  best  that  is  in  men, 
i.  e.  reason  and  reasonableness,  equity  and  charity  would  flow 
freely  from  their  ministry.^^^  They  should  feel  possessive  and 
paternal,  never  exclusive  nor  selfish,  if  they  would  see  their 
obligations  and  find  stimulation  to  fulfill  them. 

Aquinas  would  have  the  sovereign  provide  for  the  health  of 
the  people,  and  not  only  for  the  necessities  of  their  livelihood, 
but  also  for  their  creature  comfort.  Likewise  he  should  look 
to  the  public  defence.^^  He  must  remember  the  morals  of 
the  people;  courts  of  justice  are  to  be  fostered.  St.  Thomas 
is  modern  enough  to  believe  that  prevention  of  crime  should 
be  as  much  an  object  of  the  ruler  as  punishment  of  it.  The 
government  should  stimulate  the  best  in  the  people,  as  well  as 
repress  the  worst.^*  The  workingmen,  on  whom  the  prosperity 
of  the  State  so  largely  depends,  are  not  to  be  forgotten.  Nor 
is  a  general  interest  sufficient.  Thomas  requires  that  the  ruler 
consider  the  individual  as  well  as  the  generality,  and  see  that 
his  needs  are  supplied.-^^^    So  far  as  possible,  each  should  be 

3SlZ)e  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  12. 

382  Ibidem.    Cf.  Lib.  II,  cap.  15. 

383  Lib.  I,  cap.  13  et  cap.  15. 

384  Com.  de  Epis.  S.  Pauli  ad  Romanos,  cap  XIII. 

38.5  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  13;  Summa  Theol..  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.5. 
He  mentions  Moses  and  his  successors  as  ruling  the  people  with  an 
individual  interest  in  each  and  everyone  of  them — Summa,  la  2ae,  qu. 
CV,  a.  1. 


92       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

given  an  opportunity  to  advance.  Certainly  no  class  of  free- 
men is  to  be  exploited  by  another,  with  royal  permission. 

These  functions  of  rulership  are  so  important  to  the  mind 
of  Aquinas,  that  he  makes  them  primary.  They  are  to  be  up- 
permost in  the  heart  and  thought  of  the  ruler  who  has  any- 
thing to  do  with  the  formation  of  a  city,  even  before  the  first 
path  is  cleared  and  the  first  brick  laid.  They  must  animate  him 
and  his  successors. 

The  ruler  should  not  be  politically  purblind,  but  must  let 
his  gaze  pierce  far  into  the  future;  always  remembering  that 
to  govern  a  state  means  duly  to  guide  it  to  its  end.^^  Aquinas 
t-eaches  that  the  State  is  not  an  end  in  itself.'^s"^  He  is  no  Hegeli- 
an assuming  that  it  exists  not  for  the  men  who  compose  it,  but 
for  the  ethical  idea  it  embodies.  In  a  synthesis  which  the  patron 
of  triadism  could  not  surpass,  the  Doctor  holds  that  the  State 
exists  for  the  good  of  the  individuals  within  it.  It  is  important 
to  notice  that  he  does  not  place  the  end  of  the  State  solely  in 
men  themselves.  This  would  be  an  inferior  ideal,  under  which 
justice  could  never  arise,  nor  democracy  prevail.  If  the  State 
cared  only  for  the  bodies  of  the  people,  the  people  would  care 
little  for  the  rights  of  each  other.  Full  stomachs  and  empty 
souls  form  an  evil  recipe  for  a  polity.  The  baser  elements  in 
men  are  surfeited  when  the  spirit  is  starved.  In  modern  par- 
lance, Aquinas  stands  equally  for  full  dinner-pails  and  full 
hearts.  The  ruler  who  neglects  the  fact  of  the  soul  will  never 
secure  the  true  good  of  the  commonwealth ;  for  under  material 
prosperity,  however  specious,  will  lie  dangerous  explosives 
which  the  leasts  circumstance  may  ignite.  A  state  is  not  a 
stat-e,  except  of  confusion,  without  ethics  and  ethics  is  as 
impalpable  as  air,  without  God.  Aquinas  bids  the  ruler  not 
leave  the  Deity,  who  is  the  great  end  of  all,  out  of  his  reckon- 
ing.^ The  ruler  should  carry  his  religion,  though  surely  not 
his  bigotry,  into  office  and  permit  it  to  inspire  and  increase 
charity  and  justice  in  his  ministry.    St.  Thomas  could  not 


386  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap  14. 

387  Ibidem. 

388  Cf.  St.  Augustine,  De  Civit.  Dei.,  c.  IV.  De  Regimine,  Lib.  II, 
cap.  5. 

'^9De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  93 


•commend  the  man  who  wears  his  convictions  like  different  suits 
of  clothes,  according  to  occasion.  He  would  have  the  ruler 
bring  all  the  best  that  is  in  him  and  consecrate  it  perseveringly 
to  the  benefit  of  the  commonwealth.  He  would  have  him  true 
to  his  better  self,  and  consistent,  in  order  to  be  of  real  value  to 
the  polity.  He  would  have  him,  who  presumes  to  rule  others, 
also  rule  himself  .^^^ 


3. — Relation  of  St.  Thomas'  Views  to  Democracy. 

All  this  suggests  how  exalted  w^as  the  Angelic  Doctor's  opin- 
ion of  the  proper  qualifications  for  power.  And  inasmuch  as, 
in  a  democracy,  the  people  are  sovereign,  it  is  evident  that  their 
merit  must  be  of  high  degree,  if  their  government  is  to  escape 
disaster.  St.  Thomas  does  not  conceive  democracy  as  the  self- 
expression  of  an  ignorant  and  immoral  miltitude.  He  rightly 
judges  it  better  than  the  nation  be  guided  aright  by  one  or 
more  good  men,  than  that  it  go  wrong  by  itself.  But  he  is  con- 
siderate of  Aristotle's  criticism  of  monarchy  to  the  degree  that 
he  would  have  the  royal  authority  limited.  He  recognizes 
that,  when  great  power  is  vested  in  a  sovereign,  practically  an 
invitation  is  extended  to  tyranny.^^i  In  another  chapter,  we 
shall  see  more  about  his  governmental  preferences  and  restric- 
tions. It  is  enough  to  notice  here  that  he  holds  that  the  people 
should  retain  some  of  their  authority  and  so  rule  conjointly 
with  their  sovereign. this  manner,  Aquinas  seems  to 
meet  Aristotle's  objection  against  kingship,  that  two  heads  are 
better  than  one.  As  for  the  Philosopher's  proposition  that 
delegation  of  power  to  friends,  on  the  part  of  rulers,  is  an 
admission  that  equals  should  rule,  St.  Thomas  appears  not  so 
much  impressed;  for  likely,  he  senses  the  sophistry  that  the 
term  "equal,"  as  applied  both  to  friends  and  to  rulers,  is  not 
univocal. 

If  we  may  be  permitted  further  to  express  the  mind  of  Aquin- 
as on  rulers,  by  turning  the  pages  of  the  book  De  Eruditione 


390  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  XII,  ad  3. 

391  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.l,  ad  2. 
^92  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.l. 


94       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


Principum,  which  Frederick  Ozanam  cites  as  the  Doctor's  own 
composition,393  some  striking  and  significant  ideas  are  avail- 
able. There  the  nature  of  nobility  is  democratically  described, 
and  the  fact  that  a  bond  of  relationship  exists  between  the 
humblest  and  the  highest  is  featured.  God  is  the  first  cause 
of  all ;  hence  He  ennobled  all.  As  for  the  secondary  and  created 
cause  of  the  human  race — our  first  parents — they  transmitted 
one  and  the  same  nature  to  all.  This  fact  is  unforgetably 
phrased:  "God  did  not  make  one  man  of  silver  to  sire  the 
patricians,  and  another  of  mire  for  the  plebs.''^^*  Everyone 
can  basely  be  traced  to  the  slime  of  the  earth,  and  gloriously 
to  the  Almighty.  St.  Augustine's  characteristic  remark  is 
quoted:  ''Consider  Adam  and  Eve,  and  we  are  all  brothers." 
This  thought  is  strikingly  developed.  From  the  same  source 
proceed  the  high  and  the  low;  the  same  ear  yields  wheat  for 
kings  and  bran  for  swine;  the  same  stem  gives  the  rose  and 
the  thorn;  the  same  tree  produces  good  fruit  and  bad;  the 
same  book  contains  w^holesome  thoughts  and  evil.  The  message 
of  the  De  Eruditione  Principum  is  that  honor  and  shame  from 
no  condition  rise;  true  nobility  is  within  a  man.  And  here 
the  innermost  soul  of  democracy  is  touched;  a  new^  science  of 
values,  for  which  democracy  stands,  and  which  makes  a  man's 
mind  and  heart,  instead  of  his  external  circumstances,  the 
criterion  of  his  worth,  is  fully  introduced.  According  to  this 
principle,  sceptres  and  plows  are  not  w^orlds  apart  after  all. 
There  is  no  sovereign  who  has  not  had  slaves  among  his  an- 
cestors and  there  is  no  slave  who  is  not  the  descendant  of  roy- 
r^l^y  395  'pj^g  proposition  is  spurned  that  birth  signified  w^orth.-"^^^ 
A  man  is  not  w'hat  his  parents  were,  but  what  he  is  himself. 


393  See  Ozanam's  Dante  and  Catholic  Philosophy,  p.  491.  But  Man- 
donnet  writes:  "Echard  estime  que  cet  ouvrage  (De  Erud.  Prin.) 
appartient  k  Guillame  Perraud,  un  dominicain  lyonnals  mort  vers  1250. 
Scriptores  ordinis  Praedicorum,  I,  pp.  134-55.  Je  crois,  pour  des  raisons 
qu'il  serait  hors  de  propos  de  faire  valoir  ici,  que  I'ouvrage  de  Vincent 
de  Beauvais."  At  all  events,  its  tone  and  spirit  are  Thomistic,  and 
it  reflects  some  of  the  most  striking  popular  thought  of  the  day  which 
the  Angelic  Doctor  dominated.  All  the  editors  of  St.  Thomas  include 
it  in  their  collections,  save  Bernard  de  Rubeis.  See  Jourdain,  Philo- 
sophie  de  S.  Thomas,  t.  I,  p.  149. 

394  De  Erud.  Prin.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  4. 

395  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  4. 

396  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  95 

The  book  then  abounds  with  advice  to  rulers:  page  after 
page,  illumined  with  Scripture  and  patriotism,  replete  with 
practical  wisdom.  Pride  is  proscribed.  Let  no  ruler  imagine 
himself  great  because  his  position  is  high;  a  tiny  grain  of 
millet  is  not  a  whit  the  larger  for  being  on  top  of  a  mountain. 
Humility  is  prescribed.  The  King  of  Kings  was  democratic; 
can  the  mortal  monarch  rise  up  in  superiority  ?^^^  Falsehood, 
vanity,  ostentation,  and  luxury  are  sketched  in  all  their  folly. 
Truth,  clemency,  faith,  hope,  fear  of  the  Lord,  and  love  of 
God  and  neighbor — all  necessary  in  every  man  but  especially  in 
a  leader  of  men — are  earnestly  proposed.  Introspection,  respect 
for  the  possessions  of  subjects,  fore-thought  as  to  whether  a 
measure  is  licit,  expedient,  and  fitting;  meditation,  good  com- 
pany, amenability  to  counsel,  restraint  and  prudence  in  accept- 
ing favors,  are  some  more  of  the  royal  jewels  which  the  book 
exhibits. 

One  can  clearly  see  that  autocracy  is  opposite  to  the  con- 
ception of  government  here  set  forth.  The  ruler  is  not  for  him- 
self, but  for  God  and  the  People.    Right  alone  is  his  might. 

Whatever  a  regime  under  such  a  leader  is  called,  it  would,  at 
least  in  results,  amount  to  the  best  achievements  of  a  democracy. 

4. — Comparison  of  Thomistic  Teaching  on  Rulers  with 
Later  Doctrines 

It  reveals  much,  to  compare  St.  Thomas'  thoughts  on  rulers 
briefly  with  those  of  some  other  writers.  Dignified  as  he  con- 
sidered the  office  of  king,  he  did  not  presage  a  Calvinistic  view 
and  claim  that  servile  obedience  is  due  the  sceptre  and  that 
"even  an  individual  of  the  worst  character,  one  most  unworthy 
of  all  honor,  if  invested  with  public  authority,  receives  that 
illustrious  divine  power  which  the  Lord  has  by  His  Word 
devolved  on  the  ministers  of  His  justice  and  judgment,  and 
accordingly — insofar  as  public  obedience  is  concerned,  he  is 


397  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

398  Ibidem.  St.  Augustine  is  cited :  "Ecce  habemus  humilitatis  exem- 
plum,  superbiae  medicamentum.  Princeps  tuus  humilis  est,  et  tu  su- 
perbus?    Caput  est  humile,  et  membrum  superbum?" 


96       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

to  be  held  in  the  same  honor  and  reverence  as  the  best  of 
kings. He  would  not  have  the  people  writhe  helplessly,  while 
their  chief  representative  plays  the  fool.  We  have  already  seen 
that  Aquinas  democratically  teaches  that,  when  prudence  and 
patience  are  exhausted,  the  people  are  free  to  act,  through  their 
representatives.  The  king  should  be  for  the  good  of  the  State ; 
if  his  reign  prove  vicious,  it  may  be  for  the  good  of  the  State 
to  be  rid  of  him.  The  Angelic  Doctor  does  not  permit  piety  to 
exclude  practicality.  He  does  not  place  royalty  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  hands  which  empowered  it. 

The  Machiavellian  conception  of  the  ruler  as  a  combination 
of  lion  and  fox  is  much  too  pagan  to  compare  wdth  the  ideal  of 
Aquinas  who  advises  wisdom,  but  not  cunning;  strength,  but 
not  brutality.  He  would  not  have  the  king  govern  by  fear,  when 
favor  fails,  but  alw^ays  by  justice  and  mercy .^^^  He  insists 
that  royalty  ring  true  and  not  assume  virtue  to  mask  political 
extravagance.  The  difference  betw-een  Aquinas  and  the  author  of 
II  Pnncipe  on  the  subject  of  rulers  is  that  of  body  and  soul, 
mind  and  matter,  justice  and  expedience.  It  is  evident  that 
Thomas  stands  exceedingly  better  by  the  ideals  of  democracy. 

Grotius,  after  championing  the  doctrine  of  social  contract  and 
thereby  abetting  the  people,  surrenders  his  case  by  acceding 
to  absolute  monarchy.  He  wTites  that  the  transfer  of  popular 
sovereignty  may  be  inspired  by  the  purpose  of  w^arding  off 
peril;  or  that  it  may  depend  on  Aristotle-'s  principle  that  cer- 
tain men  are  natural  slaves.  Some  nations,  like  some  individu- 
als, are  fit  only  for  subjection.^oi  Grotius  proceeds  to  cite  the 
Cappadocians  as  an  example ;  and  also  the  remark  of  Philostra- 
tus  that  it  would  be  folly  to  set  the  Thracians,  Mysians,  and 
Getae  at  liberty,  ''since  they  don't  like  it."  The  Netherlander 
does  not  distinguish  sufficiently  betw^een  the  necessity  of  aliena- 
tion of  power  and  the  total  alienation  of  it.  No  nation  could 
rationally  will  to  be  in  puppet-dom  to  royalty,  though  many  a 
one  has  been  well  pleased  w^ith  the  paternalism  and  easy  sw^ay 


^99  Institutes,  Bk.  IV,  ch.  XX,  par.  25.  Quoted  by  Dunning,  Political 
Theories,  II,  p.  29. 

400  Of.  De  Erud.  Prin.,  lAh.  I,  cap.  6.  Contrast  Machiavelli,  II  PHncipe 
(tr),  p.  104. 

401  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pads,  Bk.  I,  ch.  HI,  par.  8,  n.l. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  97 

of  a  royal  regime.   Too,  he  teaches  the  unt-enabiUty  of  the  doc- 
trine that  the  end  of  all  government  is  the  good  of  the  governed. 
Dunning  expresses  his  position  thus :  ^'A  monarch,  and  especial- 
ly a  monarch  with  sovereignty  in  full  proprietorship,  may  rule, 
like  the  master  over  his  slaves,  for  his  own  interest,  or  like 
the  husband  over  the  wife,  for  the  joint  interest. "^^^  Now  St. 
Thomas  considers  no  nation  so  abject  as  to  be  absolutely  incapa- 
ble of  some  share  in  its  own  rule.    His  doctrine  of  rationality 
evinces  this.  Individuals  may  be  incapable ;  but  the  aggregate  in 
a  state  always  represents  a  degree  of  intelligence  and  responsi- 
bility which  must  be  regarded  and  respected.    One  draws  from 
the  Doctor's  views  that  no  ruler  is  or  can  be  absolutely  adequfiiQ^ 
much  less  superior,  to  the  community.    The  natural  l^w  ig^ 
bigger  than  he ;  and  he  is  less  than  the  People.    The  m^^eva^ 
monk  saves  democracy,  whereas  Hugo  de  Groot,  who"  liold-^ 
such  an  important  place  in  the  story  of  the  evolution  of  jioliticiftj 
liberty,  would  sacrifice  it.    The  Hollander's  other  cont^tio^ 
that  government  is  not  necessarily  for  the  common  gooq^;"%u»^ 
equally  counter  to  democracy  and  Aquinas.  ^  •  7 

Hobbes  lifts  a  sceptre  to  the  stars  with  one  hand,  while 
throttles  democracy  Avith  the  other.  He  repudiates  the  kind 
of  natural  law  which  St.  Thomas  regards  as  reigning  in  all 
men,  endowing  them  with  a  dignity  akin  to  the  divine,  in- 
spiring the  charity  and  justice  without  which  democracy  is  a 
far  cry,  and  uniting  them  into  a  glorious  brother-hood.  He 
depreciates  as  mere  conclusions  and  theorems,  those  findings  of 
man's  rational  nature  which  take  expression  in  law  and  cus- 
tom. Law  proper,  he  teaches,  is  the  voice  of  the  king."^^^  The 
dangers  of  such  a  doctrine  are  as  evident  as  the  merit  of  the 
opposite  principles  which  are  proposed  in  the  politics  of  St. 
Thomas.  Again  Aquinas  stands  forth,  by  contrast,  in  demo- 
cratic high-light. 

Locke's  best  contribution  to  political  theory,  is  his  doctrine  of 
natural  rights.  He  refuses  to  make  the  subject  the  pawn  of  the 
king.  Life,  liberty,  and  property  are  as  sacred  to  the  inferior 
to  the  superior.    "Absolute  arbitrary  power,  or  governing  with- 


402  Op.  cit.,  p.  185.   See  the  De  Jure,  Bk.  I,  ch.  Ill,  par.  8,  n.  2. 

403  Leviathan,  De  Homine,  cap.  XV. 


98       ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

out  settled  standing  laws/'  he  teaches,  ''can  neither  of  them 
consist  with  the  ends  of  society  and  government,  which  men 
would  not  quit  the  freedom  of  the  state  of  Nature  for,  and 
tie  themselves  up  under,  Avere  it  not  to  preserve  their  lives, 
liberties,  and  fortunes;  and  by  stated  rules  of  right  and  property 
to  secure  their  peace  and  quiet. Certainly,  in  such  tenets, 
the  mind  of  St.  Thomas  is  respected.  Aquinas  is  all  the  more 
refreshing,  for  being  so  much  the  earlier,  with  a  presentment 
of  these  richly  democratic  elements.  But  the  Englishman's 
distinction  lies  in  the  degree  of  definiteness  with  which  he 
applies  principles,  which  may  be  found  in  Thomistic  pages. 
Much  of  Aquinas'  political  doctrine  is  incidental  and  fragmen- 
tary; but  Locke  treats  politics  ex  professo  and  proposes  clearlj^ 
many  points  which  Thomas  merely  implies  or  urges  in  a  general 
way.  The  interesting  and  important  fact  is  that,  on  the  sub- 
ject of  rulers,  they  appear  to  be  kindred  souls.  The  Father 
of  Modern  Liberty  could  in  this,  as  in  other  political  views, 
be  the  son  of  Thomas  of  Aquin. 


404  Treatises  on  Government,  II,  sec.  137. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  99 


CHAPTOR  V 
FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT 
1. — Governments 

St.  Thomas'  classification  of  governments  is  based  on  Aris- 
totle's. The  Philosopher  views  polities  as  consulting  the  com- 
mon weal  or  not,  and  accordingly  they  are  either  good  or  bad. 
But  as  to  power,  he  finds  it  in  the  hands  of  one,  the  few  ,or  the 
many:  and,  from  this  aspect,  governments  are  monarchical, 
arstocratic,  and  political  or  democratic.  These  forms  have  their 
opposites:  tyranny,  oligarchy,  ochlarchy.^^^ 

Aristotle  uses  the  word  ''polity"  to  express  our  word  ''democ- 
racy;" a  name  which,  as  he  himself  observes,  is  common  to  all 
other  fair  governments.  He  apparently  sees  the  true  democratic 
spirit  present  in  each  and  every  just  regime,  and,  indeed,  as 
the  basis  of  all ;  resulting  in  an  organized  pursuit  of  the  general 
welfare  and,  consequently,  a  decent  and  consistent  general  re- 
gard for  the  good  of  the  individual.  Both  Aquinas  and  the 
Philosopher  consider  a  man  to  be  as  much  a  man  under  a  king 
as  in  a  republic ;  and  neither  of  them  finds  any  reason  why  he 
should  be  treated  as  less. 

Both  of  these  superior  minds  manifest  a  degree  of  indiffer- 
ence to  the  type  of  government,  so  long  as  the  purpose  of  the 


405  See  Politics,  I,  2,  and  the  De  Reg..  I,  1.  (Cf.  Plato's  classification 
Repub.,  VIII,  1,  2:  Aristocracy,  the  best  form,  and  its  corruptions. 
The  latter  are:  timocracy,  wherein  property  was  a  condition  of  citizen- 
ship; oligarchy,  democracy,  and  tyranny.) 

But  in  the  4th  book,  ch.  7th,  of  the  Politics,  Aristotle  classifies  govern- 
ments as  monarchy,  oligarchy,  democracy,  and  aristocracy;  which  is 
slightly  different  from  St.  Thomas'  classification.  He  mentions,  too, 
the  polity.  (For  an  explanation  of  this  particular  form  of  government, 
see  Thirwall,  History  of  Greece,  I,  ch.  X,  p.  158.)  It  seems  that  the 
Philosopher  takes  liberties  with  his  original  classification,  which  is  the 
one  adopted  by  Aquinas,  and  quotes  democracy  and  oligarchy  as  good 
forms;  though  he  considered  aristocracy  and  polity  the  better. 


100     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


people  is  achieved.^oe  Aristotle  in  his  Politics,  111,  7,  and  Aqui- 
nas in  his  De  Regimine,  I,  1,  present  the  list  of  polities  and  ex- 
pose the  forms  into  which  they  may  deteriorate.  The  king 
who  seeks  his  own  interest  and  not  the  people's,  says  St.  Thomas, 
turns  the  government  into  a  tyranny,  oppressing  by  power 
instead  of  ruling  by  justice.  The  aristocracy  which  honors 
opulence  more  than  ethics,  is  no  aristocracy  at  all,  but  a  base 
bureaucracy,  differing  from  a  tyranny  only  numerically.  Final- 
ly, a  people,  rising  up  in  defiance  of  conscience  and  overwhelm- 
ing justice  with  numbers,  is  a  mammoth  despot  and  most  un- 
democratic. Aquinas  believes  injustice  to  be  injustice,  whether 
it  is  committed  by  one  or  many.  Differently  from  such  as 
Hegel,  Ruemelin,  Treitschke,  and  Bernhardi,  he  does  not  lift 
the  State  above  the  moral  law.  Nor  does  he  place  civil,  or  any 
other  species  of  morality,  on  a  shaky  Bentham  basis  of  the 
' 'greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number."  For  him,  the  many  are 
as  obliged  to  the  simple  dictates  of  conscience  as  the  one.  The 
wrongs  which  the  few  do  them,  cannot  be  righted  by  wrongs 
on  their  own  part.  When  the  State  requires  reconscruction, 
radicalism  rather  than  justice  is  destruction  rather  than  relief. 
The  facility  with  which  unjust  governments  often  turn  into 
each  other  instead  of  into  their  betters,  is  a  lesson  of  Thomistic 
politics.  The  tide  of  reckless  and  ruthless  revolt  may  sweep 
away  an  autocrat,  only  to  throw  up  another  or  others  into  his 
place.  And  blood,  profusely  shed,  calls  to  heaven  in  weary  per- 
plexity :  when  an  obtuse  people  change  their  rulers  and  delude 
themselves  that  they  have  changed  their  rules .^^^  For  a  mod- 
ern instance,  Nicholas  was  only  palely  imperial  besides  some  of 
the  present  Russian  personalities  who  are  supposed  ta  represent 
the  total  departure  of  the  old  order. 


406  Cf.  Woodrow  Wilson's  ''The  State,''  p.  598.  See  Montagne,  Rev- 
ue Thomiste,  Vol.  8,  1900,  art.  La  pense  de  saint  Thomas  sur  les  for- 
mes, de  government  "Le  saint  Doctour  n'est  pas  une  adversaire  pre- 
venu,  mais  une  juge  clairvoyant  et  impartial.  II  examine  avec  atten- 
tion, il  prononce  sans  parti  pris,  il  parle  sans  amertume;  mais  il  s'ex- 
prime  aussi  sans  flatterie,  sans  reticences,  sans  deguisement,  avec  le 
calme,  la  serenite,  et  la  noble  independence  du  philosophe  consciencieux 
qui  n'a  cure  de  I'opinion  des  hommes  et  que  preoccupe  seulement  la 
recherche  de  la  verite." 

407  See  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  ch.  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  101 

The  Philosopher  and  the  Doctor's  classification  of  governments 
has  passed  into  a  tradition  and  is  generally  accepted.  Still  it 
has  had  to  encounter  much  criticism  some  of  which  is  men- 
tioned by  Crahay.*^^  Passay  repudiates  the  principle  of  such 
a  division,  believing  that  the  ancients  wrongly  judged  power  to 
be  sovereign  and  that  those  who  possessed  it  had  the  right  to 
impose  their  will  on  everybody  else.^o^  He  declares  that  the 
difference  among  governments  consists  rather  in  their  relations 
with  the  governed ;  and,  on  this  ground,  he  finds  two  kinds  of 
polity,  republican  and  monarchical,  according  as  the  people  exer- 
cise, or  not,  the  fullness  of  civil  power.^^^  But  this  classification 
is  fundamentally  Aristotle's  and  St.  Thomas',  only  that  theirs 
is  more  thoughtful.  He  makes  the  relation  between  governors 
and  governed  the  point  of  differentiation;  but  such  relation 
is  occasioned  and  characterized  by  the  transfer  of  power,  as  he 
himself  admits.  Now  the  transmission  must  be  made  to  the  one, 
the  few,  or  the  many,  in  gTeater  or  less  degree ;  and,  if  so,  Passy 
agrees  with  Aquinas  and  the  Philosopher.  It  is  evident,  we 
shall  see,  that  they  did  not  deem  the  alienation  of  power  in- 
variably as  total. 

De  Laveleye  believes  that  the  line  of  division  may  be  better 
determined  by  the  asking  ^'Who  actually  exercises  the  sover- 
eignity and  enacts  the  laws — the  king  or  the  nation  If 
the  former,  the  regime  is  autocratic,  even  though  there  is  a 
parliament;  if  the  latter,  the  rule  is  democratic,  even  though 
there  is  a  king.  One  can  see  the  inadequacy  of  such  a  criterion, 
and  appreciate  that  of  Aquinas  all  the  more  by  comparison. 
De  Laveleye  seems  to  forget  that  in  every  good  government  the 
people  are  ultimately  the  ruling  power;  for  from  and  by  them 
the  rulers  are  empowered,  and  act  in  justice  and  prudence  only 
when  they  are  directed  by  the  best  of  public  opinion,  since 
their  own  thought  would  be  inadequate,  not  only  in  itself  but  in 
its  efficacy ."^^^     It  is  only  in  virtue  of  their  public  office  that 


408  Op.  cit.,  pp.  70-72. 

409  Des  formes  de  gouvernement,  p.  11. 

410  Idem,  p.  7.  Cf.  Montesquieu's  division  of  governments  into  re- 
publics, monarchies,  and  despotisms;  and  de  Haller's,  into  monarchies 
and  polyarchies. 

411  Le  gouvernement  dans  la  democratie,  t.  I,  p.  197. 

412  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XC,  a.  3. 


102     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

they  are  potent  at  all.  They  are  the  servants  of  the  common- 
wealth, and  a  means  by  which  it  secures  the  blessings  of  civil 
existence  to  itself:  at  least,  in  the  thoroughly  democratic 
Thomistic  sense.^i-^  And,  therefore,  w^hat  Laveleye  would  call 
autocracy,  St.  Thomas  would  likely  denominate  tyranny.  Be- 
sides, Laveleye's  classification  is  too  general,  and  is  almost  as 
unsatisfactory  as  that  of  St.  Thomas  w^ould  have  been,  had  he 
contented  himself  with  mentioning  that  politics  are  of  tw^o 
kinds,  excellent  and  evil.  The  Angelic  Doctor  gives  the  species 
as  well  as  the  genera. 

The  question  is,  should  the  quanity  of  rulers  or  the  quality 
of  the  rule  determine  the  nature  of  the  State?  Those  who  think 
that  Aquinas  considered  numbers  the  only  determinant,  disre- 
gard that  he  mentions  also  merit.  For  him,  polities  must  be 
primarily  marked  off  as  just  or  unjust ;  and  only  then  are  they 
differentiated  by  the  number  of  their  rulers.  Blunchli  observes 
that  difference  in  number  is  in  relation  to  difference  in  charac- 
ter>i*  This  may  be  so.  But  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  realize  that 
the  truest  test  of  a  polity  is  its  promotion  of  the  public  good ; 
and  this  is  not  so  dependent  on  the  number  of  rulers  as  on  the 
supremacy  of  right.  Wherever  they  speak  of  a  good  polity 
as  a  monarchy,  an  aristocracy,  or  an  out-and-out  democracy, 
they  always  mean  one  in  which  the  good  of  the  people  is  para- 
mount, equity  prevails,  and  a  popular  interest  is  awake. 

2. — Monarchy  According  to  St.  Thomas 

Aquinas  does  not  seem  explicitly  to  choose  any  government, 
since  considerations  are  so  many  and  cases  so  diverse.  But  in 
his  distinctive  work  De  Regimine  he  writes  mostly  on  monar- 
chy; because  this  purely  political  piece  is  addressed  to  a  king. 
It  is  necessary  to  view  his  thoughts  on  sovereigns  without  preju- 
dice. He  offers  no  apology  for  the  rulers  who  wTapped  royalty 
in  opprobrium.    His  denunciation  of  them,  is  forceful  and  fiery 


413  Z)e  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  3. 

414  Th.  gcner.  de  V£tat.  Liv.  VI,  ch.  1,  p.  295.  Antoniades,  Die  Staats- 
lehere  des  Thomas  ah  Aquino,  p.  21. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AXD  DEMOCRACY  103 

with  philosophy  and  Scripture.  But  he  beheves  that  there 
should  be  a  central  personality  in  a  polity  to  give  it  consistency 
and  unity :  a  theory  to  which  we  ourselves  today  certainly  sub- 
scribe, with  our  President,  governors,  and  mayors.  Translated 
into  modern  thought,  St  Thomas  says  that  the  State  must  not 
be  all  body  and  no  head.  Contrary  to  modern  conception,  he 
does  not  teach  that  monarch}^  is  exclusively  the  rule  of  an  hered- 
itary dynasty.4^^  As  Crahay  notes  in  the  Doctor's  teaching: 
the  hereditary  monarchy  is  on\j  a  type,  and,  at  that,  not  the 
most  characteristic.  According  to  St.  Thomas,  the  monarchy 
is  the  rule  of  one  who  owes  his  authority  not  only  to  merit  but 
to  the  election  of  the  citizens.  A  search  for  any  sanction  of  evil 
historical  absolutism  in  the  politics  of  St.  Thomas,  is  futile. 
He  indicates  that  monarchies  should  be  elective.  Which  is  the 
teaching  also  of  his  Commentary.  The  chief  objection  of  his- 
tory to  dynasties  is  that  they  foisted  inefficiency  and  depravity 
on  the  State.  The  main  demur  of  psychology  is  that  the  ra- 
tional nature  of  the  people  is  contemned,  when  no  word  in  the 
selection  of  those  whom  they  are  supposed  to  obey,  is  conceded 
them.  Aquinas  honors  both  these  attitudes,  by  affirming  that 
election  is  superior  to  succession.  It  is  better,  he  says,  that  a 
ruler  be  appointed  in  the  way  in  w^hich  per  se  it  happens  that 
the  better  man  is  found ;  but  by  election  the  better  man  is  more 
surely  secured  than  by  succession ;  for  here  there  is  a  field  for 
choice.  Besides,  election  is  more  consistent  wdth  the  rational 
appetencies  of  the  people.^^^  Nevertheless,  as  elsewhere  noted, 
he  teaches  that  per  accidens  the  hereditary  monarchy  may  not 
be  such  an  evil  after  all,  when  compared  with  the  commotion 
and  base  politics  which  a  frequent  change  of  rulers  can  occa- 
sion :  conditions  of  which  we  ourselves  are  painfully  aware,  in 
our  own  countrv^*^^  Again,  Aquinas  notices  the  incongruity 
which  arises  when  my  equal  of  today  becomes  my  superior  of 


415  See  Crahay,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 

416  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  14. 

417  Such  a  writer  as  Lecky  says.  "In  my  own  opinion,  the  ballot,  in  any 
country  where  politics  rests  on  a  really  sound  and  independent  basis, 
is  essentially  an  evil."  Democracy  and  Liberty,  I,  p.  89.  St.  Thomas 
refuses  to  go  so  far.  For  him  the  ballot  may  be  accidentally  an  evil, 
but  is  not  essentially  such. 


104     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


tomorrow ;  as  is  the  case  where  election  ser\'es.4i8  But  these  de- 
merits do  not  quash  his  tenet  that  the  democratic  designation 
of  rulers  is  the  better  plan.  It  should  be  remembered,  however, 
that,  even  when  a  government  is  hereditary,  St.  Thomas  regards 
the  people  as  its  foundation.  The  popular  choice  merely  goes 
farther  back,  and  is  renewed  in  a  tacit  acceptance  of  successive 
sovereigns. 

It  is  possible  for  even  an  elective  government  to  be  absolute. 
And  the  question  as  to  whether  Aquinas  regarded  royal  power 
as  unlimited,  is  pertinent.  Crahay  answers  with  a  distinction 
between  the  ideal  monarchy  and  the  concrete. As  an  ideal, 
the  Angelic  Doctor  seemingly  favored  the  absolute  form,  where- 
in the  king  is  amenable  to  no  law,  save  his  own  conscience  f-^ 
in  the  practical  order,  however,  he  expressly  abondoned  it.  One 
may  be  unduly  influenced  by  etymology  in  adjudging  St. 
Thomas'  meaning  when  he  uses  the  word  monarchy.  But  words 
are  living  things,  and  grow  and  change  in  significance.  It  is 
better  to  interpret  St.  Thomas,  when  he  uses  the  expression, 
not  etymologically  but  from  the  spirit  of  his  politics,  which  is 
popular.  We  should  be  cautious  in  attributing  even  a  theore- 
tical absolutism  to  him ;  for,  as  we  have  already  seen,  his  esti- 
mation of  the  character  of  custom  was  too  high  to  permit  him 
to  place  a  monarch,  ruling  even  without  a  single  wTitten  law, 
much  higher.  True,  he  admits  that  a  good  sovereign  may 
legitimately  adopt  drastic  measures;  but  he  amends  that  this 
may  be  done  only  when  the  public  good  demands.^^i  And,  then, 
the  people  cannot  he  unwilling  that  their  interests  be  advanced 
and  that  their  ruler  have  the  power  to  advance  them.  The 
Thomistic  monarch  is  always  a  democrat;  for  he  must  forget 
himself  in  his  people.  He  is  powerful  insofar  as  he  is  faithful 
to  the  public  trust.*-  A  casual  recall  of  the  virtues  which 
Aquinas  prescribes  for  rulers  and  the  limitations  which  he 
throws  around  their  exercise  of  authority  (see  ch.  IV)  will  suf- 


418  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  14. 

419  Op.  cit.,  pp.  74-75. 

420  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1,  ad.  5. 

421  Ibidem. 

422  Cf.  Woodrow  Wilson's  The  State,  p.  594. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  105 


fice  to  suggest  how  little  he  inclined  to  absolutism,  even  in  a  so- 
called  absolute  monarchy. 

Feugeuray  does  not  strike  conviction  when  he  presents  St. 
Thomas'  mind  on  monarchy.  The  Doctor,  in  speculation,  ac- 
cording to  him,  believes  that  royal  authority  has  no  legal  limits, 
that  the  king  is  obliged  to  conform  to  no  laws  but  those  of  his 
conscience,  that  he  governs  by  his  own  will,  that  he  is  the  source 
of  law  and  that  he  personifies  in  himself  the  totality  of  power.*23 
All  of  w^hich  jars  miserably  on  the  Thomistic  theory  of  law  and 
popular  representation,  and  tends  to  falsify  it.  To  accept  Feu- 
gueray  on  this  point  would  be  to  sacrifice  Aquinas.  The  latter's 
idea  of  monarchy  ought  not  be  considered  apart  from  his  other 
concepts. 

It  is  an  historical  fact  that  some  monarchs  were  absolute. 
This  was  so  because  it  was  permitted  to  be  so.  Aquinas  real- 
ized and  recognized  the  situation,  but  does  he  theorize  on  it  as 
an  ideal?  On  the  contrary,  he  advises  the  people  to  temper 
the  power  of  their  rulers.*-"^  He  does  not  explain  in  detail  how 
sovereignty  should  be  shortened,  in  his  De  Regimine.  Succeed- 
ing years  were  largely  to  solve  that  part  of  the  problem.  When 
Feugueray  writes  that  he  has  searched  without  success  in  Thom- 
istic pages  for  a  single  line  on  the  limitation  of  royal  power,  such 
as  parliaments,  congresses,  or  the  matter  of  taxation,  some  retorts 
are  befitting.  As  Crahay  remarks,  to  csLrp  at  the  Angelic  Doc- 
tor's reticence  in  these  regards  would  be  to  blame  the  silence 
of  the  dead."*25  Both  his  De  Regimine  and  his  Summa  lie  un- 
completed by  his  own  hand.  Secondly,  he  was  writing  in  the 
former  work  to,  for,  and  npt  against,  a  supreme,  though  petty, 
sovereign.  Thirdly,  strong  monarchs  were  necessary  in  that  rest- 
less^ medieval  period  in  which  the  din  of  arms  was  incessant. 
Fourthly,  all  those  judging  the  Saint  a  theoretical  absolutist  who 
gave  no  circumscription  of  roj^al  omnipotence,  should  have 
read  the  De  Regimine,  not  as  an  isolated  book,  but  in  re- 
lation to  other  Thomistic  works.  Aquinas'  theory^  of  mixed 
government  with  which  we  shall  deal  presently,  sanctions  the  re- 


423  Feugeuray,  op.  cit.,  quoted  by  Crahay,  p.  76. 

424  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

425  Op.  cit.,  p.  77. 


106     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

pression  of  royal  power  in  a  manner  which  an  exacting  modern 
and  democratic  mind  would  find  reasonable  and  satisfactory^ 

It  is  in  justice  to  the  politics  of  St.  Thomas  to  read  autocracy 
into  them,  becauuse  he  deems  the  government  good  which  has 
a  firm  centre,  and  devotes  so  much  attention  to  the  subject  of 
unity.  This  is  no  more  dissonant  with  democracy  than  the 
voice  of  a  staunch  American.  How  much  the  nation  will  de- 
pend on  a  personal  hub  for  its  motion,  Thomas  democratically 
leaves  it  to  the  nation  to  determine.  But  without  a  pivot,  pol- 
itics is  madness.  If  he  suggests  that  the  civil  axis  should 
sometimes  be  a  strong  one,  so  as  to  ser\'e  w^ell  the  whirl  of 
affairs,  he  is  wise.  Few  rulers  have  ever  been  politically  braw- 
nier than  the  brainy  ones  behind  the  best  democracies  in  history. 
It  is  St.  Thomas'  idea  that,  of  the  public  servants  of  the  State, 
one  should  be  chief,  which  is  most  valuable  and  telling.  Every 
ship  should  have  a  captain,  though  the  crew  and  the  passen- 
gers are  much  more  precious  and  important.  We  repeat 
that  Aquinas  approves  of  monarchy  only  when  and  insofar 
as  the  best  interests  of  the  people  are  enchanced  and  advanced 
])y  it.^-^  And  therefore  he  is  irreproachably  democratic  even 
in  his  monarchical  approaches.  He  teaches  that  the  excellent 
polity  is  that  which  accords  with  the  wishes  of  the  governed.^^r 

St.  Thomas'  conception  of  tyranny  sets  in  high  light  the  de- 
mocracy of  his  idea  of  monarchy.  He  resolves  this  wrong  of  gov- 
ernment into  three  elements:  first,  self-seeking  on  the  part  of  the 
sovereign ;  secondly,  rule  of  the  people  not  in  conformity  with 
their  consent  and  in  spite  of  their  dissent ;  thirdly,  the  mailed 
fist.^28  ^  tyranny  is,  to  him,  the  worst  form  of  misrule ;  and 
he  is  at  pains  in  his  De  Regimine  (cap.  Ill)  to  show  how  civil 
rights  and  ideals  are  wronged  by  it.  He  approves  of  limited 
monarchy  on  the  obvious  ground  that  the  absolute  brand,  to 
be  just,  would  require  a  sovereign  of  perfect  virtue.  And  since 
such  virtue  is  found  in  few,  and  hence  the  slip  into  tyranny 
would  almost  always  be  imminent,  he  is  alert  to  find  his  ideal 
in  some  such  form  of  government  as  we  see  realized  in  England 


426  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  2. 

427  Com.  Pout.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  1. 

428  Z)e  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1.  et  10. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  107 


or  America  today .^^^  There  is  little  doubt  that  a  world  weary 
of  political  strife  would  welcome  the  advent  of  a  sufficiency  of 
of  saint-scholars  to  assume  the  leadership  of  each  nation,  to  re- 
lieve the  people  of  political  care,  to  govern  in  accord  with  the 
best  rational  experience  of  the  best  minds  of  the  respective  peo- 
ples, and  to  procure  the  reign  of  perfect  justice.  Who  would 
object  to  investing  such  manifest  personifications  of  efficiency 
and  merit  with  plenipotentiary  powers?  Aquinas  means  little 
more  than  this,  when  he  praises  the  rule  of  one.^s^ 

As  a  prevention  of  governmental  excess,  the  admonitions  of 
Aquinas,  though  terse,  are  helpful  today  as  when  first  couched. 
The  people  must  take  the  appointment  of  their  ruler  seriously 
and  tr}^  hard  to  place  the  right  man  in  the  right  place. '^^^  Here 
Thomas  touches  the  vice  of  civil  indifference  which  explains 
most  of  our  modern  political  corruption. 

Secondly,  the  power  of  the  sovereign  is  to  be  tempered.*^- 
This  proposition  is  pregnant  with  the  solutions  of  the  problems 
of  the  proper  exercise  of  sovereignty,  which  Fuegueray  says 
he  could  not  find.  It  must  have  fired  the  imagination  of  the 
thirteenth  and  succeeding  centuries.  It  would  not  be  too  rash 
even  to  offer  that  the  Thomistic  doctrine  on  royal  repression 
contains  in  embryo  the  idea  which  exalts  Montesquieu:  the 
separation  of  the  departments  of  governments,  whereby  limi- 
tation of  sovereign  power  is  so  effectually  secured.  We  shall 
see  more  of  this  in  the  Commentary  on  Aristotle. 

Thirdly,  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  the  vicious  laws  of  the 
extravagant  and  unjust  ruler  do  not  bind  the  people  in  con- 
science. A  man  is  directly  answerable  only  to  God,  and  to  rulers 
only  insofar  as  they  represent  and  reflect  in  their  own  measures 
the  goodness  of  His  law.  The  Doctor  mentions  the  three  ways  in 
which  civil  acts  may  be  seen  as  fair  and  worthy  of  obedience: 
ex  fine,  when  they  are  for  the  popular  good ;  ex  forma,  when  the 
burdens  which  they  entail  are  distributed  impartially;  ex  auc- 
tore,  when  they  do  not  exceed  the  authority  of  the  legislator.^^^ 

429  Si/ mma  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1,  ad  2:  Cf.  Montagne,  Revue 
Thomiste  Vol.  VIII,  1900,  p.  688. 

430  Cf.  Aristotle,  Politics,  VII,  14. 

431  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6. 

432  Ibidem. 

4.33  Swmma  Theol.,  la,  2ae,  qu.  XCVI,  a.  4. 


108     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


These  norms,  one  or  more,  are  violated  in  the  unjust  poHty ;  and 
hence  Aquinas,  in  such  condition,  would  have  the  individual 
free,  save  insofar  as  the  obligation  of  avoiding  scandal  or  dis- 
turbance obtains.-^^-^ 

The  texts  of  the  Commentary  in  which  monarchy  is  described, 
are  not  at  all  disproof  of  what  has  already  been  said  anent  Aqui- 
nas and  theoretical  absolutism.  Therein  he  interprets  Aris- 
totle and  describes  governments  as  they  were,  rather  than  as 
they  should  be.  The  Philosopher  put  in  his  pages  what  he  saw 
in  his  life,  and  Eastern  autocracy  was  certainly  a  large  part  of 
his  intellectual  vision.  It  is  fair  to  remember  that  Aquinas 
offers  description  rather  than  apology  when  he  writes  that  the 
out-and-out  monarch  is  a  self-sufficiency  whose  code  is  his  own 
will.^"^'^  He  plainly  refers  to  the  absolute  regime  of  a  solitary 
sovereign  not  as  monarchy  itself,  but  as  a  certain  type  of  mon- 
archy suggesting  again  that  he  admits  the  popular  form  fav- 
ored by  modern  political  development.  In  fact  he  admits  the 
admission.^37  ^he  whole  tenor  of  the  thought  of  Aquinas  on 
monarchy  nms  toward  a  wise  liberalism.  The  advantages  of  a 
strongly  centralized  government,  were  clear  and  bright  to  him. 
The  main  fault  of  feudalism,  that  it  thrust  the  king  into  the 
clouds  and  allowed  a  scale  of  isolated  subordinates  to  press  down 
the  people,  was  evident  too.  Europe  needed  a  vigorous  rule  by 
a  two-handed  man,  Charlemagne-like,  in  those  turbulent  times 
when  the  coUosal  Empire  was  breaking  up.  Aquinas  would 
have  been  fully  justified  in  teaching  explicitly  the  desirability 
of  highly  empowered  royality  for  this  time.  Rut  possibly  he 
foresaw  what  the  political  unrest  of  the  area  would  mean  for 
the  people  of  the  future,  if  it  were  permitted  to  yield  its  natural 
results.  He  realized  that  feudalism  had  two  redeeming  quali- 
ties: it  was  a  step  nearer  to  popular  government ;  and,  secondly, 
it  could  not  last.  He  did  not  obviously  try  to  kill  an  institution 
quite  capable  of  dying  by  itself.  But  he  did  seek  to  keep 
alive  the  best  advantage  that  feudalism  offered,  which  was  the 
check  it  placed  on  royal  assumptions.   Though  kings  were  essen- 


434  Ibidem. 

43.-,  Com.  Polit..  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  15. 
430  Idem.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  4. 

437  Ibidem:  Alia  est  politia  polyarchica  in  qua  plures  principantur." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  109 

tial  to  his  day,  and  strong  ones  too,  he  preferred  somewhat  to 
sacrifice  utiUty  to  a  principle  which  he  perceived  would  even- 
tuate in  greater  future  utility.  Certainly  he  draws  a  signifi- 
cant circle  around  the  throne,  which  marks  a  limit  to  monarchi- 
cal power  rather  than  a  bar  to  the  will  and  influence  of  the  peo- 
ple. And  here  in  the  Middle  Ages  is  the  first  doctrinal  expo- 
sition of  a  brand  of  politics,  limiting  governors  and  freeing  the 
governed,  which  grew  into  the  richly  democratic  constitutions 
of  later  centuries.  It  cannot  be  over-emphasized  that,  when  St. 
Thomas  praises  monarchy,  he  is  speaking  particularly  for  his 
own  time  when  it  had  its  advantages,  and  the  world  was  not  yet 
ready  for  a  wave  of  democracy. 

Referring  again  to  his  Commentary  on  Aristotle's  Politics,  we 
find  many  details  on  monarchy,  the  venerable  form  of  govern- 
ment which  is  more  maligned  than  understand  in  our  age  of 
freedom.  Let  us  recall  Aquinas'  doctrine  on  the  purpose  of  the 
State.  Not  merely  livelihood,  nor  mutual  service,  nor  wealth, 
is  the  rational  objective  of  civil  society,  but  a  good  and  happy 
life  for  the  people.  Modern  thought  has  fixed  ''liberty"  as  the 
guage  of  political  success;  and  whatever  portion  of  our  enthu- 
siasm has  not  been  consecrated  to  the  toppling  of  thrones,  is 
devoted  to  socialistic  programs  of  robbing  rich  Peter  to  pay  his 
poor  and  extremely  plural  brother  Paul.  Aquinas  shows  that 
liberty  and  riches  are  neither  fitting  repositories  for  civil  power 
nor  meet  purposes  for  it,  and  that  the  most  satisfied  citizens 
are  not  the  unrestrained  kind,  who  have  quaffed  the  beaker  of 
Life  to  the  dregs,  nor  the  sorrier  type,  who  have  been  able  to 
buy  everything  subject  to  the  magic  of  money,  only  to  be  bored. 
He  teaches  that  virtue  can  give  truer  and  deeper  satisfaction 
than  all  the  hectic  experiences  in  all  the  abandoned  careers  in 
the  world.  His  politics  pleads  for  an  ordered  and  regulated 
existence,  whereas  modern  thought  pictures  the  millenium  as 
the  flight  of  all  restraint.  His  stand  is  against  the  unwhole- 
some struggle  for  wealth  and  novelty,  and  for  the  inspiration  of 
simpler  and  saner  motives.  Shall  we  grant  with  him  that  the 
main  labor  of  the  State  does  not  consist  in  making  life  more  free 
for  the  individual?  Surely,  we  must  concede  that  the  indivi- 
dual wo\ild  be  much  more  free,  for  that  matter,  if  the  State 
never  existed,  and  that,  therefore,  lack  of  circumscription  is  not 


110     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


exactly  tlie  supreme  good  of  civil  society.  Besides,  what  is  lib- 
erty? '  Different  peoples  have  conceived  it  differently,  as  Montes- 
quieu observes.  Some  place  it  in  the  power  to  depose  a  tyrant ; 
others  in  the  faculty  of  electing  governors ;  others  in  the  right  to 
exercise  force;  others  in  rule  by  laws;  still  others  even  in  the 
wearing  of  a  long  beard.^^^  America  finds  it  largely  in  self-ex- 
pression. But  reason  tells  us  that  we  have  no  right  to  express  the 
wrong  that  is  in  us.  Montesquieu  well  asserts  that,  in  a  State, 
liberty  properly  consists  in  the  untrammelled  power  of  doing 
what  one  ought  to  will,  and  in  not  being  forced  to  do  what 
one  ought  not  will,  rather  than  of  doing  what  one  wills.^^^ 
Shall  we  agree  with  him  that,  while  the  State  should  assure  the 
individual  of  opportunity  to  secure  the  necessities  of  life,  it 
does  not  exist  essentially  to  make  all  its  members  wealthy? 
This  should  not  be  too  difficult,  in  our  dawning  realization  that 
'Sve  must  cease  our  efforts  to  make  men  comfortable  and  begin 
to  make  them  better.''-^  Then  we  can  see  the  logic  of  his  con- 
tention that  the  polity  which  knits  a  nation  together  best, 
supplying  the  unity  which  makes  for  peace  and  the  order  which 
promotes  virtue,  may  not  be  the  worst  form  of  government  after 
all,  even  if  it  does  not  admit  of  so  many  so-called  liberties  and 
harmful  luxuries.  But  with  Aristotle  he  pondei^  carefully 
whether  monarchy  is  better  adapted  for  practical  purposes  than 
any  other  regime.  He  follows  the  Philosopher's  division  of 
royalty  into  four  types : 

(1)  The  Spartan  variety  which  was  a  sort  of  persistent  gen- 
eralship.^i  The  kingly  power  descended  from  the  skies,  ac- 
cording to  Miieller,'*^-  and  did  not  rise  up  from  the  people.  If 
so,  the  Doric  regiilation  of  regal  power  by  law,  in  peace,  seems 
somewhat  inconsistent.  AVe  are  brought  to  recognize  a  genn 
of  liberalism  even  in  Spartan  rigor. 


438  Cf.  Uesprit  des  lois.  Livre  XI,  ch.  2. 
43t»  Ibidem. 

440  See  Dr.  G.  T.  Patrick's  Psychology  and  Religion  (Houghton,  Mif- 
fln,  1920). 

441  As  Mueller  observes  {Dorians.  Vol.  II,  ch.  6.),  the  Spartan  sov- 
ereigns were,  in  war  both  priests  and  princes  like  Homer's  Agamemnon 
and  Vergil's  Anius. 

442  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  13. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  111 

(2)  The  extreme  hereditary  type.  The  Philosopher  asso- 
ciates it  with  barbarism.  In  it,  he  declares,  kings  are  invested 
with  power  almost  to  the  point  of  tyranny ;  but  the  people  are 
still  safe-guarded,  inasmuch  as  the  monarch  is  bound  by  the  laws 
and  customs  of  the  land.  It  is  the  polity  most  prevalent  in  the 
Orient.  Aquinas,  commenting,  does  not  use  the  word  ^'barbar- 
ian"  in  the  conceited  Greek  sense  of  non-Hellenic,  but  with 
the  natural  meaning  of  non-awakened  or  intellectually-iacking. 
He  again  gives  emphatic  evidence  that  when  he  speaks  of  mon- 
archy as  ideal,  he  does  not  intend  the  Oriental  type — constructed 
of  a  supine  people  and  a  solitary  individual.  He  has  much 
finer  and  more  democratic  aspirations  for  the  AVestern  world,  es- 
teeming it  the  fitting  portion  of  the  earth  for  the  development 
of  free-er  poltical  institutions.  The  calibre  of  the  Occident 
so  requires.-^  The  only  rational  explanation  he  can  find  for 
Eastern  absolutism  is  the  people  themselves.  He  lays  down 
the  psychological  principle :  ''That  which  is  according  to  incli- 
nation is  natural  and  voluntary. ''^^  And  he  applies  it  to  poli- 
tics. He  charges  the  polity  directly  to  the  people.-*^^  The 
democracy  of  his  thought  shines  forth  even  when  Asia  is  his 
subject.  Shifting  the  explanation  and  justification  of  a  polity 
to  the  people,  and  out  of  the  realm  of  autocracy,  he  does  for 
politics,  in  company  with  the  Philosopher,  something  akin  to 
that  which  Copernicus  accomplished  for  astronomy.  The  mon- 
arch is  no  longer  the  genuine  force  even  in  an  oriental-politi- 
cal extravagance,  but  the  people  who  accredit  and  empower 
him. 

(3)  Aquinas  presents  an  elective  system  of  monarchy  which 
combines  all  the  features  of  absolutism.  The  Greeks  called  it 
Aesymneteia.   In  this  unusual  polity,  authority  was  not  held  by 


443  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  13. 

444  Ibidem. 

445  Ibidem. 

446  Ibidem.  "Et  ideo  isti  barbari  sustinent  principatum  dominativum 
sine  tristitia,  quia  inclinatonem  habent  ad  sustinendum  ipsum." 

Cf,  Thirwall's  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  I,  ch.  X,  in  which  he  declares 
that  the  cause  of  the  abolition  of  royalty  in  early  Hellas  is  to  be  sought 
"in  that  same  energy  and  versatility  which  prevented  it  from  ever 
stiffening  even  in  its  infancy,  in  the  mould  of  oriental  institutions; 
and  from  stopping  short,  in  any  career  which  it  had  once  opened,  before 
it  had  passed  through  every  stage." 


112     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

the  monarch  for  life,  but  until  some  necessary  object  of  State  was 
attained.  The  Greek  Aesymneteia  may  be  said  to  correspond 
to  the  Roman  dictatorship.  It  combined  the  character  of  tyran- 
ny with  that  of  monarchy :  the  former,  because  in  the  words  of 
Saint  Thomas,  the  leaders  reigned  principatu  dominativo ;  the 
latter,  because  they  thus  ruled  by  consent  and  through  elec- 
tion.Now  knowing  that  Aquinas  held  tyranny  a  corrupt 
form  of  government  to  be  shunned,  we  at  once  realize  that  he 
lacked  sympathy  for  this  hybrid  Graeco-Oriental  type.  He 
does  not  condone  tyranny  even  when  the  people  do ;  and,  in  this 
respect,  his  thought  and  sentiment  bestride  the  crest  of  democ- 
racy. Pie  deems  it  unworthy  of  a  people  to  genuflect  before 
their  rulers  and  rise  up — slaves.  Like  Aristotle,  he  could  ac- 
cept absolutism  in  the  practical  order  only  as  a  temporary  exi- 
gency. He  saw  it  as  an  abnormality  and  extremity,  justifiable 
only  as  promissory  of  an  extraordinar}'  good  to  the  State. 

(4)  The  limited  monarchy,  such  as  obtained  in  heoric  times, 
next  engages  his  interest.  It  implies :  first,  a  free  people ;  sec- 
ondly, submission  to  a  royal  rule;  thirdly,  the  subjection  of 
kingship  to  the  laws  and  customs  of  the  land.  A  consideration 
of  this  polity  brings  us  back  to  the  very  morning  of  the  race 
and  the  birth  of  the  first  states.  Here  at  the  basis  of  civil  society 
Aquinas  finds  freedom,  and  opens  a  pure  spring  of  democracy 
which  bubbles  through  his  political  doctrine,  keeping  it  fresh 
and  wholesome.  Leaders  of  men  there  were,  from  the  start ;  yet 
their  ability  alone  did  not  make  them  such,  but  their  ability  plus 
the  consent  of  the  people.^^  The  proximate  causes  of  their 
elevation  were  some  signal  services  to  the  populace  in  arms  or 
arts.  St.  Thomas  mentions,  for  instance,  the  case  of  Saturnus 
who  was  the  first  to  teach  Italia  to  sow  wheat  and  who  thereby 
won  the  reputation  of  a  god  among  his  fellow-men.  Again, 
these  early  heroes  may  have  achieved  eminence  by  collecting 
the  people  into  states  or  procuring  possessions  for  them.  But 
Aquinas  repeats  that  their  power  was  the  concomitant  of  popular 
consent  and  was  limited.  He  even  refers  to  them,  despite  their 
prestige  and  potency  as  quasi  rulers;  for  he  is  not  unmindful 


'^1  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  14. 
448  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  13. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  113 

that  the  people  had  customs  and  unwritten  laws  before  the  ad- 
vent of  their  heroes,  and,  since  these  men  were  just  benefactors, 
they  ruled  in  accord  with  the  best  traditions  and  were  duly  sub- 
ordinate to  them.  Aquinas  mentions  that  their  power  shrank  in 
the  course  of  time  to  the  most  meagre  proportions.^^  He  is  con- 
scious from  history  of  the  mutability  of  polities  and  hence  does 
not  advocate  a  rigid  regime  in  the  face  of  shifting  conditions. 
His  ideal  government  would  be  firm  but  not  adamantine.  Still, 
let  us  remember,  he  does  not  think  that  authority,  once  vested 
in  a  particular  form,  should  be  lightly  withdrawn.  So  long  as 
the  chosen  government  remains  just  and  is  achieving  the  pur- 
poses of  the  State  effectively,  he  sees  popular  unrest  as  unrea- 
sonable. In  fact  he  even  speaks  of  such  a  condition  as  the  peo- 
ple usurping  power.  Though  it  coimes  from  them,  he  evi- 
dently believes  that  they  have  no  right  to  reclaim  it,  after  ex- 
plicity  or  implicity  alienating  it,  unless  it  is  abused  or  injudi- 
ciously wielded  (see  Chapter  II). 

(5)  Finally  he  mentions  the  government  which  is  absolutism 
full-blown. 

These  five  forms,  according  to  Aristotle  and  Aquinas,  really 
fall  into  two :  monarchy  according  to  law,  and  monarchy  accord- 
ing to  the  %*irtue  of  the  ruler ;  in  more  modern  words,  constitu- 
tional and  unlimited.^'^^ 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  latter  kind,  in  the  impossible  case 
of  a  paragon  of  a  king,  wooed  the  imagination  of  the  Angelic 
Doctor.  It  meant  compactness,  and  unity.  His  thought  was 
too  synthetic  to  separate  aesthetics  even  from  politics. 

Aristotle  puts  the  question  squarely  for  Aquinas  and  all  the 
world  to  ponder :  is  it  best  to  be  governed  by  the  best  of  men,  or 
by  the  best  of  laws?*^^  Neither  the  Philosopher  nor  the  Doctor 
is  arbitrary  in  his  response.  In  favor  of  government  by  the  just 
and  efficient  individual,  we  recall  their  observation  that  the 
language  of  law  is  general,  whereas  life  is  composed  of  partic- 


449  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  13. 

450  Ibidem. 

Cf.  de  Haller's  classification  of  monarchies:  (1)  Hereditary  and  ter- 
ritorial; (2)  Military;  (3)  Spiritual.  Restauration  de  la  Science  poli- 
tique,  t.  II,  ch.  XXIV. 

Politics,  III,  15.     Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  14. 


114     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


iilarities.  Law  lacks  the  delicate  and  sympathetic  touch  of 
humanhood.  So  that  the  best  man,  with  prudence,  good  will, 
and  judgment,  would  fill  the  requirement  better.^-^^  According- 
ly as  law  is  defective,  the  personal  element  is  needed  to  perfect 
the  polity.  The  indication,  then,  is  that  a  combination  of  mon- 
arch and  law  give  a  prudent  regime.^-^^ 

On  the  other  hand  Aquinas  examines  and  admits  the  virtue 
of  that  form  of  government  which  is  solely  according  to  law. 
It  is  plain  to  him  that  the  ruling  force,  whether  personal  or 
constitutional,  should  have  a  universal  field  and  no  favor.^^ 
He  believes  that  the  head  should  lead  the  heart  in  politics,  and 
not  vice  versa.  The  law  is  as  cold,  firm,  and  unmistakable  as 
an  obelisk,  obvious  to  all,  alike  for  all.  The  Doctor  finds  a  hardy 
element  of  democratic  assurance  in  this  fact  which  seems  to 
strike  his  fancy .^•'^^ 

Still  he  does  not  see  why  this  should  cast  the  idea  of  human 
rule  into  the  discard.  For  a  man,  though  emotional,  is  also  de- 
liberative. He  can  control  his  prejudices  and  passions,  investi- 
gate cases  carefully,  and  make  decisions  justly.  Aquinas  does  not 
care  to  have  the  State  a  complete  political  mechanism,  as  it 
would  doubtless  be,  if  an  impersonal  code  were  its  only  motor. 
He  wishes  the  living  brains  which  created  civil  society  constantly 
to  share  in  its  conservation  and  advancement.  It  is  not  enough 
for  the  nation  to  set  up  a  constitution  and  then  sit  back  to  rest 
indefinitely,  as  though  the  ultima  thule  of  politics  were  attained. 
He  holds  that  neither  the  best  law  nor  the  best  man 
is  nearly  so  rich  an  asset  to  the  commonwealth  as  both  together. 
In  this  de  does  not  sacrifice  democracy,  so  much  as  he  safeguards 
it. 

3. — Aristocracy 

With  Aristotle,  St.  Thomas  next  considers  whether  it  would 
be  better  to  have  several  good  men  ruling  according  to  law,  than 
one,  i.  e.,  should  aristocracy  be  preferred  to  monarchy?  His 


4o2  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  14. 

453  See  Ch.  IV. 

454  Com  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  14. 

455  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  115 

answer  is  critical.  In  an  aristocracy,  dissention  would  readily 
arise  in  those  cases  not  easily  determinable  by  the  established 
law;  whereas  the  single  ruler  could  carr}^  the  situation  with 
more  calm  and  expedition.  Nevertheless,  since  two  or  more 
heads  are  better  than  one,  an  aristocracy  should  be  able  to  effect 
wiser  measures  than  a  monarchy .^^^^  This,  of  course,  would 
apply  to  the  many  much  more  pertinently  than  to  the  few ;  and 
democracy  at  this  point  scores  heavily  in  the  doctrine  of  the 
Stagirite  and  Aquinas.  They  point  to  another  fact  which 
enhances  democracy:  many  are  less  liable  to  corruption  than 
few  or  one.  The  broad  ocean  is  more  free  from  contagion  than 
a  brooklet  could  be.  In  numbers  is  safety.  Moreover,  while 
a  single  ruler  could  easily  be  conquered  by  his  own  distem- 
pers, it  w^ould  be  comparatively  difficult  for  a  whole  community 
thus  to  be  overcome.*^'  Treading  firmly  on  democratic  ground, 
they  agree  that,  if  the  people  are  the  liberty-loving,  intelligent, 
and  virtuous  type,  there  is  no  reason  why  their  voice  should 
not  be  dominant.^'"^^  Though  they  were  really  discussing  aris- 
tocracy, their  thought  at  this  juncture  had  taken  a  democratic 
turn.  In  answer  to  the  objection  that  in  a  rule  of  many  there 
would  be  much  division  and  little  unity,  they  state  that  men  of 
quality  are  capable  of  finding,  and  agreeing  on,  a  common  basis, 
while  their  very  character  renders  them  superior  to  the  petty .^^^ 
The  Aristotelian  and  Thomistic  doctrine  informs  us  that  mon- 
archy was  probably  the  first  form  of  government,  for  the  simple 
reason  that,  in  the  morning  of  humanit}^  it  was  impossible  to 
find  many  persons  pre-eminently  qualified  for  general  rulership, 
especially  as  the  original  commonwealths  were  smalL"^^^  We 
are  free  to  infer  that  St.  Thomas  looked  upon  monarchy  as  often 
more  necessary  than  natural,  and  the  more  liberal  forms  of  gov- 
ernment as  frequently  more  natural  than  necessary.  The  de- 
scription of  the  passing  of  one  polity  into  another  under  the 
impact  of  conditions  of  State  is  a  prominent  feature  of  the 
Saint's  doctrine  on  political  forms.    Extreme  monarchies,  w^hen 


456  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  14. 

457  Ibidem. 

458  Ibidem. 

459  Ibidem. 

460  Ibidem. 


116     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

just,  being  chiefly  expediencies,  were  not  to  enjoy  an  exceeding 
duration.  When  many  persons  of  equal  ability  would  appear 
smultaneously  and  refuse  to  brook  a  superiority,  the  crown 
would  vanish  and  an  era  of  aristocracy  would  begin.  Then 
aristocracy,  losing  its  first  fervor,  would  batten  on  the  common- 
wealth and  fall  into  an  oligarchy.  According  as  one  of  the 
rulers  became  richer  and  mightier  than  his  colleagues,  he  sub- 
jugated them,  and  the  tyranny  of  the  few  became  that  of  one 
man.  At  this  state,  the  people,  awakened  to  a  realization  of 
their  rights  by  their  wrongs,  would  rise  up  and  eject  the  tyrant 
and  the  day  of  democratic  glory  would  break. 

We  have  seen  the  objections  of  the  Philosopher  and  the  Doc- 
tor to  absolute  monarchy,  in  the  practical  order.  So  we  may 
now  pass  directly  to  a  view  of  the  free-er  forms,  to  which  their 
approval  of  the  limitation  of  sovereignty  is  such  a  fitting  pre- 
lude. 

Like  Aristotle,  Aquinas  perceives  the  link  between  the  na- 
ture of  the  people  and  the  form  of  their  government ;  just  as 
nations  differ,  so  do  and  should  their  polities.  Those  accus- 
tomed to  the  guidance  of  a  family  of  eminent  virtue  and  sub- 
missive by  nature,  are  fitted  for  monarchy.  Those  w^ho  are 
quickened  and  keen  to  the  desire  and  delight  of  freedom,  and 
are  naturally  restive  under  royal  reign,  are  better  suited  to  aris- 
tocracy. While  the  fully  aroused  populace,  with  open  minds 
and  hearts,  yet  with  a  talent  for  obedience  as  well  as  for  com- 
mand, are  ready  for  a  democracy It  is  largely  a  question 
of  national  quality  and  character:  a  fact  w^hich  ought  not  be 
ignored  in  our  more  vehement  than  well-advised  campaigns  to 
launch  democracy  wholesale  on  the  world  today.  Nations 
should  be  free ;  but  each  should  choose  for  itself  its  own  kind  of 
government.  To  force  democracy  on  any  people  would  be 
highly  undemocratic. 

In  respect  to  the  people,  there  are  two  kinds  of  government, 
from  which  the  others  are  derived.  Aquinas  compares  them  to 
the  pair  of  winds,  Australis  and  Borealis,  which  sweep  the  earth ; 
or  again  to  the  tw^o  species  of  music,  Doric  and  Phrygian.  Poli- 


461  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  16. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  117 


ties  of  the  many,  and  those  of  the  few :  this  is  the  division  be- 
yond monarchy.^6- 

Let  us  consider  first  the  good  government  of  the  few,  which  is 
aristocracy.  AVe  may  ehde  oHgarchy ;  for  though  Aristotle, 
after  stigmatizing  it  as  a  corrupt  form  of  government,  apparent- 
ly does  not  reject  it  as  such,  Aquinas  and  history  do.*^  The 
Philosopher  and  the  Doctor  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  state 
which  is  governed  by  the  very  best  men,  absolutely  fit  in  every 
ethical  and  political  sense,  has  a  right  to  be  called  an  aristo- 
cracy.*^^ Not  only  the  best  men,  but  also  the  best  principles, 
are  essential  to  such  a  polity  in  its  purity.  Three  types  of  aris- 
tocracy which  decline  from  the  ideal  are  mentioned:  first,  the 
kind  in  which  wealth  is  mingled  with  excellence  as  the  stan- 
dard for  ci\al  position  secondly,  the  Carthaginan  species  of 
aristocracy,  admitting  the  elements  both  of  wealth  and  democ- 
racy;*^^ thirdly,  the  simple  Lacedaemonian  model,  in  which 
wealth  did  not  figure,  but  virtue  and  the  democratic  strain. 
Finally,  whenever  any  free  state  tends  to  the  domination  of  the 
few,  its  polity  may  in  the  broad  sense,  be  called  aristocratic. 
By  a  free  state  is  meant  one  in  which  the  democratic  proclivity  is 
pronounced.*^^  Thus  we  come  \ds-a-vis  to  democracy  in  the 
politics  of  Aristotle  and  Aquinas. 


4. — Democracy 


Though  Aristotle  places  democracy  in  his  list  of  inferior  gov- 
ernments, it  is  not  wholly  objectionable.  It  is  in  contrast  with 
a  polity  that  it  appears  defective.  But  a  polity  is,  in  the  Phi- 
losopher's mind,  as  w^ell  as  the  St.  Thomas',  merely  democracy 
at  its  best:  duly  pared  down  to  proportions  of  stability,  safety, 
and  success.  It  can  be  readily  seen  that  a  polity  does  not  rep- 
resent pure  democracy;  yet,  according  to  the  Philosopher,  it 


462  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  2. 

463  Cf.  Thirwall,  History  of  Greece,  Vol.  I,  ch.  10. 

464  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  6. 

465  Ibidem. 

466  Ibidem. 

467  Ibidem. 

468  Idem.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  7. 


118     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

means  the  best  democracy.  This  is  significant.  It  advises  that  citi- 
zens with  suffrage  should  know  how  to  use  it  well,  and  have 
some  leisure  to  devote  to  state-affairs ;  else  the  common  good  were 
constantly  imperilled.    The  poHty  excludes  the  dregs  of  society. 

Undiluted  democracy  is  defined  in  the  Commentary  as  a  state 
wherein  the  freemen  and  the  poor,  as  a  majority  rule.469  Aqui- 
nas rejects  as  inaccurate  that  characterization  of  democracy  as 
the  form  of  government  whereby  the  supreme  power  is  lodged 
in  the  people.  For,  as  we  have  already  observed,  the  term 
'^people"  is  catholic,  and,  in  politics,  may  mean  anything  or 
nothing.  A  democracy  in  name  might  be  far  from  democratic 
in  reality.  Power,  the  presence  of  which  in  a  particular  class 
of  the  State  gives  character  to  the  rule,  is  a  changing  quantity, 
very  sensitive  to  circumstance.  NominallV,  sovereignty  in  a 
democracy  is  popular;  yet  if,  for  example,  the  rich  few  should 
be  able  and  permitted  to  sway  the  civil  situation,  democracy 
would  be  stultified  to  the  extent  of  really  amounting  to  oligar- 
chy. It  is  sound  advice  in  x-Vristotelian-Thomistic  politics 
that  democrac}^,  to  be  genuine  as  a  form  of  government,  must 
not  only  regard  the  people  as  the  ultimate  source  of  power; 
it  must  also  prevent  any  particular  portion  of  the  people,  repre- 
senting interests  apart  from  the  whole,  to  absorb  the  civil 
force.^'^  The  purest  democracy,  Aristotle  declares,  is  that  which 
is  so  called  chiefly  because  of  the  equality  which  reigns  in  it.*'''^ 
Still  this  equality  is  political  only ;  for  men  will  always  be  un- 
equal in  reality.  And  it  can  be  readily  seen,  since  such  is  so, 
that  under  any  other  form  of  good  government  according  to 
law,  the  same  effect  of  civil  equality  is  achieved.  For  law, 
to  be  such,  must  be  alike  for  the  whole  citizenry  and 
binding  on  all.  A  more  distinguishing  mark  of  democracy  is 
the  one  which  the  Philosopher  mentions  farther  on ;  that,  if  lib- 
erty and  equality  are  to  be  found  principally  in  a  democracy, 
this  requisite  is  best  realized  by  every  department  of  government 
being  alike  open  to  alL*^^     Democracy,  like  monarchy,  has 


469  Cow.  Pout.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  1. 

470  Cow.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  2. 
'i'l  Politics,  IV,  4. 

472  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  119 


diverse  modes. "^'''^  The  Aristotelian  division  which  Aquinas 
adopts,  is  of  modern  import : 

(1)  Democracy  in  which  all  the  citizenry  vote. 

(2)  Democracy  in  which  suffrage  is  tied  up  with  some  slight 
property  qualification. 

(3)  Democracy  in  which  all  the  citizens  are  possibilities 
for  the  tenure  of  office,  so  long  as  their  name  lacks  social  or 
civil  smirch.  It  appears  to  differ  from  the  first  type  in  that  here 
the  government  is  "according  to  law." 

(4)  Democracy  in  which  all  restriction  to  the  seeking  of 
office  is  swept  away,  and  anyone  within  the  State  is  liable  to 
choice.   In  this  case,  too,  the  government  is  in  the  law\ 

(5)  Democracy  in  which  the  people  are  superior  to  the  law, 
and  measures  are  determined  and  adopted  by  votes  and  not  by 
statute.  St.  Thomas  observes  that  this  last  form  of  democracy 
is  really  the  same  as  the  first  and  that  Aristotle  merely  repeats 
himself  in  a  more  specific  manner.-^'^  He  inspects  and  presents 
the  demerits  of  this  extravagant  species  of  popular  government. 
Here,  incidentally,  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  bits  of  his  and 
Aristotle's  contribution  to  the  subject  of  democracy.  Primarily, 
such  a  government  means  a  brood  of  demagogues.  The  State  is 
strong  with  voices,  and  weak  with  the  unsubstantiality  of  them. 
Very  likely.  Homer,  whom  Aristotle  quotes,  was  struck  with 
the  terror  of  tongues  when  he  sang  that  "ill  it  fares,  when  the 
multitude  hold  sway.""*"-^  Freedom  from  fixed  law,  which  indeed 
is  not  so  much  freedom,  in  the  political  sense,  as  it  is  license, 
means  that  the  masses  darken  into  many  of  the  manifestations 
of  despotism.  The  public  ear  is  easily  tickled  by  designing  flat- 
terers. And  presently  a  full-fledged  tyranny,  all  the  more  ter- 
rible by  its  great  proportions  and  corresponding  ruthlessness,  is 
lumbering  in  the  State,  crushing  the  best  individuals,  who  are 
the  fewest,  and  thus  destroying  the  means  of  escape  from  the 
bondage  of  itself.-*"^ 

The  ancient  yet  ever  new  trick  of  politicians,  which  seems 


473  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  6. 

474  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  4. 
4lo  Politics,  IV,  4. 

476  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  4. 


120     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

to  be  in  continental  evidence  today,  is  effectively  suggested. 
The  ambitious  individual  who  would  climb  to  the  civil  pin- 
nacle may  be  a  fire-breathing  preacher  of  revolution.  On  the 
ruins  of  an  old  order,  and  in  the  new  and  popular  day,  he  can 
quietly  restore  the  old  system  by  artfully  assuming  the  place  of 
the  deposed  monarch.  And  while  the  people  are  felicitating 
themselves  that  their  freedom  is  absolute,  their  savior  is  be- 
coming their  tyrant  and  law  is  being  re-established  in  his 
will.^""^  Here  the  Commentary  and  the  De  Regimine  repeat 
each  other.  Finally,  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  maintain  that 
this  extreme  form  of  democracy  is  not  democracy  at  all.  For, 
if  democracy  is  to  be  reckoned  among  the  good  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, we  cannot  mean  by  it  a  system  of  inevitable  abuse 
and  anarchy.  Law  is  essential;*'^  without  it,  there  is  politi- 
cally no  freedom,  for  rights  are  unprotected  and  wrongs  spring 
up  on  every  side.  It  must  be  supreme,  if  the  protection  and 
perfection  which  civil  society  is  to  secure  the  people  are  not 
to  be  merely  prospective.  The  acts  of  a  lawless  democracy 
would  have  no  lasting  value,  nor  universal  application;  they 
would  be  conceived  and  exercised  only  Mc  et  nunc  for  particular 
exigencies  and  aims.  Thus  government  would  be  unsettled, 
choppy,  indefinite,  and  inharmonious,  until  some  master  hand 
would  grasp  the  segments  and  crush  them  back  to  some  sem- 
blance of  unity,  which  would  mean  the  end  of  democracy;  or 
until  the  people  themselves  would  revert  to  the  necessity  of 
law,  which  would  be  the  rational  limitation  of  democracy .^"^^ 
But,  as  we  have  already  insinuated,  law,  written  or  unwritten, 
is  an  element  of  governmental  forms  other  than  democracy; 
and  therefore  the  three  species,  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  de- 
mocracy, when  wielded  by  prudence  and  justice,  are  seen  to 
look  very  much  alike.  Aquinas  apprehends  this  fact,  and 
explains  how  a  monarchy  may  be  clearly  distinguished  from 
an  aristocracy  or  democracy,  since  they  meet  and  apparently 
merge  in  the  fact  of  law  which  is  common  to  all.    In  a  mon- 


477  Ibidem. 

478  Com.  Polit..  Lib.  IV,  cap.  4. 

479  Recall  the  Athenian  Constitution,  according  to  which  the  classical 
example  of  democracy  operated.    Tr.  by  F.  G.  Kenyon,  London,  1891. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  121 

archy,  he  \rates,  the  law  is  in  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  ruler. 
(He  is  referring  to  the  absolute  brand.)  In  the  others,  it  is 
concreted  in  code  or  constitution.  Or  to  use  his  exact  expres- 
sion, it  is  written.4^0  This  elucidation,  however,  is  not  so  very 
strong  and  is  offered  only  to  clarify  the  thought  of  the  Philoso- 
pher. It  merely  throws  the  distinction  back  on  an  accident. 
Written  or  unwritten,  law,  according  to  Thomistic  principles, 
must  be  just  and  advantageous  to  the  people ;  else  it  is  no  law 
at  all.  And  so  all  good  governments  in  the  politics  of  Aquinas 
are  one,  inasmuch  as  reason  is  their  common  soul  and  justice 
their  object. 

The  next  appropriate  question,  then,  is:  what  form  of  gov- 
ernment did  St.  Thomas  prefer  and  prescribe  for  the  majority 
of  cases?  Or  rather,  w^hich  one  did  he  think  would  answer 
best  the  needs  of  the  average  nation  ?  We  find  Aristotle  teach- 
ing that  the  best  polity  is  comparable  to  the  best-tempered 
harmony .4^1  Aquinas  does  not  comment  on  this,  but  there  is 
no  doubt  that  he  accepts  it,  since  it  expresses  well  the  spirit 
of  his  politics.  When  the  Philosopher,  however,  identifies  dem- 
ocracy with  the  soft,  and  dulcet  moods  of  melody,  the  Angelic 
Doctor  perchance  disagrees.  And  this  would  explain  his  silence 
with  regard  to  the  text.  He  knew  that  periods  of  national 
transition,  so  significant  and  critical,  cannot  be  entrusted  to  the 
mutitude  but  require  genuine  leaders  and  guides.  Democracy 
is  for  periods  of  peace;  but  times  of  stress  may  dispense  with 
the  leadership  of  the  right  man  or  men  no  more  than  an  army 
with  a  commander.  It  is  simple  fairness  to  the  politics  of  the 
Saint  to  remember  the  activity  of  medieval  arms  when  we  are 
inclined  to  forget  or  to  minimize  the  amount  of  democracy 
in  his  doctrine  on  the  species  of  government. 


480  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  4. 

481  Politics,  IV,  3. 


122    st.  thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 

6. — St.  Thomas'  Favored  Form  of  Government:  the 
Mixed  Type 

To  appreciate  the  new  form  of  rule  which  we  shall  find  in 
his  Summa,  let  us  re-consider  his  De  Regimine,  where  he  speaks 
so  highly  of  monarchy^  and  recollect  that  he  was  writing 
to  a  monarch,  and  naturally  regarding  government  from  the 
royal  point  of  view,  conceding  whatever  merit  it  presented. 
Though  the  letter  is  frank  as  regards  kingly  duties,  it  is  duly 
diplomatic  in  its  strictly  political  references.  When  he  extolls 
unlimit.ed  monarchy,  he  is  star-gazing;  for  he  knows  that,  in 
our  world  of  flux  and  discords,  a  general  reign  of  the  single- 
sovereignty  plan  would  be  as  unattainable  as  a  universal  and 
permanent  peace,  and  that  the  only  absolutely  absolute  ruler 
that  ever  was,  or  will  be,  is  the  God  of  Abraham,  Isaac  and 
Jacob.  The  golden  shadow  of  his  sanctity  falls  on  his  politics ; 
and,  even  from  a  democratic  view-point,  does  it  not  enhance  and 
beautify  his  message?  It  is  the  office  of  the  earth,  as  of  the 
individual,  to  tend  to  the  Creator.  The  interests  of  democracy 
are  not  injured,  but  advanced,  by  a  yearning  towards  idealistic 
unity  and  peace,  which  are  finally  realized  only  in  the  Begin- 
ning of  all  things.  Who  is  the  End.  Even  the  Pagans  were  awed 
with  the  divinity  of  monarchy.  From  Thales  to  Cicero,  the 
belief  in  a  supernal  hegemony  is  intense.^^^ 

''The  members  of  the  body  constitute  a  unity  only  by  their 
submission  to  a  principal  organ,"  writes  Erdmann ;  ''the  powers 
of  the  soul  are  united  only  by  their  subjection  to  reason ;  and 
the  parts  of  the  world  form  one  whole  only  by  their  subjection 
to  God. "4^^  Here  is  a  pure  echo  of  Aquinas.  Submission  to 
reason  and  to  God;  these  are  the  motif  of  the  Saint's  politics. 
A  spiritual  estimation  of  the  world  will  always  reveal  an  ab- 
solute monarchy,  in  which  God  reigns  by  His  august  will  and 
men,  by  reason,  duly  obey.   It  is  a  concept  vast  and  yet  simple. 


4S2Cf.  Lactantus,  Epit..  c.  4. 

483  Johann  Edouard  Erdmann,  His.  of  Phil..  Vol.  I,  p.  438. 

Cf.  Plato's  idea  that  there  is  no  greater  evil  for  a  State  than  "that 
which  tears  it  to  pieces  and  makes  it  many  instead  of  one,"  and  no 
greater  good  than  "that  which  binds  it  together  and  makes  it  one." — 
Republic,  V,  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  123 

Aquinas  could  not  but  touch  on  ineffable  unity  in  his  politi- 
cal doctrine,  since  he  was  so  conscious  of  the  unity  of  a  God, 
as  present  to  the  world  as  an  artist  to  his  instrument,  and  of 
the  common  gift  of  reason  in  man.  With  such  thoughts,  he 
would  have  been  untrue  to  himself  if  he  did  not  call  monarchy 
the  ideal  form  of  government.^^  But,  as  usual,  he  is  practical 
as  well  as  idealistic  and,  Dunning  declares,  "his  general  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject  is  characterized  by  great  moderation 
and  good  sense.  "^^^  Right  here  prosaic  facts  must  have  served 
to  place  his  feet  firmly  on  earth.  Man  is  incomparably  less 
than  his  Maker;  and  therefore  in  nowise  is  there  a  parity  of 
reason  why  any  individual  should  rule  his  fellow-men  in  the 
manner  in  which  God  rules  the  world.^^^  Yet  on  the  other 
hand,  the  kingship  of  the  Creator,  though  absolute,  is  peerlessly 
democratic;  for  it  regards  and  respects  every  individual,  his 
freedom  and  his  needs.  Aquinas  never  tires  of  teaching  the 
just  and  necessary  tendency  of  all  creatures  to  God.  And, 
interpreting  his  politics  in  the  light  and  spirit  of  this  princi- 
ple, we  find  the  most  admirable  democracy  in  his  doctrine. 
Men  may  be  able  in  the  course  of  mental  and  moral  advance- 
ment, to  rule  themselves ;  but  they  must  ever  be  as  children  in 
the  tremendous  hand  of  their  Maker.  Aquinas  would  be  eager 
to  welcome  the  day  in  which  democracy  could  prevail,  so  long 
as,  in  it,  the  hearts  of  all  individuals  would  acknowledge  and 
turn  in  abjection  and  subjection  to  the  one  true  King,  ac- 
knowledging His  absolute  sovereignty.  Then  the  kingdom 
of  God  would  have  truly  come ;  and  the  Angelic  Doctor's  doc- 
trine of  absolute  monarchy  as  the  supernal  ideal  would  have 
been  magnificently  vindicated.  Such  a  dream  is  of  poets,  saints 
— and  Christians.  It  is  the  breath  of  the  Lord's  Prayer.  There 
is  no  evolution  without  an  ideal.  Christianity  and  Aquinas 
have  served  the  cause  of  democracy  pricelessly,  by  furnishing 


484  De  Reg.,  Dib.  I,  cap.  12:  "Inventum  autem  in  rerum  natura  regi- 
men universale  et  particulare.  Universale  autem,  secundum  quod 
omnia  sub  Dei  regimine  continentur,  quia  sua  providentia  universa 
gubernat;  particulare  autem  regimen  maxime  quidem  divino  regimini 
simile  est,  quod  invenitur  in  homine,  qui  ob  hoc,  minor  mundus  appel- 
latur,  quia  in  eo  inventur  forma  universalis  regiminis." 

"i:^  Political  Theories,  Ancient  and  Med.,  p.  200. 

486  Cf.  Antoniades,  Die  Staatslehre  des  Thomas  ah  Aquino,  p.  39. 


124     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

an  ideal  which  is  ineffably  powerful  in  attraction  and  stimula- 
tion, not  only  spiritually,  but  also  politically.  For  the  creature 
will  never  fully  enjoy  his  rights,  until  those  of  the  Creator  are 
fully  reverenced.  A  flight  from  petty  politics  to  divine !  This 
is  the  turn  w^hich  Thomistic  doctrine  takes,  though  the  An- 
gelic Doctor  will  not  let  himself  disregard  the  very  real  impedi- 
menta of  a  personal  devil,  a  stinging  flesh  ,and  a  clamorous 
world.^87 

It  is  evident  in  the  De  Regimine,  w^hen  Aquinas  praises 
monarchy,  that  he  is  really  occupied  with  concern  for  the  w^el- 
fare  of  the  State.  One  can  readily  see  that  he  does  not  wish  to 
disaparge  democracy.  All  that  he  repudiates  is  political  un- 
rest. There  is  a  great  probability  that  the  State  wall  be  afflicted 
with  storms  and  the  public  good  ship-wrecked  if  many  rule 
and  altogether  disagree.^^"^  Thus  St.  Thomas  does  not  make  an 
absolute  statement.  He  frankly  posits  the  condition  (si  omnino 
dissentirent)  .^^^  He  does  not  deny  that  the  government  of 
the  harmonious  many  is  not  the  best.  In  emphasizing  the 
utility  and  necessity  of  a  focal  personality  in  a  polity he 
but  recognizes  what  every  modern  representative  democracy, 
without  the  slightest  detriment  to  its  character,  admits.  He 
feels  that  the  State  falls  more  naturally  into  oneness,  if  it  has 
a  single  head.  Unity  is  his  object,  not  monarchy  for  unity 
means  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  people.  If  this  unity 
happens  to  obtain  better  in  a  democracy,  Aquinas  w^ould  grant 
his  approval  without  stint  to  that  particular  form.  Then  again 
he  is  mindful  that  the  corruption  of  a  popular  government  is 
apt  to  be  more  dire  in  consequence  than  that  of  a  per- 
sonal polity ,4^2  ^  tyranny  is  not  less  but  even  more 
probable  in  the  government  of  many  than  of  one.  It  can  be 
better  hidden.    And  so  we  see  that,  w-hatever  praise  is  meted 


487  Com.  Pout.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  6. 

488  De  Reg..  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

489  Ibidem:  "Manifestum  est  quod  plures  multitudinem  nullo  modo 
bene  regerent,  si  omnino  dissentirent."  N.  B. — The  Farm.  Ed.  brings 
out  even  better  St.  Thomas'  regard  for  the  pople  in  his  criticism  of  the 
government  of  the  many;  for  there  the  reading  of  this  text  is  "multi- 
tudinem nullo  modo  conservant,  si  omnino  dissentirent." 

490  De  Reg.  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

491  Ibidem. 

492  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AND  DEMOCRACY  125 

out  to  monarchy,  is  inspired  by  something  beyond  and  above 
it.  The  modern  mind  too  readily  identifies  monarchy  with 
tyranny  and  recoils.  Aquinas  would  turn  with  equal  disgust 
from  tyranny,  which  he  denounces  as  the  worst  form  of  gov- 
ernment.^^^  But  he  differs  from  us  in  that  he  saves  his  emo- 
tions not  for  a  man  of  straw,  but  for  a  truly  guilty  reality. 
His  monarchy  is  the  kind  in  which  charity  and  justice  are 
triumphant  and  on  which  no  one  could  reasonably  carp.  In 
the  theoretical  case,  as  Borrell  observes,  where  a  people  are  con- 
scious of  their  incapability  of  governing  themselves,  it  would 
be  a  much  more  democratic  act  to  confide  themselves  to  a  sover- 
eign than  to  sink  into  a  republican  demagogy.*^  This  is  the 
idea  also  of  Saint  Thomas,  if  one  is  to  judge  from  his  princi- 
ples of  popular  worth  and  the  common  good. 

Thomas'  commendation  of  monarchy,  it  is  fair  to  say,  is 
not  necessitated  by  his  Catholicism.  Montesquieu  has  thrown 
dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  by  teaching  that  the  Catholic 
religion  is  more  agreeable  to  a  monarchy,  and  that  Protestant- 
ism accommodates  itself  better  to  a  republic.  The  thought  of 
Aquinas  is,  of  course,  very  representative  here;  and  we  can- 
not find  any  such  a  thesis  in  Thomistic  pages  either  directly 
or  indirectly.  We  have  seen  that  his  praise  of  pure  monarchy 
is  because  of  its  rank  in  the  ideal  order.  His  attitude  is  prac- 
tically different  and  abundantly  democratic  in  the  world  of 
reality. 

If  Montesquieu  means  that  the  Catholic  Church  is  more 
consonant  with  that  form  of  government  which  best  ensures 
the  rights  of  God  and  man,  he  is  at  one  with  Aquinas.  But 
since  these  blessed  rights  are  as  well  and  often  better  safe- 
guarded in  a  less  rigid  but  more  enlightened  regime,  the  choice 
of  the  Church  and  of  her  most  intellectual  son  is  indefinite. 
For  them,  all  just  governments  are  good  until  they  prove 
themselves  inadequate,  weak,  or  generally  bad.  The  best  is 
the  one  which  performs  its  mission  best.  The  Church  is  as 
indifferent  to  the  form  as  she  is  concernful  of  the  success.  Her 
scholars  may  speculate  as  to  the  respective  and  relative  merits 


493  Idem,  cap.  2. 

494  Revue  de  PhilosopMe,  XII,  p.  119. 


126     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  democracy,  but  she  herself  thinks 
in  practical  terms  of  results,  and  approves  or  disapproves  ac- 
cordingly. Politics  may  be  somewhat  explained  by  climate. 
Aquinas  and  Aristotle,  we  remember,  drew  a  contrast  between 
the  quiescent  East,  favorable  to  one-man  rule,  and  the  dynamic 
West,  suitable  to  democratic  approaches.  But  religion  requires 
a  loftier  elucidation.  It  transcends  temperature  or  political 
expedience  and  experience.  It  is,  among  other  things,  an 
ultimate  attitude.  It  is  universal,  and  can  thrive  just  as  vig- 
orously, with  the  sceptre  or  the  flag,  or  under  the  cross.  Its 
external  manifestation  prospers  wherever  justice  does  not  fail. 
Montesquieu  ignores  that  Catholicism  has  found  acceptance  in 
every  part  of  the  world,  and  is  as  vital  in  our  democratic  era  as 
it  ever  was  in  the  monarchial  past.  The  celebrated  French- 
man is  unconscious  of  the  oddity  of  conditioning  theology  on 
geography.  He  describes  the  North  of  Europe,  which  broke 
away  from  Rome  and  embraced  Protestantism,  as  possessing 
a  spirit  of  independence  and  liberty  which  the  more  southern 
countries  lacked  somewhat  oblivious  of  the  burst  of  autocracy 
which  followed  the  Reformation  in  the  very  region  of  its  birth, 
as  well  as  of  the  pure  democracy  of  the  Italian  cities  in  the 
very  shadow  of  Rome  and  in  the  Age  when  the  Roman  Church 
was  at  the  zenith  of  its  prestige.  Great  movements  are  to  be 
explained  by  essentials,  not  accidents.  Character  is  something 
more  than  a  creature  of  climate.  Men  can  be  Catholic,  despite 
the  latitude  and  longitude  of  their  country.  Of  all  possible 
reasons  which  could  be  advanced  to  explain  the  Reformation, 
geography  is  the  least  convincing,  except,  perhaps,  Taylor's 
skull  theory  that  ''the  dolichocephalic  Teutonic  race  is  Protest- 
ant, the  brachycephalic  Celto-Slavic  race  is  either  Roman  Catho- 
lic or  Greek  Orthodox.  "^96  To  argue  that  the  Catholic  religion 
is  non-acceptable  to  the  North  or  more  adaptable  to  monarchy, 
because  farenheit  is  lower  in  Berlin  or  because  an  Italian's  head 
may  be  more  egg-shaped  than  a  German's,  is  to  draw  an  ex- 
ceedingly long  bow.  Imagination  wounds  prudence  in  the 
process. 


495  L'esprit  des  Lois,  Liv.  XXIV,  ch.  5. 

496  The  Origin  of  the  Aryans,  p.  247 ;  quoted  by  Ross  in  his  Social 
Psychology,  p.  6. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  127 

The  government  which  St.  Thomas  proposes  as  ordinarily 
best,  in  his  greatest  work,  not  written  to  a  prince  but  to  pos- 
terity, which  is  the  court  of  final  appeal  in  determining  his 
thought,  is  the  moderated  type,  in  which,  Montesquieu  avers, 
political  liberty  can  alone  be  found.*^"  It  is  a  commixion  of  the 
three  good  forms:  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  democracy 
There  is  no  inconsistency  between  the  teaching  of  his  De  Regi- 
mine  and  this  different  doctrine;  for  in  the  former,  while  he 
thoroughly  accredits  the  monarchical  phase  in  rule,  he  does 
not  teach  that  it  should  be  the  only  one.  In  the  Summa,  he 
lays  down  the  governmental  principle  which  the  succeeding 
story  of  European  politics  has  well  vindicat-ed  and  which  has 
blazed  the  way  to  true  liberty. 

He  teaches  that,  no  matter  w^hat  the  form  of  government,  all 
should  have  some  part  in  it."^^^  Here  he  shows  how  well  he  is 
thinking  in  the  practical  order  and  that  he  has  indeed  descended 
from  the  summits  of  sacred  abstraction  which  he  scaled  in 
his  letter  to  the  king  of  Cyprus.  We  are  more  convinced  than 
ever  that  his  epistle  had  a  predominantly  pious  purpose.  He 
compares  the  earthly  monarch  to  the  divine;  he  washes  the 
former  to  gaze  upon  the  super-terrestrial  exemplar,  and  profit. 
This  is  the  key  to  the  idealism  of  the  doctrine  of  the  document. 
And  now,  in  the  Swmma,  he  gives  free  play  to  the  political  wis- 
dom which  he  has  drawn  form  Christianity,  Aristotle,  and 
his  own  meditation,  and  the  democracy  of  his  mind  satisfactor- 
ily manifests  itself.  In  his  declaration  that  all  should  have 
a  share  in  the  rule,  St.  Thomas  brushes  away  the  old  property 
requirement  which  the  Philosopher  believed  to  be  so  important 
to  the  qualification  of  a  citizen.  His  religion  had  taught  him 
a  nobler  democracy  than  the  superb  Macedonian  approved. 
The  type  of  the  latter  could  be  stretched  to  include  only  two 
classes:  the  rich  and  the  bourgeoisie.    The  Angelic  Doctor 


497  Op.  cit.,  Liv.,  XI,  ch.  4. 

498  Feugueray,  op.  cit.  Migne,  III,  Serie  22,  Dictionnaire  de  Theologie 
Scholastique:  "Le  gouvernement  le  plus  parfait,  selon  Saint  Thomas, 
n'est  ni  la  monarchie,  ni  I'aristocratie,  ni  la  republique;  c'est  celui  ou 
ce  trois  formes  de  gouvernement  sont  melanges  de  manniere  a  reunir 
les  avantages  et  a  neutraliser  les  inconveniants  de  chacun  d'elles." 

499  Summa  Theoh,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1. 


128     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

takes  in  the  best  of  the  poor  class  too.^^  Christ's  dispensation 
had  changed  the  idea  of  poverty.  It  was  no  longer  an  exact 
synonym  for  abjection,  ignorance,  and  knavery.  Medieval  and 
monastic  religion  and  zeal  removed  many  clouds  from  the  pic- 
ture; and  St.  Thomas  could  behold  virtues  and  possibilities  in 
the  lower  ranks  of  society,  which,  continuing  to  develop,  would 
fit  them  well  for  the  duties  of  active  citizenship.  The  broadness 
of  his  view  is  identical  with  American  principle;  though,  as 
already  suggested,  he  was  more  careful  in  the  concession  of 
suffrage  than  we  have  always  been,  requiring  a  higher  degree 
of  mental  and  moral  qualification.  His  practical  reason  for 
prescribing  the  popular  spirit  in  government  is  three-fold: 
peace  appears  more  probable  in  such  a  polity;  patriotism  is 
more  ferv^ent;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  people  will  rally 
to  the  civil  defence  whenever  and  however  attack  occurs.^^^ 
Here  Aquinas  could  be  writing  of  our  own  country,  so  surely 
does  he  express  the  cause  of  her  security  from  the  menace  of 
bolshevism,  and  the  explanation  of  the  love  of  her  children. 
It  is  by  her  adherence  to  popular  principle,  that  she  has  risen 
as  a  goddess  of  liberty  to  the  nations  and  an  earnest  of  political 
inspiration  and  hope.  It  is  because  our  civics  has  adopted  the 
generous  view,  of  such  as  Aquinas',  toward  the  people,  and  not 
the  narrow  Aristotelian  concept,  that  we  have  a  more  or  less 
satisfied  lower  class  today. 

The  Angelic  Doctor  teaches  that  this  respect  and  provision 
for  popular  participation  in  government  should  be  primary. 
The  question  of  the  form  of  the  polity  is  secondary.^^^  ^ 
matter  of  fact,  his  favorite  practical  government,  from  his  own 
popular  demand,  just  mentioned,  is  a  democracy.  In  it,  the 
people  predominate;  for  all  have  a  share.  But  he  w^ould  add 
to  it  the  best  that  the  other  good  forms  have  to  offer.  The 
Greek  city-state,  we  know,  had  politically  widened  into  the  medi- 
eval province ;  w^hich  in  turn  was  overflowing  into  the  modern 
kingdom  or  nation.   Thomas  brings  to  the  attention  of  Europe 


500  Though  Aristotle,  too,  believed  that  "keeping  quality  in  view,  it 
is  fit  to  make  the  franchise  as  extensive  as  possible,  so  that  those  who 
share  in  it  shall  not  outnumber  those  who  do  not."  Pol.,  IV,  13. 

501  Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1. 

502  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  129 

the  possibility  of  representative  government,  which  would  mean 
the  inversion  of  feudalism.  Medieval  rule,  beyond  the  Italian 
independencies,  was  from  the  top  down;  Aquinas  would  have 
it,  first  from  the  bottom  up;  and  then,  and  only  then,  down. 
He  is  in  logical  accord  with  his  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  State 
and  the  transference  of  power. 

In  this  mixed  government,  which  he  finds  the  most  practical 
and  the  best,  he  would  have  the  monarchical  form  represented 
by  a  single  person  who  is  chosen  for  his  merit  and  presides  in 
the  State.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  Aquinas  does  not  speak  of 
such  a  one  as  ruling,  so  much  as  presiding.  The  monarch,  in 
the  strong  sense,  which  we  met  in  iVristotle's  Politics  and  in 
the  Commentary,  is  the  sole  regent  and  his  rule  is  according  to 
virtue,  not  law.  But  the  influence  of  the  chief  in  the  Angelic 
Doctor's  mixed  government  would  be  more  moral  than  material, 
executive  rather  than  legislative.  Next,  Thomas  would  have  the 
aristocratic  element  present  in  a  body  of  picked  men.  These 
are  to  be  the  practical  rulers.  He  describes  them  as  principantes. 
The  real  weight  of  the  government  is  in  their  hands.  Finally, 
democracy  is  genuinely  and  plentifully  present  in  the  fact  that 
these  rulers  should  be  chosen  from  the  people  and  by  the  people. 
This  Thomistic  teaching  was  very  valuable  to  political  science. 
Aquinas  forsees,  in  the  immensity  of  nations,  the  necessity 
of  some  scheme  for  handling  the  popular  will.  So  his  state- 
ment is  of  a  nature  to  leave  room  for  any  suitable  plan.  The 
viva  vox  of  Athens,  or  the  Teutonic  disapproval  by  a  general 
murmur  and  approval  by  the  clashing  of  javelins,  would  hardly 
suit  the  new  democracy.  The  people  could  more  conveniently 
express  themselves  through  the  lips  of  their  representatives. 
Modern  thought  wholly  agrees.  The  up-to-date  indirect  democ- 
racy of  our  own  country  is  the  kind  which  St.  Thomas  declares 
to  be  proper  in  his  best  practical  form  of  government.^^*  He 
does  not  teach  the  choice  by  lot,  which  was  the  feature  of  Greek 
democracy  and  was  more  or  less  practical  in  the  unusual  Hellen- 


503  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  1:  "unde  optima  ordinatio 
principum  est  in  aliqiia  civitate,  vel  regno,  in  quo  unus  praeflcitur 
secundum  virtutem,  qui  omnibus  praesit;  et  sub  ipso  sunt  aliqui 
principates  secundum  virtutem;  et  tamen  talis  principatus  ad  omnes 
pertinet;  tum  quia  ex  omnibus  eligi  possunt;  tum  quia  etiam  ex 
omnibus  eliguntur." 


130     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

ic  situation.  But  neither  does  modern  democracy  teach  or  de- 
mand it.  The  size  of  the  modern  nation,  and  the  variety  which 
it  includes,  forbid. 

The  AngeHc  Doctor  unfortunately  does  not  mention  explicit- 
ly the  necessity  of  a  constitution  according  to  which  the  rule 
should  operate.  But  piecing  together  the  other  sections  of  his 
politics,  we  see  that  he  implies  it.  And  we  are  sure  of  it,  when 
we  recall  that  his  model,  the  Mosaic  rule,  had  its  written 
code.  At  any  rate,  he  offers  us  an  outline  of  an  excellent  polity, 
combining  the  best  results  of  the  world's  civil  experience  and 
giving  democracy  its  due.  He  was  not  blinded  by  Aristotle's 
aura  and  subdued  by  his  authority  into  accepting  aristocracy 
as  the  peerless  practical  regime.  He  reaches  beyond  culture 
and  wealth  to  the  popular  heart  and  mind,  and  raises  them  to 
their  proper  place  in  an  enlightened  prospectus  of  government. 

The  idea  of  mixed  rule  was  not  new;  but  to  Aquinas  is  the 
credit  of  having  revived  it  in  his  age;  thus  making  it  a  factor 
in  modern  political  history.  In  accrediting  it,  we  do  not  ne- 
glect the  eminent  thinkers  who  worked  out  a  similar  solution 
of  the  problem  of  government  long  before.  Plato,  in  his  trea- 
tise on  Laws  descends  from  the  Olympian  heights  of  his  Re- 
public  and  offers  a  practical  political  schema  with  popular 
respect.^^  He  teaches  that  authority  and  liberty,  the  tenors 
of  monarchy  and  democracy,  should  be  preserved;  because 
neither  of  them  could  subsist  without  the  other.  He  pru- 
dently offers  that  the  ruler  and  the  ruled  should  make  mutu- 
al concessions,  in  order  that  the  two  important  principles  of 
polity  might  live  and  thrive.  But  his  mixed  government  is 
inferior  to  that  of  Saint  Thomas,  because  he  ignores  the  means 
by  and  in  which  this  harmony  is  secured:  the  aristocracy .^^^ 
There  is  no  middle  layer  to  his  plan. 

Aristotle,  with  his  presentation  of  governments,  works  in  and 
out,  praising  here,  criticizing  there,  but  failing  to  deliver  such 


^Laws,  IV,  712  sq.  See  Dunning,  Political  Theories,  Ancient  and 
Modern,  p.  37. 

505  See  Crahay,  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  131 

took  in  the  ephoralty.  The  oligarchical  element,  Aristotle  sub- 
could  afford.  Moreover,  tne  people  elected  the  senate  and  par- 
a  clean-cut  final  opinion  as  we  find  in  Aquinas.  He  lauds  the 
to  education;  rich  and  poor  were  reared  alike.  The  economic 
middle  state,  quoting  Euripides : 

''The  middle  state  is  best ;  that  state  be  mine, 
What'er  my  city  be."506 

Though  favoring  aristocracy,  he  evidently  likes  the  balance 
and  poise  which  a  mingling  of  forms  would  effect.  He  devotes 
some  space  to  political  admixture  and  signals  out  the  corn- 
Democracy  in  that  singular  state  was  operative  with  regard 
posite  character  of  Lacedaemonian  polity  for  consideration, 
line  of  social  demarcation  was  quite  removed ;  the  public  tables 
knew  no  favorites;  the  rich  wore  only  such  clothes  as  the  poor 
mits  as  an  opinion,  consisted  in  the  fact  that  officers  were  chosen 
by  vote  and  not  by  lot.  And  the  ruling  body  made  up  the 
aristocratic  feature.^^" 

The  Philosopher  is  more  concerned  with  the  fact  of  mixed 
government  than  with  its  degree  of  desirability.  Aquinas  goes 
further,  perfecting  and  prescribing  the  principle. 

He  owes  more  to  Polybius  and  Cicero  in  his  theory  than  to 
Aristotle.  For  these  two  writers  were  express  apostles  of  the 
three-fold  polity.  The  former  adopts  the  Philosopher's  view  of 
six  species  of  government,  three  good  and  three  bad.  He  be- 
lieves that  one  type  should  be  used  to  off-set  the  other,  according 
to  the  happy  combination  of  Lycurgus,  in  whose  requblic  the 
king,  the  nobles,  and  the  people,  had  the  sovereign  power  ap- 
portioned among  them  in  a  degree  which  produced  equilibrium 
instead  of  sacrificing  it.  Each  power  respects  the  other.  The 
Polybian  principle  would  read  like  the  Dumas  motto  of  "one 
for  all  and  all  for  one."    Our  historian  finds  his  ideal  crystal- 


50Q  Politics,  IV,  11.    Eurip.,  Ion.  632. 

W.  L.  Newman  declares:  "In  all  probability  his  mind  was  under  the 
influence  of  two  conflicting  views,  that  which  he  inherited  from  the 
Politicus  and  the  Republic  of  Plato,  and  that  which  was  more  especially 
his  own — the  view  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  supremacy  of  law  whicl^ 
should  make  it  out  of  place  even  in  the  best  constitution." — Politics 
of  Aristotle,  Vol.  I,  p.  281. 

507  Politics,  IV,  9. 


132     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

lized  in  the  Roman  constitution  of  the  time  of  the  Punic  wars. 
There  the  three  governments  were  so  commingled  that  it  was 
impossible  to  distinguish  any  one  of  them.'^o^  But  the  Roman 
consulate,  or  supreme  magistry,  was  split.  And  thus  the  State 
was  somewhat  abnormal  with  its  two  heads.  Aquinas  improves 
on  Polybius  and  the  Tiber  city  by  advocating  the  more  natural 
apex  of  a  single  leader. 

Dunning  has  to  say  of  Polybius'  analysis  of  the  Roman 
system  that  ''it  is  interesting  as  the  first  formal  exposition  of 
the  principle  of  check  and  balance  in  constitutional  organiza- 
tion."^^ It  is  of  interest,  too,  that  St.  Thomas  should  fasten 
on  its  merits,  and  add  to  them  the  symmetry  which  Dunning 
declares  to  be  absent,  in  order  to  create  the  more  perfect  State. 

Cicero,  though  favorable  to  royalty,  is  fascinated  with  the 
system  of  equilibrium  which  so  pleases  Polybius.  He  is  im- 
pressed with  the  instability  of  any  polity  in  its  purity;  though, 
like  Aquinas,  he  believes  the  monarchy  best  for  unity,  the 
aristocracy  for  counsel,  and  the  democracy  for  liberty.^^^  All 
extremes  are  converted  into  their  contraries. As  Janet 
remarks,  the  orator  but  appropriates  and  clothes  in  his 
own  beautiful  diction  the  main  preoccupations  of  Polybius.^^- 
But  Dunning  insists  that  Cicero  made  some  contributions  to 
the  theory  of  mixed  government,  e.  g.,  that  his  idea  of  check 
and  balance  was  less  mechanical  than  his  predecessor's  and 
that  he  appealed  more  to  political  principles  than  to  political 
persons  (magistrates,  senates,  and  assemblies)  in  the  process  of 
equi-posing.^i^  "With  St.  Thomas  the  leader  is  chosen  secundum 
virtutem;  and  those  beneath  him  rule  secundum  virtutem. 

Crahay  is  loath  to  yield  that  Aquinas  profited  from  the  con- 
clusions of  the  famous  ancients.  He  believes  that  it  is  from 
Moses  and  the  Old  Testament  that  he  draws  his  theory  of  mixed 


508  Paul  Janet,  Histoire  de  la  philoso2)hie  morale  et  politique,  tome  1, 
pp.  193-194.    Vide  Polybius,  Lib.  VI. 

509  Op.  cit.,  p.  117. 

310  Z)e  Rep.,  I,  31,  ?,2.  Also  I,  35:  "Ita  caritate  nos  capiunt  reges, 
consiliis  optimates,  libertate  populi,  ut  in  comparando  difficile  ad 
eligendum  sit  quid  maxime  velis." 

511  Idem,  45:  Vide  I,  29. 

512  Op.  cit.,  p.  191.   De  RepuUica,  I,  45.   Idem,  II,  23. 

513  Op.  cit.,  p.  123-4. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  133 

government.^i*  This  is  the  truth,  though  perhaps  not  the 
whole  of  it;  for  the  article  in  which  he  proffers  his  conception 
is  conclusively  entitled  ^'Utrum  convenienter  lex  vetus  de  prin- 
cipibus  ordinaverit."^^^"*  And,  in  the  body  of  it,  he  shows 
how  well  the  type  was  attained  among  the  Hebrews.  The 
prophet  and  his  successors  were  quasi-monarchs ;  under  them 
were  the  seventy-two  elders,  who  represented  aristocracy.  These 
in  turn  were  chosen  from  and  by  the  people.  But  there  is 
apparently  a  slight  difference  between  St.  Thomas'  idea  of 
mixed  government  and  its  scriptural  prototpye,  which  could 
perhaps  be  traced  to  his  political  musings  on  history  and  pro- 
fane texts.  He  does  not  grant  the  sovereign  the  quality  and 
quantity  of  power  which  the  Hebrew  leaders  enjoyed.  Natur- 
ally; for  Moses,  Josue,  and  the  Judges,  were  cedars  of  Libanas. 
He  tempers  his  theory  to  less  spectacular  periods  and  more 
ordinary  people  than  those  of  the  Old  Testament.  Besides,  Je- 
hovah reserved  to  Himself  the  right  of  selecting  the  sovereign 
prince;  though  regularly,  according  to  Thomistic  implication, 
it  resided  in  the  people. 

But  whether  he  had  recourse  to  pagan  sources  or  not  for 
my  part  of  his  message  on  mixed  government,  the  fact  is  that 
lie  actually  has  seized,  knowingly  or  not,  the  best  that  the 
past  had  to  offer  in  this  regard  and,  with  a  few  pregnant  and 
Lnmistakable  phrases,  has  presented  it  as  something  slightly 
better.  For  the  Angelic  Doctor,  Moses  was,  politically,  of  great- 
er stature  than  any  of  the  other  ancients ;  and  Holy  Scripture 
superseded  Greek  science.  Thomas  was  not  the  kind  to  ignore 
aay  valuable  and  available  pagan  utterance ;  but  he  was  always 
at  pains  to  place  it  in  the  service  of  a  larger  truth,  and  so  to 
prove  its  worth.  Question  CV.,  art.  1,  of  the  Prima  Secundae  of 
the  Summa  would  give  no  indication  that  he  owed  anything  to 
piofane  authors  for  his  theory  of  mixed  government.  But  his 
other  articles  and  books,  using  so  many  quotations  from  the 
best  minds  of  the  past  and  indicating  such  familiarity  with 
them,  suggest  that  he  was  at  least  indirectly  influenced  by  them. 


514  Op.  cit.,  p.  100. 

515  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu,  CV,  a.  1. 

516  Ibidem. 


134     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

This  theory  of  mixed  government  has  been  more  praised  in 
modern  times  than  the  scholar  who  improved  and  transmitted 
it  to  us.  Its  reasonableness  could  not  but  make  a  wide  appeal 
from  the  start. 

Gerson  commended  the  French  polity,  inasmuch  as  it  com- 
bined royal  and  aristocratic  elements,  but  carped  on  the  fact 
that  it  fell  short  of  the  ideal  which,  we  have  just  seen,  St. 
Thomas  upheld:  the  Mosaic  commonwealth.^!'^  ''The  clean-cut 
and  acute,  but  never  intemperate,  pleas  of  Gerson  and  his 
allies,"  writes  Dunning,  "in  behalf  of  limited  government,  the 
reign  of  law,  and  the  subordination  of  strict  law  and  tradition 
to  the  requirements  of  equity  and  the  general  welfare,  received 
the  complet^st  ratification  in  the  decrees  of  the  council  of  Con- 
stans,  and  thus  became  merged  in  the  intellectual  consciousness 
of  the  time."-^!^  The  theory  of  St.  Thomas  was  bearing  rich 
fruit.  For  this  Council,  says  Figgis,  "set  forth  a  system  of 
politics  which  was  consistent  yet  scarcely  doctrinaire,  which 
saved  the  rights  of  the  crown  while  it  secured  the  liberties  of 
the  people;  it  paved  the  way  for  the  constitutional  re- 
formers of  future  generations."^!^  And  the  soul  of  Aquinas 
brooded  over  Constance  and  was  felt  and  respected,  as  even 
Martin  Luther,  in  his  graphic  parlance,  admits.  "The  source 
and  cess-pool  of  every  error,"  he  bitterly  styles  the  Angelic  I>oc- 
tor,  for  his  moral  predominance  at  the  deliberations. 

Fortescue,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  fifteenth  century,  carried 
Thomistic  influence  into  his  day.  He  taught  that  a  mixed 
polity  was  proved  by  experience  to  merit  special  praise.  He 
calls  attention  to  Israel,  Rome,  and  England.^-^  It  would  have 
been  highly  appropriate  for  him  to  point  a  finger  to  the  Summc. 

Bellarmine  (1541-1621)  repeats  Aquinas  and  advocates 
mixed  government  as  the  best  form  in  the  practical  order.^^i 

Althusius  (1604-1638),  severe  Calvinist  as  he  was,  showed 


517  Tract,  de  Pot.  Eccl.,  8.   See  Dunning,  op.  cit.,  pp.  269-270. 

518  Op.  cit.,  p.  270.    Co.  of  Constans:  1414. 

519  Pontics  of  the  Council  of  Constance,  in  the  Transactions  of  tie 
Royal  Historical  Society,  1899,  p.  103.    Quoted  by  Dunning,  p.  270. 

520  Cf.  Dunning,  Polit.  Theories,  from  Luther  to  Montesquieu,  p.  2)2. 

521  Cf.  Idem.,  p.  129. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  135 


himself  Thomistic  to  the  extent  of  teaching  the  naturalness  of 
the  composite  polity.^^^ 

Harrington  (1658)  tied  up  his  political  theory  insufferably 
with  property  relations.  He  regarded  mixed  government  as 
natural  only  where  the  land  was  in  the  possession  of  a  few 
people;  and  absolute  monarchy,  when  some  unconscionable 
Croesus  owned  everything.^^^  Aquinas  is  no  party  to  any  such 
artificial  concept.  His  theory  is  purer  and  far  more  promissory 
of  the  reign  of  true  democracy;  for  he  makes  virtue,  and  not 
property,  the  entrance  to  political  power.  Harrington  thinks 
that  the  prerequisite  for  the  stability  of  the  State  is  that  su- 
preme authority  be  placed  in  owners;  Thomas,  more  sensibly 
and  safely,  would  have  the  people  place  it  in  the  best  and  fittest. 

Bodin  (1578)  and  Hobbes  (1668)  are  inimical  to  the 
mixed  form.  Advocates  of  autocracy,  twentieth  century  thought 
must  dismiss  them,  if  not  with  some  contempt,  at  least  with 
much  pity.  We  can  appreciate  how  far  the  Angelic  Doctor  had 
democratically  advanced  beyond  these  early  thinkers  of  the 
modern  age,  when  we  read  the  dictum  of  the  former  that  ^'sov- 
ereignty  is  supreme  power  over  citizens  and  subjects,  unre- 
strained by  law,"^24  Qj.  ii^Q  assertion  of  the  latter  that  the  power 
of  the  king  or  assembly  must  be  unlimited.^^^  Consistently 
they  could  not  approve  of  a  liberty-fostering  polity.  And 
so,  from  one  point  of  view,  they  set  back  the  cause  of  the  people. 
From  another,  they  advanced  it.  The  very  extravagance  of 
their  offering  was  an  irritant  which  helped  to  stir  up  those 
whom  they  would  clamp  down.  Aquinas  has  the  merit  of 
profiting  the  people  by  the  directness  of  his  doctrine  and  not 
by  antithesis. 

Bossuet  (1677),  it  seems,  was  as  captivated  by  St.  Thomas' 
remarks  on  monarchy  as  unmindful  of  his  sentiments  on 
democracy.  There  was  much  more  reason  for  Aquinas  to  be  a 
royal  enthusiast  than  the  French  orator,  double  related  to  no- 
bility as  he  was,  through  both  his  parents,  and  contemporary 


522  Cf.  Idem.,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

523  Idem.,  p.  250. 

524  "Majestas  est  summa  in  cives  ac  subditos  legibusque  soluta  po- 
testas."    Quoted  by  Dunning,  op  cit.,  p.  96. 

525  Elementorum  Philosophiae,  De  Give,  cap.  VI,  par.  18. 


136     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

and  intimate  of  the  illustrious  Louis  IX.  But  it  was  Bossuet 
who  strummed  out  the  most  loyal  of  royal  rhapsodies  on  his 
literary  lyre,  elating  Louis  XIV,  but  not  representing  medieval 
tradition. 

Fenelon  (1721),  with  his  doubts  that  any  single  human 
being  could  be  adequate  to  civil  demands,  and  his  preference 
for  a  sort  of  aristocratic  monarchy,  somewhat  representative, 
better  bodies  forth  the  mind  of  the  Angelic  Doctor. ^-^ 

Locke  (1690)  takes  the  theory  of  mixed  government  for 
granted.  He  writes:  'The  majority  having,  as  has  been  shown, 
upon  men's  first  uniting  into  society,  the  whole  power  of  the 
community  naturally  in  them,  may  employ  all  that  power  in 
making  laws  for  the  community  from  time  to  time,  and  exe- 
cuting those  laws  by  officers  of  their  own  appointing,  and  then 
the  form  of  government  is  a  perfect  democracy;  or  else  may 
put  the  power  of  making  laws  into  the  hands  of  a  few  select 
men,  and  their  heirs  or  successors,  and  then  it  is  an  oligarchy ; 
or  else  into  the  hands  of  one  man,  and  then  it  is  a  monarchy; 
if  to  him  and  his  heirs,  it  is  a  hereditary  monarchy;  if  to 
him  only  for  life,  but  upon  his  death  the  power  only  of  nomi- 
nating a  successor,  to  return  to  them,  an  elective  monarchy. 
And  so  accordingly  of  these  make  compounded  and  mixed 
forms  of  government,  as  they  think  good. "^2''  This  is  practi- 
cally an  epitome  of  the  Thomistic  doctrine  on  governments. 
By  Locke's  time,  the  theory  of  mixed  polity  was  sufficiently 
fixed  and  accepted;  so  that  he  was  free  to  go  beyond  it  and 
devise  further  means  of  ensuring  the  liberties  of  the  people 
and  the  life  of  justice.  He  introduces  the  idea  of  a  separation 
of  powers.^-^  But  even  here  he  is  anticipated  by  St.  Thomas, 
in  whose  mixed  form  of  government  the  position  of  the  politi- 
cal chief  seems  to  be  mostly  of  executive  character,  and  the 
ruling  or  law-making  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  subordinate 
body. 


526  Cf.  Janet,  op.  cit.,  t.  2,  p.  292. 

See  Bossuet,  Politique  tiree  de  V^criture  sainte,  1,  IV,  a.  1. 

527  Two  Treatises  of  Government,  II,  ch.  X,  sec.  132.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  he  does  not  use  "oligarchy"  in  the  Aristotelian-Thomistic 
sense. 

528  Idem,  II,  ch.  XII,  sec.  144. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  137 

It  is  to  Montesquieu,  whose  reputation  de  Haller  sourly  but 
significantly  declares  too  great,  that  the  credit  goes  for  the  tri- 
partite division  which  has  become  a  political  commonplace.  He 
changes  Locke's  enumeration  of  governmental  departments 
(legislative,  federative,  and  executive)  into  legislative,  execu- 
tive, and  judicial,^^^  thus  harking  back  to  iVristotle  and  Aqui- 
nas, who  are  quite  neglected  in  the  effulgence  of  his  fame.  In 
the  fourth  book  of  his  Politics,  chapter  XIV,  the  Stagirite  sets 
forth  the  division  of  every  republic  as  deliberative,  executive, 
and  judicial.  It  is  hard  to  see  much  improvement  on  this  pres- 
entation, and  hence  originality,  in  the  offering  which  Dunning 
honors  as  appearing  in,  political  philosophy,  for  the  first  time, 
from  the  pen  of  Montesquieu.  Aquinas  was  cognizant  of  the 
classification  some  centuries  before  the  Frenchman  conceived 
it,  and  set  himself  the  task  of  commenting  on  it.^-^^  As  to 
the  teaching  that  the  separate  powers  should  be  exercised  by 
different  organs,  Aquinas  had  gathered  this  also,  from  Aristotle, 
and  presented  it  to  the  Middle  Age.  The  doctrine  of  the  Phil- 
olospher  and  St.  Thomas  is  more  comprehensive  than  Montes- 
quieu's. They  give  us  four  alternatives  for  the  disposition  of 
the  deliberative  power:  (a)  to  all  the  people;  (b)  to  a  few  only; 
(c)  to  all  in  some  matters;  (d)  to  some  in  some  matters.  Mag- 
istrates are  seriously  considered,  as  to  their  number,  their  tenure 
of  office,  and  the  class  from  which  they  should  be  chosen.^^'^ 
They  divide  the  judicial  department  into  several  sections:  (a)  a 
court  of  judicial  scrutiny;  (b)  one  to  punish  public  malefac- 
tors; (c)  to  handle  civil  affairs;  (d)  to  consider  appeals  of 
private  citizens  from  the  fines  imposed  by  magistrates;  (e)  to 
settle  disputes  on  contracts;  (f)  to  judge  between  aliens;  (g)  to 
deal  with  the  different  kinds  of  murder  cases.*'^^^ 

It  looks  as  though  the  incomparable  English  system  to  which 


529  Sec.  145-146.   "There  is  another  power  in  every  commonwealth  

the  power  of  war  and  peace,  leagues  and  alliances,  and  all  the  trans- 
actions with  all  persons  and  communities  without  the  commonwealth, 
and  may  be  called  federative  if  any  one  pleases." 

530  Uesprit  des  lois,  Liv.  XI,  ch.  6. 

Cf.  Franck's  Reformateurs  et  PuMicistes  de  VEurope.  p.  280. 

531  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  12 :  "Determinat  de  quibusdam  partibus 
republicae,  scilicet  de  consiliativo  et  dominativo  et  judicativo." 

532  Politics,  IV,  15.    Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  13. 

533  Politics,  IV,  16.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  IV,  lec.  15. 


138     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Montesquieu  thrills,  and  which  he  traces  back  to  the  old  Ger- 
mans of  Tacitus,^^*  could  be  at  least  partly  accounted  for  by 
the  book  that  St.  Thomas  made  powerful  in  the  politics  of  the 
later  Middle  Age.  The  Angelic  Doctor  gave  Europe  a  theory 
of  State  which  appealed  to  the  liberty-loving  and  order-re- 
specting people  of  the  West.  England  found  that  it  agreed 
with  her  own  yearning  and  aspirations.  Langdon  had  begun 
the  work  of  reform,  which  Montesquieu  prefers  to  trace  so  much 
farther  back  to  the  shade  of  Teutonic  forests.  Aquinas  gave  the 
sanction  of  his  political  philosophy  to  a  wholesomely  popular 
concept  of  the  State.  And  so  the  enterprises  of  reconstruction 
went  on  consistently,  if  not  apace,  culminating  in  the  modern 
consitutions  to  which  we  refer  with  pride  as  evidence  of  the 
evolution  of  the  race. 


534  Op.  cit.,  XI,  6. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  139 


CHAPTER  VI 
PURPOSE  OF  THE  STATE 

St.  Thomas  teaches  that  the  common  aim  of  states  is  something 
more  than  mere  self-preservation.  It  would  have  to  be ;  else  self- 
preservation  could  never  be  assured.  He  finds  the  mission  of  the 
State  to  be  general  and  particular.  The  general  purpose  is  to 
supply  a  fuller  and  more  perfect  life  for  its  members ;  the  partic- 
ular may  be  considered  as  four-fold:  economic, ethical, social  and, 
in  a  sense,  ultramundane.  His  is  a  complete  program,  and  one 
towards  the  realization  of  which  the  best  democracy  of  today  is 
groping.  Other  plans  of  states  should  be  subordinated  to  these, 
which  are  essential. 

1. — Limitations  of  Civil  Scope:  First,  Individuality 

First,  let  us  consider  what  Aquinas  regards  as  the  limits  of 
civil  scope ;  then  we  can  more  correctly  appraise  his  doctrine  of 
civil  purpose.  Primarily,  he  refrains  from  committing  a  modern 
folly  of  making  the  State  more  real  than  those  who  compose  it. 
He  deaf'ens  himself  to  the  Platonic  siren-^ong  against  which 
Hegel's  ears  were  not  waxed.  A  conception  of  the  State  as  "the 
highest  evolution  of  the  Absolute,"  "the  realization  of  the  moral 
ideal,"  "the  concretization  of  the  divine  will,"  or  "the  substance 
of  individuals,"  would  not  be  acceptable  to  him.  He  guards 
against  the  fallacy  of  separatism.  For  him,  men  cannot  be 
parted  from  the  State ;  they  constitute  it.  The  State  may  not  be 
parted  from  them,  else  it  were  an  emptiness.  In  this,  as  ever, 
his  view  is  realistically  synthetic. He  does  not  sacrifice  society 
any  more  than  a  Schelling,  a  Saint-Simon,  or  a  Comte ;  neverthe- 
less, he  democratically  does  what  they  do  not — he  saves  the  indi- 
vidual.^^'^   Here  then  is  his  first  limitation  of  the  State:  it  must 


535  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14  et  15. 

536  Cnvi.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1.  Cf.  Fouillee,  La  science  sociale  contem- 
poraine,  pp.  23-24;  Schwalm.  Lemons  de  pTiilosopMe  sociale,  I,  p.  155. 


140     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

not  destroy  individuality.  It  must  not  usurp  the  souls  of  its 
subjects.^^  Man  is  man,  before  he  is  citizen;  and  the  State 
is  in  his  mind,  before  he  projects  it  into  the  external  world 
and  realizes  it  there.  Humanity  is  superior  to  the  civil  society 
it  creates.  There  is  much  of  man  which  has  not  gone  into  the 
State  at  all ;  and,  over  this,  the  State  has  no  direct  control. 

Individual  Rights 

The  Doctor's  first  limitation  of  civil  power  being  based  on  the 
principle  of  individuality,  his  second  is  inspired  by  the  indi- 
vidual's rights,  which  are  granted  by  the  natural  law,  and  accord- 
ing to  which  the  State  must  always  reckon.^^  With  regard  to 
them,  the  State  may  not  interfere,  as  we  have  already  noticed, 
save  to  define  and  defend.^  Any  measure  in  defiance  of  them  or 
detriment  to  them,  is  not  law  but  a  corruption  of  it.  We  have 
only  to  recall  the  Angelic  Doctor's  theory  of  law,  to  see  how 
firmly  he  attributes  human  rights  to  the  reality  of  rational  nature 
and  not  to  any  artificiality  of  civil  concession.^^^  We  find  him 
warding  off  aggression  from  those  precious  prerogatives  which 
enter  so  largely  into  the  constitution  of  a  democracy,  particularly 
liberty  of  conscience  and  liberty  of  education. 

As  regards  the  former,  he  holds  that  anyone  outside  the  fold 
is  not  to  be  forced  into  it.  Free-will  is  to  be  respected.  Faith, 
he  maintains,  involves  freedom.^*^  However,  by  this  he  does  not 
mean  that  deliberate  opposition  to  religious  truth,  blasphemies, 
seductions,  and  frank  affront,  should  not  be  repulsed.  It  may  be 
that  he  was  impressed  with  the  ethical  significance  of  liberty  of 
conscience,  more  than  with  its  political  bearing.  Cajetan  com- 
ments on  Aquinas'  view,  in  effect,  that,  if  it  is  an  evil  for 


537  Cf.  Laveleye,  Le  Gouvernement  dans  la  Democratie,  I,  p.  109. 

o38Keesen,  La  mission  de  Vetat  d'aiwes  la  doctrine  et  la  methode  de 
saint  Thomas  d'Aqtiin,  p.  17.    Crahay,  op.  cit.,  p.  138. 

oZ^Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCV,  a.  2.  Cf.  Leo  XIII's  Encyc,  De 
condit.  opif.:  "est  autem  ad  praesidium  juris  naturalis  instituta  oivitas 
non  ad  interitum." 

"40  Cf.  Leo  XIII's  Encyc,  De  praecipuis  civium  christianorum  officiis. 

541  Summa  Theol.  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  8.  Cf.  Deploige,  La  question  juive, 
p.  9. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  141 


a  Christian  to  live  as  a  pagan,  it  is  a  greater  wrong  for  a  con- 
verted pagan  to  don  in  private  v^hat  he  has  doffed  in  public.  But 
the  principle  of  freedom  is  there,  for  all  that ;  and,  for  politics, 
this  is  the  pearl  of  great  price. 

The  Angelic  Doctor  further  limits,  or  rather  defines,  freedom 
of  conscience  by  assuming  a  different  attitude  toward  those  who 
have  freely  accepted  but  then  rejected  the  Faith.  For  here  a 
solemn  pledge  is  broken  and  truth  is  outraged.  They  may  be 
compelled  to  keep  their  Christian  oath.^^  It  is  to  be  noticed 
that  St.  Thomas  speaks  explicitly  only  against  heretics,  or  those 
who,  with  their  message,  rend  the  peace  of  the  State,  which,  as 
we  shall  presently  see,  he  considers  primary.  As  for  those  who 
think  for  themselves^"*^  and  whose  thought  has  a  portion  of  truth 
in  it  or  at  least  is  not  fatal  to  the  interests  of  the  Christian  State, 
he  is  quite  tolerant.^** 

He  believes  it  is  at  least  as  grave  a  matter  to  cornipt  the  Faith, 
which  is  the  life  of  souls,  as  to  falsify  money,  w^hich  procures  the 
needs  of  bodies.  And  that  exceptional  monarch  of  his  own  day, 
Saint  Louis,  had  ordained  punishments  for  malefactors  of  the 
latter  type.  The  spiritual  life  of  men  is  nobler  than  the  corporal. 
Yet,  if  we  punish  with  death  those  who  slay  the  flesh,  who  should 
object  to  a  similar  fate  for  murderers  of  the  spirit  ?^'*^  Thomas 
further  offers  that,  even  though  unsuccessful  at  corrupting  others, 
heretics  may  be  capitally  punished  or  dispossessed,  for  their 
blasphemy  and  false  faith ;  since  their  example  has  had  a  dele- 
terious effect  on  the  community. 

All  this  doctrine  is,  of  course,  chargeable  to  the  medieval  view- 
point, which  the  modern  thinker  finds  hard  to  comprehend  and 
excuse,  and  still  harder  to  reconcile  with  the  idea  of  democracy. 
It  is  only  when  we  project  our  thoughts  into  the  mind,  heart, 
and  environment  of  the  thirteenth  century,  that  whatever  virtue 


542  Siimma  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  8;  et  idem,  ad  3. 

543  He  teaches  further  that,  when  a  person  is  capable  of  thinking  for 
himself,  he  may  choose  for  himself;  that,  at  miost,  persuasion  should  be 
used  on  him,  and  never  force;  and  that,  even  in  the  face  of  parental 
opposition,  he  may  do  what  he  considers  right  and  just.  Stimma  Theol., 
2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  12.  .  . 

oii  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  9. 
545  IV  Lib.  Sent.,  dist.  XIII,  qu.  II.  a.  3. 


142     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

this  particular  and  peculiar  teaching  possesses  can  appear  to  us. 
Then  the  Church  and  the  State  were  united  as  never  before  nor 
since ;  and  a  revolt  against  religion  practically  amounted  to  trea- 
son and  presaged  bloody  warfare.  The  Albigensian  heresy  was 
filling  France  with  woe  in  the  Doctor's  own  day.  The  dove  of 
peace  was  wounded  and  bespattered.  And  the  infamous  sect, 
called  the  Brothers  and  Sisters  of  the  Free  Spirit,  which  repells 
us  as  the  serpent  of  the  century,  was  grievously  offending  the 
public  with  unclean  excesses.  The  Waldenses  and  the  Cathari 
continued  and  increased  the  confusion.  Aquinas  could  not  but 
see  that  the  all-important  political  principle  of  the  common  good 
was  far  from  being  enhanced  by  this  pandemonium  and  that  the 
sponsors  of  these  heresies  were  more  carnal  than  spiritual,  and 
more  erratic  than  sincere — or,  if  not  so,  at  least  blind  beyond 
belief  to  the  logic  of  their  own  premises.  With  the  exception  of 
the  Waldensian  doctrine,  each  of  them  afforded  an  invitation 
and  foundation  to  turpitude. 

In  St.  Thomas'  attitude,  aside  from  his  zeal  for  truth  and 
the  God  of  it,  we  can  see  two  democratic  facts.  First,  his  cham- 
pionship of  the  spiritual  rights  of  individuals.  No  more  may  a 
man  be  robbed  of  his  religion  than  of  his  life.  Burglars  and 
murderers  whose  outrages  are  material,  are  admittedly  outlaws ; 
much  more,  the  assaulters  of  souls.  Aquinas  stands  against  the 
principle  of  would-be  dissenters  seizing  hold  of  the  ignorance  of 
the  medieval  masses,  and  administering  their  doctrinal  poisons. 
He  is  no  opponent  of  intellect,  as  his  thoroughly  reasoned  tomes 
testify.^"^^  He  w^ould  have  the  people  able  to  argTie  for  the  Faith 
within  them.^^^  But  he  does  not  consider  it  just  that  any  and 
every  one  who,  like  Peter  Waldo,  may  have  been  stirred  to  sud- 
den religious  fervor  by  the  death  of  a  friend,  or  who  may  have 


54GBlakey  writes:  "It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  scholastic 
writers  greatly  aided  the  cause  of  religious  and  civil  liberty  and  en- 
lightenment by  their  claiming  unreserved  intellectual  discussion." — The 
History  of  Political  Literature,  Vol.  I,  p.  219. 

547  St.  Thomas  does  not  consider  the  authority  of  any  Father,  whose 
doctrine  may  be  contradicted,  as  superior  and  final;  but  the  authority 
of  the  Church.    Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae.  qu.  X,  a.  12. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  143 

conceived  a  brainless  passion  for  ripping  the  moral,  political, 
and  social  fabric,  should  be  given  a  free  field  to  contradict  author- 
ities gTeater  than  himself  and  accomplish  chaos.  The  masses 
of  the  Middle  Age  had  to  be  safe-guarded  all  the  more  carefully, 
for  the  fact  that  they  could  not  discern  the  true  from  the  false. 
Education  was  general  then,  as  now,  but  very  weak  with  youth. 
To  Aquinas,  it  was  a  most  serious  matter  to  attack  a  mind  incap- 
able of  defending  itself ;  just  as  violence  committed  on  the  body 
of  a  child  would  be  much  more  criminal  than  in  the  case  of  an 
adult.  He  does  not  aim  at  the  limitation  of  anybody's  right  to 
think  freely,  but  rather  at  the  protection  of  everybody's  right  to 
the  truth. 

And  so,  secondly,  he  seeks  the  good  of  the  many.  The  right 
of  the  people  to  the  truth  and  to  be  protected  in  its  possession,  is 
superior  to  that  of  any  individual  to  free  speech.  The  question 
is :  where  and  what  is  truth  ?  The  Angelic  Doctor  pointed  to  an 
authoritative,  divinely  instituted  Church.  And  for  him  the 
keenest  and  surest  intellect  could  not  soar  beyond  the  principles 
which  Christ,  through  the  living  voice  of  His  Spouse,  enunciated. 

Aquinas  repeats  Augustine,  that  the  extreme  punishment  of 
heretics  is  undesirable.  But  as  in  the  house  of  David  there  could 
be  no  peace  until  impious  Absolom,  warring  against  his  own 
father,  was  removed  by  fate:  so  in  Christendom  calm  can  be 
secured  only  by  the  ejection  of  the  disturber.  Many  may  be 
free,  when  one  is  bound.^^^  Each  individual  has  his  rights ;  but 
these  do  not  exceed  the  cumulative  rights  of  the  multitude  and 
must  not  be  sought  at  the  expense  of  the  whole  people.  True 
democracy  does  not  teach  that  everyone  should  be  allowed  to  do 
everything,  but  that  verity  and  equity  should  have  free  access 
to  all.  Thomas  takes  no  liberty  from  the  people  in  g-uarding 
them  against  the  enemies  of  the  truth  which  makes  all  men  free. 

However,  we  must  never  forget  that  he  was  writing  on  this 
point  for  a  world  which  was  substantially  a  politico-religious 
unit ;  and,  with  this  unique  state  of  affairs  vanished,  his  doctrine 
would  not  please  modern  mentality  and  sentiment.  But  the 
Church  of  St.  Thomas  realizes  as  well  as  her  most  intelligent 


548  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  8,  ad.  4. 


144     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

enemies  could  inforin  her,  that  the  twentieth  century  is  not  the 
thirteenth;  that  the  principles  of  the  Angelic  Doctor  are  more 
valuable  than  his  applications  of  them ;  and  that,  while  his  serv- 
ice to  truth  is  great,  his  is  not  necessarily  the  last  word  on  a  sub- 
ject. Aquinas  himself  believed  that  law  should  relax  or  con- 
tract, to  further  enlightenment  and  to  new  necessities;  all  the 
more  would  he  admit  advancement  and  development  in  doctrine. 
It  is  sufficient  that  he  advocates  spiritual  freedom  and  even 
strenuous  means  of  attaining  and  maintaining  it,  to  evince  the 
democratic  essence  of  his  thought. 

Toleration 

The  State  is  limited,  too,  by  the  demands  of  tolerance. 
Human  government  is  derived  from  the  divine,  and  should 
imitate  it.  Now  God,  omnipotent  and  good  as  He  is,  permits 
much  in  the  world  which,  of  course,  could  be  prevented ;  lest  in 
the  prevention,  gTeater  good  should  be  sacrificed  or  worse  evil 
folloAv.^^  The  State  must  not  attempt  to  do  everything.  In 
many  things,  its  action  should  be  the  last  resource,  rather  than 
the  first.  But  St.  Thomas,  apparently,  intends  this  prin- 
ciple to  apply  to  a  civil  society  in  which  the  cultural  and  spir- 
itual influences  of  the  domestic  and  ecclesiastical  institutions 
are  fully  operative.  It  seems  certain  that  he  would  concede  a 
wider  state  action  today,  when  religion  has  broken  down  so  pite- 
ously  in  men's  lives,  and  industrialism  has  so  grievously  damaged 
domesticity. 

The  Sanctity  of  the  Home 

Aquinas  also  closes  the  door  of  the  home  against  the  State, 
with  his  insistent  teaching  that  the  child  belongs  to  its  parents, 
and  that  to  stand  between  them  and  it,  is  to  violate  natural 
justice.^  Until  the  babe  grows  to  the  estate  of  reason,  he  is 
under  parental  care  as  in  a  certain  spiritual  womb.    They  who 


Summa  TheoL.  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  11. 
ooO  Siiwma  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  12. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  145 

brought  him  into  the  world  have  a  right  to  think  and  do  for  him 
until  he  is  able  to  think  and  do  for  himself.  The  hand  of  the 
State  may  not  rob  the  cradle,  as  in  the  Platonic  Republic  and  a 
Socialist's  dream,  to  mould  future  citizens  to  its  purposes.  Still, 
the  Thomistic  principle  does  not  mean  that  parents  may  not 
partially  surrender  to  the  State  their  privilege  and  permit  their 
children  to  be  educated  at  piiblic  expense,  nor  that  the  State 
may  not  step  in  when  parental  duty  is  not  and  cannot  be  ful- 
filled. It  merely  announces  a  great  human  right.  It  recognizes 
that  individual  claims  may  exceed  a  demand  of  State,  and  that 
the  true  individual  good  is  not  to  be  sacrificed  to  a  too  idealistic 
scheme  of  the  common  good. 

Finally,  the  State  must  not  force  the  minds  of  its  subjects. 
Initiative  is  not  to  be  crushed.^^-'^  The  individual  spirit  is  not 
to  be  broken  nor  is  the  body  ordinarily  to  be  bound.^^  In 
other  words,  the  State  must  respect  all  the  sacred  rights  of  man's 
nature  and  limit  itself  exactly  to  the  sum  and  scope  of  authority 
which  the  people  have  given  to  it. 

We  can  see,  then,  that  St.  Thomas  did  not  over-estimate  the 
mission  of  the  State  as  universal.^  He  introduces  enough  cir- 
cumscription to  rescue  individuality  and  domesticity.  Heart 
and  hearth  hold  the  hope  of  progress  in  a  state.  ' 'Reason  and 
Ignorance,"  writes  Thomas  Paine,  "the  opposites  of  each  other, 
influence  the  great  bulk  of  mankind.  If  either  of  these  can  be 
rendered  sufiiciently  extensive  in  a  country,  the  machinery  of 
Government  goes  easily  on.  Reason  obeys  itself ;  and  Ignorance 
submits  to  whatever  is  dictated  to  it."^^  But  Thomas  Aquinas 
stands  first,  last,  and  always  for  reason.  He  makes  the  indi- 
vidual vivid  and  electric ;  a  real  force  in  civic  development  and 


ooi  Summa  TJieol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5:    Here  Seneca  is  quoted  with 
approval:  "mens  quidem  est  sui  juris." 
552  Ibidem. 
Ibidem. 

554  In  accordance  with  the  principle  "Omnis  ratio  operationis  variatur 
secundum  diversitatem  finis"  (Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill),  Aquinas  must 
have  believed  that  the  duty  of  the  State  essentially  lay  in  accomplish- 
ing that  of  which  groups,  families,  and  individuals  are  incapable.  As 
Crahay  observes  (op.  cit.,  p.  147) :  "une  force  superieure  ne  doit  jamais 
etre  employee  la  ou  une  energie  moindre  suffit." 

555  Rights  of  Man,  p.  161. 


146     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


political  evohition.^^  Evidently  the  State  must  help  the  indi- 
vidual to  help  himself. 

2. — The  General  Mission  of  the  State 

And  thus  we  again  face  Aquinas'  theory  of  civil  mission.  Let 
us  first  consider  the  general  purpose  of  the  State  according  to 
him.  His  doctrine  amounts  to  this :  that  the  State  is  an  organ- 
ized effort  for  the  hest  interests  of  men.^^"  Happiness  is  the 
magnet  of  hearts.  Unalloyed,  it  cannot  be  attained  here  below 
first,  because  it  involves  the  complete  satisfaction  of  intellect 
and  will ;  secondly,  since  such  satisfaction  implies  the  universal 
truth,  as  the  object  of  the  intellect,  and  the  universal  good,  as 
the  aim  of  the  will ;  but,  thirdly,  the  universal  truth  and  good 
do  not  exist  in  any  created  thing,  for  every  creature  has  some 
limitation.  They  are  found  only  in  God  to  Whom  whatever 
reality  they  possess  is  due  and  to  Whom  they  should  lead.^^ 
Man  is  capable  of  an  imperfect  happiness  on  earth,  however ; 
and  the  duty  of  the  State  is  to  help  secure  it  in  as  large  a  meas- 
ure as  possible.  Explanation  must  be  made  as  to  what  Aquinas 
signified  by  the  happiness  at  which  the  State  should  aim.^^  He 

556  Such  sentences  as  the  follo^^ing  reveal  the  Saint's  faith  in  the 
individual  and  the  human  nature  which  he  represents:  "bonum  politi- 
cae  virtutis  commensuratum  est  naturae  humanae;  et  ideo  absque 
auxilio  gratiae  gratum  facientis  potest  voluntas  humana  in  illud  ten- 
dere,  licet  non  absque  auxilio  gratiae  Deo." — S.  T.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXXXVI, 
a.  3,  ad.  2.  But  he  warns:  "sed  in  natura  corrupta  praevalet  incli- 
natio  concupiscentiae,  quae  in  homine  dominatur;  et  ideo  pronior  est 
homo  ad  sustinendum  malum  propter  bona,  in  quibus  concupiscentia 
delectatur  praesentialiter,  quam  tolerare  mala  propter  bona  fu- 
tura. ..." 

557  Cf.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  ch.  1:  "Finis  autem  optimae  reipublicae 
est  optimus  finis  hominis,  quia  respublicae  non  est  aliud  quam  ordo 
civitatis. ..." 

558  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  II,  a.  1-8. 

559  Idem,  a.  8. 

560  By  happiness  St.  Thomas  naturally  did  not  mean  pleasure.  He 
was  no  utilitarian,  and  would  have  been  duly  shocked  by  Bentham's 
belief  that  "pushpin  is  as  good  as  poetry,  provided  the  pleasure  be  as 
great."  Cf.  William  McDougall's  Social  Psychology,  p.  161.  St.  Thomas 
does  not  confine  himself  to  the  psychological,  like  McDougall,  in  his 
conception  of  happiness.  With  Aristotle,  he  considers  the  psychological 
phase  of  happiness  contingent  on  the  ethical,  and  enhanced  by  the 
material. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  147 


means  as  much  as  Aristotle  and  more.  The  Philosopher  sees 
happiness  in  a  possession  of  spiritual,  bodily,  and  external 
good.^^  By  spiritual  good,  he  signifies  the  moral  virtues.  A 
man  could  not  be  happy,  he  teaches,  who  had  no  justice,  temper- 
ance, prudence,  or  fortitude,  but  would  be  afraid  of  the  flies  that 
whirred  about  him.  Happiness  is  far  from  the  wretch  who  is  a 
slave  to  himself,  or  who  Avould  crimson  his  hands  in  the  blood  of 
his  friend  for  a  farthing. Xo  more  than  an  infant  or  a 
maniac,  can  the  individual  scale  the  heights  of  temporal  bliss, 
who  deserves  to  be  classed  with  them.  Virtue  is  indis23ensable. 
They  delude  themselves  who  think  a  little  virtue  and  much 
external  property  are  the  correct  recipe  for  equanimity.  Virtue 
can  be  provided  to  be  more  essential  than  external  goods,  both 
practically  and  thoretically.  Practically,  because  men  originally 
do  not  acquire  it  through  external  goods,  but  rather  external 
goods  through  it.  Theoretically,  because  external  goods  have  a 
limit,  which  virtue  lacks ;  secondly,  because  the  soul  is  superior 
to  the  body,  and  qualities  differ  in  importance  according  to  the 
subjects  in  which  they  reside;  and,  thirdly,  external  goods  exist 
for  the  sake  of  the  soul,  but  the  soul  does  not  exist  for  the  sake  of 
them.^^  He  is  happiest  whose  morals  are  the  most  pure,  whose 
mind  is  the  best  cultivated  and  whose  material  effects  are  in 
decent  moderation.  External  goods  are  useful ;  but,  in  excess, 
they  are  largely  inutile,  and  may  be  harmful.  True  happiness 
is  proportionate  to  one's  possession  of  mentality  and  morality 
and  to  the  obedience  with  which  their  dictates  are  met.  For 
the  truth  of  this,  we  have  the  evidence  of  God  Himself,  who  in 
Himself  alone  is  perfectly  happy.^^^  The  state  which  is  and 
acts  best,  is  the  happiest.^ 

St.  Thomas  not  only  subscribes  to  Aristotle's  three-fold  divis- 
ion of  natural  desires,  but  unfolds  the  content  of  it.  The  fol- 
lowing tabulation  reveals  the  range  of  his  thought  and  his  human 
interests : 


561  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  1. 

562  Cf.  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  1. 

563  Ibidem.  Cf.  Aristotle's  Politics,  Walford,  p.  232,  n.  2. 
oU  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  1. 

565  Ibidem. 


148     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


Classes  of  Goods  Objects 

Food  Pleasure  (Con.  Gen.  3,  c.  27) 
Sex  Pleasure  (ibid.) 
Health  (Con.  Gen.  3,  c.  32) 

Goods  of  the  Body  !   Beauty  (ibid.) 

Strength  (ibid.) 
Activity  (2— 2ae,  Q.  65,  a.  3) 
Integrity  (ibid.) 


Goods  of  the  Mind 


External 
Goods  ^ 


Body . . 


f  Things 


.  Persons 


Things 


Knowledge  (1— 2ae,  Q.  3,  a.  7;  ibid.  Q. 
32,  a.  8) 

Virtue  (1— 2ae,  QQ.  58-67;  2— 2ae,  QQ. 
23-171) 

Meat  (la,  Q.  78,  a.  2,  ad.  4;  Q.  97,  a.  3, 

a.  4) 
Drink  (ibid.) 

Clothing  (2— 2ae,  Q.  169,  a.  1) 
Money  (1— 2ae,  Q.  2,  a.  1;  2— 2ae,  Q. 
118) 

Houses  (Joan  1  c.  4,  lec.  1) 
I  Friends  (2— 2ae;  QQ.  23-46;  1— 2ae,  Q. 


4,  a.  8) 


Mind . . . 


{Honor  (1— 2ae,  Q.  2,  a.  2) 
Fame  (1— 2ae,  Q.  2,  a.  2) 
Glory  (Con.  Gen.  3,  c.  29) 
Power  (Con.  Gen.  3,  c.  31) 


Persons    5  Friends  (2— 2ae.  QQ.  23-46) 

l(5od  (ibid.;  De  Dilection€)566 


Such  of  these  cravings,  as  can,  should  be  kept  in  ken  by  the 
State.  They  are  ingredients  of  the  happiness  which  civil  society 
should  seek  to  secure  and  assure.  They  are  to  be  inspected, 
when  the  question  of  natural  rights  and  the  definition  of  them 
arise.  In  their  entirety  they  constitute  the  larger  life  for 
which  St.  Thomas  teaches,  the  State  was  conceived.  A  glance 
through  the  list  will  show  that  nature  and  the  individual  him- 
self have  much  to  do  with  the  presence  of  many  of  these  goods. 
But  it  is  clear  that  the  State  can  serve  materially  in  the  attain- 
ment for  the  people  of  as  many  more.  And  its  general  pui^pose 
is  to  offer  such  service  without  stint,  consistently  with  the  indi- 
vidual's effort  and  ability.^ 


566  Henry  Ignatius  Smith,  0.  P.,  Cldssification  of  Desires  in  St. 
Thomas  and  in  Modern  Sociology,  p.  31. 

567  Cf.  Aristotle,  Politics.  VII,  13. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  149 


On  the  basis  of  this  classification,  the  Doctor's  positive  theory 
of  civil  purpose  should  be  considered.  The  endeavor  of  the  State 
to  obtain  benefits  for  the  people  constitutes,  according  to  the 
nature  of  such  benefits,  a  social,  an  economic,  and  an  ethical  aim  ; 
then  again,  since  nothing  is  good  except  insofar  as  it  reflects  the 
goodness  of  God,  and  nothing  is  to  be  sought  save  inasmuch  as  it 
leads  to  Him,  the  State  should  possess  and  manifest  a  godly 
spirit  in  its  entire  enterprise. 

PkEKEQUISITE  TO  THE  SOCIAL  MiSSION 

Let  us  proceed  to  investigate,  first,  the  social  mission.  It  can 
never  be  achieved  apart  from  the  attainment  of  two  conditions : 
peace  and  unity.  Aquinas  carefully  expresses  what  he  would 
recognize  as  peace.  It  is  a  more  comprehensive  condition  than 
mere  concord,  which  it  includes  and  complements.  Concord  is 
among  men ;  peace  is  a  quality  within  men  themselves.  There 
may  be  concord  where  there  is  no  peace ;  though,  where  there  is 
peace,  there  is  always  concord.^  The  latter  is  superficial  and 
may  be  false.  Agreement  can  be  forced,  as  when  a  tyrant  super- 
imposes his  will  on  the  people  and  they,  through  no  option, 
acquiesce.^^  This  certainly  is  not  peace,  which  requires  free 
and  tranquil  compliance.  When  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  the 
State  must  secure  peace,  he  means  that  it  must  do  so  on  the 
terms  of  the  people;  else,  clearly  from  his  conception,  there 
could  be  no  peace.  Mere  concord  in  civil  society  does  not  suf- 
fice ;  it  may  mask  a  state  of  smoldering  hate  on  the  part  of  the 
populace  and  be  a  mere  prelude  to  internecine  terrors :  a  point 
which  our  reconstruction  program  today  cannot  afford  to  ignore. 

From  his  further  development  of  the  idea  of  peace,  one  can 
see  how  truly  Aquinas  defers  to  the  psychology  of  the  indi- 
vidual. He  holds  that  peace  entails  not  only  assent  but  also 
consent ;  not  only  conviction  but  also  persuasion ;  not  only  mind 
and  will,  but  also  feeling. Evidently  the  State  must  present 
a  reasonable  attraction  to  the  individual,  with  all  that  this 

o6S  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIX,  a.  1. 

5G9  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIX,  a.  1,  ad  1. 

5lOSuvima  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIX,  a.  2,  ad  1. 


150     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


democratically  implies,  in  order  that  the  peace  of  St.  Thomas, 
which  is  unmistakably  that  of  democracy,  may  prevail. 

It  is  not  enough  for  peace  that  the  individual  be  satisfied  in 
himself.  He  must  be  content  with  his  neighbor,  and  his  neigh- 
bor with  him.  The  Gospel  lesson  breathes  fragrant  in  the  Saint's 
political  philosophy.  In  the  common  love  of  God,  all  should  be 
mindful  of  each  other.  Man  must  be  willing  to  fulfill  the  just 
will  of  his  neighbor,  as  well  as  his  own.^"-*^  Aquinas  quotes 
Cicero,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  the  property  of  friends  to  seek  and 
to  spurn  the  same  objects.  But  friendship,  he  echoes  from 
Aristotle,  does  not  mean  harmony  in  mere  opinions  so  much  as 
in  important  issues.  It  does  not  preclude  petty  disagreements ; 
for  these  indeed  may  but  lend  it  zest,  provided,  of  course,  that 
charity  is  not  lost  and  prudence  is  present.^^^ 

Briefly,  peace  is  the  proper  act  and  expression  of  charity.^^^ 
And  so  the  State,  to  promote  it,  must  first  subject  itself  to  the 
law  of  love.  Directly  an  achievement  of  charity,  peace  is  also, 
indirectly,  a  work  of  justice;  . for  justice  removes  the  obstacles 
which  makes  it  possible,  and  gives  every  man  his  due.^^*  It  is 
significant  that  Aquinas  makes  charity  the  essential  force  in 
internal  peace.  For  him,  the  State  is  not  an  impersonal 
machine,  set  up  to  grind  out  justice  inhumanly.  It  is  a  throb- 
bing thing  of  hearts — a  living  democratic  unit. 

Yet  in  Thomistic  doctrine,  the  purpose  of  peace  does  not 
exclude  the  necessity  of  w^ar.  Those  who  assume  arms  desire 
to  secure  the  peace  which  they  judge  themselves  to  lack.  With 
grievances  gnawing  at  the  souls  of  nations,  concord  there  may 
be,  but  peace  never.  In  the  throes  of  a  just  conflict,  true  peace 
may  be  born.  While  Aquinas  would  have  men  love  one  another, 
he  apparently  would  not  have  them  foster  injustice  by  too  meekly 
submitting  to  it.  Aquinas  no  more  sacrifices  justice  to  love  than 
love  to  justice ;  he  surrenders  ideals  to  practicality  no  more  than 
he  renounces  practicality  for  ideals.    He  teaches  that  the  State 


571  Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  128. 

572  8u7nma  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIX,  a.  3,  ad  2. 
57.3  Ibidem. 

574  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XXIX,  a.  3,  ad  3.  Cf .  Taparelli,  Naturel 
Droit,  p.  134. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  151 

should  guard  the  people  well  from  the  attacks  of  enemies.  He 
sees  little  astuteness  in  attaining  internal  prosperity,  and  neglect- 
ing external  menaces.  A  stream  of  invasion  could,  destroy  in  a 
twinkling  all  the  merits  of  a  state  which  was  strong  within  but 
weak  without.  St.  Thomas  is  an  apostle  of  preparedness.^^^  It 
would  seem,  how^ever,  that  he  is  speaking  in  this  regard,  espe- 
cially for  his  own  bellicose  times.  But  that  he  would  approve  of 
the  plan  of  universal  disarmament  today,  is  improbable ;  for,  if 
permitted  to  stand  among  us  in  the  twentieth  century  and  view 
the  international  situation,  he  would  adjudge  Faith  not  suf- 
ficiently fervent  to  assure  the  observation  of  treaties.  In  an 
age  when  economics  supersedes  religion,  expediency  is  the  guide 
of  human  action.  Pacts  shrivel  up  to  ''scraps  of  paper"  in  the 
heat  of  selfishness.  And  Aquinas  always  sanctioned  the  use  of 
prudence,  and  used  it  always  himself. 

Peace,  in  the  Doctor's  mind,  implies  unity,  just  as  unity  sug- 
gests peace.  He  identifies  them  when  he  writes  that  the  benefit 
and  even  the  salvation  of  civil  society,  demands  that  ''its  unity 
be  preserved,  which  is  called  peace."^^^  Without  unity,  civil 
purpose  is  impossible  of  attainment.  Advantage  fades  from 
social  life;  the  bond  of  love  becomes  a  chain  of  hate.^^^  The 
government  must  earnestly  strive  to  secure  this  blessing  of 
blessings,  this  unity  of  peace  (pads  unitatem)  ;  and  Aquinas 
tells  how  it  can  succeed.  That  polity  will  the  more  efficaciously 
provide  it,  which  is  the  most  beneficial  to  the  popular  interests ; 
i.  e.,  which  more  truly  guides  the  people  to  the  advantages  for 
the  attainment  of  which  the  State  exists.^'^^  His  belief  that  this 
unity  is  best  achieved  with  one  man  at  the  head,  need  not  arrest 
our  attention  here.  His  principle  is  what  counts.  It  is  of 
importance  to  note  that  Aquinas  does  not  advocate  unity  through 
violence;  for  such  a  course  would  defeat  its  own  purpose  and 
fail  by  far  to  evoke  the  interior  disposition  without  which  peace 
is  impracticable  and  unity  itself  a  sham.  He  is  not  for  a  drastic, 
but  for  a  prudent,  centralization  and  unification. 


575  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  15. 

576  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  2. 

577  Ibidem. 

578  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  15. 


152     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


The  Social  Purpose 

\\^ithin  these  great  purposes  of  unity  and  peace,  several  atten- 
dant ideals  must  be  sought.  Thomas  is  explicit  that  the  State 
should  improve  the  people  and  make  life  lighter  for  them,  imply- 
ing that  otherwise  its  existence  is  in  vain;  indeed,  worse  than 
in  vain — unjust;  for  it  takes  much  and  makes  meager  return. 
The  duty  of  government  is  three-fold  :  first,  to  see  that  the  people 
have  a  good  living;  secondly,  to  make  this  fact  permanent  as 
Avell  as  paramount,  and  not  permit  it  to  fluctuate  into  periods 
of  stress  and  want ;  thirdly,  to  be  unsatisfied  even  with  satisfac- 
tory civil  conditions,  and  ever  to  strive  to  better  them.^'^  These 
necessities  are  full  of  sugg-estion ;  and,  analyzed,  they  reveal  the 
Angelic  Doctor's  consideration  for  all  the  social,  economic,  and 
ethical  values  which  a  democracy  must  secure,  if  it  is  to  endure. 
But  it  should  be  emphasized  that  Aquinas  does  not  esteem  the 
goods  of  life  as  ends  in  themselves.  He  takes  pains  in  his 
Summa  and  Contra^  Gentiles  to  show  that  happiness  does  not 
really  consist  in  them  and  that  they  are  at  most  only  means  to  it. 
But  without  them,  the  "good  life"  which  the  State  is  to  assure, 
cannot  obtain.  And  certainly  Thomas  includes  them,  when  he 
speaks  of  the  civil  mission. 

Since  much  of  his  politics  appears  only  transiently,  it  is  neces- 
sary often  to  bring  the  scattered  parts  into  relation,  in  order  to 
discover  his  thought  on  a  given  political  subject.  The  bare  prin- 
ciples sometimes  appear  in  one  book,  while  in  another  the  con- 
tent, application,  tone,  and  color  of  them  are  to  be  found.  When 
Aquinas  writes  that  the  government  should  promote  the  general 
welfare,  we  must  infer  from  his  further  statements  what  and 
how  much  he  meant.  The  common  good  may  first  be  treated 
under  its  social  aspect.  ''It  was  not  till  Aristotle's  Politics  were 
rediscovered  in  the  thirteenth  century,"  Carlyle  declares,  ''that 
St.  Thomas  Aquinas  under  their  influence  recognized  that  the 
State  w^as  not  merely  an  institution  devised  to  correct  men's 
vices,  but  rather  the  necessary  form  of  a  real  and  full  human 
life."^^   However  uncertain  the  first  half  of  this  assertion  may 

579  Ibidem. 

580 Hi*.  Of  Med.  Polit.  Theory,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  153 


be,  the  second  is  firm.  The  Doctor  did  recognize  the  State  as 
the  means  to  a  fairer  and  finer  expression  of  individuality 
through  communality.  Civil  society  must  clear  the  way  and 
hold  up  the  standards  to  greater  progress.  And  its  interest 
must  not  rest  v^ith  the  mass,  but  seek  out  the  individual.  We 
find  in  the  De  Regimine  the  democratic  monition  that  every 
person  in  civil  society  is  to  be  assured  of  his  necessities  '^accord- 
ing to  his  condition  and  state"  (secundum  uniusquisque  consti- 
tutionem  et  statum).    Otherwise  the  State  cannot  last.^^-*- 

Aquinas  does  not  scorn,  but  rather  accentuates,  a  material 
element  in  the  purpose  of  civil  society .^^  The  State  is  to  be 
vitally  concerned  with  the  health,  labor,  and  enjoyments  of  the 
people;  not  entering  unduly  into  their  intimate  affairs,  how- 
ever, but  rather  affording  them  the  opportunity  and  stimulation 
to  express  the  best  that  is  in  them.  As  regards  health,  Thomas 
requires  that  the  State  have  care  for  creature-needs.  His  doc- 
trine here  deals  with  the  founding  of  cities  and  is  addressed  to 
a  king ;  but  he  expressly  intends  that  the  advice  should  hold  true 
in  the  subsequent  history  of  the  city  and  that  the  government 
should  see  that  it  does.^^^  When  he  speaks  of  the  suitable  site, 
elevated,  unclouded,  free  from  chills,  open  to  the  view  of  the 
heavens,  neither  hot  nor  cold,  afar  from  the  miasms  of  the  marsh, 
and  clean-swept  by  breezes,  we  immediately  realize  that  he  would 
be  dissatisfied  with  congested  conditions  of  our  large  cities.^^ 
Good  air  is  essential.^^  He  stresses  the  necessity  of  a  decent 
water-supply,  declaring  that  the  health  of  the  body  depends 
exceedingly  on  such  a  common  necessity,  l^ext  to  the  purity 
of  the  air,  nothing  is  more  necessary  to  the  health  of  a  city  than 
good  water.^^^  The  government  should  strive  to  provide  and 
protect  these  needs.  Aquinas  was  sufficiently  modern  to  sense 
a  certain  relation  between  laws  and  lungs.    One  cannot  but 

581  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  13:  "Demum  vero  providendum  est  ut  sin- 
gulis necessaria  suppetant  secundum  uniusquisque  constitutionem  et 
statum:  aliter  enim  nequaquam  posset  regnum  vel  civitas  commanere." 

582  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

538  Idem,  Lib.  I,  cap.  13:    "Non  igitur  gubernationis  officium  plena 
cognosci  poterit.  si  institutionis  ratio  ignoretur." 
5.S4  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  2. 

585  Ibidem. 

586  Ibidem. 


154     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


moon  that,  if  the  modern  State  had  discerned  and  regarded  it  so 
well,  the  reign  of  the  white  plague  among  us  would  hardly  have 
reached  its  present  proportions. 

He  interestingly  observes  that  the  looks  of  the  people  are  the 
index  of  a  city ;  and  who  will  gainsay  that  his  method  of  gauge 
is  quite  as  effective,  more  graphic,  and  much  more  human  than 
statistics  ?  The  bright  complexion,  the  sinewy  arm,  the  well-knit 
frame,  tell  a  tale,  and  fairly  well  answer  whether  the  State  is  a 
success.  Children,  many  and  mirthful,  and  a  goodly  number  of 
old  people,  also  are  excellent  evidences.^^"  On  the  contrary,  the 
sunken  cheek,  the  stooped  back,  the  slender  limb,  silent  child- 
hood, and  scarce  old  age,  are  a  tragic  indictment. 

It  is  the  Thomistic  idea  that  the  government  should  use  its 
reason  and  imagination,  see  such  conditions  before  they  occur, 
and  stave  them  off.  If  despite  all  efforts,  or  because  of  no  efforts 
at  all,  the  people  find  themselves  in  misery,  Aquinas  would  have 
the  government  do  its  best  to  draw  them  out.  The  faces  of  the 
people  are  the  glory  or  the  shame  of  the  polity. 

Also  the  question  of  housing  the  people,  he  believes,  should 
engage  civil  concern.  A  decent  district  is  to  be  laid  out  for 
them.'^^^  The  food  problem  gives  him  pause.^^  He  mentions 
that  when  Xenocrates,  the  skilled  builder,  remarked  to  Alex- 
ander the  Great  that,  on  a  certain  mountain,  a  wondrous  city 
could  be  constructed,  the  incomparable  leader  inquired  whether 
there  were  near-by  fields  to  supply  the  proposed  city  with  food. 
Keceiving  nay  for  an  answer,  he  spurned  the  project.^^  Aquinas 
believes  that  food  is  a  foremost  civil  concern,  and  that  the  mind 
of  the  government  should  be  devoted  to  the  subject  of  its  supply. 
His  interest  reminds  one  of  that  of  Pope  Gregory  I,  who  is  said 
to  have  done  penance  by  keeping  to  his  room  for  three  days, 
because  a  person  had  died  of  hunger  in  Kome.  He  offers  two 
plans.  Let  the  State  be  interested  in  the  soil,  seeing  that  it  is 
cultivated  and  not  allowed  to  lie  fallow.    As  an  infant  is  de- 


587  Ibidem. 

oSSDe  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  13:  "Si  autem  institutioni  civitatis  opera 
detur,  providere  oportet  .  .  .  quis  locus  artificibus  singulis  depu- 
tandus." 

589  Idem,  Lib.  II,  cap.  3. 

590  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  155 


pendent  on  the  maternal  breast  for  its  nourishment  and  growth, 
so  is  the  city  bound  to  the  bosom  of  nature.^^^  The  people  are  in 
relation  to  the  food.  The  land  must  be  made  fertile  and  abun- 
dantly productive  of  the  necessities  of  life. 

Secondly,  the  State  should  encourage  commerce,  especially 
when  the  soil  fails.  But  here  Aquinas  takes  a  stand  for  the 
simple  life.  He  prefers  that  the  wants  of  the  peoj^le  be  of  such 
a  nature  that  they  can  be  satisfied  for  the  most  part  at  home; 
and  that  only  when  the  immediate  supply  is  insufficient,  should 
ships  set  sail.  A  state  ought  develop  its  own  potentialities  to 
the  fullest  and  rely  no  more  than  necessary  on  others.  It  can 
often  furnish  enough  enterprise  right  within  its  own  confines 
for  the  people ;  and  educated  in  time  of  peace  to  self-sufficiency, 
it  w^ill  be  triumphant  in  the  event  of  war.^^- 

His  arguments  against  commerce  are  unique.  The  first  of 
them  is  doubtless  inspired  to  a  degree  by  the  sombre  side  of  the 
Crusades  which  brought  back  oriental  vice  and  the  penalty  of  it 
a-plenty  into  Europe.  He  indicates  that,  opening  its  gateways 
to  the  world,  a  state  lets  into  its  life  a  power  of  adulteration. 
Men  of  different  laws  and  customs,  afar  from  home,  and  free 
from  restraint,  pour  in,  and,  attractive  by  novelty,  they  exercise 
a  sinister  influence  on  the  people.^^  One  cannot  but  be  impressed 
with  the  practical  truth  of  this  observation,  in  a  recollection  of 
our  own  American  fads  of  foreign  origin. 

Thomas  offers  as  a  second  argument  against  a  mercantile  state 
that  such  a  one  is  prone  to  luxury  and  vice.^^*  Gold  is  god. 
Faith  falls ;  fraud  rises ;  the  public  good  is  slain  by  selfishness ; 
virtue  yields  to  advantage. 

Thirdly,  the  people,  under  a  commercial  regime,  are  weak- 
ened spiritually  and  physically.^^  Delicacies  produce  delicacy ; 
the  firm  hand  and  the  strong  heart,  which  make  for  civil  success, 
are  among  the  missing. 

Finally,  cities  become  too  congested  and  new  evils  sprout.^^^ 

591  Ibidem. 
392  Ibidem. 
593  Ibidem. 
5W  Ibidem. 

595  Ibidem. 

596  Ibidem. 


156     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Souls  jostle  each  other,  as  well  as  bodies;  friction,  contention, 
and  sedition  dispel  the  peace  which  is  so  important  to  the  State, 
^s'o  more  than  the  thinking  modern,  can  Thomas  see  the  sense 
of  a  feverish  pursuit  of  temporalities,  wherein  the  winners  so 
often  lose  what  is  best  in  life  and  purchase  what  is  worst,  while 
the  losers  are  more  deplorably  circumstanced  than  before.  He 
would  have  the  State  try  to  direct  the  gregarious  instinct  of  the 
people,  so  far  as  possible,  and  inspire  a  love  for  the  land.  [N'ever- 
theless,  the  merits  of  moderate  commerce  and  industry  elicit  his 
praise,  and  he  considers  the  state  imperfect  which  does  not  admit 
them. 

Although  his  gaze  could  not  penetrate  the  intensive  era  of 
modern  industrialism,  at  any  rate  he  somewhat  saw  it  in  medie- 
val  miniature,  and  knew  whereof  he  spoke.  The  guilds  and  the 
commercial  activities  of  the  Italian  cities  foreshadowed  the 
present  day  and  furnished  him  much  material  for  observation. 
He  speaks  with  authority  in  his  critical  realization  that  a  state, 
in  which  commercialism  is  altogether  untrammelled  and  the 
political  organization  is  of  such  a  nature  that  no  civil  interfer- 
ence in  the  bustling  campaign  for  money  is  made,  does  not  fulfill 
its  mission  of  the  common  good.  He  does  not  abet  our  present 
system  of  unbridled  competition  which  creates  the  multi-million- 
aire and  the  pauper ;  but  his  remedy  is  not  rancor.  He  sees  that 
the  clash  of  classes  would  be  suicidal  to  the  interests  of  the  State. 
He  holds  that  in  the  clear  open-places,  under  the  innocent  skies  of 
heaven,  men  could  better  find  peace,  and  plenty,  and  God.  The 
gi'ind  of  industry  must  be ;  but  it  need  not  be  first.  The  State 
should  have  a  correct  sense  of  values  and  assist  the  masses  to  act 
according  to  it.  Farms  first,  factories  second,  and  sea-ports 
third,  would  seem  to  be  the  right  modern  expression  of  Thomistic 
advice,  and  of  the  order  which  the  interest  and  aid  of  the  State 
should  follow. 

Aquinas  teaches  that  the  State  ought  to  be  solicitous  that  the 
refining  effect  of  beauty  reach  the  people.^^^  He  would  have  the 
lives  of  the  multitude  not  only  wholesome  but  also  sweet.  He 


597  In  his  own  words,  "quoddam  bonum  et  diliglbile,"  "quoddam  sola- 
tium et  dulcedinem  naturalem."    Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  157 


hears  the  cry  of  the  soul  as  well  as  of  the  senses.  The  craving 
for  beauty  is  important,  just  as  the  demand  for  food,  and  must 
likewise  receive  the  attention  of  authority .^^^  The  Angelic 
Doctor  expects  the  government  to  see  that  boulevards  are  laid,^^ 
and  that  houses  are  built  a  decent  distance  apart,  so  that  refresh- 
ing bits  of  landscape  may  lie  between.  He  is  against  the  ruth- 
less utilitarianism  which  swings  an  axe  at  every  tree,  consider- 
ing it  only  so  much  wood  for  burning  or  building,  instead  of  so 
much  perfection  for  delighting.  The  State  should  attend  that 
there  are  many  of  these  leafy  avenues  of  cool  enjoyment  for  the 
people.®^^  The  natural  charms  of  a  city  are  to  be  enchanced 
and  not  concealed. 

St.  Thomas  takes  care  to  advise,  however,  that  love  of  nature 
and  the  satisfaction  of  it  be  duly  regulated.  It  may  lead  to 
defects.  It  is  plain  that  he  would  not  apotheosize  Athens,  who 
lived  for  beauty,  rather  than  for  virtue,  and  whose  architecture 
proved  purer  than  her  ethics.  He  describes  how  this  worship 
of  nature  may  subtly  soften  judgment  in  an  excess  of  heart,^-^ 
and  quotes  Aristotle  for  confirmation.  The  sentiments,  being 
blind,  are  to  be  led.  Delight  does  not  satisfy  the  appetite  so 
much  as  it  whets  it.  If  he  advocates  that  the  government  supply 
and  protect  public  beauty,  he  does  so  because  and  only  insofar 
as,  aesthetics  is  a  natural  right  and  necessity  of  the  people.  And 
having  in  mind  perhaps  the  extravagant  spectacles  with  which 
the  Roman  emperors  regaled  the  masses  and  cheaply  bought  their 
favor,  pleasing  their  eyes  but  poisoning  their  brains,  he  denounces 
civic  munificence  in  this  regard.  Men  should  be  guided  to  abstain 
from  superfluous  pleasures,  that  they  may  comply  with  reason 
the  better  and  enjoy  the  simpler  joys  the  more.^^  Quality  is 
the  criterion,  not  quantity. 

The  State  ought  endeaver  to  dispel  indigence  rather  than  to 
increase  wealth.  St.  Thomas  traces  the  degeneration  of  opulence, 
through  indolence  and  effeminacy,  to  poverty,  and  thence  to  the 

598  Be  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  4. 

590  There  is  a  chapter  in  the  unauthentic  part  of  the  De  Reg.  devoted 
to  the  subject  of  public  roads.    Lib.  II,  cap.  12. 

600  Be  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  4. 

601  Ibidem. 

602  Ibidem. 


158     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

frequent  exigence  of  crime.^^  He  views  concentration  of  wealth 
as  a  gi-eat  cause  of  poverty,  and  legacies  as  a  sometimes  curse. 
The  ideal  he  presents  the  State  is  much  like  that  which  was  a 
reality  in  Longfellow's  Acadia  'Vhere  the  richest  were  poor 
and  the  poorest  lived  in  abundance."^  The  law-abiding  indi- 
vidual has  a  right  not  only  to  a  decent  livelihood,  but  also  to  a 
certain  amount  of  recreation  and  enjoyment.  Pleasure  is  a 
condiment,  and,  used  as  such,  it  makes  life  more  palatable  and 
energy  more  apt.  The  people  have  a  better  claim  to  a  fit  and 
happy  existence  than  any  one  of  them  has  to  a  golden  life  of 
harmful  luxury,  to  which  indeed,  from  an  ethical  angle,  no  one 
has  a  right  at  all.  St.  Thomas  observes  how  inefficient  and  use- 
less to  the  purposes  of  the  State  are  the  idle  rich,^^  and  insin- 
uates how  pernicious.  Civil  society  is  perfect  in  ratio  to  its 
assurance  to  the  individual  of  the  requirements  of  a  good  liveli- 
hood.^^ Here  the  right  of  property  is  wholly  respected,  but  its 
abuse  in  excessive  amassment  of  wealth  receives  no  sanction. 
Aquinas  repeats  the  statement  of  Valerius  Maximus  anent  the 
old  Romans,  to  the  effect  that  they  i3referred  to  be  poor  in  a 
rich  state  than  rich  in  a  poor.^^ 


The  Economic  Purpose 


And  thus  we  are  led  to  the  economic  field  of  the  State.  One 
of  the  reasons  why  civil  society  arose  was  to  ease  the  struggle 
for  existence.  Work  is  the  law  of  men.  It  remains  for  the  State 
not  only  to  help  regulate  labor  but  also  to  see  that  it  may  be 
obtained ;  for,  without  it,  society  does  not  yield  a  sufficiency  of 
necessities  and  the  common  good  is  seriously  hurt.  St.  Thomas 
teaches  not  only  that  men  should  work,  but  proposes  that  each 
has  a  right  to  work.   He  offers  four  proofs : 


603  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  4. 

604  Ibidem. 

605  Ibidem. 

606  Be  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  1. 

607  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  X,  ad  2.  We  find  in  the  De 
Regimine,  Lib.  IV,  cap.  15,  a  helpful  distinction  between  voluntary 
poverty  and  necessary.  Here  the  suggestion  is  that  we  should  move 
away  from  poverty  as  a  condition  but  toward  it  as  an  ideal. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  159 


First,  and  principally,  mouths  must  be  fed.  The  voice  of 
Genesis  still  vibrates  through  human  destiny,  and  '^work''  is 
written  large  on  the  wall  of  Life.  Without  it,  man  cannot  comply 
with  the  law  of  self-preservation. 

Secondly,  idleness  is  as  much  the  source  of  evils  as  work  may 
be  the  means  of  blessings.   Virtue  is  in  close  relation  to  industry. 

Thirdly,  by  labor  the  call  of  the  flesh  is  weakened.  Con- 
cupiscence is  restrained,  and  the  spirit  purged. 

Fourthly,  men  must  have  work  and  wages,  in  order  to  fulfill 
the  Christian  law  of  charity.  In  this,  Aquinas  seems  to  recog- 
nize that  the  honest  hard-serving  person  is  entitled  not  only  to 
the  requisites  of  life  but  also  to  a  surplus.  Each  man  has  a  right 
to  the  thrill  of  helping  those  who  cannot  help  themselves.^  The 
possessors  of  wealth  are  the  stewards  of  it;  out  of  their  abun- 
dance, they  must  succor  the  less  fortunate,  l^o  greater  luxury 
can  be  purchased  with  riches  than  the  joy  of  charity. 

From  labor,  the  logical  transition  in  the  Thomistic  doctrine 
of  civic  purpose  is  to  the  subjects  of  money  and  taxation.  In 
the  De  Regimine,  two  sets  of  reasons  are  advanced  for  coinage. 
First,  the  image  of  the  sovereign  is  stamped  on  the  pieces  of 
gold  or  silver,  and  nothing  could  keep  the  memory  of  the  repre- 
sentative of  law  and  order  (and  incidentally  civil  ideals)  more 
green  than  this  frequent  passing  from  hand  to  hand  of  the 
inscribed  coin  of  the  realm. ^  Secondly,  money  is  a  conven- 
ience for  the  people,  and,  duly  accredited  by  the  stamp  of  the 
State,  it  saves  them  from  fraud.^-^^  Thus  in  the  time  of  Christ, 
when  Roman  ascendency  w^as  supreme,  there  was  only  one  kind 
of  coin  in  the  empire,  and  Caesar's  image  frowned  from  it,  for 
justice  as  well  as  domination. 

St.  Thomas'  views  on  money  should  be  of  interest  to  an  age 
of  finance  like  ours.  For  him,  specie  is  primarily  an  instru- 
ment of  exchange,^-^-  for  the  convenience  of  men  but  not  at  all 

608  Sumnm  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLXXXVII,  a.  3. 

609  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  13. 

610  Ibidem. 

611  Ibidem. 

612  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu,  LXXVIII,  a,  1.  Of.  Aristotle's  doctrine 
that  usury  is  money  born  of  money,  not  of  work,  and  that,  of  all  means 
of  money-making,  it  Is  the  most  contrary  to  nature. — Politics,  I,  10. 
Cf.  Albertus  Magnus'  Corri,  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  8. 


160     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

for  the  making  of  magnates.  He  does  not  regard  it  as  productive 
in  itself,  but  solely  as  a  symbol  of  production.  For  him  it  is 
criminal  that  anything  should  be  sold  fraudulently  for  more 
than  a  just  price.*^^^  Money  is  an  institution  of  the  State  for 
the  common  good  and  should  be  maintained  as  such.  Abuse  is 
not  to  be  tolerated.  Even  in  cases  where  cheating  does  not 
figure,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  buying  and  selling  are 
transactions  for  the  benefit  of  both  parties  concerned,  one  sup- 
plying what  the  other  lacks ;  and  the  equity  of  the  process  should 
be  perfect.  If  the  price  exceeds  the  value  of  the  object,  or  con- 
versely, justice  is  injured;  and,  therefore,  to  sell  too  dearly  or  to 
buy  too  cheaply  is  illicit.^-^*  But  Aquinas  introduces  also  the 
instance  in  which  a  man  suffers  a  loss  over  and  above  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  transferred  article,  in  supplying  the  purchaser,and 
declares  that  then  something  over  and  above  the  worth  may  be 
asked.  And  no  one  should  sell  what  is  not  absolutely  his  own.^^^ 
The  law  must  forbid  whatever  injures  the  social  life  of  men 
{quae  destmunt  hominum  convictum)  ;  but  he  realizes  that  its 
influence  is  limited  and  that,  if  civil  society  had  to  depend  on  it 
solely,  each  man  in  the  State  would  probably  need  to  be  per- 
sonally policed.  So  he  tells  the  profiteer  of  God's  vision  which 
pierces  every  injustice,  and  of  His  justice  which  exacts  the  last 
farthing.  To  be  sure  the  State  should  do  as  much  as  it  can  to 
secure  justice ;  but  the  final  issue  is  with  the  individual  himself, 
whom  Thomas  always  refuses  to  sacrifice,  and  in  whose  powers 
for  good  he  does  not  surrender  confidence.  Yet  this  does  not 
prevent  him  from  explaining  the  State's  duty  in  the  matter. 
Standardization  must  vary  in  different  places,  according  to  sup- 
ply and  demand ;  hence,  in  every  polity  the  government  should 
reflect  on  conditions  and  then  determine  the  standard  of  justice. 
The  rulings  of  just  authortiy  or  of  custom  in  this  regard  must 
not  be  transgressed.^^^ 

The  Doctor  mentions  varieties  of  fraud  in  business — (a) 


613  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXXVII,  a.  1. 

614  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  6.  et  Com.  Eth..  Lib.  V,  cap.  5,  et  Summa 
Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXXVII,  a.  1. 

615  Ibidem:  Suvima. 

616  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXXVII,  a.  II,  ad  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  161 

adulteration  of  goods;  (b)  false  measure;  (c)  misrepresenta- 
tion of  merchandise.^-^^  In  these  directions,  the  eye  of  the  State 
must  search  and  the  force  of  law  be  wielded.  Profit  should  be 
permitted  only  when  its  purpose  is  honest  and  necessary.  This 
condition  is  met  when  the  emolument  is  moderate,  applies  to  the 
support  of  the  home,  benefits  the  needy,  or  results  in  public  util- 
ity, so  that  those  things  which  are  necessary  to  the  life  of  the 
State  may  not  be  lacking.  Lucre  is  never  to  be  sought  as  the 
end  of  business  but  as  to  the  reward  of  honest  labor.^^^  As  for 
multi-millionaires,  St.  Thomas  would  approve  their  benefactions 
but  not  always  their  methods.  Their  remarkable  energy  and 
genius  might  have  been  better  devoted  to  the  welfare  of  their 
native  land  and  of  humanity  than  to  the  accumulation  of  colossal 
wealth  for  themselves.  He  believes  that  every  man  should  have 
opportunity  to  make  enough  money,  by  body  or  brain,  for  his 
own  needs  and  his  family's ;  but  this  is  as  far  as  he  would  have 
the  savor  of  self  to  travel ;  all  other  profit  should  be  inspired  by, 
and  devoted  to,  purposes  of  altruism.  He  judges  a  man  by 
what  he  is,  not  by  what  he  has ;  he  insinuates  that,  if  a  man  has 
more  than  he  should,  he  is  not  what  he  ought  to  be.  He 
does  not  decry  capitalists,  but  rather  greed,  fraudulency,  and 
inordinate  selfishness. Here  again  he  inculcates  the  Christian 
princij^le  and  spirit  of  the  stewardship  of  wealth.  In  the  ideal 
State,  strength  must  supplement  weakness ;  and  surplus  gain 
should  be  devoted,  not  through  civil  coercion,  indeed,  the  office 
of  which  is  limited  to  social  essentials,  but,  through  the  free  and 
noble  spirit  of  the  opulent  individual,  to  social  improvement. 

He  further  solves  the  problem  of  distribution  with  his  doc- 
trine that  money  should  not,  of  itself,  be  esteemed  fruitful.  For 
him,  interest  is  usury  and  frank  injustice,  because,  by  it,  ^'that 
is  sold  which  is  not."  Iso  one  should  be  required  to  pay  for  the 
use  of  a  thing  when  the  use  means  the  loss  of  it;  for  then  one 
would  be  paying  for  the  same  thing  twice.    This  is  the  case  with 

617  Ibidem. 

Qis  Sunima  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXXVII,  a.  4. 

619  Cf.  Aristotle's  teaching  that  courage  is  intended  to  inspire  forti- 
tude, not  to  earn  money;  that  the  end  of  the  soldier's  and  the  physi- 
cian's vocation  is  victory  and  health,  not  gain;  that  it  is  unjust  and 
unseemly  to  make  the  higher  motive  less  than  the  lower. — Politics,  I,  9. 


162     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


money.^  His  tenet  is  of  course  due  to  his  conception  of  money 
essentially  as  sterile  and  a  medium  of  exchange.  Whereas,  in 
modern  times,  it  has  become  a  thing-in-itself.  Its  purpose  is 
subordinate  to  its  possibilities.  A  symbol  that  can  be  handled 
and  hoarded,  it  invites  accumulation,  readily  loses  its  original 
innocence,  and  departs  on  a  career  of  social  crime. 

St.  Thomas  believes  that  lack  of  state-action  on  the  abuse 
of  money  is  excusable  only  on  the  gTound  that  human  laws,  as 
noticed,  are  limited  in  scope,  because  of  human  imperfection, 
and  that  much  bad  is  often  permitted  in  order  that  more  good 
may  not  be  impeded.  A  stricter  stand  for  justice  on  the  part  of 
the  State,  however,  would  require  drastic  measures.*-^ 

The  Angelic  Doctor  surely  would  champion  civil  intervention 
today,  when  the  individual  conscience  is  comparatively  dull  and 
justice  so  readily  accedes  to  Mammon. 

He  concedes  that  he  who  makes  a  loan  with  risk,  or  with  sacri- 
fice, may  exact  a  degree  of  interest.  But  his  teaching  is  for  free 
and  ready  lending,  with  humanity  and  benevolence  for  their 
own  reward.^--  He  would  have  social  reinforcement  possible  to 
every  worthy  individual.  He  has  confidence  in  every  individual 
who  has  not  forfeited  the  right  to  it,  and  even  then  the  spirit  of 
his  writings  evinces  that  he  has  hope ;  while  in  any  event,  his 
charity  is  certain. 

To  recapitulate  his  doctrine  of  the  duty  of  the  State  in  the 
economic  question  of  a  more  equitable  distribution  of  wealth : 

(1)  He  accentuates  man's  right  to  life,  and  the  means  of 
securing  sustenance  for  it,  as  well  as  the  protection  and  perfec- 
tion of  it :  work.  Which  necessitates  that  the  State  endeavor 
to  provide  opportunity  equally  for  all;  and  since  it  does  not 
defend  without  first  defining,  the  right  of  the  individual  to  a 


620  See  Von  Roey,  La  Mor.naie  d'apres  Saint  Thomas  d'Aquin,  Revue. 
Neo-Scholastique,  XII,  1905.  For  Thomistic  doctrine  on  money  beyond 
the  Summa,  III  Sent.,  dist.  XXXV] I,  qu.  I,  a.  6.  Quodmeta.  III.  a. 
XIX.  De  Malo,  qu.  XIII,  a.  4.  De  Emptione  et  Venditione  ad  tempus, 
In  duo  praecepta  caritatis  et  in  decern  Legis  praecepta  expositio  (c. 
XXIV),  et  in  psalmos  Davidis  expositio  (ps.  XIV)  (Von  Roey). 

fi2l  Summa  TheoL.  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXXVIII,  a.  1,  ad.  3. 

622  Idem,  ad.  4. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  163 

profitable  position  should  be  made  the  subject  of  legislation.^^ 
Such  is  the  legitimate  conclusion  from  the  Doctor's  principles 
of  the  common  weal,  the  protectorate  character  of  the  State,  the 
guarantee  of  law,  and  the  supremacy  of  right. 

(2)  The  State  must  not  assume  the  place  of  the  individual, 
but  enable  him,  insofar  as  it  is  fitting  and  necessary,  to  play  his 
own  part  and  play  it  well. 

(3)  Capitalism  should  be  repressed  to  the  proportions  of 
justice,  (a)  by  the  civil  action  of  fair  and  standard  prices  and 
(b)  by  a  prudent  limitation  of  interest. 

(4)  The  spirit  of  charity  and  fraternity  should  be  fostered 
and  spread. 

Under  the  economic  mission  of  the  State  is  to  be  considered 
also  the  question  of  taxation.  The  government  is  not  to  seek  its 
own  interest  or  glory,  but  the  people's.  The  fire  of  Ezechiel's 
diction  is  hurled  by  St.  Thomas  against  avaricious  polities  ^'like 
wolves  ravening  the  prey  to  shed  blood,  and  to  destroy  souls,  and 
to  run  after  gains  through  covetousness"  (Ezech.  XXII,  27). 
''Woe  to  the  shepherds  of  Israel,"  he  cries  with  the  Prophet, 
"that  fed  themselves :  should  not  the  flocks  be  fed  by  the  shep- 
herds ?  You  ate  the  milk,  and  you  clothed  yourselves  with,  wool, 
and  you  killed  that  which  was  fat:  but  my  flock  you  did  not 
feed"  (Ezech.  XXXIV,  2,  3).  Only  in  real  necessity,  such  as 
the  national  defense,  or  the  fitting  support  of  the  administrators 
of  the  government,  are  taxes  to  be  levied ;  and  then,  the  Doctor 
observes,  it  is  only  rational  that  the  people  render  that  with 
which  their  common  utility  is  procured.^""^  Aquinas  democrat- 
ically regards  taxes  from  the  view-point  of  those  on  whom  they 
are  laid,  rather  than  from  that  of  those  by  whom.  If  they  result 
in  ultimate  advantage  to  the  people,  they  are  just;^^^  if  not,  the 
State  has  stumbled  in  its  mission. 

Taxes  must  always  be  moderate.  And  if  a  ruler  greedily 
exacts  more  than  is  meet,  he  is  guilty  of  grave  wrong,  and  is 

623  Cf.  Karl  Mueller,  Die  Arbeit  (nach  den  moral-philosophlschen 
Grundsatyen  des  hi.  Thomas  von  Aquln),  p.  93.  Also,  S.  Thomae 
Contra  Retrahentes  Horn,  a  Relig.  Ingressu.  Cf.  Ratzinger,  Geschichte 
der  Kirchlichen  Armenpflege,  p.  541. 

624  De  Reg.  Judaeorum  ad  Ducissam  Brabantiae. 

625  Ibidem. 


164     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


bound  to  restitution. In  general  the  government  should  carry 
on  with  its  ordinary  and  established  revenues  and  trouble  the 
people  as  little  as  possible.^^^ 


Ethical  Purpose 

Throughout  the  social  and  economic  phases  of  the  State's 
mission,  a  trend  of  ethical  necessity  is  observable.  There  could 
be  neither  peace  nor  unity,  if  the  hearts  of  men  were  severed. 
There  could  be  no  lasting  civil  success,  if  selfishness  were  king. 
As  for  the  economic  storm,  it  could  never  be  stilled  save  by  the 
Christ-like  principles  of  charity  and  justice. 

Moral  itself,  the  State  must  strive  to  render  and  keep  the 
people  so.  The  happiness  which  civil  society  should  seek  for 
the  people,  as  we  have  already  seen,  is  dependent  on  the  things 
of  the  spirit.  Happiness,  Aquinas  asserts  in  his  Commentary 
on  Aristotle's  Ethics,  is  according  to  perfect  virtue  and  the  per- 
fect exercise  of  virtue.^^^  And  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Poli- 
tics, we  learn  that  felicity  is  more  apt  to  be  the  portion  of  those 
whose  morals  are  purest  and  whose  intellects  are  best  cultivated. 
External  goods  are  essential,  but  only  in  moderation.^^  Virtue 
is  the  child  not  solely  of  sentiment,  imitation,  or  custom.  It 
requires  a  rational  foundation.  Its  deep  and  consistent  presence 
requires  the  education  of  the  individual.  Aristotle  and  Aquinas 
agree  that  virtue  and  education  are  the  props  and  principles  of 
well-living.^  The  great  political  good  is  justice;  and  this  is 
the  good  of  all.^-'-  It  can  never  be  realized  and  the  State  cannot 
be  preserved,  unless  the  people  be  trained  particularly  in  a 
democracy.  And  so,  of  all  the  elements  of  State,  education  in 
the  laws  and  purposes  of  the  polity  is  chief.  The  psychological 
reason  which  Aquinas  would  offer  is  that  one  loves  only  what 
one  knows,  and  knows  to  be  fair.    The  more  one  knows,  the 

626  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVI,  a.  8,  ad  3. 

627  Regimine  Judaeorum. 

628  Lib.  I,  lec.  2. 

629  Lib.  VII,  lec.  1. 

630  Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  11. 

631  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  10. 

632  Idem,  Lib.  V,  lec.  7. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  165 


more  one  may  be  expected  to  love ;  and  the  more  one  loves,  the 
better  one  serves.^^  The  logical  reason  which  he  would  advance 
is  that  man  is  by  nature  intellectual  and  is  therefore  most  nat- 
ural, personal,  and  free,  when  he  acts  according  to  reason.  By 
reason,  a  citizen  can  see  the  reasonableness  of  the  State  and  of 
living  as  it  directs.  Therefore  by  education,  which  develops 
reason,  the  individual  and  the  State  are  at  once  preserved;^* 
for  the  educated  individual  must  confess  that  to  live  in  civil 
society  is  to  his  advantage  rather  than  not,  and  is  not  slavery, 
but  liberty. 

It  is  explicit  in  the  Commentary  on  the  Politics  that  education 
may  be  within  the  province  of  legislation  though  elsewhere, 
as  we  have  seen,  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  parental  and  other 
rights,  bearing  on  this  point  are  to  be  respected.  But  education 
is  so  important  that,  when  prior  institutions  are  unable  fully  to 
supply  it,  the  State  rightly  steps  in,  to  supplement  rather  than 
assume  or  supplant.  The  Thomistic  view  of  education  is  broad 
and  well-ordered.  With  Aristotle,  the  Doctor  sees  the  functions 
of  man  as  divided  into  two  parts,  the  rational  and  the  irrational, 
the  higher  and  the  lower.  The  rational,  or  higher,  is  sub- 
divided, as  to  object,  into  the  theoretical  and  the  practical,  of 
which  the  latter  is  inferior  to  the  former  and  hence  sub-serv- 
ient.^^  Man  ought  always  be  taught  to  seek  the  higher,  and  to 
accept  the  lower  only  as  a  means  thereunto;  e.  g.,  war  for  peace, 
or  the  useful  for  the  worthy.  Law  and  government  should  fol- 
low out  this  idea.  The  people  must  be  trained  to  work  for  their 
country  and  to  defend  it ;  not  for  labor  and  war  in  themselves, 
as  with  inhuman  Sparta,  but  for  rest  and  peace.  They  should 
be  instructed  in  what  is  necessary  and  useful,  but  only  for  the 
purpose  which  renders  it  noble.  The  militaristic  state  is  as  cen- 
surable as  the  hedonistic,  since  both  make  a  lower  end  their 

633  Ibidem.    Also  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  11. 

634  Ibidem. 

635  R,  L.  Poole,  Illustrations  of  the  History  of  Medieval  Thought,  p. 
246:  "Nor  oan  we  omit  to  note  the  emphasis  with  which  Thomas  main- 
tains that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  state  to  provide  for  the  education  of  all 
its  members  and  to  see  that  no  citizen  suffers  want." 

636  St.  Thomas  considers  speculative  knowledge  superior  to  practical, 
because  its  object  is  universal  and  immutable  truth,  and  it  soars  above 
turmoil  and  matter,  to  the  spiritual. — Com.  Polit..  Lib.  VII,  lec.  11. 


166     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


object.  The  ultimate  object  of  human  life,  declares  St.  Thomas, 
does  not  consist  principally  in  what  appertains  to  the  body,  for 
the  body  and  its  perfections  are  on  account  of  the  soul  {propter 
animam)  ;  but  in  what  belongs  to  the  soul,  which  is  the  more 
excellent  part  of  man.^*  It  is  as  important  that  the  State 
should  be  imbued  with  a  correct  sense  of  values  in  education 
as  that  it  should  be  interested  in  education  at  all:  Freedom  of 
thought,  as  we  have  elsewhere  observed,  does  not  mean  that 
known  error  should  be  allowed  free  circulation.  The  Angelic 
Doctor  would  not  have  the  State  rule  the  minds  of  the  people, 
any  more  than  he  would  have  it  trammel  their  bodies ;  but  he 
does  believe  that  befitting  direction  of  thought  is  no  more  servi- 
tude than  is  decent  protection  of  corporal  welfare  and  preven- 
tion of  crime,  and  that  society  owes  something  to  souls  as  well 
as  to  bodies.  It  is  wrong  for  government  to  encourage  systems 
of  education  in  which  what  Revelation  offers  and  mankind  has 
so  long  held  dear  is  sacrificed  to  a  pseudo-liberty,  and  in  which 
the  interests  of  the  people  are  truly  imperilled,  all  the  more  so 
because  they  temporarily  seem  to  be  improved.  Aquinas  was 
not  behind  Aristotle  in  the  conviction  that  government  should 
consider  the  best  for  its  present  and  future  citizens  (Pol.,  VII, 
14). 

He  traces  with  Aristotle  a  suitable  line  of  education,  in  which 
spiritual  and  temporal  significances  are  fitly  regarded.  In  the 
order  of  time,  the  body  demands  care  previously  to  the  soul.^ 
But  the  appetites  must  be  trained  for  the  sake  of  the  mind,  and 
the  body  for  the  sake  of  the  soul.  The  cradle  contains  the 
future.  Thomas  and  the  Stagirite  begin  there,  and  offer  their 
detailed  instructions  for  the  mental,  bodily,  home  and  civic 
training  of  future  citizens.^ 

^^"aturally  Aquinas  gives  morals  a  greater  role  in  training 


637  Ibidem. 

638  Politics,  VII,  15. 

639  Politics,  VII,  17;  VIII,  1-3;  Com.  Pol.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  12,  et  lib. 
VIII,  lec.  1.  Cf.  schema  of  education  repeated  by  Aegidius  Colonna, 
disciple  of  St.  Thomas.  Li  Livres  du  Gouvernement  des  Rois  (Xlllth 
Cen.  French  version— Molenaer) ,  Bk.  II,  part  II,  chs.  XV-XVIII.  Cf. 
W.  L.  Newman,  The  Politics  of  Aristotle,  1,  pp.  372-73. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  167 

than  does  Aristotle.^^  His  ideas  on  ethics,  thanks  to  Chris- 
tianity, are  much  fuller  and  more  definite  than  the  Philosopher's. 
His  thoughts  on  the  virtue  of  justice,  which  the  State  should 
exercise  and  uphold,  are  especially  useful  from  a  political  as 
well  as  an  educational  point  of  view.  The  people,  men,  women, 
and  children,  are  to  be  taught  the  significance  of  justice,  and  the 
government  itself  must  be  animated  with  the  same  realization. 
Without  justice,  unity  or  peace  can  hardly  obtain.^^  An  unjust 
regime  insults  the  rational  nature  of  man  and  arouses  the  pas- 
sions. The  State  is  to  be  swayed  with  the  will  to  ensure  the 
rights  of  all.^^  This  entails  an  active,  though  not  aggressive, 
interest  and  enthusiasm  for  the  ascendency  of  the  moral  virtues ; 
since  without  them,  civil  justice  were  impossible.^^  The  justice 
which  Aquinas  advocates  is  a  combination  of  prudence,  forti- 
tude, temperance,  love,  and  law.  The  government  is  not  to  be 
apart  from  the  people  and  impersonal.  It  is  to  be  a  living  expres- 
sion of  the  best  that  is  in  them ;  and  it  must  even  make  its  appeal 
to  the  best,  in  order  that  the  best  may  be  ever  further  expressed. 
It  reflects  back  what  it  receives.  Fed  by  justice,  it  lives  for  it 
and  advances  it.  Justice  must  be  in  the  people,  if  it  is  to  be  in 
the  democratic  State;  but  a  great  purpose  of  the  State  is  not 
only  to  exercise  it,  but  also,  insofar  as  possible,  to  inspire  it 
among  the  people.  St.  Thomas  teaches  that  the  whole  people, 
or  he  to  whose  guidance  they  have  committed  themselves,  must 
decide,  in  sincere  conformity  with  reason,  what  is  to  be  con- 
sidered just  in  set  cases. Rights  must  be  carefully  defined ; 
not  only  the  general  ones,  but  those  of  particular  classes  of  the 
people,  such  as  the  military,  the  magisterial,  etc.   Each  man  is 


040  In  the  work  De  Eruditione  Principum  are  miany  excellent  chap- 
ters, as  replete  with  Christian  spirit  as  advice,  on  parental  solicitude 
for  the  education  of  children,  the  reprehensibility  of  neglect;  the 
value  of  an  early  start,  the  necessity  of  a  religious  element,  the  choice 
of  a  teacher,  instruction  in  morals,  discipline,  the  inculcation  of  humil- 
ity, patience,  obedience,  the  shunning  of  bad  company,  the  chief  evils 
of  youth,  the  timely  word  of  warning,  etc.,  etc.    See  Lib.  V,  cap.  1-49. 

641  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  2. 

042  Cf.  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  1. 

043  Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  LX.  a.  2. 

044  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVII,  a.  2. 


168     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


to  be  accorded  that  which  befits  his  office  and  station.^^  This 
requires  the  reign  of  good  will.  The  virtue  of  giving  every  one 
his  due  cannot  be  traced  to  the  sensitive  appetite  of  man,  and 
hence  not  to  the  emotional  side  of  human  nature,  but  to  the 
rational  appetite,  and  therefore  to  the  will.^^  Sporadic  senti- 
ment and  periodical  reforms  will  not  induce  justice;  the  State 
must  help  to  elevate  and  strengthen  the  inner  life  of  the  people. 
Christian  education  is  imperative.  Only  with  a  permanent 
foundation  can  justice  be  a  constant  factor.  It  implies  and 
resembles  charity,^^  save  that  its  aim  is  lower ;  love  ordains  all 
to  the  divine  good,  but  justice  (legal)  to  the  common  weal.***^ 
The  latter  ordination,  however,  is  assured  and  reassured  in  the 
former;  for  the  divine  good  demands  the  common,  and  men  are 
most  willing  to  grant  others  their  due,  when  they  are  eager  to 
give  God  His. 

The  people  must  not  be  content  to  have  justice  only  in  the 
abstraction  of  the  State,  but  also  in  the  reality  of  themselves. 
Legal  justice  indeed  directs  man  immediately  to  the  common 
good,  but  only  mediately  to  the  good  of  any  particular  person. 
Consequently  there  must  be  some  particular  justice  which  im- 
mediately stimulates  a  man  to  the  good  of  his  neighbor.  He^-e 
again  we  meet  the  necessity  of  love. 

Civil  justice  deals  only  with  the  external  relations  of  men  ;^^ 
but  since  these  are  so  largely  dependent  on  the  internal  disposi- 
tion of  the  individual,  the  requirement  of  charity  is  evident. 
Justice  pertains  to  the  will  of  the  individual  indeed,^  but  love 
perfects  volition.  St.  Thomas  conceives  true  justice  as  warm, 
inviting,  and  fruitful.  Mercy,  liberality,  and  other  sterling  vir- 
tues are  its  issue.^^ 

Therefore,  according  to  Aquinas,  a  system  of  education  which 
does  not  include  justice,  and  a  family  or  state  which  takes  no 
interest  in  the  inclusion,  are  exceedingly  defective.    For  justice 


645  Idem,  a.  4,  ad  3. 

646  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  4. 

647  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LIX,  a.  4. 
^■iS  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LIX,  a.  6. 

649  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  8. 

650  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  8,  ad  1. 

651  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  11,  ad  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  169 


is  the  chief  of  the  moral  virtues,  striving  for  the  good  of  all  in 
society,  and  expressing  the  rational  appetite  of  man,  his  reason 
and  his  will,  which  are  his  noblest  possessions.  It  is  essentially 
altruistic  and  democratic.  St.  Thomas  repeats  Aristotle  (I. 
Rhetor.,  cap.  IX)  that  those  virtues  are  the  greatest  which  are 
the  most  beneficial  to  others  and  that,  while  such  qualities  as 
bravery  are  useful  in  time  of  war,  justice,  superiorly,  is  needed 
both  in  clangor  and  calm.^- 

The  Angelic  Doctor  may  be  said  to  arraign  injustice  on  the 
ground  of  its  undemocratic  character.  It  includes  contempt  for 
the  public  good,  and  injures  the  individual  rights  of  others.^ 
The  inequality  is  intolerable,  when  one-man  claims  more  riches 
and  honors  than  another,  and  at  the  same  time  refuses  to  face  as 
many  labors  and  losses  as  his  neighbor.^  The  opportunity 
which  the  State  should  offer  equally  to  all,  is  not  evident,  if  such 
assumptions  are  civilly  countenanced.  Though  every  individual 
in  the  State  must  have  his  rights,  none  is  to  be  exalted  beyond 
his  deserts.^^  Such  is  the  only  kind  of  practical  equality  which 
genuine  democracy  may  demand,  which  Aquinas  sincerely  pro- 
poses, and  which  his  doctrine  of  justice,  to  be  taught  to  all, 
plainly  expresses. 

Ultkamuxdaxe  Purpose 

Throughout  these  purposes  of  the  State,  social,  economic  and 
ethical,  as  presented  by  St.  Thomas,  runs  a  thread  of  finality 
glinting  with  religion.  The  State  cannot  be  an  end  in  itself. 
Its  mission  is  bigger  than  itself,  and  beyond ;  just  as  a  port  ex- 
ceeds the  ship  that  sails  to  it.  In  fact,  Aquinas  uses  this  very 
simile  and  draws  it  out.  The  ship  of  State  should  protect  well 
its  precious  cargo,  the  people,  and  bear  on  through  this  world  to 
a  further  and  final  goal.  If  man's  destiny  were  merely  earthly, 
an  epicurean  polity  would  appear  rational,  and  the  State  would 


652  Sumnia  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  12. 

653  Sumnia  Theai.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LX,  a.  1. 

654  Ibidem. 

Qoo  Summa  Theol..  2a  2ae,  qu.  LX,  a.  2. 


170     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


be  hardly  more  than  a  squat  and  aimless  house-boat.^  Beyond 
food,  drink,  shelter,  a  little  education,  less  ethics,,  and  certainly 
much  amusement,  life  would  hold  nothing.  Under  such  a  ma- 
terialistic delusion,  men  seem  to  be  laboring  today. 

The  State  which  does  not  reach  beyond  itself  will  stoop  to 
measures  beneath  its  dignity.  It  will  be  either  autocratic,  and 
therefore  intolerable,  or  lackadaisical,  and  hence  useless.  Fiber 
will  either  be  feigned  in  it  or  frankly  lacking.  There  is  nothing 
solid  to  hold  it  up,  if  it  lets  go  of  the  ideals  which  are  so  asso- 
ciated with  another  world,  that  they  seem  illogical,  if  severed 
from  it,  and  lack  intrinsic  attraction. 

The  combined  genius  of  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  Adams, 
Hume,  Bentham,  and  Mill  could  not  give  us  a  good  substitute 
for  the  natural  law  which  receives  its  universal  and  binding 
character  from  the  God  whom  it  expresses  and  to  Whom,  out  of 
this  world,  it  leads.  The  best  that  materialism,  deism,  phenome- 
nalism, or  associationism  can  do  for  morals  is  to  make  them  the 
best  policy.  Religion  alone  renders  them  the  prime  necessity. 
The  society  which  lacks  a  spiritual  and  ultramundane  outlook 
is  as  unstable  as  human  impulse  itself,  by  which  it  is  largely 
ruled.^^  Seeing  no  end  above  itself,  it  makes  itself  its  own  end. 
It  focusses  on  terrestrial  affairs  without  reference  to  aught 
higher,  and  renders  the  people  low  in  ambition  and  aim.  It 
champions  progress,  not  upward,  but  on  a  plane  surface,  and 
considers  its  success  commensurate  with  its  territorial  expan- 
sion; thus  furnishing  a  fruitful  cause  of  war.  It  stresses  ma- 
terial things,  and  then  trembles  when  the  masses  rise  to  demand 
what  they  have  been  taught  to  consider  alone  worth  while.  It 
permits  ease  to  pile  up  on  one  side  and  misery  on  the  other,  for 
it  lacks  an  immutable  and  compelling  standard  of  justice.  It 
glitters,  but  decay  is  within ;  for  no  system  which  withholds  the 
souls  of  men  from  soaring  and  which  blots  out  the  view  of  a 
better  world,  the  striving  towards  which  spells  genuine  progress 
in  this,  can  permanently  satisfy.    It  would  be  easy  for  Aquinas 

656  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14 :  "Quod  si  homo  non  ordinaretur  ad  allud 
exterius  bonum,  sufficerent  homini  curae  praedictae  (temporales)." 

657 Thus,  as  Erdmann  puts  it:  "The  aim  of  the  (Christian)  State  is 
to  bring  its  citizens  nearer  their  highest  goal,  the  condition  of  blessed- 
ness. ..." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  171 


to  explain  the  modern  restlessness,  which  our  romantic  literature 
and  the  daily  press  feature.  He  would  judge  that  the  vision  of 
the  people  has  been  limited  and  their  ideals  stunted ;  that  racial 
energy  has  been  turned  back  on  itself  to  combat  itself;  that  a 
higher  outlet  is  wanting ;  in  a  word,  that  the  potent  principle  of 
finality  has  been  thwarted. 

St.  Thomas  would  have  society  enjoy,  in  a  rational  measure, 
all  the  reasonable  good  which  a  materialistic  presentment  could 
boast,  but  also  more.^  He  would  open  up  an  infinite  ideal  to 
the  race ;  teach  it  to  fly  as  well  as  to  creep ;  present  solid  princi- 
ples for  g-uides ;  place  a  conscience  in  the  State  that  would  direct 
the  government  and  the  people  onward,  rather  than  inw^ard  or 
backward.  But  he  would  give  the  people  today,  who  have  re- 
linquished faith,  credit  for  at  least  retaining  logic.^^  If  the  end 
of  man  were  earth  and  the  purpose  of  the  State  were  itself,  ethics 
might  rightly  be  repudiated;  for  certainly  it  is  something  of  a 
hamper  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  But  this  fallacy,  which 
today  is  being  so  extensively  lived,  if  less  intensively  believed, 
is  denounced  by  Aquinas.  Neither  men  nor  the  State  exist  for 
themselves.  The  latter  is  for  the  sake  of  the  former ;  the  former 
gather  into  the  latter  that  they  may  the  more  easily  live  well. 
But  there  is  no  good  life  save  that  which  is  lived  according  to 
virtue;  every  other  kind  is  confusion.  Xow  the  question  pre- 
sents itself:  will  natural  virtue  suffice,  or  must  the  supernatural 
prevail?  Aquinas  answers  that  the  former  might,  if  man  had 
no  super-terrestrial  destiny;  we  ourselves  may  respond  that  it 
does  not,  from  our  sufficiency  of  experience  in  a  period  which 
has  snapped  its  relations  with  the  divine.  St.  Thomas  insists 
that,  since  man  is  intended  for  a  higher  state,  his  virtue  must 
bear  reference  to  sacred  things. For  virtue,  no  more  than  the 
State,  is  an  end  in  itself.^^-*^  It  is  a  means  of  attaining  to  the 
supernal  life  which  signifies  not  only  beatitude  in  the  realm  of 
soul-survival,  but  also  the  greatest  amount  of  inner  happiness 
here. 


658  Be  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  15. 
650  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 

670  Ibidem. 

671  Ibidem.    Contra  Gentiles,  Lib.  Ill,  cap,  34. 


172     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


Thomistic  politics  now  reaches  the  border  line  of  the  purely 
spiritual,  where  the  mission  of  the  State,  in  a  manner,  both 
begins  and  ends.  If  men  could  achieve,  bv  merely  human  effort, 
their  supernatural  destiny, -which  is  written  partly  in  the  stars 
and  fully  in  Revelation,  the  duty  of  civil  government  would  be 
to  direct  them  to  it.^*"^  But  a  supernatural  object  necessitates  a 
supernatural  guidance.  Here  the  State  itself  cannot  guide,  but 
must  itself  be  guided.^'^ 

In  other  words,  there  must  be  a  spiritual  magisterium,  to  keep 
the  morals  of  the  individuals  in  the  State  at  their  purest  and  best, 
to  appeal  to  the  individual  conscience  and  responsibility,  and 
to  point  an  unfailing  finger  to  the  highest  goal  of  humanity.^ '"^ 

Rightly  understood,  this  part  of  Thomistic  doctrine  in  which 
religion  takes  on  where  politics  proper  leaves  off,  is  an  asset  to 
democracy.  Aquinas  would  have  the  people  secure  from  the 
tyranny  of  rulers  by  subjecting  rulers  to  the  principle  of  jus- 
tice.^"^    But  justice  is  a  vague  thing,  unless  it  is  concreted  and 

672  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14.  Deploige,  L<z  question  juive,  p.  57:  "La 
finalite  essentielle  de  la  vie  sociale  dans  la  conception  ttiomiste,  est  de 
faciliter  a  rhomme  la  realization  de  sa  destine  immortelle." 

673  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14:  "Perducere  ad  ilium  finem  non  humani 
erit,  sed  divini  regiminis." 

674  Lib.  I,  cap.  15:  "Quae  autem  sit  ad  veram  beatitudinem  via,  et 
quae  sint  impedimenta  eius,  ex  lege  divina  cognoscitur,  cuius  doctrina 
pertinet  ad  sacerdotium  officium,  secundum  illud  Malacbiae  II,  7: 
Labia  sacerdotis  custodient  scientiam  et  legem  requirent  de  ore  eius." 
Cf.  "(Democratie)  c'est  I'organization  sociale  qui  tend  a  porter  au 
maximum  la  conscience  et  la  responsabilite  civiques  de  chacun."  Marc 
Sangier,  UEsprit  democratique,  p.  167,  Perrin,  ed.,  1905;  quoted  by 
Philippe  Borrell,  Uldee  de  Deniocratie.  Revue  de  Philosophie,  XII, 
p.  118. 

675  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  must  interpret  such  assertions  of  St. 
Thomas  as:  "nisi  forte  potestati  spirituali  etiam  saecularis  potestas 
conjungatur,  sicut  in  Papa,  qui  utriusque  potestatis  apicem  tenet,  sc. 
spiritualis  et  saecularis,  hoc  illo  disponente  qui  est  sacerdos  in  aeter- 
num  secundum  ordinem  Melchisedech.  ..."  Sent..  Lib.  II,  dist. 
44,  ad  4.  Aquinas  admitted  temporal  rulers.  His  De  Regimine  is  a 
paternal  instruction  to  one  of  them.  The  leadership  which  he  claims 
for  the  Church  is  essentially  moral;  if  material,  it  is  so  per  accidens. 
The  Church  represents  morality,  to  which  the  State,  whether  it  recog- 
nizes the  Church  or  not,  is  always  subordinate.  If  his  sentences  are 
sometimes  too  strong  for  the  modern  sense,  it  is  because  he  writes,  at 
times,  more  from  fact  than  from  theory.  De  facto  the  Church  was 
mighty  in  both  orders  during  the  twilight  of  Europe's  emergence.  She 
had  to  be.  Civil  society  was  in  the  throes  of  formation  and  reforma- 
tion, while  ecclesiastical  organization  then  alone  was  perfect  and  pow- 
erful enough  to  control  the  situation. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  173 

standardized  in  a  living  institution,  capable  of  keeping  its  sig- 
nificance clear,  endowed  with  authority  to  speak,  and  free  enough 
to  be  impartial  in  its  utterances.  Where  there  is  full  justice, 
there  is  all  that  any  democratic  ideal  in  reason  can  demand. 
The  Church,  which  now  appears  as  the  epi-phenomenon  of  the 
political  philosophy  of  Aquinas,  is  the  expounder  of  Christian 
equity  to  the  world,  and  the  doctrinal  defender  of  true 
democracy. 

St.  Thomas  credits  not  only  the  individual,  but  also  Christ. 
He  calls  earnest  attention  to  the  fact  that  an  inheritance  of 
eternal  beatitude  has  been  won  for  each  by  the  blood  of  the 
Savior;  that  every  soul  is  precious,  and  requires  spiritual  care 
through  which  it  may  be  directed  to  the  haven  of  everlasting 
salvation.^''^^  He  regards  the  whole  man.  Civil  society  deals 
with  the  people  in  their  external  relations  and  needs,  and  pur- 
posely seeks  to  regulate  and  perfect  those  conditions.  The  spir- 
itual society  provides  for  those  innermost  cravings  of  the  indi- 
vidual's bosom,  and  feeds  them  with  God-given  truth  and  conso- 
lation. True,  the  Church  is  administered  by  human  agents  and 
so  must  partake  in  appearance  of  the  elements  of  human  form ; 
but  it  is  as  spiritual  and  as  democratic  as  the  Savior  whose  '^king- 
dom was  not  of  this  world"  and  whose  blood  was  shed  for  all. 
It  is  more  perfect  than  the  State,  for  its  purpose  is  more  sub- 
lime. The  State  promotes  external  morality;  the  Church 
renders  the  work  of  the  State  lighter  and  more  fruitful  by  afford- 
ing morals  the  highest  sanction  and  motive,^^®  and  thus  fostering 
them  deep  in  the  individual's  mind  and  heart,  whence  their 
gratifying  expression  in  social  and  political  life  is  easy  and 
natural.  The  State  appeals  to  the  individual  from  without ;  the 
Church  from  within,  as  well  as  without.^^^  If  a  power  is  needed 
to  superintend  the  bodily  welfare  of  the  people,  much  more  is  a 
factor  required  to  attend  to  the  spiritual  concerns.    The  two 


676  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14. 

677  Ibidem:    Com.  Eth.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1. 

678  Com.  Eth.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1:  "Circa  quod  considerandum  est  quod 
finale  bonum  in  quod  tendit  appetitus,  est  ultima  perfectio." 

679  Of.  Taparelli,  Naturel  Droit,  p.  156. 


174     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


realms  are  distinct,^  but  their  relations  are  intimate  and,  for 
the  good  of  the  people,  should  be  cordial.  This  is  clearer  when 
we  realize  that  a  state  can  never  separate  itself  from  the  prin- 
ciples of  justice  without  forfeiting  its  honor  and  betraying  its 
citizens.  But  the  Church  is  much  more  qualified  to  interpret 
and  inspire  justice  than  any  other  body,  being  the  special  stu- 
dent of  it  for  twenty  centuries,  and  the  spouse  of  the  Author  of 
it.  Hers  is,  by  right  of  excellency  and  divine  commission,  the 
art  of  goodness  and  equity.^^  Whenever  a  State  is  truly  just, 
it  is  in  accord  with  the  soul  of  religion  and,  in  fact,  is  expressing 
the  Church,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  willingly  or  unwill- 
ingly.^'^- Every  truly  fair  civil  enactment  is  precisely  what  the 
Church,  in  the  sacred  name  of  Him  Whom  it  represents,  would 
have  to  approve.  But  if  the  State  is  capable  of  ruling  justly, 
without  the  aid  of  the  Church,  why  is  an  ecclesiastical  institu- 
tion necessary  in  this  respect  ?  St.  Thomas  would  answer  that 
justice  is  more  permanent  and  consistent,  and  less  sporadic  and 
uncertain,  when  it  has  an  authoritative  guide  and  stimulus.^ 

There  is  nothing  in  the  Thomistic  doctrine  of  the  union  of 
Church  and  State  to  affront  the  modern  mind.  For,  first  of  all, 
it  is  not  a  union,  in  a  certain  sense,  at  all.^  St.  Thomas  advo- 
cates no  theocracy,  but  would  have  government  just  as  free  and 
unhampered  as  we  find  it  today.  He  recognizes  fully  that  the 
civil  sphere  is  apart  from  the  ecclesiastical,  and,  like  Leo  XIII, 
that  '^each  is  greatest  in  its  own  kind."  The  fourteenth  chapter 
of  the  Be  Regimine  strictly  proves  this.  Man's  existence  is  both 
temporal  and  eternal;  the  two  aspects  of  his  life  are  quite  dis- 


680  De  Reg.,  Lib.  I,  cap.  14:  "Huius  ergo  regnl  ministerium,  ut  a 
terrenis  essent  spiritualia  distincta,  non  terrenis  regibus,  sed  sacerdo- 
tibus  est  oommissum,  et  praecipue  summo  Pontifici  summo  Sacerdoti 
successori  Petri,  Christi  vicario  cui  omnes  reges  populi  Cbristiani 
oportet  esse  subditos  sicut  ipsi  Domino  Jesu  Christo." 

681  As  Dante  remarks  in  Dig.  de  Justitia  et  Jure  I,  1:  "Jus  est  a 
justitia  appellatum:  nam  ut  eleganter  Celsus  definit,  jus  est  ars  boni 
et  aequi." 

682  Cf.  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  1,  ad  6. 

683  In  the  Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXXXVI,  a.  3,  ad  1,  he  shows  that 
fallen  humanity  really  requires  spiritual  aid,  grace. 

684  Aquinas  indicates  clearly  in  his  Contra  Errores  Graecorum  (see 
chs.  21-27)  that  papal  primacy  is  in  the  ecclesiastical,  not  the  secular, 
circle. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  175 


tinct,  demanding  different  attention.  The  temporal  aim  is  an 
honest  career  and  the  earthly  happiness  which  evenes  from  an 
harmonious  development  of  faculties.  The  State  can  aid  sub- 
stantially here.  But  another  society  must  guide  man  in  his 
purely  extra-mundane  aspiration.    That  is  all. 

Secondly,  Aquinas  would  have  a  cor  dfespit  between  the  two, 
a  moral  union,  but  without  the  one  being  merged  in  the  other 
(ut  a  terrenis  essent  spirituodia  distincta).  The  two  swords  of 
power  ought  not  clash.^ 

Thirdly,  he  looks  upon  the  Church  as  an  impartial  power  for 
fairness  and  good ;  and  only  as  such  has  it  a  right  to  exist.  It 
must  and  cannot  but  preserve  the  spirit  of  Christ,  whose  sacred 
democracy  is  indisputable  and  who  was  virtue  incarnate.  Only 
in  such  a  role  and  service  is  the  Church  capable  of  holding  aloft 
an  ethical  light  for  the  State.  Unde  homo  christianus,  cui  heati- 
tudo  ilia  est  per  Christi  sanguinem  .  .  .  idiget  alia  spir- 
itualia  cura,  per  quam  dirigatur  ad  portum  salutis  aeternae. 

Fourthly,  St.  Thomas  is  speaking  solely  of  the  Christian  State 
and  the  Christian  Church,  and  hence  is  quite  warranted  in  his 
teaching  that  perfect  peace  should  exist  between  them.  Insofar 
as  a  state  has  truly  subjected  itself  to  the  dispensation  of  Christ, 


  ^ 

685  There  is  mention  in  St.  Luke's  Gospel,  XXII,  10,  of  two  swords: 
"But  they  said:  'Lord,  behold,  here  are  two  swords.'  And  he  said  to 
them:  'It  is  enough.'"  It  seems  that  this  was  allegorically  explained 
as  material  and  spiritual  weapons,  first  by  Goffredus  (-{-  1132).  See 
Migne,  Tom.  157,  p.  220. 

Bernard  of  Clairvaux  excessively  estimated  the  ecclesiastical  interest. 
"Petri  uterque  est,  alter  suo  mutu,  alter  sua  manu." — Ep,  256.  See 
Migne,  vol.  182.  But  Bernard  was  a  mystic  and  saw  everything  spirit- 
ualized and  hence  in  spiritual  power. 

John  of  Salisbury  taught  that  the  prince  received  one  of  the  swords 
from  the  hand  of  the  Church,  and  that  the  Church  used  it  "per  prin- 
cipis  manum." — Polycrat.  IV,  c.  3. 

But  St.  Thomas'  opinion  doubtless  coincides  with  the  restrained  view 
of  his  contemporary,  Pope  Innocent  IV  (1243-54),  who  held  that  what 
is  Caesar's  is  Caesar's  and  that  the  swords  are  separate:  "nam  tem- 
poralia  et  spiritualia  diversa  sunt,  et  diversos  judices  habent,  nec  unus 
judex  habet  se  intromittere  de  pertinentibus  ad  alium,  licet  sese  invicem 
juvare  debeant." 

Thus  the  rigid  theory  of  Gregory  VII  (1073-85)  was  mellowed  by 
time  and  relieved  of  excess.  Repugnance  disappears  from  it,  as  enun- 
ciated in  the  thirteenth  century. 


176     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

would  he  relate  it  to  the  Church?^  Omnes  Christi  fideles, 
inquantum  sunt  membra. 

Fifthly,  he  sees,  as  must  every  reasoning  man,  that  to  be  sub- 
ject to  Christ  implies  deference  and  obedience  to  His  Own  insti- 
tution which  is  His  mystical  body. 

Sixthly,  he  finds  this  subjection  to  be  really  an  elevation.  To 
be  the  bondsman  of  the  Savior  is  to  be  most  free.  To  serve  God 
is  to  reig-n.  To  be  faithful  to  His  doctrine,  as  presented  by  His 
Own  commissioned  institution,  which  keeps  His  voice  vibrant 
among  us,  is  our  honor  as  w^ell  as  His  due. 

Seventhly,  St.  Thomas  is  not  a  protagonist  of  the  machina- 
tions and  intrigues  which  are  so  often  read  into  the  story  of 
Church  and  State.  He  would  be  the  first  to  denounce  the  prosti- 
tution of  ecclesiastical  authority  to  politics,  and  holds  no  brief 
for  any  churchmen  who  ever  sacrificed  their  holiest  of  trusts. 

Eighthly,  he  realizes  what  the  world  of  thought  today  is  again 
coming  to  suspect  and  respect,  ^'in  spite  of  pride,  in  erring  rea- 
son's spite":  that,  above  nations,  allied  to  none  of  them,  free 
from  all,  yet  bound  by  equal  ties  of  affection  to  each ;  impartial, 
superior  to  the  sword  and  the  clink  of  gold,  sober,  rational,  altru- 
istic, humane,  ideal :  some  institution  is  needed.  Christ  worked 
out  the  problem  on  a  human-divine  basis  two  thousand  years 
ago;  and  St.  Thomas  but  repeated  the  Master's  solution.  A 
church  of  all  nations,  for  all  nations,  above  all  nations,  and 
founded  by  the  God  of  all  nations,  is  the  most  truly  democratic 
of  societies  and  the  most  competent  institution  in  the  world 
today,  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Aquinas,  to  dictate  where  justice, 
without  which  peace  is  an  impossibility,  lies  and  how  is  it  to  be 
obtained. 

Xinthly,  St.  Thomas  enhances  the  democracy  of  his  politics 


686  Both  Bellarmine  and  Suarez  upheld  the  indirect  power  of  the 
Papacy  in  temporal  matters.  Bellarmime,  De  Summo  Pontifice,  Opera 
I,  888  a.;  Suarez,  De  Legihus,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  6,  3.  Nowadays,  however, 
we  realize  more  clearly  that  the  power  of  the  Church  is  moral.  The 
historical  situation  which  necessitated  the  Church's  being  material  as 
well  as  spiritual  mistress  in  the  early  Dark  Ages,  obfuscated  the  minds 
of  many  on  this  point.  "The  influence  of  the  Papacy,"  says  Rahilly, 
"in  a  world  which  has  ceased  to  be  a  Catholic  hegemony  is  an  ideal 
rather  than  a  fact  or  right." — Studies,  Mar.,  1918.  Art.  Suarez  and 
Democracy. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  177 

by  safeguarding  it.  He  is  not  content  to  let  it  float  aimlessly 
into  men's  minds  and  out  again,  clouding  practical  issues.  He 
was  writing  for  a  very  human  period  like  our  own,  when  nations 
were  in  contest  and  the  people  were  paying  the  price.  He  knew 
that  passionate  parties  are  not  qualitied  to  pass  judgment  on 
themselves  or  on  each  other  and  that,  of  a  necessity,  countries, 
without  ideals  and  principles,  would  be  unjust.  He  therefore 
specified  that  society  as  arbitratrix  which,  every  scholar  admits, 
efficiently  fulfilled  her  mission,  notwithstanding  unspeakable 
handicap,  in  the  Middle  Ages. 

Tenthly,  he  lifts  the  question  of  Church  and  State  absolutely 
above  all  material  consideration,  by  making  the  final  object  of 
any  relation  between  these  two  great  bodies  not  any  glorification 
of  either  one  of  them,  but  God  Himself.  For  Him,  God  is  the 
Omega  as  well  as  the  Alpha,  and  man  must  seek  Him.  To  do 
so  is  true  blessedness.  He  proves  conclusively  that  man's  ulti- 
mate end  and  happiness  ^  can  consist  only  in  the  contempla- 
tion of  his  Maker.  It  is  in  the  Christian  and  democratic  spirit 
of  wishing  the  supreme  felicity  of  every  individual,  that  his 
politics  is  conceived;  and  all  his  principles  tend  to  this  ex- 
alted issue,  attaining  it  perfectly  in  eternity.  His  purpose  for 
every  individual  is  exactly  that  of  every  individual  for  himself ; 
and  the  means  which  he  prescribes  are  eminently  reasonable, 
once  his  divine  premise  and  conclusion  (God  is  the  end  of  all, 
Deus  sit  finis  omnium)  is  conceded.  One  by  one  he  examines 
the  lesser  objects  on  which  the  individual  is  apt  to  set  such  store, 
and  shows  the  folly  of  making  them  an  end,  instead  of  a  means 
to  the  greatest  end  of  all.  Bodily  pleasures,  according  to  nature, 
must  always  be  referred  to  a  purpose  beyond  themselves ;  as 
eating  to  living,  etc.^  Besides,  they  are  enjoyed  in  common 
with  the  brute  creation  and  therefore  cannot  be  the  distinctive 
good  of  man.^  Glory  is  evanescent.^-*-  Riches  are  obviously 
valuable  only  as  a  medium ;  they  are  lost  in  exchange ;  they  en- 


687  See  Contra  Gentiles.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  16,  17,  18,  19,  25. 

688  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  37. 

689  Idem,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  27. 

690  Ibidem. 

691  Idem,  cap.  29. 


178     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

tail  care  and  worry.^"  Power  is  always  limited  and  uncer- 
tain.^^ Health,  beauty,  and  strength  have  wings.^^  And  so  on. 
An  analysis  yields  ashes.  Good  in  themselves,  the  things  of  the 
body  and  the  spirit  are  best  only  when  they  serve  to  lead  to  what 
is  better.  Aquinas  would  have  them  plentifully  present,  but 
also  accurately  estimated.  If  they  are  not  sufficient  in  them- 
selves, there  should  certainly  be  something  beyond  them.  If 
there  is  something  beyond  them,  it  must  be  beyond  the  earth; 
for  they  are  the  best  which  the  world  has  to  offer.  If  that  some- 
thing is  supra-terrestrial,  we  need  a  spiritual  power  to  help  us 
to  order  our  physical  and  material  possessions  to  its  attainment. 
Aquinas  sees  such  a  jDower,  highly  organized  and  efficient,  in  the 
Church. 

Let  the  State  secure  all  the  good  it  can  for  the  people.  But 
let  the  Church  inspire  the  State  with  the  sweet  sanity  of  subor- 
dinating the  lower  aspirations  to  the  higher;  of  moderating 
human  appetites,  that  every  man  may  have  enough  of  life's 
necessities,  and  that  each  joy  may  yield  its  fullest ;  and  finally, 
of  referring  all  to  the  Source  of  all.®^^ 

Thus  the  Thomistic  doctrine  of  political  purpose  is  perfect, 
rising  up  to  the  Ineffable  Good  of  all,  for  all,  forever.  Teaching 
that  the  State  is  not  an  end  in  itself  but  a  means  to  man's  true 
end,  the  Angelic  Doctor  does  not  stop  there,  as  do  some  present- 
day  writers,  who  themselves  have  come  to  see  as  much  of  the 
truth  as  this.  He  plainly  states  what  and  where  that  end  is,  and 
how  it  may  be  more  certainly  attained.  He  opens  the  door  of  a 
kingdom  in  which  there  is  neither  Jew,  nor  Gentile,  bond  nor 
free.  He  shows  us  the  truest  emblem  of  democracy,  the  Cross. 
He  leaves  us  in  awe,  veneration,  and  love,  at  the  feet  of  the 
supernal  and  supreme  democrat  of  History,  Christ. 


692  Cap.  30. 

693  Cap.  31. 

694  Cap.  32. 

695  Cf.  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LVIII,  a.  1,  ad  6. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  179 


CHAPTER  VII 
THOMISTIC  AND  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  LIBERTIES 

The  politics  of  Aquinas  could  be  epitomized  in  his  doctrine 
on  rights.  There  we  see  his  principles  in  their  application,  and 
realize  the  living  value  of  his  thought.  When  he  traces  rights 
to  man's  rational  nature  and  the  natural  law,  he  places  them 
securely  above  the  arrogance  of  rulers  who  claim  that  the  pre- 
rogatives of  the  subject  come  from  the  State  and  that  the  sov- 
ereign is  the  Stat-e.  Laws  are  not  rights,  but  the  public  expres- 
sion of  them  and  a  direction  to  them.^^^  Deducing  rights  from 
humanity,  Aquinas  esteems  them  as  universal  as  humanity  and 
as  lasting  as  time.  That  is  why  his  teaching  has  been,  in  so 
many  respects,  as  pertinent  in  so  many  periods  after  his  death 
as  during  his  life,  and  why  it  could  not  be  democratic. 

To  see  just  how  modern  this  medieval  mind  was,  let  us  con- 
sider some  American  bills  of  rights  and,  in  parallel,  the  corres- 
ponding Thomistic  teaching.  Since  Virginia  and  Massachu- 
setts stand  out  as  the  earliest  and  best  representatives  of  the 
spirit  which  won  our  American  liberties,  we  shall  turn  to  their 
Constitutions. 

Back  in  1776,  a  month  before  the  signing  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  a  list  of  rights  was  written  "by  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  good  people  of  Virginia,  assembled  in  full  and  free 
convention ;  which  rights  do  pertain  to  them  and  their  posterity 
as  the  basis  and  foundation  of  government."  Its  first  section 
was  as  follows: 

I. — "That  all  men  are  by  nature  equally  free  and  indepen- 
dent, and  have  certain  inherent  rights,  of  which,  when  they  en- 
ter into  a  State  of  society,  they  cannot,  by  any  compact,  deprive 


Q^QSumma  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVII,  a.  1.  Cf.  Laveleye,  Le  Gouv- 
ernement  dans  la  Democratie,  t.  I,  p.  2.  "Le  droit  se  decouvre  par  la  rai- 
son,  car  il  n'existe  pas  dans  les  faits.  Les  droits  s'impose  aux  faits  et 
aux  hommes  par  I'autorite  legitime.  Saint  Thomas  a  admirablement 
appele  le  droit:  Ratio  gubernativa  totius  universi  in  mente  divina  exis- 
tens." 


180     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

or  divest  their  posterity ;  namely,  the  enjoyment  of  life  and  lib- 
erty, w^th  the  means  of  acquiring  and  possessing  property,  pur- 
suing and  obtaining  happiness  and  safety." 

With  regards  to  which,  we  find  in  the  doctrine  of  Saint 
Thomas,  2  Sent.,  d.  6,  Q.  I,  a.  4,  ad  5 :  ''Men  are  not  superior  to 
each  other  according  to  the  order  of  nature." 

And,  2  Sent.,  d.  44,  Q.  I,  a.  3 :  "Nature  made  all  men  equal  in 
hberty." 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CIV,  a.  5 : — ''In  two  respects,  the 
subject  is  not  bound  to  obey  his  superior  in  all  things:  first, 
in  the  case  of  a  command  on  the  part  of  a  greater  power; 
secondly,  if  the  latter  orders  something  in  which  the  former  is 
not  subject  to  him.  Hence  in  such  affairs  as  appertain  to  the 
inner  volitional  life,  man  is  not  beholden  to  man,  but  to  God 
alone.  His  obedience  is  due  in  regard  to  his  external,  bodily 
activity ;  yet  in  those  acts  which  belong  to  the  nature  of  the  body, 
God  alone  is  his  superior;  for  all  men  .are  equal  by  nature." 

Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  Q.  XL VII,  a.  2 :— "The  human  will 
by  common  agreement  can  make  a  measure  just  in  such  cases  as 
are  not  intrinsically  repugnant  to  natural  justice ;  thus  creating 
a  positive  right.  But  if  the  measure  is  opposed  to  natural  jus- 
tice, human  will  cannot  make  it  just." 

Comment : 

According  to  this  teaching,  men,  when  they  enter  into  a  state 
of  society,  cannot  by  any  compact,  commit  the  injustice  of  de- 
priving or  divesting  themselves,  let  alone  their  posterity,  of  cer- 
tain inherent  rights.    (Vs.  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  etc.) 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae.,  Q.  LXVI,  a.  2: — "Two  offices  per- 
tain to  man  with  regard  to  exterior  things.  The  first  is  the  pow- 
er of  precuring  and  dispensing  them,  and,  in  respect  to  this, 
it  is  lawful  for  man  to  hold  things  as  his  own.  It  is  even  neces- 
sary for  human  life  " 

Comment : 

Aquinas  is  plainly  with  the  Virginians  in  their  declaration  of 
the  right  of  property.  Further,  as  we  shall  later  see,  he  explains, 
rationalizes,  and  interprets  the  right  in  a  way  to  attain  the  ad- 
vantages, without  any  of  the  harms,  of  socialism. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  181 

II.— Section  2  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights:— ''That  all 
power  is  vested  in,  and  consequently  derived  from,  the  people ; 
that  magistrates  are  their  trustees  and  servants,  and  at  all  times 
amenable  to  them." 

The  Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas: 

Swmma  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XC,  a.  3 : — ''It  is  the  property  of 
the  whole  people  or  of  the  public  person  who  has  care  of  them, 
to  make  law." 

Comment : 

Here  the  popular  source  of  civil  power  is  so  strongly  indicated 
that  any  other  interpretation  of  the  text  would  be  weak. 

Contra  Gentiles,  Book  III,  Ch.  31 : — "Human  power  is  very 
imperfect;  for  it  is  rooted  in  the  wills  and  opinions  of  men, 
in  which  inconstancy  is  very  considerable ;  and  the  greater  the 
power,  the  greater  the  number  of  those  on  whom  it  depends; 
which  is  another  source  of  weakness,  since  that  which  depends 
on  many  can  be  destroyed  in  many  ways." 

Comment : 

By  this  critique  of  power,  St.  Thomas  surely  suggests  that  the 
greatest  power  in  the  State  originally  resides  not  in  any  individ- 
ual or  individuals,  but  in  the  greatest  number,  i.  e.  the  people. 
And  he  warns  the  possessors  of  power  of  their  relation  to  the 
source  of  it. 

De  Eruditione  Principum,  Book  I,  Ch.  6: — "If  the  head  is 
higher  than  the  human  body,  nevertheless  the  body  is  greater ; 
the  body  is  ruled  by  the  head,  but  the  head  is  carried  by  the 
body;  no  less  does  the  head  need  the  body  than  the  body  the 

head    Thus  the  mler  has  power  from  the  subjects,  and 

eminence;  and  in  the  event  of  his  despising  them,  sometimes 
he  loses  both  his  power  and  his  position  " 

Comment : 

This  simile  of  the  body  and  the  head  fitly  proposes  the  truth 
of  Sec.  2  of  the  Virginia  Bill,  and  has  the  merit  not  only  of 
expressing  the  right  of  the  people  but  also  that  of  the  ruler. 
III. — Section  3  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights : — "That  govern- 


182     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

ment  is,  or  ought  to  be,  instituted  for  the  common  benefit,  pro- 
tection and  security  of  the  people,  nation,  or  community ;  of  all 
the  various  modes  and  forms  of  government,  that  is  best  which 
is  capable  of  producing  the  greatest  degree  of  happiness  and 
safety;  and  is  most  effectually  secured  against  the  danger  of  mal- 
administration ;  and  that,  when  any  government  shall  be  found 
inadequate  or  contrary  to  these  purposes,  a  majority  of  the 
community  hath  an  indubitable,  inalienable,  or  indefeasible 
right  to  reform,  alter,,  or  abolish  it,  in  such  a  manner  as  shall 
be  judged  most  conducive  to  the  public  weal." 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  2 : — ''It  is  the  duty  of  the  captain  to 
steer  the  ship  to  the  port  of  safety,  by  keeping  it  safe  from  the 
perils  of  the  deep.  But  the  good  and  the  salvation  of  the  people 
consist  in  this:  that  their  unity,  which  is  another  word  for 
peace,  be  preserved;  for  when  peace  flies,  the  benefits  of  social 
life  perish  " 

Comment : 

Here  the  Doctor  clearly  teaches  that  the  object  of  government 
is  the  benefit,  the  protection,  and  the  security  of  the  State,  and 
that  rulers  must  take  these  purposes  to  mind  and  heart.  He 
lays  stress  on  the  interior  foes  of  social  life ;  for  he  considers  these 
even  more  ominous  than  enemies  from  without.  A  united 
nation  can  weather  a  storm  like  an  iron-clad  ship. 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  15 : — "The  unity  of  the  people,  called 
peace,  is  to  be  procured  through  the  assiduity  of  the  ruler. 
Three  things  are  requisite  to  the  good  living  of  the  people. 
First  that  they  be  constituted  as  a  harmonious  whole ;  secondly, 
that,  thus  united  in  the  bonds  of  peace,  they  may  be  directed  to 

a  fair  existence   Thirdly,  it  is  required  that,  through 

the  endeavors  of  the  ruler,  a  sufficiency  of  those  things  which  are 
necessary  to  a  good  life  be  available." 

Ibidem: — "A  good  life  for  the  people  entails  whatever  par- 
ticular goods  are  procurable  by  human  effort;  e.  g. — wealth, 
profit,  health,  eloquence,  learning." 

Comment : 

When  we  connect  this  text  with  the  preceding  one,  we  per- 
ceive even  more  clearly  how  much  Aquinas  considered  the  pur- 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  18-3 

pose  of  government  the  benefit  of  the  governed.  He  declares 
that  the  ruler  must  strive  to  provide  a  good  life  for  the  peo- 
ple; and  by  a  good  life  he  means  bodily,  mental,  economic,  and 
moral  well-being  for  everybody — education  and  opportunity  for 
all. 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  1: — ''In  proportion  as  a  government 
is  effcacious  in  the  preserv^ation  of  unity,  it  will  be  the  more  use- 
ful." 

Comment : 

We  have  just  seen  what  civil  unity  implies  in  the  politics  of 
Aquinas.  Hence  this  principle  can'  only  mean  that  ''of  all  the 
various  modes  and  forms  of  government,  that  is  best  which  is 
capable  of  producing  the  greatest  degree  of  happiness  and 
safety." 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  3 : — "According  to  the  degree  in  which 
it  departs  from  the  common  good,  a  government  is  unjust." 

Comment : 

This  is  the  negative  form  of  the  positive  principle  that  the 
polity  which  consults  and  secures  the  public  good  most  is  the 
best. 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  6 : — "The  rule  of  a  kingdom  should  be  so 
disposed  that  the  occasion  of  royal  corruption  is  removed.  The- 
king's  power  should  be  so  curtailed,  that  he  cannot  readily  turn 
into  a  tyrant." 

Comment : 

St.  Thomas  was  as  duly  concerned  with  "  the  danger  of  mal- 
administration," and  security  against  it,  as  the  Virginian  sires 
of  our  Republic. 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CIV,  a.  6 : — "Man  is  bound  to  obey 
secular  rulers  only  insofar  as  the  order  of  justice  requires ;  and 
therefore,  if  the  government  be  not  just,  but  usurped,  or  if  the 
rulers  command  unjustly,  the  subjects  are  not  held  to  obedience, 
save  accidentally,  to  avoid  scandal  or  peril." 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  6:— "It  seems  that  procedure  against  the 
excess  of  tyrants  should  be  made  not  by  the  private  presumption 
of  some,  but  by  the  public  authority.    First  of  all,  if  it  is  the 


184     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

right  of  the  people  to  provide  themselves  a  king,  the  monarch 
chosen  by  them  can,  without  injustice,  be  degraded  or  re- 
strained in  power,  if  he  tyranically  abuses  the  royal  might.  Nor 
are  such  a  people  to  be  thought  of  as  faithless  in  their  act  of 
stripping  the  tyrant,  even  though  they  had  previously  subjected 
themselves  forever,  because  he  has  his  deserts  for  not  comporting 
himself  duly  in  the  rule  of  the  people,  as  his  office  demanded 

7} 


Comment : 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Aquinas  teaches  that  a  perni- 
cious polity  (and  this  should  include  an  inadequate  one)  is 
justly  at  the  mercy  of  the  people,  and  that  theirs  is  the  right  ''to 
reform,  alter,  or  abolish  it"  for  the  common  weal. 

IV.— Section  4  of  the  Virginian  Bill  of  Rights That  no 
man  or  set  of  men  are  entitled  to  exclusive  or  separate  emolu- 
ment or  pivileges  from  the  community,  but  in  consideration  of 
public  services ;  which,  not  being  descendible,  neither  ought  the 
offices  of  magistrate,  legislator,  or  judge  be  hereditary." 

Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas : 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  63 : — ''Favoritism  is  opposed  to  dis- 
tributive justice ;  for  the  equality  of  such  justice  consists  in  the 
fact  that  different  people  are  treated  differently  according  to 
their  deserts.  Hence  if  consideration  is  given  to  the  qualifica- 
tion in  a  person,  on  account  of  which  the  reward  is  but  his  due, 
then  there  is  no  preference  of  person  but  of  cause ;  whence  the 
Gloss  on  'God  is  not  an  acceptor  of  persons'  {Eph.  6)  says  that: 
*God  being  a  just  judge  regards  deserts  and  not  persons.'  For 
example :  if  anyone  should  promote  a  man  to  office  because  of  the 
sufficiency  of  his  knowledge,  here  the  correct  cause  is  consid- 
ered, and  not  the  person.  But  if  one  should  regard  in  the  fav- 
ored man,  not  whether  the  favor  be  fitting  or  meet,  but  simply 
the  fact  that  this  individual  is,  say,  Peter  or  Martin,  here  is  a 
clear  case  of  partiality ;  since  the  gift  is  made  not  because  of  his 
merit,  but  because  of  his  person.  For  some  condition,  not  con- 
stituting a  cause  of  worthiness,  is  referred  to  the  person.  For 
magistracy  because  he  is  rich  or  a  relative,  favoritism  is  evident 
instance,  if  anyone  should  promote  a  man  to  a  prelacy  or  to  a 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  185 

  It  is  plain  that  partiality  is  opposed  to  natural  justice, 

because  it  implies  excess.  But  nothing  is  opposed  to  virtue,  save 
sin.    Hence  favoritism  is  a  sin.'^ 

Comment : 

St  Thomas  is  in  close  accord  with  Section  4.  He  not  only 
believes  that  ''no  man,  or  set  of  men,  are  entitled  to  exclusive  or 
separate  emoluments  or  privileges  from  the  community,"  apart 
from  their  merits  and  deserts;  but  he  positively  teaches  that  to 
grant  them  such  favors  is  sinful. 

Com.  Polit.,  Book  III,  Lesson  14 : — ''The  ruler  should  not  be 
appointed  by  heredity  but  by  election,  because  the  qualities  of 

the  sire  are  never  certainties  in  the  son   It  must  be 

understood  that,  of  itself,  election  is  always  better  than  hered- 
ity." 

Comment : 

Aquinas  is  one  with  Aristotle  and  Virginia  in  the  idea  that 
honors  should  not  be  descendible,  where  work  and  worth  are  not, 
and  that  the  key  to  civil  office  should  be  kept  in  the  public 
hand. 

v.— Section  5  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That  the 
ligislative  and  executive  powers  of  the  State  should  be  separate 
and  distinct  from  the  judiciar}^,  and  that  the  members  of  the 
two  first  may  be  restrained  from  oppression,  by  feeling  and 
participating  the  burdens  of  the  people,  they  should,  at  fixed 
periods,  be  reduced  to  a  private  station,  return  into  that  body 
from  which  they  were  originally  taken,  and  the  vacancies  be 
supplied  by  frequent,  certain,  and  regular  elections,  in  which 
all,  or  any  part  of  the  former  members,  to  be  again  eligible,  or 
ineligible  as  the  laws  shall  direct." 

St  Thomas'  doctrine: 

Com.  Polit.,  Book  II,  Lesson  1 : — "It  is  manifest  that,  since 
the  State  is  a  certain  perfect  whole,  it  should  consist  of  specifi- 
cally different  parts.  Hence  it  is  said  in  the  fifth  book  of  the 
Ethics,  that  the  State  is  preserved  by  a  balance  (of  power) 

Com-.  Point.,  Book  IV,  Lesson  12: — "According  to  the  condi- 
tion of  these  parts  (the  deliberative,  the  executive,  and  the  judi- 


186     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

cal) the  State  prospers  or  declines.  And  according  to  the  differ- 
ence of  their  relations  to  each  other,  it  is  necessary  that  states 
differ,  because  through  them  the  commonwealth,  inasmuch  as  it 
it  a  thing  of  order  and  rule,  is  distributed.  One  of  these  parts 
is  that  which  concerns  itself  with  ordinary  civil  affairs.  Another 
is  that  which  regards  rulership,  e.  g. — who  ought  to  be  rulers 
and  of  whom  they  should  be  rulers,  and  how  they  should  be 
appointed,  whether  by  lot  or  election.  The  third  division  deals 
with  the  judicial." 

Comment : 

Thus,  it  seems,  that  Aquinas,  under  the  spirit  of  Aristotle, 
would  go  even  farther  than  the  Virginian  demand,  and  have 
not  only  the  judiciary  "separate  and  distinct"  from  the  legisla- 
tive and  executive  department,  but  would  also  have  the  latter  two 
separate  and  distinct  from  each  other.  At  least  the  idea  was 
not  alien  to  him ;  and  through  him,  it  passed  into  medieval 
Europe. 

Com.  Polit.,  Book  V,  Lesson  13 : — "Certain  rulers  are  in  office 
for  six  months;  certain  others  last  a  year;  still  others,  longer. 
Some  are  not  forever,  but  for  long.  Some  are  neither  forever 
nor  for  long,  but  it  happens  that  the  same  man  frequently  rules. 
Sometimes  the  same  man  does  not  rule  twice,  but  only  once. 
Further  thought  must  be  given  to  the  institution  of  offices — from 
what  they  should  be  instituted,  who  should  institute  them,  and 
in  what  way."     (See  Politics,  Book  VI,  2). 

Comment : 

The  Angelic  Doctor  was  aware  of  the  value  of  the  limited 
tenure  of  office  and  introduced  the  idea  fairly  from  Aristotle 
into  his  political  philosophy. 

VI.— Section  6  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That  elec- 
tions of  members  to  serve  as  representatives  of  the  people  in  as- 
sembly ought  to  be  free;  and  that  all  men,  having  sufficient 
evidence  of  permanent  common  interest  with,  and  attachment 
to,  the  community,  have  the  right  of  suffrage,  and  cannot  be 
taxed  or  deprived  of  their  property  for  public  uses,  without 
their  own  consent,  or  that  of  their  representatives  so  elected, 
nor  bound  by  any  law  to  which  they  have  not,  in  like  manner, 
assembled  for  the  common  good." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  187 

St.  Thomas'  doctrine : 

Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  Q.  €V,  a.  1 : — ''Two  things  are  to  be 
attended  to,  for  the  good  ordination  of  rulers  in  any  state.  One 
of  them  is  that  all  have  some  share  in  the  government,  where- 
by the  popular  peace  is  preserved,  and  all  love  and  protect  such 

a  polity   Such  a  regime  (the  mixed)  belongs  to  all; 

now  because  the  rulers  can  be  chosen  from  all,  again  because 

they  actually  are  thus  chosen   It  is  democratic,  i.  e.  of 

popular  power,  inasmuch  as  the  rulers  can  be  elected  from  the 
people,  and  the  election  of  rulers  belongs  to  the  people.  This 
form  of  government  was  instituted  according  to  divine  law." 

Comment : 

The  fact  and  freedom  of  election  are  features  in  Thomas' 
idea  of  the  best  practical  form  of  government.  He  places  the 
right  of  election  beyond  doubt,  by  tracing  the  kind  of  govern- 
ment which  must  include  it,  to  the  divine  plan. 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  Ch.  14: — ''These  alone  are  parts  of  the 
state  who  help  each  other  in  the  object  of  well  living." 

Comment : 

We  immediately  discern  from  this  and  the  foregoing  that 
St.  Thomas  regarded  all  men,  having  sufficient  evidence  of  per- 
manent common  interest  with,  and  attachment  to,  the  commun- 
ity as  possessing  the  right  of  suffrage. 

De  Regimine  Judaeorum: — "Rulers  of  the  earth  were  in- 
tended by  God  not  to  seek  their  own  benefit,  but  to  secure  the 
common  benefit  of  the  people.  Wherefore  the  revenues  of  lands 
are  so  constituted  that  the  rulers,  living  from  them,  may  refrain 
from  despoiling  the  people." 

"But  sometimes  it  happens  that  the  government  lacks  suf- 
ficient revenue  to  protect  the  country  and  to  pay  reasonable 
current  expenses.  In  such  cases,  it  is  just  that  the  subjects  yield 
that  w^herewith  their  common  benefit  is  secured.  The  fact  is 
that  in  some  countries  the  rulers,  in  accord  with  a  venerable 
custom,  impose  certain  taxes  on  their  subjects  w^hich,  if  not 
immoderate,  can  be  exacted  w^ithout  sin.  Thus  the  ruler,  who 
ser\'es  in  the  interest  of  the  community  can  have  his  living 
from  the  community  and  take  charge  of  the  common  afifairs, 


188     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

from  certain  revenues  or,  if  these  are  wanting  or  inadequate, 
from  the  taxes  which  are  raised  from  each  individual.  The 
case  is  similar,  if  an  emergency  arises  in  which  a  great  expen- 
diture for  the  public  good  is  necessary,  or  for  preserving  the 
honorable  state  of  the  ruler,  to  which  his  own  resources,  or  the 
customary  exactions  are  insufficient;  e.  g.,  in  the  event  of  the 
enemy  invading  the  land,  or  some  other  such  contingency. 
For  them,  over  and  above  the  usual  demands,  the  rulers  can 
licitly  make  a  requisition  for  the  common  good.  But  if  they 
wish  to  exact  more  than  is  customary,  for  their  own  avarice,  or 
because  of  their  own  inordinate  and  immoderate  expenses, 
this  is  absolutely  unwarranted."^^ 

Comment : 

Here  the  Virginian  view  of  taxation  appears  in  medieval 
prototype.  Aquinas  sees  custom  behind  just  and  ordinary 
taxation  and  custom  implies  consent.  He  teaches  that  taxa- 
tion must  be  for  the  common  weal :  and  this  entails  acquiescence, 
for  the  people  cannot  rationally  be  unwilling  to  be  benefited. 
Ordinarily  the  people  are  not  to  be  deprived  of  their  property 
in  any  way. 

Suinma  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XC,  a.  3: — "Properly  law,  first 
and  foremost,  has  reference  to  the  public  w^elfare.  But  to  or- 
dain anything  for  the  public  welfare  is  the  property  either  of 
the  whole  people,  or  of  the  representative  of  the  whole  people." 

Comment : 

That  the  people  are  the  basis  of  just  law,  in  themselves  or 
in  their  representative,  is  as  indubitable  in  Thomistic  politics 
as  in  the  Virginian  Bill  of  Rights.  Every  civil  enactment 
must  in  some  wise  come  from  them  to  be  binding  on  them. 
The  popular  power  in  law  is  further  evidenced  in  the  following : 

Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCVII,  a.  3:— "If  the  multi- 
tude are  free,  and  can  make  laws  for  themselves  (which  is 
Aristotle's  and  St.  Thomas'  idea  of  a  democracy — Politics,  Book 


697  Cf.  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  XI,  et  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVI, 
a.  VIII,  ad  3. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  189 

IV,  Ch.  2),  the  consent  of  the  whole  people  to  any  measure, 
which  custom  manifests,  is  greater  than  the  authority  of  the 
ruler  " 

VII.— Section  7  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights:— 'That  all 
power  of  suspending  laws,  or  the  execution  of  laws,  by  any  au- 
thority, without  consent  of  the  representatives  of  the  people^ 
is  injurious  to  their  rights,  and  ought  not  to  be  exercised." 

Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas: 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LX,  a.  6: — ''As  law^  cannot  be 
established  save  by  public  authority,  so  judgment  cannot  be 
passed  except  by  the  same  authority,  which  extends  itself  to 
those  who  are  subjects  of  the  community.  And  hence,  as  it 
would  be  unjust  that  anyone  should  force  another  to  observe 
a  law  which  was  not  sanctioned  by  public  authority,  so  would 
it  be  unjust  if  anyone  compelled  another  to  bear  judgment 
which  is  not  borne  by  public  authority." 

Comment : 

Aquinas  not  only  considers  law  to  be  of  popular  origin,  but 
also  the  application  of  it.  A  pari,  the  suspension  of  laws  or 
of  the  execution  of  them  should  be  referred  to  the  people  or  to 
their  representatives. 

Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCVII,  a.  4: — "Now  it  happens 
at  times  that  a  precept,  which  is  conducive  to  the  common 
weal  as  a  general  rule,  is  not  good  for  a  particular  individual, 
or  in  some  particular  case,  either  because  it  would  hinder 
some  greater  good,  or  because  it  would  be  the  occasion  of  some 
evil   But  it  would  be  dangerous  to  leave  this  to  the  discre- 
tion of  each  individual,  except  perhaps  by  reason  of  an  evident 
and  sudden  emrgency.  Consequently  he  who  is  placed  over 
a  community  is  empowered  to  dispense  in  a  human  law  that 
rests  upon  his  authority,  so  that,  when  the  law  fails  in  its  ap- 
plication to  persons  or  circumstances,  he  may  allow  the  pre- 
cept of  the  law  not  to  be  observed..  If  however,  he  grant  this  per- 
mission without  any  such  reason,  and  of  his  mere  will,  he  will 
be  an  unfaithful  or  an  imprudent  dispenser:  unfaithful,  if  he 
has  not  the  common  good  in  view;  imprudent,  if  he  ignores 
the  reason  for  granting  dispensations  " 


190     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Comment : 

The  law-making  power  resides  in  the  people  or  their  rep- 
resentatives, but  the  power  of  withholding  legal  force  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  ruler  of  the  community,  for  obvious  reasons. 
However,  he  has  not  the  right  to  exercise  the  power  always  and 
at  will,  but  only  when  the  law  fails,  and  ever  for  the  good  of  the 
people.  Too,  only  in  the  case  of  a  law^  which  ^'rests  on  his 
authority'^  is  he  privileged  to  dispense ;  and  we  recall  Aquinas' 
doctrine  that  law  is  of  the  people  or  of  their  representative. 
If  the  ruler  represents  the  people  in  making  the  law,  equally 
he  must  represent  them  in  suspending  it,  or  the  excution  of  it. 
The  Doctor  is  explicit  that  he  must  not  act  merely  from  his  own 
will  in  the  matter. 

VIII.— Section  8  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights That  in 
all  capital  or  criminal  prosecutions  a  man  hath  a  right  to  de- 
mand the  cause  and  nature  of  his  accusation,  to  be  confronted 
with  the  accusers  and  witnesses,  to  call  for  evidence  in  his  favor, 
and  to  a  speedy  trial  by  an  impartial  jury  of  twelve  men  from 
his  vicinage,  without  whose  unanimous  consent  he  cannot  be 
found  guilty ;  nor  can  he  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against 
himself ;  that  no  man  be  deprived  of  his  liberty,  except  by 
the  law  of  the  land  or  the  judgment  of  his  peers." 

The  Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas: 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXVII,  a.  3: — ''A  judge  is  an 
interpreter  of  justice;  wherefore,  as  the  Philosopher  says 
(Ethic,  v.),  men  have  recourse  to  a  judge  as  to  one  who  is 
the  personification  of  justice.  Now\... justice  is  not  between  a 
man  and  himself  but  between  one  man  and  another.  Hence  a 
judge  must  needs  judge  between  two  parties,  which  is  the  case 
when  one  is  the  prosecutor,  and  the  other  the  defendant. 
Therefore  in  criminal  cases  the  judge  cannot  sentence  a  man 
unless  the  latter  has  an  accuser,  according  to  Acts  XXV,  16: 
It  is  not  the  custom  of  the  Romans  to  condemn  any  man, 
before  that  he  who  is  accused  have  his  accusers  present  and 
have  liberty  to  make  his  answer,  to  clear  himself  of  the  crimes 
of  which  he  is  accused." 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXV,  a.  3:— "It  is  unlawful  to 
imprison  or  in  any  way  detain  a  man,  unless  it  be  done  accord- 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  191 

ing  to  the  order  of  justice,  or  as  a  measure  of  precaution  against 
some  evil." 

Comment : 

Here  St.  Thomas  teaches  the  unlawful  character  of  all  civil 
measures  against  a  man,  beyond  those  which  strict  justice  re- 
quires. In  this  the  right  of  a  speedy  trial  is  implied,  and  is 
further  suggested  in  the  Doctor's  sensible  remark  that,  fetter- 
ing a  man,  we  hinder  him  ''from  doing  not  only  evil,  but  also 
good  deeds."  Too,  the  need  of  promptitude  and  facility  in 
the  administration  of  justice  is  referred  to  as  self-evident  in 
the  Summa,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  2: — ''Since  the  necessity  of 
judgments  frequently  obtains,  access  to  a  judge  should  be 
ready /'^^ 

Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXX,  a.  3 : — "Good  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed of  everyone  unless  the  contrary  appear,  provided  this 
does  not  threaten  injury  to  another  " 

Comment : 

Here  the  right  of  the  accused  to  be  treated  humanely  and 
considerately  prior  to  his  trial,  is  unmistakably  implied. 

Com.  Polit.,  Book  IV,  Lesson  15: — "As  regards  the  secur- 
ity of  jvidges,  the  systems  which  admit  all  the  community  to 

be  judges  in  all  cases  are  most  suitable  to  the  popular  state  

Those  are  most  suitable  to  an  aristocracy  and  a  republic  in 
which  the  judgments  come  partly  from  the  people  and  partly 
from  certain  individuals." 

Idem,  Book  III,  Lesson  1 : — "Nothing  is  more  determina- 
tive of  the  ordinary  citizen  than  that  he  somehow  participates 
in  the  judgment  of  the  State — that  he  has  a  share  in  the  judi- 
cial power  "    Or  again,  "Those  who  cannot  participate  in 

such  offices  (council  and  judicature)  do  not  share  in  the  polity 
at  all  and  therefore  do  not  seem  to  be  citizens.  "^^ 

Comment : 

The  cry  from  such  texts  to  our  modern  idea  of  a  jury  of 


698  Praeierea  7. 

699  St.  Thomas  naturally  refers  here  to  the  type  of  active  citizen 
explained  in  Ch.  III. 


192     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

inen  of  the  prisoner's  own  vicinage  is  not  far.  The  thought 
that  the  people  should  in  some  wise  be  judged  by  the  people 
was  Aristotle's,  and  passed  through  the  Angelic  Doctor's  Com- 
mentary into  medieval  influence.  When  Thomas  teaches  that 
a  man  can  judge  none  other  than  his  subjects,  he  is  not  counter 
to  the  jury  idea;  for  the  accused  is  always,  in  a  manner,  inferior 
to  those  who  are  appointed  to  pass  judgment  on  him.  In 
fact,  Aquinas  speaks  of  juridical  authority  as  both  delegated  and 
ordinary. 

Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXIX,  a.  1 :— ''If  the  judge  asks 
of  him,  (the  accused)  that  which  he  cannot  ask  in  accordance 
with  the  order  of  justice,  the  accused  is  not  bound  to  satisfy 
him.  and  he  may  lawfully  escape  by  appealing  or  otherwise." 

IX.  — Section  9  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights:— ''That  ex- 
cessive bail  ought  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed, 
nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  inflicted." 

St.  Thom<is'  Doctrine : 

SummxL  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CLIX,  a.  1,  ad  1: — "A  rational 
diminution  of  punishments  belongs  to  the  exception  known  as 
epicheia;  but  the  wholesomeness  of  disposition,  from  which  a 
man  is  inclined  to  this,  pertains  to  clemency.  A  positive  excess 
of  punishments,  insofar  as  external  manifestation  is  concerned, 
means  injustice;  and  inasmuch  as  it  signifies  a  hard-heartedness 
which  renders  one  swift  to  increase  punishments,  it  is  of  the 
quality  of  cruelty." 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CLIX,  a.  2,  ad  1 : — "Clemency  is  a 
human  virtue;  wherefore  cruelty,  which  is  a  human  malice, 
is  directly  opposed  to  it." 

X.  — Section  10  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That  gen- 
eral warrants,  whereby  an  officer  or  messenger  may  be  com- 
manded to  search  suspected  places  without  evidence  of  a  fact 
committed,  or  to  seize  any  person  or  persons  not  named,  or 
whose  offence  is  not  particularly  described  and  supported  by 
evidence,  are  grievous  and  oppressive,  and  ought  not  to  be 
granted." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine: 

It  follows  from  his  teaching  that  the  home  is  a  distinct  in- 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  193 

stitution,  prior  to  the  State,  possessive  of  its  own  character  and 
hence  we  must  conclude,  of  its  own  rights,''^^  that  an  undue 
invasion  of  it  even  w^ith  civil  sanction  is  unjust.  He  considers 
the  home  the  civil  unit,  and  a  moral  person.  Summa  TheoL, 
2a  2ae,  Q.  L,  a.  3 : — "The  home  is  midways  between  the  indivi- 
dual and  the  city  or  kingdom ;  for  as  one  single  person  is  part 
of  the  home,  so  is  one  home  part  of  the  city  or  kingdom." 
Hence  he  w^ould  have  the  inviolability  of  the  home,  as  well  as 
of  the  individual,  duly  acknowledged.  Under  the  name 
'^home,"  it  would  seem,  all  private  houses  and  places  may  be 
grouped. 

As  for  the  second  half  of  the  Virginian  claim,  the  Saint's 
doctrine  that  a  man  is  innocent  until  he  is  proved  guilty  and 
-must  be  faced  by  his  accusers  (vide  suj)ra) ,  is  a  strong  sug- 
gestion and  justification  of  it. 

"  XI.— Section  11  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That  in 
controversies  respecting  property,  and  in  suits  between  man 
and  man,  the  ancient  trial  by  jury  is  preferable  to  any  other  and 
ought  to  be  held  sacred." 

For  the  Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas,  vide  supra.  His  Com- 
mentary on  the  Politics  teaches  that  the  practical  judiciary  in 
a  democracy  is,  in  all  cases,  fittinglv,  popular  (Lib.  IV,  lec. 
15). 

XII. — Section  12:  "That  the  freedom  of  the  press  is  one 
of  the  great  bulwarks  of  liberty,  and  can  never  be  restrained  but 
by  despotic  governments." 

St.  Thomas'  doctrine: 

To  be  sure,  the  Doctor,  preceding  Gutenberg  and  Faust  in 
history  by  nearly  two  centuries,  is  silent  about  the  liberty  of 
the  press.  But  he  is  eloquent  on  the  right  of  conscience  and 
speech.  His  thoughts  on  these  subjects,  conceived  in  a  pecu- 
liarly religious  age,  are  naturally  bound  up  in  the  topic  of 
non-iChristians  and  recusants  from  the  Faith.  Here,  particular- 
ly, his  principle  must  be  disting-uished  from  its  historical  ap- 
plication.   And  his  principle,  democratically  enough,  is  this: 


700  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  I,  lec.  1: — "Duplex  est  communltas  omnibus 
manifesta,  scilicet  civitatis  et  domus." 


194     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

"Those  who  have  never  accepted  the  faith  are  in  no  wise  to 
be  forced  into  it;  for  to  believe  is  an  act  of  the  w^ll."  (Summa 
TheoL,  2a  2ae  Q.  X,  a.  8).  His  advocacy  of  freedom  of  con- 
science is  hardly  destroyed  in  principle  by  his  additional  teach- 
ing that  those  who  have  freely  accepted  the  faith  are  bound  to 
fulfill  its  obligations. 

Of  speech,  he  plainly  admits  the  right ;  but  he  speaks  rather 
on  the  abuse  and  misapplication  of  it,  the  better  to  keep  it 
from  brimming  over  into  a  license,  and  into  that  vulgarity 
which  once  caused  Lord  Morely  to  describe  the  Press  as  "a  per- 
petual engine  for  keeping  discussion  on  a  low  level."  Summa 
Theol,  2a  2ae,  Q.  X,  a.  7,  ad  1,  2 :— "The  Apostle  does  not  forbid 
disputation  itself  but  the  excess  of  it,  which  makes  for  much 
wrangling  rather  than  sound  thought."  And  again,  "That 
law  (the  law  of  Martianus  Augustus,  confirmed  by  canons  and 
expressed  thus:  'It  is  an  insult  to  the  judgment  of  the  most 
religious  synod,  if  anyone  ventures  to  debate  or  dispute  in 
public  about  matters  which  have  once  been  judged  and  disposed 
of  ),  forbade  those  public  disputations,  which  arise  from  doubt- 
ing the  faith,  but  not  those  which  are  for  the  safe-guarding 
thereof." 

Comment  : 

In  other  words,  Aquinas  insists  that  constructive  criticisn 
should  be  the  aim  of  free  speech,  and  that  disputants  have  no 
right  to  disrespect  authorities  greater  than  themselves. 

Ibidem,  ad  3 : — "One  ought  to  dispute  about  matters  of  Faith 
not  as  though  one  doubted  about  them,  but  in  order  to 
make  the  truth  known  and  to  confute  errors.  For,  in  order 
to  confirm  the  faith,  it  is  necessary  sometimes  to  dispute  with 
unbelievers,  sometimes  by  defending  the  faith,  according  to 
I  Pet.  Ill,  15: — 'Being  ready  always  to  satisfy  everyone  that 
asketh  you  a  reason  of  that  hope  and  faith  which  is  in  you\ 
Sometimes  again,  it  is  necessary  in  order  to  convince  those  who 
are  in  error,  according  to  Titus,  I,  9: — 'That  tve  may  be  able 
to  exhort  in  sound  doctrine  and  to  convince  the  gainsay ers' /' 

Comment : 

These  monitions  of  Aquinas  on  the  proper  use  and  purpose 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  195 

of  free  thought  and  speech  assume  the  right  of  them;  and 
assuming  it,  they  teach  it  J^^ 

XIII.— Section  13  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That  a 
well-regulated  militia,  composed  of  the  body  of  the  people, 
trained  to  arms,  is  the  proper,  natural,  and  safe  defence  of  a 
free  State;  that  standing  armies,  in  time  of  peace,  should  be 
avoided  as  dangerous  to  liberty ;  and  that  in  all  cases  the  mili- 
tary should  be  under  strict  subordination  to,  and  governed  by 
the  civil  power." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine: 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  XL,  a.  1 : — "It  is  not  the  business 

of  a  private  individual  to  start  war  likewise  even  to  summon 

together  the  people,  which  has  to  be  done  in  war."  In  this  text 
is  reflected  his  idea  of  a  "militia,  composed  of  the  body  of  the 
people,  trained  to  arms."  The  people  are  not  to  depend  on  a 
standing  army,  but  are  to  be  ready  to  rise  up,  not  at  the  in- 
stigation of  any  dissenter,  but  at  the  just  call  of  their  govern- 
ment, to  defend  their  State.  Thomas  writes  in  the  De  Regimine, 
Lib.  I,  cap.  13,  that  a  place  should  be  provided  for  military 
exercise  (ubi  exercitia  militum).  Finally,  his  principles 
on  peace  and  his  dominant  regard  for  the  common  good,  are 
instinct  with  the  spirit  of  which  this  particular  Virginian  right 
is  the  spirit.  It  is  patent  that  he  teaches  the  subordination  of  the 
military  power  to  the  civil;  for  only  at  the  command  of  the 
government  may  the  army  operate.  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae, 
Q.  XL,  a.  1 : — "And  as  the  care  of  the  common  weal  is  com- 
mitted to  those  who  are  in  authority,  it  is  their  business  to 
watch  over  the  welfare  of  the  city,  kingdom,  or  province  com- 
mitted to  them.    And  just  as  it  is  lawful  for  them  to  have 


TOlWith  regard  to  freedom  of  speech  and  the  press,  a  reviewer  of 
Zechariah  Chafee's  book  (Freedom  of  Speech,  New  York,  Harcourt, 
Brace  and  Co.,  1921)  pointedly  remarks:  "Some  literal-minded  persons 
have  thought  that  when  the  Constitution  says  'Congress  shall  make  no 
law, — abridging  the  freedom  of  speech  or  of  the  press',  it  confers  a 
constitutonal  rght  to  commit  all  manner  of  crime  as  long  as  the  instru- 
ment employed  is  the  spoken  or  written  word.  Upon  this  simple 
theory  Congress  could  not  punish  a  man  who  published  the  dates  of 
sailing  of  troop  ships  during  a  submarine  campaign,  or  who  orally  or 
in  writing  solicited  another  to  assassinate  the  President."  The  New 
Republic,  Mar.  23,  1921,  p.  112. 


196     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

recourse  to  the  sword  in  defending  that  common  weal  against 
internal  disturbers,  when  they  punish  evil-doers — so  too,  it  is 
their  business  to  have  recourse  to  the  sword  of  war  in  defending 
the  common  interest  against  external  enemies." 

XIV.— Section  14  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights:— ''That  the 
people  have  a  right  to  uniform  government,  that  no  government 
separate  from,  or  independent  of  the  government  of  Virginia 
ought  to  be  erected  or  established  within  the  limits  thereof," 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

The  right  of  uniform  government  is  evident  in  the  Doctor's 
definition  of  society  and  his  teaching  on  unity.  Contra  impug- 
nates  Dei  cidtum,  ch.  Ill : — ''Society  is  a  gathering  of  men  for 
a  set  purpose;  and  therefore  according  to  the  diverse  aims 
which  society  set«  itself,  should  societies  be  distinguished  and 
judged."  De  Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  1 : — "We  differ  in  our  particu- 
lar ends,  but  in  the  common  good  we  are  one."  Idem,  ch.  2: — 
"The  good  and  safety  of  a  multitude  dwelling  together  is  that 
its  unity,  which  is  called  peace,  should  be  presen'ed;  for,  if  it 
is  removed,  the  service  of  civil  life  crumbles  and  the  people, 
with  their  dissensions,  become  a  burden  to  themselves."  Ibi- 
dem : — "The  many  are  said  to  be  united  in  proportion  to  their 
approach  to  a  unit." 

AVhen  we  juxtapose  to  these  texts  some  of  St.  Thomas'  re- 
marks on  patriotism,  we  see  the  better  how  little  he  inclined 
to  any  measure  which  would  tear  the  unity  of  the  State.  *S'ii77i- 
ma  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CI,  a.  3,  ad  3 : — "We  love  our  country, 
because  it  is  a  certain  principle  of  our  being.''  Ibidem,  a.  1: — 
"Next  to  God,  a  man  is  most  indebted  to  his  parents  and  his 
country.  And  therefore,  if  it  is  the  office  of  religion  to  render 
homage  to  God,  so,  in  a  less  degree  is  it  a  principle  of  piety 
to  render  homage  to  one's  parents  and  one's  country." 

Comment : 

The  Angelic  Doctor  views  the  State  as  a  sacred  whole  which 
should  never  be  severed,  and  hence  should  be  administered  by 
a  single  legislature.  In  fact,  whatever  tendency  to  monarchy 
he  manifests,  springs  from  a  defence  of  this  very  Virginian 
right  itself:  uniform  government. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  197 

XV.— Section  15  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— 'That  no 
free  government,  or  the  blessings  of  liberty,  can  be  reserved  to 
any  people,  but  by  a  firm  adherence  to  justice,  moderation,  tem- 
perance, frugality,  and  virtue,  and  by  frequent  recurrence  to 
fundamental  principles." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LVIII,  a.  5: — ^'Justice  directs 
man  in  his  relations  with  other  men.  Now  this  may  happen 
in  two  ways :  first  as  regards  his  relations  with  individuals ;  sec- 
ondly, as  regards  his  relations  with  others  in  general,  insofar 
as  a  man  who  serves  a  community,  serves  all  those  who  are 
included  in  that  community.  Accordingly,  justice  in  its  proper 
acceptation  can  be  directed  to  another  in  both  these  senses. 
Now  it  is  evident  that  all  who  are  included  in  a  community 
stand  in  relation  to  that  community  as  parts  to  a  whole; 
while  a  part,  as  such,  belongs  to  a  whole,  so  that  whatever  is  the 
good  of  a  part  can  be  directed  to  the  good  of  the  whole.  It 
fellows,  therefore,  that  the  good  of  any  virtue,  whether  such 
virtue  direct  man  in  relation  to  himself,  or  in  relation  to  cer- 
tain individual  persons,  is  referable  to  the  common  good,  to 
which  justice  directs;  so  that  all  acts  of  virtue  can  pertain  to 
justice,  insofar  as  it  directs  man  to  the  common  good.  It  is 
in  this  sense  that  justice  is  called  a  general  virtue.  And  since 
it  belongs  to  the  law  to  direct  to  the  common  good,  it  follows  that 
the  justice  which  is  in  this  way  styled  general,  is  called  legal 
justice,  because  thereby  man  is  in  harmony  with  the  law  which 
directs  the  act  of  all  the  virtues  to  the  common  good." 

Comment : 

Obviously  justice,  from  St.  Thomas'  exposition  of  it,  must  be 
in  causal  relation  to  the  common  good,  which  includes  all  ''the 
blessings  of  liberty."  We  have  noted,  elsewhere,  the  growing 
tendency  in  our  day  to  identify  democracy  with  justice.  There 
can  be  no  harmony,  security,  or  consistency  in  human  so- 
ciety unless  each  individual  is  granted  his  due.  More  than 
this,  democracy  could  not  ask  nor  a  free  government  promise; 
and  no  less  than  this  is  the  Thomistic  demand  and  doctrine. 

Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CXLII,  a.  4: — "Intemperance  is 


198     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

particularly  opprobrious  to  man  for  two  reasons :  first,  because 
it  is  opposed  to  his  specific  excellence,  since  it  is  concerned  with 

pleasures  which  are  shared  in  common  with  brute  creation  ; 

secondly  because  it  is  antagonistic  to  brightness  and  to  beauty, 
inasmuch  as,  in  the  delights  which  it  entails,  the  light  of  reason 
is  dimmed,  whence  all  the  brilliance  and  charm  of  virtue  appear. 
And  so  pleasures  of  this  kind  are  called  extremely  servile." 

Idem,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCII,  a.  1,  ad  3: — "It  is  impossible  for  the 
common  good  of  a  state  to  obtain,  unless  the  citizens  (at  least 
those  who  have  the  government  in  their  hands)  be  virtuous." 

Comment : 

These  texts  suggest  the  incompatibility  of  democracy  with 
vice.  Democracy  requires  a  government  of  freemen;  and,  ac- 
cording to  St.  Thomas,  intemperance  renders  the  individual  a 
slave.  A  man  must  be  master  of  himself,  to  be  a  fitting  citizen 
in  a  democracy,  which  is  really  at  the  mercy  of  the  individual. 
For  in  such  a  form  of  government,  every  citizen  has  a  hand. 

As  for  the  "frequent  recurrence  to  fundamental  principle,'' 
on  which  the  Virginia  Bill  insists,  the  politics  of  St.  Thomas 
in  their  totality  are  a  corroborative  doctrine.  Not  once  does 
he  snap  connection  with  principles,  to  indulge  a  dizzy,  specta- 
cular flight.  His  majestic  concept  of  the  natural  law  is  the 
beginning,  the  guide,  and  the  end  of  his  political  thought.  It 
is  the  consistent  and  immutable  source  of  rights,  as  well  as  the 
vindication  of  duties.  It  perpetually  prescribes  reason,  and  ap- 
proves all  reasonable  ideas  of  State.  It  teaches  not  only  liberty, 
but  law;  not  only  culture,  but  service;  not  only  justice,  but 
charity;  not  only  peace,  but  prudence.  So  earnestly  does 
Aquinas  cling  to  its  principles,  that  he  may  be  accused  of  im- 
practicality.  But  such  a  judgment  would  be  as  unjust  to  him 
as  to  the  Fathers  of  Virginia,  who  set  their  own  State  and 
our  nascent  Republic  such  noble  political  ideals. 

XVI.— Section  16  of  the  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights :— "That 
religion  or  the  duty  which  we  owe  to  our  Creator,  and  the 
manner  of  discharging  it,  can  be  directed  only  by  reason  and 
conviction,  not  by  force  or  violence ;  and  therefore  all  men  are 
equally  entitled  to  the  free  exercise  of  religion,  according  to  the 
dictates  of  conscience;  and  that  it  is  the  mutual  duty  of  all  to 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  199 

practice  Christian  forbearance,  love,  and  charity  towards  each 
Other." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

See  Sec.  12;  ''Those  who  have  never  accepted  the  Faith  are 
in  nowise  to  be  forced  into  it,  for  to  believe  is  an  act  of  the  will." 

Again,  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  CIV,  a.  5: — "In  those 
things  which  appertain  to  the  interior  working  of  the  will,  man 
is  not  bound  to  obey  man,  but  God  only." 

Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  XXVI,  a.  4,  ad  3 :— "As  Augus- 
tine asserts  in  his  Rule,  the  saying  'charity  seeks  not  her  own' 
means  that  it  prefers  the  common  to  the  private  good.  Now 
the  common  good  is  always  more  lovable  to  the  individual  than 
his  private  good,  even  as  the  good  of  the  whole  is  more  lovable 
to  the  part,  than  the  latter's  own  partial  good." 

Idem,  Q.  XXXI,  a.  2,  ad  1 : — "Absolutely  speaking,  it  is 
impossible  to  do  good  to  every  single  one :  yet  it  is  true  of  each 
individual  that  one  may  be  bound  to  do  good  to  him  in  some 
particular  case.  Hence  charity  binds  us,  though  not  actually 
doing  good  to  someone,  to  be  heartily  ready  to  do  good  to 
anyone  if  the  opportunity  presents  itself." 

Idem,  a.  3,  ad  2 : — "The  common  good  of  many  is  more 
God-like  than  the  good  of  one  individual.  Wherefore  it  is  a 
virtuous  action  for  a  man  to  endanger  even  his  own  life,  either 
for  the  spiritual  or  for  the  temporal  good  of  his  country." 

Comment : 

Aquinas  teaches  that  one's  Christian  attitude  must  not  be 
limited  by  one's  social  sphere.  The  helping  hand  should  not 
be  exclusive,  but  warm  with  democracy.  The  individual  is  to 
think  and  feel  in  large  terms,  breaking  the  husks  of  pusilani- 
mity  and  recognizing  that  humanity  is  bigger  than  self.  Here 
is  not  only  democracy,  but  also  the  assurance  and  protection 
of  it. 

The  Massachusetts  Declaration  of  Rights  (1780)  is  length- 
ier than  the  Virginian,  but  substantially  the  same.  The  origi- 
nal third  article  of  the  Bill  mingles  civics  and  religion  in  a 
manner  to  make  the  anti-medieval  American  frown ;  for  right 
here  in  a  document,  couched  by  the  very  goddess  of  Liberty, 


200     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

we  see  an  admission  of  the  moral  influence  of  the  Church  on 
the  Stat«,  and  an  admiration  for  it.  We  feel  all  the  more 
certain  that  the  role  which  Thomas  assigns  religion  in  the  Stat€ 
does  not  limit  his  appreciation  of  liberty  in  the  least.  ^'As  the 
happiness  of  a  people,"  declared  Massachusetts,  ''and  the  good 
order  and  preservation  of  civil  government  depend  upon  piety, 
religion,  and  morality;  and  as  these  cannot  be  generally  dif- 
fused through  a  community  but  by  the  institution  of  the  pub- 
lic worship  of  God,  and  of  public  institutions  in  piety,  religion, 
and  moralty:  Therefore,  to  promote  their  happiness,  and  to 
secure  the  good  order  and  preservation  of  their  government, 
the  people  of  this  commonwealth  have  a  right  to  invest  their 
legislature  with  power  to  authorize  and  require,  and  the  legis- 
lature shall,  from  time  to  time,  authorize  and  require,  the  sev- 
eral towns,  parishes,  precincts,  and  other  bodies  politic,  or  re- 
ligious societies,  to  make  suitable  provision,  at  their  own  ex- 
pense, for  the  institution  of  the  public  worship  of  God,  and 
for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  public  Protestant  teachers 
of  piety,  religion  and  morality,  in  all  cases  where  such  provision 
shall  not  be  made  voluntarily.  And  the  people  of  this  com- 
monwealth have  also  a  right  to,  and  do,  invest  their  legisla- 
ture with  authority  to  enjoin  upon  all  the  sujects  an  attend- 
ance upon  the  instructions  of  the  public  teachers  aforesaid,  at 
stated  times  and  seasons,  if  there  be  any  on  whose  instructions 
they  can  conscientiously  and  conveniently  attend. ""^^^ 

We  find  in  the  Summa,  2a  2ae,  Q.  XCIX,  a.  3 :— 'The  di- 
vine law  is  principally  instituted  to  direct  the  relations  of  men 
to  God;  but  the  human  law,  chiefly  to  regulate  the  relations 
of  men  to  each  other.  Therefore  human  laws  have  not  the 
care  of  instituting  anything  with  regard  to  divine  worship,  save 
in  reference  to  the  common  good.  They  have  indeed  established 
many  things  with  regard  to  sacred  concerns,  accordingly  as 


702  Article  III.  (Amendment,  Art.  XI,  was  substituted  for  this.) 
After  proclaiming  for  "the  support  and  maintenance  of  public  Protest- 
ant teachers,"  the  Article,  more  justly  than  consistently,  reads: — "And 
every  denomination  of  Christians,  demeaning  themselves  peaceably, 
and  as  good  subjects  of  the  commonwealth,  shall  be  equally  under  the 
protection  of  the  law:  and  no  subordination  of  any  one  sect  or  denomi- 
nation to  another  shall  ever  be  established  by  law." 


ST.  THOMAS^  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY  201 

it  seemed  expedient  to  them,  in  order  to  strengthen  the  morals 
of  men,  as  appears  in  the  rite  of  the  Gentiles." 

Comment : 

A  comparison  of  St.  Thomas'  paragraph  with  the  Massachu- 
setts article  evinces  that  the  latter  is  the  stronger  and  the  bolder, 
though  written  in  the  very  hey-dey  of  the  spirit  of  American 
liberty.  It  was  later  mollified  and  became  Article  XI  of  the 
Amendments.  Governmental  attention  to  expenses  and  co- 
ercion in  the  matter  of  religious  instruction  are  not  mentioned 
in  the  new  version.  In  its  softer  tones,  the  Article  sounds  even 
more  Thomistic  than  before. 

Articles  I  and  II  deal  with  the  liberty,  equality,  and  inalien- 
able rights  of  man  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Aquinas  concedes, 
and  with  the  freedom  of  conscience,  which  his  politics  likewise 
teaches. 

Articles  IV  and  V  express  the  popular  origin  of  power  and 
the  amenability  of  the  "magistrates  and  officers  of  the  govern- 
ment" to  the  governed.  The  De  Regimine  speaks  unequivo- 
cally: ''If  any  society  of  people  have  the  right  of  choosing  a 
ruler  for  themselves,  there  is  no  injustice  if  he  be  deposed  by 
them,  or  curbed  in  power,  when,  by  a  royal  tyranny,  he  abuses 
his  position.  Nor  is  such  a  society  to  be  accounted  unfaithful 
in  this  deposition  of  the  despot,  even  had  it  previously  sworn 
to  him  perpetually ;  for  he  deserved  to  be  deserted  for  not  keep- 
ing faith  in  the  ruling  of  his  people.  Fidelity  is  an  obligation 
on  the  ruler's  part,  if  the  compact  made  with  him  by  the 
subjects  is  to  be  maintained." 

Comment : 

This  text  gives  the  coup  de  grace  to  George  the  Third  as 
effectively  as  any  colonial  effusion.  It  is  the  essence  of  the 
logic  which  gave  birth  to  our  republic.  And  if  the  superior 
executive  in  the  State  is  bound  to  the  brain  and  will  of  the 
people,  much  more  are  the  inferiors.  Articles  IV  and  V  are 
quite  Thomistic. 

Article  VI  is  concerned  with  civic  honors  and  heredity.  We 
have  already  seen  the  opposition  of  Aquinas  to  political  fa- 
voritism and  inheritance. 


202     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Article  VII,  the  ''common  good".  This  is  the  most  recur- 
rent phrase  in  St.  Thomas'  poUtics  and  well  expresses  its 
scope  and  object. 

Article  VIII,  the  limited  tenure  of  office.  Which  is  in  uni- 
son with  the  teaching  of  the  Stagirite  and  the  Saint  that,  in 
a  democracy,  public  service  should  be  open  to  all  who  qualify, 
and  that  opportunity  should  be  general. 

Article  IX,  suffrage  for  ''all  the  inhabitants  of  this  common- 
wealth, having  such  qualifications  as  they  shall  establish  by 
their  frame  of  government."  This  tenet,  too,  is  Thomistic. 
Aquinas,  as  seen,  teaches  the  popular  vote:  "From  the 
people  the  rulers  can  be  elected,  and  to  the  people  belongs  the 
election  of  them."'^^^ 

Art.  X  and  XI,  the  individual's  right  to  protection.  Now 
St.  Thomas  vindicates  for  the  individual  not  only  the  needs 
of  life,  but  the  preservation  and  the  improvement  of  them.  He 
teaches  that  the  government  must  interest  itself  in  these  ob- 
jects. De  Beg.,  Book  I,  ch.  13 : — "Provision  must  be  made  that 
each  individual  be  supplied  with  necessities  according  to  his 
condition  and  state,  for,  otherwise,  a  kingdom  or  state  could 
not  hold  together  at  all."  And  in  Chapter  XIV:— "The  rul- 
er's mind  should  be  bent  on  this  special  study :  how  the  people 
subject  to  him  may  live  well.  And  this  study  is  tripartite: 
first,  he  must  institute  this  good  living  among  his  subjects; 
secondly,  started,  he  should  preserve  it;  thirdly,  preserved, 
he  should  improve  it." 

Comment : 

Massachusetts  guarantees  protection  to  the  individual.  Thom- 
istic politics  does  as  much,  and  more.  Not  only  protection, 
but  subsistence,  are  the  Saint's  insistence.  The  Bay  State 
proclaims  the  necessity  of  religion  in  the  republic,  if  morality 
is  to  prevail.  Aquinas  says  as  much,  and  more.  He  believes 
and  teaches  that  virtue  is  partly  conditioned  by  temporalities 
and  that  the  government  should,  therefore,  seek  to  assure 
every  worthy  citizen  of  a  sufficiency  of  bodily  goods.  De 
Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  15: — "Two  things  are  required  for  a  good 


703  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  Q.  CV,  a.  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  203 

life:  the  principal  one  is  working  according  to  virtue  (for  it 
is  virtue  by  which  we  live  well)  ;  the  other  is  secondary  and 
in  a  way  instrumental,  viz.  a  sufficiency  of  bodily  goods,  the 
use  of  which  is  necessary  to  an  act  of  virtue."  Aquinas  would 
no  more  have  a  hungry  man  in  the  State  than  a  wronged  one. 
His  teaching  makes  the  Massachusetts  declaration  look  some- 
what timid  and  tame. 

Art.  XII  bespeaks  the  right  of  the  accused  to  self-defence 
and  trial.  St.  Thomas'  doctrine  on  this  point  has  already 
been  indicated.  But  the  Article  additionally  declares  the 
right  of  judgment  according  to  the  law  of  the  land.  Of  this 
the  Angelic  Doctor  has  to  say,  in  the  Summa,  2a  2ae,  Q.  XL, 
a.  5 : — "It  is  necessary  that  judgment  be  passed  according  to 
the  written  law,  else  it  would  fall  foul  either  of  the  natural 
or  of  the  positive  right." 

Art.  XIII  prescribes  a  point  of  judicial  prudence,  rather 
than  a  right.  It  is  a  safeguard  of  justice  to  the  accused,  and, 
as  such,  it  is  not  far  from  being  a  practical  version  or  appli- 
cation of  St.  Thomas'  principles:  ''The  fact  that  the  judge 
himself  was  an  eye-witness,  does  not  authorize  him  to  pro- 
ceed to  pass  sentence,  except  according  to  the  order  of  judicial 
procedure"  {Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXVII,  a.  3,  ad  2), 
and  "Good  is  to  be  presumed  of  everyone  unless  the  contrary  ap- 
pear" (Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q.  LXX,  a.  3,  ad  2).  The 
Article  reads:  "In  criminal  presecutions,  the  verification  of 
facts,  in  the  vicinity  where  they  happen  is  one  of  the  greatest 
securities  of  the  life,  liberty,  and  property  of  the  citizen.*' 
Aquinas  teaches  the  requirement  of  rigid  juridical  proof  and 
expresses  himself  in  terms  large  enough  to  include  and  ap- 
prove any  reasonable  plan  for  its  attainment.  His  concern 
that  "the  life,  liberty,  and  property  of  the  citizen"  be  secured 
from  untoward  judgment,  is  plain  in  his  monition  that  "it 
is  better  to  err  frequently  through  thinking  well  of  a  wicked 
man,  than  to  err  less  frequently  through  having  an  evil  opin- 
ion of  a  good  man;  because  in  the  latter  case  an  injury  is  in- 
flicted, but  not  in  the  former."  (Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  Q. 
LX,  a.  4,  ad  1). 

Art.  XIV,  security  against  ureasonable  search  or  arrest. 
St.  Thomas'  corresponding  thought  on  this  subject  has  already 


204     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

been  disclosed.  As  is  also  the  case  with  regard  to  Art.  XV, 
which  speaks  of  trial  by  jury ;  to  Art.  XVI,  claiming  liberty  of 
thought  and  expression;  to  Art.  XVII,  concerning  military 
provision;  to  Art.  XVIII,  maintaining  the  necessity  of  a  fre- 
quent recurrence  to  fundamental  principles. 

Art.  XIX: — ^'The  people  have  a  right,  in  an  orderly  and 
peaceful  manner,  to  assemble  to  consult  upon  the  common 
good,  give  instructions  to  their  representatives,  and  to  request 
of  the  legislative  body,  by  the  way  of  addresses,  petitions  and 
remonstrances,  redress  of  the  wrongs  done  them,  and  of  the 
grievances  they  suffer." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

De  Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  6: — ''If  any  society  of  people  have  the 
right  of  choosing  a  king  for  themslves,  it  is  not  unjust  if  he  be 

deposed  by  the  same  But  if  it  belong  to  the  right  of  some 

higher  power  to  provide  the  people  with  a  king,  the  remedy  for 
the  cruelty  of  the  tyrant  is  to  be  looked  for  from  it." 

Comment : 

Here,  by  teaching  the  right  of  popular  assertion  against 
civil  wrongs,  the  Doctor  necessarily  implies  the  right  of  the 
people  to  meet  for  that  purpose.  In  the  case  where  a  civil 
body  is  a  buffer  between  the  multitude  and  the  chief  official, 
Aquinas  apparently  would  have  him  dealt  with  through  the 
agency  of  that  body.  The  important  fact  is  that  he  vindi- 
cates the  right  of  the  people  to  be  in  practical  relation  to  their 
own  welfare  and  to  their  legislature:  which  is  the  sum-total 
of  the  Massachusetts  requirement. 

Art.  XX  deals  with  the  power  of  suspending  laws.  We 
have  already  noted  the  accordant  thought  of  Aquinas  in  the 
matter.  This  is  true  of  Art.  XXI,  on  freedom  of  speech,  which 
merely  claims  and  applies  the  principle  to  the  practical  case 
of  discussions  in  both  houses  of  the  legislature. 

Art.  XXII: — ''The  legislature  ought  frequently  to  assemble 
for  the  redress  of  grievances,  for  correcting,  straightening, 
and  confirming  the  laws,  and  for  making  new  laws,  as  the 
common  good  requires." 

St.  Thomas  Doctrine : 

Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  cap.  9: — "Law  is  a  universal  affair, 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  205 

and  particular  instances  will  arise.  The  legislator  cannot 
foresee  all  the  cases  in  which  the  law  may  be  defective  and 
consequently  he  sometimes  errs." 

Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCVII,  a.  2: — ''Human  law  is 
rightly  changed,  insofar  as  such  change  is  conducive  to  the 
common  weal.  But,  to  a  cert-ain  extent,  the  mere  change  of 
law  is  prejudicial  to  the  common  good:  because  custom  avails 
much  for  the  observance  of  laws,  seeing  that  what  is  done 
contrary  to  general  custom,  even  in  slight  matters,  is  looked 
upon  as  grave.  Consequently,  when  a  law  is  changed,  the 
binding  power  of  the  law  is  diminished,  in  so  far  as  custom 
is  abolished.  Wherefore  human  law  should  never  be  changed, 
unless,  in  some  way  or  other,  the  common  weal  be  compensated 
according  to  the  extent  of  the  harm  done  in  this  respect. 
Such  compensation  may  arise  either  from  any  great  and  very 
evident  benefit  conferred  by  the  new  enactment;  or  from  the 
extreme  urgency  of  the  case,  due  to  the  fact  that  either  the 
existing  law  is  clearly  unjust  or  its  observ^ance  extremely  harm- 
ful. Wherefore  the  Jurist  says  {Pandect.  Justin.  I.)  that  in 
establishing  new  laws,  there  should  be  evidence  of  the  benefit  to 
be  derived,  before  departing  from  a  law  which  has  long  been 
considered  just." 

Comment : 

St.  Thomas  realizes  both  the  stability  and  the  inadequacy 
of  law,  and  teaches  the  necessity  of  remedying  and  perfecting. 
This  includes  the  further  necessity  of  the  legislative  body  meet- 
ing as  frequently  as  the  duty  of  making  new  laws  and  the 
amelioration  or  confirmation  of  old  ones  requires. 

Art.  XXIII:  ''No  subsidy,  charge,  tax,  impost,  or  duties 
ought  to  be  established,  fixed,  laid,  or  leveled  under  any  pre- 
text whatsoever,  without  the  consent  of  the  people  or  their 
representatives  in  the  legislature." 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

De  Regimine  Judaeorum  ad  Ducissam  Brabantiae:  "If  they 
(rulers)  wish  to  levy  any  tax  beyond  that  which  is  fixed,  out 
of  the  lust  alone  of  possessing,  or  on  account  of  inordinate 
and  immoderate  expenses,  this  is  absolutely  illicit." 


206     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

Again,  '^Rulers  of  the  earth  are  estabhshed  by  God  not  to 
seek  their  own  advantage  but  the  common  good  of  the  people." 

Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XC,  a.  3: — 'To  ordain  any- 
thing for  the  common  good  is  the  prerogative  of  the  whole 
people  or  of  their  representative." 

Comment : 

These  texts  teach  all  that  Art.  XXIII  comprises :  the  odious- 
ness  of  ''taxation  without  representation."  The  substance 
of  the  shibolleth  which  blazed  the  way  to  the  American  Revo- 
lution had  lain  in  the  pages  of  St.  Thomas  for  five  centuries 
before  the  Boston  Tea-Party. 

Art.  XXIV : — "Laws  made  to  punish  for  actions  done  before 
the  existence  of  such  laws,  and  which  have  not  been  declared 
crimes  by  preceding  laws,  are  unjust,  oppressive,  and  incon- 
sistent with  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  free  government.  ' 

St.  Thomas'  Doctrine : 

Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCV,  a.  1: — "  Legislators  judge 
in  universal  terms,  and  for  the  future." 

Comment : 

Here  the  Angelic  Doctor  expressses  his  view  of  law  as  a 
guide  and  remedy  toward  civil  betterment,  and  therefore  as 
futuristic  in  operation  and  not  as  retroactive  .  According  to 
him,  it  affords  a  remedy  for  the  future  and  not  a  penalty  for 
an  isolated  past.  Law  primarily  is  not  punitive;  it  is  secon- 
darily so,  but  essentially  directive.  "Because  we  find  certain 
violent  individuals,  prone  to  vice,  who  cannot  easily  be  moved,'' 
he  writes,  "it  was  necessary  that  by  force  or  fear  they  be  with- 
held from  evil,  in  order  that,  desisting  from  wrong-doing, 
they  might  grant  a  quiet  life  to  others,  and  that  they  them- 
selves in  such  wise  should  at  length  be  induced  to  do  freely  what 
they  have  previously  effected  through  fear,  and  so  become  vir- 
tuous." (Summa  TheoL,  la  2ae,  Q.  XCV,  a.  1).  Aquinas  thus 
teaches  that  law  naturally  cures  rather  than  destroys,  and 
should  keep  its  face  to  the  future  rather  than  to  the  past.  Retro- 
active legislation  seems  antithetical  to  his  idea  and  doctrine. 

Art.  XXV  may  be  assimilated  into  Art.  XXX. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  207 

Art.  XXVI  declares  against  excessive  bail,  fines,  and  punish- 
ments ;  on  which  we  have  already  had  the  statement  of  Aquinas. 

Art.  XXVII  proclaims  the  privacy  of  the  home.  This  fol- 
lows from  the  character  of  the  home  as  a  distinct  institution, 
which  St.  Thomas  teaches. 

Art.  XXVIII,  dealing  with  court-marshal,  and  maintaining 
that  only  those  are  subject  to  that  law  who  are  employed  in  the 
army  and  navy,  implies  the  right  of  the  ordinary  trial  by  jury. 
We  have  considered  Thomistic  texts  in  this  regard. 

Art.  XXX  speaks  of  the  separation  of  the  three  departments 
of  Government.  The  relation  of  this  idea  to  Thomistic  doc- 
trine has  been  indicated. 

These  various  texts  sufficiently  show  that  the  master-mind 
of  the  Middle  Age  may  not  have  been  altogether  remote  from 
the  birth  of  the  American  Republic.  The  seed  of  his  politics 
sprouted  in  the  centuries.  He  taught  men  what  they  could 
not  forget.  Besides,  the  Popes,  all  of  them,  from  Urban  IV, 
his  contemporary,  down  to  Benedict  XV,  have  used  their  high- 
est sanctions  to  keep  his  voice,  so  eloquent  of  true  democracy, 
a  living  thing  in  w^orld-thought ;  so  that  the  final  political  har- 
vest was  a  fore-gone  conclusion. 

One  has  but  to  turn  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
compare  it  with  Thomistic  doctrine,  to  be  further  convinced  of 
the  intellectual  relationship  of  Aquinas  to  the  liberty  we  enjoy. 
All  the  "self-evident  truths"  in  the  document  are  points  of 
his  politics. 


THE  DECLARATION 

(1)  . — "That  all  men  are  cre- 
ated equal." 

(2)  . — "That  they  have  been 
endowed  by  their  Creator  with 
certain  inalienable  rights;  that 
among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and 
the  pursuit  of  happiness," 


DOCTRINE    OF    ST.  THOMAS 

(1)  . — "Nature  made  all  men 
equal  in  liberty."  2  Sent.,  d. 
XLIV,  q.  1,  a.  3. 

(2)  . — "In  those  things  which 
pertain  to  the  inner  volitional 
life,  man  is  amenable  only  to 
God  In  those  things  which  per- 
tain to  the  nature  of  the  body, 
man  is  accountable  only  to  his 
Creator."  Summa,  2a  2ae,  Q. 
CIV,  a.  5. 


208     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


(3). — "That,  to  secure  these 
rights,  governments  are  institut- 
ed among  men  " 


(4). — "deriving  their  just  pow- 
ers from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned." 


(5). — "That  whenever  any 
form  of  government  becomes  dis- 
tructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the 
right  of  the  people  to  alter  or 
abolish  it." 


(6)  . — "And  to  institute  a  new 
government,  laying  its  founda- 
tions on  such  principles  and 
organizing  its  powers  in  such 
form,  as  to  them  shall  seem 
most  likely  to  effect  their  safety 
and  happiness." 

(7)  . — "Prudence,  indeed  will 
dictate  that  governments  long 
established  shall  not  be  changed 
for  light  and  transient  causes; 
and,  accordingly,  all  experience 
hath  shown  that  mankind  are 
more  disposed  to  suffer,  while 
evils  are  sufferable,  than  to  right 
themselves  by  abolishing  the 
forms  to  which  they  are  accus- 
tomed." 


(3)  . — "It  Is  necessary  that  be- 
sides that  which  moves  to  the 
particular  good  of  the  individual, 
there  should  be  something  that 
moves  to  the  common  good  of  the 
many."  (Ergo,  government).  De 
Regimine,  Book  I,  ch.  1. 

(4)  . — "Legislature  belongs  ei- 
ther to  the  whole  people  or  to 
the  public  person  who  has  the 
care  of  the  whole  people."  (Ergo, 
the  popular  source  of  power  and 
the  free  transference  of  it). 
Summa,  la  2ae,  Q.  XC,  a.  3.  Also, 
"if  a  multitude  of  freemen  be 
directed  by  a  ruler  to  the  com- 
mon good  of  all,  that  will  be  a 
right  ruling  and  just,  such  as  is 
fitting  for  free  men."  De  Reg., 
Lib.  I,  ch.  1. 

(5)  . — "If  any  society  of  people 
have  the  right  of  choosing  a  king 
for  itself,  it  is  not  unjust  if  he 
be  deposed  by  the  same,  or  if 
his  power  be  curbed,  when  by  a 
royal  tyranny  he  abuses  his  pow- 
er."   De  Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  6. 

(6)  . — "Then  the  government  of 
the  kingdom  is  to  be  so  arranged 
as  to  leave  the  king  when  insti- 
tuted no  occasion  for  tyranny. 
At  the  same  time  also  his  power 
should  be  so  tempered  that  he 
may  not  easily  fall  into  tyranny." 
De  Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  1. 

(7)  . — "If  indeed  a  tyranny  is 
not  excessive,  it  is  better  to  bear 
it  for  a  time  than,  by  acting 
against  the  tyrant,  to  be  involved 
in  many  perils,  which  are  worse 
than  tyranny.  For  it  may  hap- 
pen that  they  who  rise  against 
a  tyrant  do  not  prevail  against 
him;  and  so  the  tyrant,  being 
incensed,  rages  the  more  violent- 
ly.  And  if  one  should  be  able  to 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  209 


(8). — "But  when  a  long  train 
of  abuses  and  usurpations  pur- 
suing invariably  the  same  ob- 
ject, evinces  a  design  to  reduce 
them  under  absolute  despotism, 
It  is  their  right,  it  is  their  duty, 
to  throw  off  such  government,  and 
to  provide  new  guards  for  their 
future  security." 


prevail  against  the  tyrant,  from 
this  there  very  often  arise  grave 
dissensions  among  the  people, 
either  while  he  is  striving  against 
the  tyrant,  or  after  the  deposing 
of  the  tyrant,  whilst  the  multi- 
tude is  separated  in  parties  with 
regard  to  the  ordering  of  the 
rule.  It  happens,  also,  sometimes, 
that  when  by  the  help  of  anyone 
the  multitude  expels  the  tyrant, 
he  himself,  having  accepted  the 
power,  takes  to  himself  the  tyran- 
ny, and,  fearing  to  suffer  himself 
what  he  wrought  against  anoth- 
er, he  oppresses  his  sibjects  with 
a  more  burdensome  slavery."  De 
Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  6. 

(8). — "Nor  is  such  a  society 
(of  free  men)  to  be  regarded  as 
acting  unfaithfully  in  thus  depos- 
ing the  tyrant,  even  if  it  have  pre- 
viously sworn  to  him  forever;  for 
he  deserved  to  be  deserted,  in  not 
keeping  faith  in  the  ruling  of 
his  people,  since  this  is  an  obli- 
gation on  his  part,  if  the  com- 
pact made  with  him  by  the  sub- 
jects is  to  be  maintained.''  De 
Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  6. 


We  conclude  that  the  mind  of  Thomas  Aquinas  was  not  far 
from  Thomas  Jefferson  when  the  document,  powerful  enough 
to  free  America,  was  couched.  The  Declaration  of  Indepen- 
dence already  lay  Latinized  in  the  books  of  the  ablest  general 
scholar  in  the  history  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  the  best 
representative  of  her  spirit  and  traditions:  a  satisfying  proof 
that  the  thought  of  Roman  Catholicism  is  inimical  to  tyranny 
and  friendly  indeed  to  the  people,  their  rights,  and  the  rational 
reign  of  liberty. 

We  may  even  extend  the  parallel  of  Thomistic  with  American 
ideas,  to  show  that  the  Angel  of  the  Schools  taught  the  very 
principles  which  projected  the  existing  Constitution  of  the 


210     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


United  States,  and  which  Peletiah  Webster  embodied  in  his 
"epoch-making  tract"  of  February  16,  1783. 


THE  PHILADELPHIAN'S 
DOCTRINE 

(1)  . — "The  Supreme  authority 
of  any  State  must  have  power  to 
effect  the  ends  of  its  appoint- 
ment, otherwise  these  ends  can- 
not be  answered,  and  effectually 
secured ;  at  best  they  are  precari- 
ous.  But  at  the  same  time, 

(2)  . — "The  supreme  authority 
ought  to  be  so  limited  and 
checked  if  possible,  as  to  prevent 
the  abuse  of  power,  or  the  exer- 
cise of  powers  that  are  not  neces- 
sary to  the  ends  of  its  appoint- 
ment, but  hurtful  and  oppressive 
to  the  subject,  but  to  limit  a  su- 
preme authority  so  far  as  to  di- 
minish its  dignity,  or  lessen  its 
power  of  doing  good,  would  be 
to  destroy  or  at  least  to  corrupt 
it,  and  render  it  ineffectual  to  its 
ends. 


(3). — "A  number  of  sovereign 
States  uniting  into  one  Common- 
wealth, and  appointing  a  supreme 
power  to  manage  the  affairs  of 
the  Union,  do  necessarily  and 
avoidably  part  with  and  transfer 
over  to  such  supreme  power,  so 
much  of  their  own  sovereignty  as 
Is  necessary  to  render  the  ends 
of  the  union  ineffectual,  other- 
wise their  confederation  will  be 
an  union  without  bands,  like  a 
cask  without  hoops,  that  may  and 
probably  will  fall  to  pieces,  as 
soon  as  it  is  put  to  any  exercise 
which  requires  strength." 


ST.  THOMAS' 

(1)  . — "It  is  the  property  of  the 
office  of  government  to  preserve 
the  states  it  governs,  and  to  use 
them  for  that  purpose  for  which 
they  were  constituted."  De  Reg., 
Book  I,  ch.  13. 

(2)  . — "The  government  of  the 
kingdom  is  to  be  so  tempered 
as  to  leave  the  appointed  ruler 
no  occasion  for  tyranny."  De 
Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  6. 

"A  power  that  is  united  is 
more  efficacious  in  producing  its 
effect  than  a  dispersed  or  divided 
power.  For  many,  congregated 
together,  achieve  that  which 
dividedly,  by  single  units,  could 
not  be  secured."  De  Reg.,  Book 
I,  ch.  3. 

"So  much  the  more  perfect  is 
a  state  by  how  much  it  provides, 
of  istelf,  the  necessaries  of  life." 
De  Reg.,  Book  I,  ch.  1. 

(3)  . — "The  imperfect  is  or- 
dered to  the  perfect.  But  every 
part  is  ordered  to  the  whole,  as 
the  imperfect  to  the  perfect:  And 
therefore  every  part  is  naturally 

on  account  of  the  whole  Now, 

every  single  person  is  compared 
to  the  entire  community  as  the 
part  to  the  whole."  Summa 
Theol.,  Q.  LXIV,  a.  2. 

"The  good  of  the  people  is  bet- 
ter than  the  good  of  one  who  is 
of  the  people."  Summa  Theol., 
la  2ae,  Q.  XXIX,  a.  2,  ad  2. 

"There  is  a  certain  good  pro- 
per to  any  man  inasmuch  as 
he  is  an  individual;  but  there 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  211 


is  a  certain  common  good  which 
belongs  to  this  or  that  man  in- 
sofar as  he  is  part  of  some 
whole;  as  to  the  soldier  inas- 
much as  he  is  part  of  an  army 
and  the  citizen  inasmuch  as  he 
is  part  of  the  state."  Quaest.  Dis- 
pute De  Caritate,  Q.  I,  a.  4,  ad  2. 

"There  are  diverse  grades  and 
orders  of  communities;  the  last 
is  the  civil  community,  ordained 
to  a  per  se  sufllciency  for  human 
life.    Hence  it  is  the  completest 

of  human  unions  to  which  all 

other  human  unions  are  re- 
ferred." Com.  Polit.,  Book  I, 
lec.  1. 

Comment: — These  texts  show 
the  relation  of  the  less  to  the 
greater  and  the  necessity  of  the 
less  becoming  even  lesser  in  the 
greater,  in  order  to  preserve  itself 
the  better.  Which  is  precisely 
the  thought  of  Webster. 

Clearly  Aquinas  would  have  withheld  his  approval  from  a 
national  condition  which  wrung  from  George  Washington  the 
complaint,  "We  are  one  nation  today  and  thirteen  tomorrow." 
His  principles  made  for  the  civil  synthesis  which,  wdthout  de- 
stroying the  individuality  of  the  states  any  more  than  that 
of  the  individuals  composing  them,  would  "form  a  more  per- 
fect union,  establish  justice,  insure  domestic  tranquility,  pro- 
vide for  the  common  defence,  promote  the  general  welfare,  and 
secure  the  blessing  of  liberty."  In  a  word,  he  was  an  advocate 
of  "the  perfect  community,"  which  Peletiah  Webster  envisaged 
and  our  Constitution  secured. 

Two  centuries  before  Columbus  discovered  America  geo- 
graphically, it  would  seem  that  Aquinas  had  located  it  politi- 
cally. In  his  politics,  our  country  is  in  embryo.  He  differs 
from  the  founders  of  our  republic  and  their  achievement,  only 
as  summer  from  spring-time,  or  the  full-blown  blossom  from 
the  humble  seed.  To  admit  the  merit  and  democracy  of  the 
United  States,  is  to  concede  the  same  of  the  presaging  Thomis- 


212     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

tic  thought.  In  the  right-bills  of  our  sovereign  states,  in  the 
document  of  our  Declaration  of  Independence,  in  the  rationale 
of  our  Constitution,  his  finger  appears.  An  invisible  guest, 
he  was  present  at  the  founding  of  our  nation;  as  he  is 
also  present  through  its  preservation.  So  long  as  she  is  true 
to  justice  and  reason,  the  spirits  in  which  she  was  conceived, 
our  country  cannot  die.  But  justice  and  reason  express  the 
political  apostolate  of  Aquinas,  and  are  the  very  substance  of 
his  message.  Ideally  and  practically,  they  are  his  theory  of 
State.  And  in  justice,  the  people  must  find  their  due:  which 
is  democracy.  In  reason,  they  must  accept  duty  as  well  as 
claim  right ;  which  is  the  salvation  of  democracy. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  213 


CHAPTER  VIII 
CIVIL  MENACES  AND  PROBLEMS 
1. — External  Evil:  War 

The  panorama  of  St.  Thomas'  political  philosophy  now  spreads 
before  us.  We  see  the  State  of  his  construction,  firm  with 
justice,  united  with  love,  happy  with  liberty,  hopeful  with  relig- 
ion, interested  with  labor,  ideal,  yet  non-Altrurian.  But  men- 
aces ever  darken  within  and  without ;  and  the  politics  of  Aquinas 
is  complete  only  when  his  doctrine  of  the  method  whereby  these 
visitations  to  civil  society  are  to  be  met  and  removed,  is  duly 
expressed.  The  external  danger  is  war ;  the  internal — sedition, 
vice,  and  poverty. 

His  thoughts  on  war  are  precise  and  pithy.  A  just  campaign, 
he  tells  us,  aims  at  peace.  '^We  do  not  seek  peace  in  order  to  be 
at  war,"  he  repeats  from  St.  Augustine,  "but  we  go  to  war  in 
order  to  secure  peace.  Be  peaceful,  therefore,  in  warring,  so 
that  you  may  vanquish  those  whom  you  war  against,  and  bring 
them  to  the  prosperity  of  peace."^^  The  peace  to  be  attained  by 
war  must  be  two-sided ;  the  conqueror  should  share  it  with  the 
vanquished.  Hate  must  not  still  reverberate  when  the  thunders 
of  the  fray  have  rolled  away.  Vindictiveness  is  thrice  petty, 
in  a  nation  that  has  been  big  and  brave  unto  victory.  Mag- 
nanimity alone  is  fitting.  The  fight  must  not  continue  to  rage 
in  hearts,  after  it  has  been  finished  on  the  field. 

By  making  peace  the  final  cause  of  war,  and  by  placing  char- 
ity in  the  effect,  Aquinas  answers  the  moralist's  and  pacifist's 
objection:  "Nothing  but  sin  is  contrary  to  an  act  of  virtue. 
But  war  is  contrary  to  peace.  Therefore  war  is  always  a  sin." 
And  here  again  we  find  the  characteristic  and  democratic  Thom- 
istic  consideration  for  the  common  good ;  which  will  more  clearly 
appear  in  an  exposition  of  the  Doctor's  three  requisites  to  a  just 
war: 


704  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XL,  a.  1,  ad.  3.  Machiavelli's  doctrine 
is  in  striking  contrast.    II  Principe,  XIV. 


214     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

(1)  Such  must  be  declared  by  proper  authority.  The 
logic  of  this  necessity  lies  in  the  fact  that  rulers  are  the  elected 
custodians  of  the  common  welfare ;  and  when  it  is  threatened 
from  within  or  without,  theirs  naturally  is  the  duty  of  calling 
a  defense."^  Xo  private  person,  under  a  just  regime,  has  the 
right  to  ignore  the  government  and  stir  up  the  masses.  The  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  sovereigns  in  the  State,  poised  above  civil 
affairs,  see  more  accurately  than  could  any  citizen,  however 
ardent  and  earnest,  the  course  to  be  adopted  or  avoided  in  a 
crisis.  Prudence,  as  well  as  order,  demands  that  the  call  to  arms 
come  from  above. 

(2)  A  just  cause  is  essential.''^  The  restlessness,  ambition, 
and  recklessness  of  some  of  the  famous  commanders  of  History 
were  without  excuse,  and  replete  with  criminality  in  the  blood 
they  spilled.  The  caprice  of  a  sovereign  is  not  the  slightest 
reason  why  the  dogs  of  war  should  be  unleashed.  St.  Thomas 
would  tie  the  nervous  hands  of  bellicose  autocracy  as  truly  as 
did  our  modem  purpose  of  "making  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy." Though  he  leaves  the  declaration  of  war  to  the  govern- 
ment, he  places  the  purpose  and  the  propulsion  of  it  with  the 
people.  It  is  their  honor  or  good  which  must  be  considered,  and 
not  the  sovereign's.  It  is  their  rational  will,  not  his,  which 
should  be  consulted.  However,  wars  for  territorial  expansion 
appear,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  as  unjust  as  wars  for  the  per- 
sonal aggrandizement  of  the  ruler.  Inordinate  ambition  is  no 
more  pardonable  in  a  nation  than  in  an  individual.  Aquinas 
believes  that  a  just  cause  for  war  is  to  be  found  not  within  a 
nation  but  without.  Xot  interior  psychology  but  exterior  fact. 
The  psychology  may  follow  the  fact,  and  be  just;  but,  preced- 
ing, it  will  in  all  probability  either  project  or  imagine  the  "fact" 
and  so  be  unjust.  A  nation,  tingling  for  combat,  would  not  be 
long  in  finding  or  making  a  cause  for  it.  The  frankly  militar- 
istic state,  filled  with  that  patriotism  which  is  hate  of  another 
country  more  than  love  for  one's  own,  is  a  political  abomination ; 
though  the  decently  prepared  one  is  an  example  of  prudence. 


705  Sunima  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XL,  a.  1.  Cf.  Machiavelli.  Discours 
Politiques,  X,  p.  327. 

706  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XL,  a.  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  215 

True  patriotism  must  be  prior  to  swords ;  the  better  defense  of  a 
country  is  the  hearts  of  the  people,  and  these  are  won  by  the 
justice  of  the  government.  But  the  State — people  and  rulers — 
must  love  peace;  and  only  when  peace  is  unduly  assailed  by 
extrinsic  force,  is  war,  involving  the  nation  as  a  whole,  justifi- 
able. Aquinas,  after  Aug-ustine,  mentions  two  of  these  extrinsic, 
justifying  causes:  the  refusal  of  an  offending  nation  to  make 
amends  for  the  wrongs  inflicted  by  its  subjects,  or  to  restore 
what  it  has  seized  unjustly.  It  is  gratifyingly  clear  that  his 
thought  had  quite  outstripped  the  logic  and  ethics  of  regent 
medievalists — and  of  how  many  moderns? — who  believed  that, 
with  the  material  powers  of  the  State,  their  own  personal 
whimsies  might  be  served.  Hitherto  war  had  been  only  by  the 
people ;  Aquinas  made  it  essentially  for  the  people.  Whatever 
merit  it  possessed,  lay  in  the  popular  as  distinct  from  the  per- 
sonal advantage;  justice  for  all,  or  for  the  State  in  which  all 
were  represented. 

(3)  A  rightful  intention  of  advancing  good  and  avoiding 
evil  is  necessary  to  the  belligerents.'^^  This  third  requirement 
grows  out  of  the  second.  A  just  cause  should  be  prosecuted  only 
in  and  by  justice.  Aquinas  warns  that  under  the  cloak  of  rea- 
sonable and  righteous  purpose,  untoward,  un-Christian  feelings 
may  beat.  Augustine  vividly  calls  them  the  "passion  for  inflict- 
ing harm,  the  cruel  thirst  for  revenge,  and  unpacific  and  relentless 
spirit,  the  fever  of  revolt,  the  lust  of  power.'^  These  vitiate  the 
justification  of  a  war,  and  trail  the  national  banners  in  the  mire. 
They  may  accelerate  material  victory;  but  they  signify  moral 
defeat.  Xo  matter  what  it  gains,  the  state  is  inglorious  which 
loses  itself.  Only  two  aims  propose  themselves  to  the  state  that 
would  be  just:  the  advancement  of  good  and  the  avoidance  of 
evil. 

A  peculiarly  interesting  page  in  the  Angelic  Doctor's  article 
on  war  concerns  what  would  amount,  today,  to  trench-fighting, 
with  its  preponderant  dependence  on  strategy.  Aquinas  con- 
siders whether  it  is  just  only  for  men  to  meet  eye-to-eye  in  open 
contest  on  the  battle-fields,  or  whether  ambush  and  other  artifices 
are  permissible  too.  Likely  no  one  ever  dreamed  of  questioning 


707  8umm<i  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XL,  a.  1. 


216     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


the  ethics  of  our  modem  military  method,  when  the  khakied  mil- 
lions were  pouring  into  Flanders'  field ;  it  was  accepted  as  a  fact, 
and  a  decided  improvement  on  the  old  mass-men  tactics.  Here 
then  is  another  instance  in  which  a  medieval  mind  was  more 
alert  than  our  own,  to  inspect  and  justify  a  course  which  we 
were  superficially  content  to  accept  without  moral  thought. 
The  possible  objections  to  clandestine  tactics,  which  the  Saint 
reviews,  are :  first,  their  character  of  deception,  and  hence  their 
apparent  pertinence  to  injustice;  secondly,  their  seeming  opposi- 
tion to  faithfulness,  which  we  must  observe  even  with  our  ene- 
mies; and  thirdly  the  necessity  of  refraining  from  doing  to  others 
what  we  would  not  have  them  do  to  us.  His  disposition  of 
them  is  summary.  He  teaches  that  strategems  which  involve 
deliberate  falsehood  or  the  infraction  of  a  pledge  are  always 
unlawful.  From  Ambrose  {De  offic,  I),  he  quotes  that  there 
are  "certain  rights  of  war  and  covenants  which  ought  to  be 
observed  even  among  enemies."  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  required  that  one  belligerent  party  declare  its  design  to 
another.  St.  Thomas  believes  that  a  soldier,  and  therefore  an 
army,  should  learn  the  art  of  concealing  as  well  as  of  fighting; 
and  he  refers  to  the  Book  on  Strategems  by  Frontinus  for  con- 
firmation. Such  concealment,  he  maintains,  is  not  opposed  to 
justice  or  a  well-ordered  Avill.'^  It  is  proper  to  the  offensive 
and  the  defensive  in  warfare,  and  is  practiced  by  both.  Air- 
raids and  submarine  attacks,  of  course,  would  be  in  the  ambush 
category  which  St.  Thomas  legitimatizes,  but  not  the  kind  which 
ruthlessly  destroy  non-combatants.  He  declares  that  the  object 
of  military  artifice  is  to  deceive  the  enemy  ;'^  and  only  in  this 
regard  does  he  exculpate  them. 

Finally,  he  is  not  without  a  retort  for  the  would-be  objector 
who  sophisticates  himself  thus :  War  has  for  its  purpose  the 
peace  of  the  republic ;  but  peace  is  the  occasion  of  many  evils 
(luxury,  delicacy,  indolence,  etc.)  ;  and  it  does  not  seem  that 
one  should  expose  himself  to  the  peril  of  death  for  such  sc  per- 
nicious purpose ;  ergo,  deafness  or  deftness  when  the  call  to  the 
colors  comes.    To  which  the  Angelic  Doctor  replies  by  distin- 


~0S  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XL,  a.  3. 
709  7& idem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  217 

guishing  between  an  accidental  occurrence  and  an  essential  fact. 
The  peace  of  the  State  is  good  in  itself  and  hence  worthy  of 
defense.  It  is  not  rendered  bad  by  the  chance  that  some  use  it 
badly;  and,  besides,  against  such  unhappy  cases  could  be  pro- 
posed a  greater  number  of  instances  in  which  citizens  use  civil 
calm  for  the  practice  and  advancement  of  virtue,  and  the  repres- 
sion or  suppression  of  such  vices  as  homicide,  sacrilege,  and  im- 
moral! ty."-*^^  Thus  he  lifts  a  veil  of  nobility  to  reveal  a  counte- 
nance of  cow^ardice.  He  teaches  that  the  virtue  of  fortitude, 
a  readiness  to  fight  and  even  die  for  one's  country,  is  necessary, 
and  pure  conscience  approves.  For  him,  objectively,  there  is 
no  such  being  as  a  conscientious  objector. 

Frightfulness  has  no  sanction  in  war,  he  maintains.  Rulers 
are  not  to  use  violence  and  coercion  save  according  to  the  tenor 
of  justice,  and  then  only  in  so  far  as  they  possess  and  represent 
the  public  authority  and  therefore  the  public  will.  The  custo- 
dians of  justice,  they  must  accord  with  it  and  not  exceed  it  even 
in  their  dealings  wdth  the  enemy.  Much  less  is  the  individual 
at  liberty  to  be  wanton  in  a  taken  territory.  Rioting  and  pil- 
lage are  unjustifiable  excesses,  and  he  w^ho  indulges  in  them  is 
a  robber,  rather  than  a  soldier  of  his  country.  Both  the  govern- 
ment and  the  individual  are  bound  to  restitution  for  their 
respective  crimes  in  such  excessive  regard.^-^^ 

St.  Thomas  is  careful,  however,  to  show  that  he  does  not 
believe  the  victor  should  have  to  go  without  his  spoils.  If  the 
war  is  just,  it  is  just  that  the  righteous  side  should  be  indemni- 
fied ;  and  exaction  of  indemnity,  in  this  case,  is  quite  free  from 
any  smirch  of  rapine,  provided,  of  course,  that  gain  does  not 
pervert  justice  nor  usurp  its  place  as  the  chief  motive.'-*^"  He 
agrees  with  St.  Augustine  that  to  fight  for  plunder  is  a  sin. 
However  crude  the  nature  of  war  may  be,  the  motivation  of  it 
must  be  pure  and  noble ;  and  if  this  is  so,  the  chances  are  that 
the  crudity  will  be  mitigated  or  at  least  kept  from  increasing 
into  out-and-out  cruelty  and  cupidity.  A  high  ideal  stays  the 
passions  from  falling  too  low.  Men  should  fight  only  for  right, 
Aquinas  teaches ;  and,  accordingly,  they  must  be  content  when 

710  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXXVII,  a.  V,  3.    praeterea;  et  ad  3. 

711  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVI,  a.  8. 

712  Ibidem. 


218     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

right  is  decently  secured.  Mercy  must  be  the  hand-maid  of 
victory  and  the  companion  of  justice.  Moderation  means  double 
victory :  for  the  nation  which  exercises  it  has  conquered  not  only 
its  enemy  but  itself. 

2. — Internal  Evils:  Sedition  and  Vice:  Poverty 

Aquinas  also  has  a  voice  for  the  internal  civil  menaces  which 
are  among  the  strongest  enemies  of  democracy.  First,  let  us 
scan  his  doctrine  on  sedition.  He  differentiates  this  form  of 
antagonism  from  war  and  strife,  the  former  of  w^hich  is  waged 
against  external  foes,  and  the  latter  of  which  is  between  one 
individual  and  another,  or  between  a  few  people  on  one  side 
and  a  few  on  the  other;  w^hile  sedition  is  between  dis- 
sentient parts  of  a  people,  as  when  one  section  of  the  State  rises 
against  another.  The  seditious  man  is  the  sower  of  discord, 
whose  specialty  is  hate.  Sedition  and  the  inspirer  of  it  are, 
according  to  St.  Thomas,  gravely  guilty ;  for  they  rend  the  unity 
of  the  people  and  wound  the  common  good.  The  gravity  of 
sedition  is  great  in  proportion  as  the  general  weal  which  it 
assails  surpasses  the  private  good  which  is  jeopardized  by  ordi- 
nary strife. We  remember  that  x\quinas,  while  recognizing 
'  self-expression,  does  not  ignore  prudence  and  patriotism,  which 
should  limit  or  rather  perfect  it.  The  absence  of  these  and  the 
presence  of  their  opposites,  culminating  in  seditious  incitement, 
make  a  terrible  wrong,  which  the  Doctor  brands  mortal  sin. 

The  culpability  of  sedition  is  first  and  foremost  in  the  authors 
themselves,  and  secondly  in  those  who  hearken  to  them.  As  to 
those  who  w^ithstand  the  uprising,  defending  the  State  and  the 
common  good,  they  are  not  seditious  but  righteous.'^-^* 

Thus  Aquinas  ethically  closes  the  door  to  civil  disturbance. 
He  does  not  accept  that  discord  is  the  inevitable  and  essential 
prelude  to  harmony  and  that  protest  is  always  necessary  to 
progress.  So  long  as  a  government  remains  true  to  its  purpose 
and  achieves  it  in  reasonable  degree,  the  civil  disturber  has  no 


713  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  2. 

714  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  219 


apology  for  his  existence.  However,  the  case  is  quite  different 
when  the  polity  perverts  itself  by  repudiating  the  general  wel- 
fare. In  his  SuTrnna,  Aquinas  repeats  his  doctrine  of  the 
De  Regimine,  that  to  up-set  such  a  regime  is  not  sedition  at  all. 
Indeed,  he  declares,  it  is  the  evil  rulers  themselves  who  are 
guilty  of  the  action.  They  are  a  deeper  cause  of  their  own 
down-fall  than  their  antagonists.'-^^ 

The  Angelic  Doctor,  like  Ruskin,  approves  a  qualitative 
standard  of  government.  The  rule  is  to  be  judged  by  its  amount 
of  success  rather  than  of  failure  and  there  is  no  logic  in 
pulling  down  the  pillars  of  State  because  the  roof  leaks.  He 
believes  that  revolt  should  be  the  last,  rather  than  the  first,  resort, 
for  he  is  coolly  cognizant  that  the  people  may  suffer  more  harm 
from  disturbance  than  from  endurance.''-'^^ 

It  is  only  because  sedition  is  counter  to  the  common  good 
that  Aquinas  condemns  it.  If  it  is  not  so,  it  is  not  sedition. 
It  is  not  only  lawful,  but  it  may  be  a  duty,  to  fight  for  the 
certain  advantage  of  the  Commonwealth.  Discord  from  what  is 
not  evidently  good,  he  teaches,  may  not  be  wrong ;  but  opposi- 
tion to  what  is  patently  good,  e.  g.  the  unity  of  the  people,  is 
patently  bad."^^^ 

And  so  his  doctrine  is  synthetically  conservative  and  pro- 
gressive. He  would  be  neither  the  first  nor  the  last  ''to  lay  the 
old  side."  The  Church  of  St.  Thomas,  sober  in  his  doctrine, 
which  is  hers,  looms  up  to  remind  us  that  the  past  is  to  be  rev- 
erenced and  that  the  future  promises  only  the  fruition  of  the 
present.  The  secret  of  political  prosperity  does  not  consist  in 
hurling  a  monarch  from  his  throne,  nor  in  substituting  over- 
alls for  crowns.  It  lies  in  a  democracy  deeper  than  even  our 
own  day  has  yet  become  clearly  conscious  of;  it  is  not  in  civil 
up-heavals,  but  in  the  awakening  of  the  individual  soul,  not  to 
strife  and  rancor,  but  to  virtue  and  right.  This  is  the  Thomistic 
contribution  to  the  problem,  modern,  as  well  as  medieval.    It  is 

715  Summa  TheoL,  2a  ^ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  2,  ad  3. 

716  Aquinas  speaks  of  the  good  government  as  one  which  is  ordered 
to  the  public  welfare.  He  does  not  refer  to  it  as  one  which  always 
secures  this  welfare;  e.  g.  in  ad.  3,  he  writes  "regimen  tyrannicum  non 
est  justum:  quia  non  ordinetur  ad  bonum  commune." 

717  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLII,  a.  2,  ad  3. 

718  Idem,  ad  2. 


220     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


as  old  as  Catholicism  and  as  new.  Xo  sedition  is  stirring  or  is 
likely  to  stir  there,  where  the  spirit  of  Aquinas  is  still  a  living 
factor  and  merges  into  the  sentiment  of  true  Americanism. 
Patriotism,  for  the  true  son  of  the  old  religion,  is  an  absolute 
duty  ;  and  the  practical  lack  of  it,  expressing  itself  in  sedition, 
is  a  sin.  The  reasonably  just  government  must  always  find 
Catholicism  as  gentle  as  a  lamb  or  as  the  Good  Shej)herd  him- 
self. This  is  a  truth  that  sparkles  in  the  sentences  of  Summa 
and  in  the  De  Regimine. 

AYe  have  already  proposed  St.  Thomas'  belief  that  the  indi- 
vidual mind  and  heart  have  much  to  do  with  the  merit  and  success 
of  a  polity.  Vice  is  the  evil  expression  of  individuality  or  the 
expression  of  evil  individuality.  It  is  an  autocracy  not  against 
many  but  against  one.  The  individual  does  not  command  it,  after 
it  has  passed  into  a  habit ;  on  the  contrary,  it  commands  him. 
Then  it  is  not  self-determination,  but  a  determination  of  self. 
And  yet  Aquinas  would  not  have  the  State  remove  every  vice  out 
of  society.  His  preoccupation  is  as  that  of  Gilbert  K.  Chester- 
ton who  expresses  himself  practically:  ""Take  the  policeman. 
He  is  there  to  punish  crime.  When  you  and  I  indulge  murder, 
he  takes-  charge  of  us  and  deals  with  us  according  to  law.  But 
just  imagine  what  you  would  say  if  told  that  the  policeman  was 
there  to  encourage  virtue.  What  would  happen  if  you  and  1 
were  always  followed  by  a  policeman,  and  we  heard  his  voice 
over  our  shoulder  telling  us  when  to  do  this  and  not  to  do  that  ? 
I  think  we  should  soon  begin  to  look  upon  it  as  rather  a  bore."'-"-^ 
But  the  Angelic  Doctor  looks  upon  it  as  worse — an  imposition. 
Though  the  individual  has  no  right  to  do  wrong,  the  State  ordi- 
narily has  no  call  to  obtrude  itself  directly  on  the  individual's 
purely  personal  affairs.  So  long  as  sin  does  not  attain  social 
proportions  and  significance,  the  State,  as  we  have  already  seen 
in  his  doctrine,  has  the  duty  of  passivity.  The  good  which  might 
accrue  from  preventing  minor  evils  would  be  exceeded  by  the 
harm  which  would  result  from  a  civil  violation  of  personal 
liberty."-^    To  save  the  individual  by  preventing  him  from 


719  His  lecture  on  the  "Perils  of  Health"  as  reported  by  the  Boston 
Transcript  and  quoted  in  the  Literary  Digest,  Feb.  5,  1921. 
T20  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CI,  a.  3,  ad  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  221 

injuring  himself  is  not  altogether  to  hasten  the  day  of  democ- 
racy; for  such  a  procedure  creates  bonds  which  chafe;  and, 
bound,  the  individual  is  not  a  positive  but  a  negative  quantity, 
useless  to  the  democratic  need  and  spirit.  Besides,  Aquinas  is 
able  to  point  to  a  morally  superior  institution  whose  method  is 
not  coercion  but  persuasion ;  which  appeals  to  the  best  in  man, 
instead  of  curbing  the  worst ;  and  which  reaches  the  heart,  where 
the  civil  arm  is  shortened.  In  this  it  again  appears  what  an 
asset  to  democracy  the  Church,  which  the  Doctor  champions, 
really  is.  What  the  State  lacks  and  should  lack,  if  the  indi- 
vidual conscience  is  to  count  for  aught,  the  Church  supplies  and 
applies  in  a  manner  perfectly  harmonious  with  personal  liberty. 

Aquinas  does  not  teach  that  the  State  is  limited  to  the  merest 
essentials  for  the  maintenance  of  society.  On  the  conrary,  we 
recall  his  ideas  on  a  necessary  governmental  interest  and  aid 
in  many  social,  economic,  and  ethical  concerns.  Hence  his  cur- 
tailment of  civil  power  in  the  matter  of  vice-prevention  is  all 
the  more  remarkable  and  important. 

Even  towards  the  larger  social  evils,  Aquinas  holds  that  the 
law  should  be  wisely  restrained.  Saint  as  he  is,  he  seemingly 
sanctions  toleration  in  such  a  painful  regard  as  prostitution.  He 
reflects  the  shrewdness  of  another  holy  man,  who,  like  himself, 
knew  earth  as  well  as  heaven,  and  the  sordid  human  clay  as 
well  as  the  amazing  potentiality  palpitating  in  it:  ^'Take  away 
your  scarlet  women  and  you  shake  everything  with  lust."  At 
least  until  the  dispensation  of  Christ  is  more  generally  accepted 
and  lived,  the  segregated  district  is  a  necessary  evil,  however 
deplorable.  Spreading  the  poison,  St.  Thomas  believes,  does 
not  heal  the  sore.'^^-^  Just  as  the  greater  good  is  not  to  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  lesser,  so  the  lesser  evil  is  to  be  preferred  to  the 
greater,  ^ot  that  Thomas  would  not  have  the  war  on  vice  inces- 
sant ;  but  he  would  have  the  manner  of  it  much  less  crudely 
coercive  than  civil  measures.  Aquinas  never  forgets  that  the 
deeper  secret  of  reform  is  in  the  individual  himself,  and  that  a 
multiplicity  of  laws,  without  a  corresponding  amount  of  good 
will  and  self-conquest,  may  be  a  mass  of  civil  debris.  Attempt- 
ing too  much,  law  effects  too  little.    It  should  be  the  expression 


721  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  X,  a.  XI. 


222     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

of  the  higher  nature  of  the  people  rather  than  the  oppression  of 
the  lower.  It  may  be  perfectly  right  in  itself,  but  wrong  in  its 
application.  Ideals  err  when  they  violently  seek  to  make  them- 
selves practical.  As  each  individual  has  the  right  and  duty  to 
do  good,  but  not  always  to  force  his  creed  and  discipline  on 
others,  so  the  government  should  ever  hold  up  high  ideals  but  not 
always  press  down  the  people  with  the  butt  of  them. 

The  doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  on  the  treatment  of  vice  is  readily 
seen  to  be  a  political  application  of  the  parable  of  the  wheat  and 
the  cockle,  and  so  rests  on  an  authority  much  loftier  than  his 
own:  another  evidence  of  the  sanity  of  Christianity.  In  the 
passion  for  reform  by  civil  means,  which  a  portion  of  the  people 
are  indulging  against  all,  in  our  own  country  at  present,  a 
consideration  of  Aquinas  would  be  very  appropriate;  and,  of 
Christ,  more  so.  When  the  State  usurps  the  place  of  the  Church, 
there  is  tyranny  indeed ;  for  the  former  can  use  only  the  mate- 
rial and  anti-democratic  means  of  force,  while  the  power  of  the 
latter  does  not  antagonize  the  individual,  being  love.  Too, 
Thomas,  the  Christian,  remembered  what  even  the  pagan  Seneca 
did  not  forget,  and,  nevertheless,  many  emotional  Americans  are 
ignorant :  the  better  part  of  a  m  an  is  free — the  mind  has  its  own 
rights. ^-^ 

The  inference  is  again  obvious  at  this  point  of  the  Doctor's 
teaching,  that  democracy  can  be  secure  only  when  the  State 
recognizes  its  own  limits  and  the  proper  sphere  of  another 
society.  Vice  must  somehow  be  curbed  to  a  quantity  which  will 
not  imperial  civil  society.  If  the  State  represses  it  with  the 
only  weapons  at  its  disposal,  grave  danger  is  apt  to  threaten 
liberty.  Law,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  II,  is  more  a  direction 
than  a  force.  But  if  the  majority  of  the  people  are  not  of  the 
moral  education  and  calibre  to  follow  it,  it  must  be  more  a 
force  than  a  direction ;  and  if  it  is  such,  it  is  ill-conceived, 
oppressive,  and  perilous.''-^    To  prepare  the  people  for  law  and 


722  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5. 

723  Cf.  T.  B.  Maroney,  The  Idea  of  Personality,  p.  104:  "Law  is  but 
the  deposit,  the  fixed  result  of  the  operation,  of  that  native  power  of 
intuition,  which,  'while  still  hearing  shapelessly,  is  called  morality.  In 
the  actual  world  they  are  never  wholly  separate;  one  without  the 
other  is  dangerous  to  the  community.'  "    (Wallace,  Wm.) 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  223 

the  observation  of  it,  the  spiritual  society  is  essential.  If  effici- 
ent in  service,  it  is  of  inestimable  value  to  the  individual  and 
the  State,  and,  accordingly,  to  the  possibility  of  democracy.  It 
cleanses  public  opinion  which  is  the  real  power  behind  law  in  a 
free  government.  It  perpetuates  equity,  by  conviction,  in  the 
many;  while  the  State  preserves  justice,  by  jails,  in  the  few. 
It  reigns  by  affection,  while  the  State  depends  on  fear. 

However,  it  must  not  be  disregarded  that  Thomas  by  no 
means  intends  to  hold  the  hands  of  the  government  from  every 
repressive  enactment.  He  only  stands  for  the  principles  of 
toleration,  moderation,  prudence,  and  respect  for  personal 
rights.  These  are  compatible  with  legislation :  limiting  it  indeed, 
but,  at  the  same  time,  enlarging  its  prestige  and  influence.  His 
is  the  extremely  sensible  view  that  more  and  more  statutes 
are  not  the  State's  need,  but  more  and  better  observation  of 
those  already  existing.  A  country  may  be  reformed  on  paper, 
while  fact  laughs.  And  if  nations  are  to  be  regenerated  only  in 
prison,  democracy  outdistances  the  millennium.. 

In  our  chapter  on  the  Purpose  of  the  State,  we  touched  the 
subject  of  poverty.  Here  we  shall  regard  it  again,  but  now 
chiefly  from  the  view-point  of  its  remedy.  Poverty  is,  with  sedi- 
tion and  vice,  one  of  the  '^enemies  within  the  gate."  In  fact,  it 
is  a  prolific  cause  of  its  accompaniments.''^^  Its  aspects  are 
many.  Economically,  it  signifies  a  dearth  of  the  necessities  of 
life;  ethically,  the  decline  of  morals  and  the  flourish  of  ignor- 
ance ;  socially,  a  stunted  existence.  Communism,  a  modern 
panacea  which  happens  to  be  as  ancient  as  the  Broad-Browed 
himself,  would  dispel  all  the  phases.  Throw  care  into  the  State, 
and  problems  dissolve.  But  Aristotle  and  Aquinas,  preferring 
fact  to  fancy,  perceive  that  the  State  is  no  more  than  a  figment 
when  it  is  considered  apart  from  the  people  who  compose  it, 
and  their  political  and  social  nature  which  it  expresses.  It  can 
do  no  more  than  its  constituents ;  that  it  can  do  so  much,  is  due 
to  its  organization.  But  one  must  not  forget  its  deficiency  in  an 
estimation  of  its  power. 

We  find  in  the  Angelic  Doctor's  Commentary  on  the  Politics 


124:  Com  PoUt.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  6. 


224     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

a  suggestive  critique  of  the  glorification  of  the  State  and  its 
ability  to  turn  all  kinds  of  poverty  and  need  into  the  airy  noth- 
ingness of  a  memory  or  a  dream.  The  thoughts  expressed  are 
Aristotle's ;  but  Aquinas  masters  and  presents  them  in  a  manner 
suitable  to  his  age. 

He  punctures  the  conceit  of  common  ownership,  conceived  by 
Socrates  and  published  by  Plato.  The  premise  of  the  Philos- 
opher's predecessors  was  that  whatever  promotes  unity  in  the 
State,  advances  the  civil  purpose.  Believing  that  common  pos- 
session would  do  exactly  this,  they  preached  it.  Their  argu- 
ment is  abstract  rather  than  concrete  or  economic,  and  ideal 
rather  than  practical.  And  the  extremeness  of  it  is  evident  from 
its  unnatural  inclusion  of  the  common  possession  of  wives  and 
children  as  well  as  aught  else.  The  response  of  the  Commentary 
to  this  extravagance  is  that  absolute  unity  is  not  quite  so  much, 
of  an  essential  and  a  possibility  as  may  be  imagined.  The 
Stagirite  and  the  Saint  hold : 

(1)  That  with  an  excess  of  unity,  there  would  be  no  State. 
By  its  very  nature  a  State  consists  of  numbers,  and  these  are 
opposed  to  oneness.  The  blessedness  of  unity,  yes;  but  the 
undue  possession  of  it,  no.  The  State  can  no  more  be  a  full- 
fledged  individual  than  an  individual  the  perfect  State.^^  And 
if  the  latter  gathers  up  all  the  duties  of  the  hearth  and  appro- 
priates them,  it  is  no  longer  the  State  but  a  mammoth  home. 
The  ingrowing  State  is  the  disappearing  one. 

(2)  That  the  State  must  be  composed  not  only  of  many  indi- 
viduals, but  of  many  classes  of  individuals.'*^-^  The  indication 
is  threefold :  first,  because  all  cannot  do  everything  in  a  State ; 
there  are  diverse  tasks,  differently  from  the  case  of  a  mere  con- 
federacy which  is  entered  into  for  the  purpose  of  mutual  defense. 
Secondly,  the  ear-mark  of  a  State  is  the  disparities  within  it. 
Indeed,  the  more  perfect  equality  would  obtain  in  the  less  per- 
fect state,  where  the  individuals  live  apart  from  each  other  and 
reduce  community  of  goods  and  spirit  to  a  minimum.  Thirdly, 
perfection  implies  variety.    Sameness  is  imperfection.'''^ 


725  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  1. 

726  Ibidem. 

727  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  225 


(3)  There  must  be  a  distinction  between  rulers  and  ruled; 
for  if  all  synchronously  are  rulers,  then  there  are  no  rulers  at 
allJ^ 

(4)  A  family  is  more  self-sufficient  than  an  individual;  a 
state,  than  a  family.  To  make  the  State  too  individualistic,  is  to 
reduce  its  self-sufficiency  in  ratio.^-^ 

The  effect  of  these  arguments  on  the  Doctor's  mind  could  be 
traced  in  the  De  Begimine.  Still  he  is  not  prevented  from 
strongly  urging  the  necessity  of  civil  unity  in  that  book.  But 
unlike  Plato,  he  would  have  this  object  secured  through  a  sensible 
degree  of  centralization  in  government  rather  than  through  com- 
munity of  possession  and  a  level  of  population  which  could  not 
but  be  dull  and  dead. 

Advancing  in  this  refutation,  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  show  (1) 
that  goods  which  are  possessed  by  all  are  possessed  by  none. 
The  abstraction  of  the  State  is  the  real  possessor.  The  indi- 
vidual cannot  say  of  anything,  "This  is  mine" ;  though  Plato 
fondly  believed  that  this  sentence  on  everyone's  lips  would  mean 
perfect  civil  unity.  When  any  citizen  claims  what  really  be- 
longs to  all,  the  fallacy  of  Composition  and  Division  is  in  evi- 
dence.'^^  By  pointing  out  this  fact,  Aristotle  and  Aquinas 
suggest  the  incompatibility  of  communism  with  democracy.  If 
the  individual  be  denied  the  right  of  property,  he  is,  in  this 
respect,  a  political  nonentity.    And  democracy  despises  zeros. 

(2)  What  is  common  to  all,  is  a  care  to  none.  What  is 
everybody's  business  is  nobody's.  What  one  thinks  another 
should  do,  everyone  neglects."^^^ 

(3)  The  confusion  on  the  score  of  children  would  be  incal- 
culable.^^- 

(4)  The  prosperity  of  a  state  really  depends  on  an  amic- 
ability among  its  individuals  and  classes,  which  naturally 
results  in  unity.  But  in  a  socialized  polity,  where  no  one  is 
beholden  to  anybody,  and  neither  parent  nor  child  can  refer  to 


728  Ibid. 

729  Ibid. 

730  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  2. 

731  Ibid. 

732  Ibid. 


226     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


his  own  relation,  there  is  little  foundation  for  friendship,  and, 
consequently,  less  possibility  of  unity 

(5)  Sacred  rights  and  relations  would  be  sacrificed  in  a 
socialization  plan ;  and  violence  and  vice,  hitherto  restrained  by 
domestic  reverence,  would  receive  a  great  impetus. 

(6)  Unnatural  sin,  frowned  upon  by  all  nations,  would  be 
inevitable  in  the  Platonic  plan,  if  women  and  children  were  the 
property  of  the  State.  Such  a  fearful  excess  could  hardly  be 
obviated  by  a  law  which  might  strongly  prohibit  it,  but  yet,  in 
a  communistic  regime,  could  not  prevent  the  libidinous  love 
which  would  be  the  cause  of  it."^^^ 

Aquinas  repeats  that  friendly  relations  w^ould  accomplish 
what  communism,  which  would  destroy  such  bonds,  could  not. 
Friendship,  he  declares,  is  commonly  admitted  to  be  the  greatest 
good  in  a  state.  With  it,  sedition  is  impossible.  By  it,  unity 
is  attained.  He  again  observes  that  there  are  two  sources  of 
inspiration  to  a  man  as  to  the  care  and  effection  for  persons  and 
things :  the  fact  that  they  are  his  own  and  the  consciousness  of 
their  exclusive  possession.''^^ 

These  facts,  impoverishing  the  Platonic  theory,  enrich  the 
individual  and  thus  are  highly  democratic.  There  is  such  a  thing 
as  spiritual  poverty  (different,  of  course,  from  the  Christian 
virtue  of  poverty  in  spirit)  ;  and  communism,  while  affecting  to 
dispel  the  material  brand,  would  be  drawing  down  this  still 
more  deplorable  species.  If  the  individual  is  robbed  by  misguided 
political  theory  of  those  tenderest  and  best  influences  and  rela- 
tions in  his  life  w^hich  consanguinity,  domesticity,  and  friend- 
ship constitute,  he  is  poor  indeed,  no  matter  what  the  substitutes 
may  be.  Aristotle  and  Aquinas,  refusing  to  let  their  heads  reel 
at  the  contemplation  of  civil  woes,  seek  to  save  the  wealth  of 
higher  quality  which  Plato,  with  his  personally  innocent  but 
practically  calamitous  imagery,  would  sacrifice.  They  further 
unmask  the  allurements  of  the  Broad-Browed's  theory  by  indi- 


733  Ibid. 

734  Ibid. 

7.35  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  3. 
736  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  227 

eating  that,  after  taking  away  the  better  wealth  from  the  indi- 
dual,  it  might  not  secure  for  him  the  lesser. 

Primarily,  it  is  convincingly  shown  that  common  ownership 
of  lands  and  goods  would  create  problems  in  place  of  those  it 
would  solve.  Who  would  do  the  work,  if  all  were  equally 
owners  ?  Either  alien  labor  would  have  to  be  introduced  or 
some  of  the  people  would  have  to  step  out  of  the  leisure  class. 
And  here  the  State  is  tossed  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma.  But 
hard  as  it  would  be  to  get  a  sufficient  amount  of  outside  help, 
the  second  alternative  would  be  more  difficult  still.  All  could 
not  till  the  soil;  some  would  have  to  attend  to  the  loftier  con- 
cerns. However,  those  who  would  work  least  in  one  respect 
would  receive  more  in  another :  whence  accusations  and  recrim- 
inations would  heaten  the  air  and  unity  would  melt  away.*^^" 
The  obvious  conclusion  for  us  to  draw  is  that  individualism 
should,  because  it  will,  have  its  play.  That  is,  to  a  much  more 
reasonable  degree  than  communism  could  conceive.  The  prob- 
lem of  poverty  can  hardly  be  solved  by  thrusting  misshapen 
humanity  into  a  well-tailored,  yet  bad-fitting,  ideal. 

The  advice  of  the  Commentary  is  that  the  natural  system  of 
ownership  prevail,  but  that  some  things  be  possessed  in  com- 
mon :  the  solution  which  has  been  widely  accepted  in  these  later 
years.  Morals  and  laws  can  do  more  towards  easing  the  condi- 
tion of  the  poor  than  impractical  prescriptions.  Let  the  good 
spirit  of  a  people  develop.  Let  individuals  be  knit  by  friendship 
and  common  interests  and  ardor.  Let  benevolence  be  diffused. 
(It  would  be  only  right  to  recall  at  this  point  in  the  Commentary 
the  Saint's  doctrine  on  the  spiritual  society  and  its  beneficent 
service  to  the  State. )  Then,  though  private  property  is  the  rule, 
mutual  help  and  spirit  make  many  things  common.  Private 
property  is  naturaly  requisite :  for  it  attracts  every  man's  atten- 
tion to  his  own  particular  concerns  and  so  makes  for  civil  peace ; 
it  more  cordially  invites  improvement,  and  thus  increases  the 
prosperity  of  the  State:  it  satisfies  a  compelling  instinct  in 
man."*^  But  while  it  is  best  to  permit  private  possession,  the 
use  of  it  should  be,  in  some  sense,  common ;  and  the  legislative 


Til  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  4. 
738  Ibidem. 


228     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


body  of  the  State  ought  to  concern  itself  with  ways  and  means 
of  bringing  property-holders  to  this  realization.'^^  Therefore, 
Aquinas  apparently  would  have  the  State^  if  it  must  use  its  voice 
on  property  matters,  do  so  in  a  democratic  way:  appealing  to 
the  possessing  class  but  not  clamping  down  a  Platonic  artificial- 
ism  on  the  people  whereby  the  richest  would  be  made  poor  and 
the  poor,  deprived  of  the  experienced  leadership  and  interest  of 
their  whilom  superiors,  would  probably  become  poorer.  The 
unmistakable  opinion  of  the  Philosopher  and  the  Doctor  is  that 
a  nation's  customs  cannot  be  changed  instanter  and  in  gloho, 
and  that  social  salvation  rather  begins  at  the  stand-point  of  the 
individual.  Aquinas  would  have  received  this  idea  from  Chris- 
tianity, without  any  benefit  from  Aristotle  at  all;  and,  in  its 
radiance,  he  would  likewise  have  perceived  the  unsubstantiality 
of  Plato's  city  in  the  air.  The  Philosopher  only  confirms  the 
Saint's  conviction  and  reassures  his  democratic  out-look. 

They  both  see  the  individual  sadly  injured  in  a  socialized 
polity.  It  does  not  occur  to  many  moderns  that  the  individual 
may  be  injured  by  receiving,  as  well  as  relieved.  The  Com- 
mentary uncovers  certain  directions  in  which  extreme  commun- 
ism would  be  criminal  to  the  individual  and  hence  highly  anti- 
democratic. First,  it  would  imperil  the  virtue  of  self-restraint 
in  the  all-important  regard  of  sex.^^^  The  dykes  w^hich  religion 
and  civilization  have  reared  to  repress  the  surge  of  passion  would 
be  broken,  if  women  were  made  common  objects.  And,  of  course, 
Christianity,  conscience,  the  moral  law,  and  common  decency 
would  be  w^ofully  impugned.  ^luch  less  than  the  Philosopher 
could  Aquinas  or  any  other  Christian  subscribe  to  Plato's 
peculiar  prescription.  The  second  sombre  fact,  which  the  Doctor 
stresses,  is  the  removal  from  the  people  of  the  opportunity  to 
practice  the  altruistic  virtues,  which  communism  would  entail.'^*-'^ 
If  all  goods  were  possessed  in  common,  there  would  be  no  call 
for  generosity,  neighborly  assistance,  interest,  or  concern.  Pagan 
as  he  was,  Aristotle  detected  the  barbaric  effect  of  a  theory  which 
would  prevent  the  individual  from  that  beautiful  expression  of 


739  Ibidem. 

740  Ibidem. 

741  Ibid. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  229 

self  which  humanitarianism  signifies  and  without  which  true 
democracy  is  inconceivable.  And  Aquinas,  who  taught  not  only 
the  expedience  and  charm  of  charity,  but  also  the  duty,  must 
have  been  much  more  repulsed.  Since  giving  sanctifies  the 
giver,  a  design  which  would  take  charity  absolutely  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  individual,  would  be  injudicious  and  unjust.  That 
one  of  the  finest  means  of  self-development  would  thereby  be 
undemocratically  denied  the  individual,  is  certain ;  and  spiritual 
poverty  would  spread,  blacker  than  any  tenement  district. 

Thomas  lightly  places  an  intelligent  finger  on  the  real  sore 
of  society  when  he  declares  that  poverty,  economic  and  other- 
wise, is  not  due  to  the  absence  of  common  possession,  but  to  the 
presence  of  malice  among  men.''^^-  Once  more  one  feels  the  pulse 
of  religious  and  ecclesiastical  yearning  in  his  politics.  For  what 
could  more  efiiciently  dispel  malice  than  the  Christian  dispensa- 
tion of  ''peace  on  earth  to  men  of  good  will,"  and  the  institution 
in  which  it  is  embodied  ? 

The  State  can  never  be  any  more  than  a  moral  unit;  hence 
moral  means  must  operate  behind  it.  It  follows  that  education 
is  imperative.''^*^  Here  we  find  the  democratic  idea  that  civil 
change  should  work  its  way  up  out  of  the  people  and  not  be 
forced  down  on  them.  Their  customs  and  tendencies,  their  na- 
ture, their  enlightenment  and  aspirations,  are  to  be  the  elements 
of  law.  The  individual  is  to  have  his  opportunity  to  unfold. 
Education,  the  key  of  democracy,  is  to  be  placed  within  every- 
body's reach.  Social  advancement  will  then  be  more  automatic 
and  democratic  than  a  ready-made  and  static  platonic  fiction 
could  admit.  And  accordingly  as  the  thoughts  of  the  individual 
increase,  his  sympathies  will  spread,  and  the  devoutly-to-be- 
wished  civil  unity  will  be  the  sequence.  There  is  no  necessity  to 
sacrifice  the  individual  to  the  universal,  if  the  individual  is  uni- 
versalized by  education.  Both  universality  and  individuality 
are  thus  preserved.  Plato  with  his  array  of  separate  ideas, 
encircling  paradise,  for  the  gods  and  the  souls  of  the  blessed  to 
contemplate,  could  not,  on  principle,  appreciate  individuality. 


742  Ibid. 

743  Ibid. 


230     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


much  less  conceive  it  as  the  germ  of  his  beloved  and  resplendent 
universals.  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  could  and  did,  vanquishing 
the  extreme  idealism  which  considered  the  individual  merely  as 
a  shadowy  something,  and  treating  the  alleged  shadow  as  a  man 
of  flesh,  bone,  blood,  sinew,  soul,  and  incalculable  possibility. 
In  adding  to  this  concept  of  individuality  the  doctrine  that 
education,  by  means  of  which  the  individual  practically  enters 
into  his  own,  is  a  part  of  civil  life,  Aristotle  and  Aquinas  are 
democratic  indeed.  And  the  immaterial  wealth  of  the  State  is 
greatly  enhanced  by  their  teaching. 

The  Commentary  decries  a  tendency  which  is  common  enough 
in  our  own  day  of  evolution  and  biogenetic  law,  to  look  to  ani- 
mals for  what  is  natural. ^"^^  Because  the  brutes  lack  property 
and  are  gregarious,  is  no  reason  why  man,  the  higher  animal, 
should  emulate  them.  The  human  being  is  different,  lives  so, 
and  should.  His  object  must  be  much  loftier  than  a  return  to 
the  prehistoric.  The  solution  of  the  problem  of  poverty,  at  least 
of  the  spirit,  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  Darwinian  dawn.  Democ- 
racy and  its  riches  are  the  climax  of  man's  development  and  not 
the  beginning. 

The  difficulties  of  a  communistic  plan  multiply,  decreasing  the 
value  of  the  theory  as  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  poverty. 
How  much  of  the  common  goods  would  be  permitted  to  an  indi- 
vidual ?  Enough  for  a  temperate  livelihood,  as  Plato  holds  ? 
Aristotle  observes  that  a  man  could  live  moderately,  yet  quite 
miserably  at  the  same  time.  Aquinas  declares  that  ^'to  live 
well"  is  the  righteous  object  of  the  individual  in  civil  society; 
and  so,  asking  less  in  the  line  of  theory,  he  demands  more  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  l^ot  food  and  other  necessities,  but  a  chance  to 
earn  them,  is  his  normal  demand  for  the  people.  Therefore  he 
preserves  their  independence,  without  which  individuality  is 
emasculate,  and  fosters  liberty.  He  saves  spontaneity,  initiative, 
self-expression,  creativeness ;  in  a  word,  all  the  individualistic 


744  St.  Thomas  reproves  this  tendency  in  its  application  to  women. 
They  should  not  have  to  till  the  soil  and  otherwise  share  the  un- 
sheltered life  of  men,  as  Plato  prescribed,  drawing  an  example  from 
the  beasts  with  w^hom  male  and  female  work  alike.  Civilized  beings 
have  a  domestic  life  which  brutes  lack.    Com.  PoUt.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  5. 


ST,  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  231 


qualities  which  endow  Life  with  color  and  verve.  The  ^'good 
life"  which  the  State  should  help  the  individual  to  secure  for 
himself,  rather  than  secure  for  him,  involves  much  that  com- 
munism would  take  awaj  and  more  than  it  could  giveJ^^  Indeed 
the  temperance  which  Plato  prescribes  is  out  of  the  question  in 
a  communistic  State ;  for  one  can  be  temperate  only  in  the  use 
of  goods  which  he  himself  possesses  and  not  in  that  of  those 
which  belong  to  the  State.  Or  again,  if  a  man  holds  only  what 
the  civil  authority  hands  him,  he  has  little  chance  to  practice 
virtue  in  reference  to  it.  Receiving  just  so  much,  he  can  hardly 
be  accredited  with  temperance  because  he  does  not  possess  any 
more.^^^  In  other  words,  virtue  in  a  Platonic  polity,  would  be 
transferred  from  the  individual  to  the  State,  from  the  reality  to 
the  abstraction,  from  the  human  will  to  the  civil  mechanism, 
from  the  personal  conscience  to  the  general  expedience.  And, 
naturally,  in  this  unnatural  transfer,  it  would  quite  lose  its  char- 
acter of  virtue  and  become  a  mere  political  form. 

Another  snag  in  a  communistic  state  consists  in  the  fact  that 
the  government  would  have  to  interfere  in  the  matter  of  births. 
Equal  distribution  would  be  problematic  among  a  con- 
stantly increasing  population. The  greater  the  number  of 
citizens,  the  smaller  the  allotment  of  goods  to  each  would  have 
to  be.  From  one  point  of  view,  this  would  approach  a  return 
to  poverty ;  from  any  angle,  it  would  be  an  undesirability.  And 
so,  from  a  violation  of  the  right  of  property,  the  State  would 
turn  to  the  limitation  of  the  still  more  sacred  right  of  procrea- 
tion. 

Finally,  there  could  hardly  be  any  distinction  between  rulers 
and  subjects  in  this  artificial  State,  since  all  are  perfectly  equal. 
And  yet  even  Plato  admits  the  necessity  of  such  a  distinction, 
declaring  that  just  as  the  warp  is  made  out  of  one  sort  of  wool 
and  the  woof  out  of  another,  so  are  some  fit  for  governance  and 
others  for  obedience  in  the  civil  design.'^*^  The  fact  is  that 
Plato,  driving  ISTature  out  through  the  gate  of  his  Republic, 


745  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  6. 

746  Ibidem. 
W  Ibidem. 
748  Ibid. 


232     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

finds  it  climbing  back  in  again  over  the  wall.  Theories  may  be 
untrue  to  i^ature,  but  they  can  never  make  her  untrue  to  herself. 
Because  Aquinas  is  so  natural  in  thought,  he  is  opposed  to  far- 
fetched remedies  for  the  problems  of  State,  and  democratically 
seeks  in  the  nature  of  the  individual,  or  at  least  accordingly  with 
it,  the  solution  which  others  look  for  in  some  glistening  mirage. 

For  Aquinas,  it  is  certain  that  man  has  a  right  to  property. 
He  does  not  believe  that  this  right  was  alienated  in  the  forma- 
tion of  civil  society,  and,  furthermore,  he  does  not  see  any  reason 
why  it  should  be  surrendered  afterwards.  But  his  stand  is  a 
satisfactorily  reasoned  one.  The  purpose  of  society  is  the  com- 
mon good ;  what  favors  the  common  good  is  serviceable  to 
society ;  but  private  property  favors  the  common  good,  which  is 
evinced  by  the  several  proofs  to  be  found  in  the  Commentary 
and  in  the  Summa.  In  the  latter  work  (2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVI 
a.  ^),  Aquinas  reduces  them  to  three.  First,  man  has  a  motive 
to  elicit  his  energies  and  render  him  a  vital,  important,  produc- 
ing member  of  society,  if  he  is  permitted  to  toil  for  his  own 
concrete  self  rather  than  compelled  to  strive  for  the  generality 
of  the  State.  "^^^  Secondly,  civil  society  could  not  but  run  much 
more  smoothly,  when  each  individual  is  busy  with  his  own  pos- 
sessions and  with  the  care  and  increase  of  them.  Thirdly,  there 
cannot  be  much  civil  calm,  unless  there  is  individual  content- 
ment; and,  Aquinas  notes,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  quarrels 
arise  more  frequently  where  there  is  public  possession  than 
where  there  is  private. 

By  thus  vindicating  the  right  of  property,  the  Angelic  Doctor 
again  proves  his  regard  for  the  individual.  He  gives  the  indi- 
vidual an  opportunity  to  expand  and  cover  environment  with  his 
personality,  and  expects  the  State  to  do  the  same.  He  would 
not  make  society  the  richer  by  rendering  the  individual  the 
poorer ;  realizing  that  there  can  be  no  genuine  social  wealth  if 
individuality  is  compressed  to  mediocrity  or  worse.  He  saves 
the  individual,  not  to  destroy  the  State,  but  to  perfect  it. 

However,  he  is  not  averse  to  whatever  justice  the  plea  for 
community  of  goods  possesses,  and  he  is  at  pains  to  show  where 


749  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVI,  a.  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  233 


the  fallacy  of  the  communistic  contention  lies.  That  the  natural 
law  does  not  specify  private  ownership,  he  admits.  But,  he 
declares,  neither  does  it  dictate  that  all  things  should  be  held  in 
common.  Hence  private  ownership  is  not  counter  to  the  natural 
law^  and  certainly  it  is  in  accord  with  human  reason  and  neces- 
sity. In  other  words,  private  property  is  an  institution  of  the 
positive  law,  but  is  not  a  violation  of  the  natural.^^ 

His  fairness  in  dealing  with  this  question  of  property  inspires 
respect.  We  can  turn  then  with  a  deal  of  confidence  to  his 
remedy  for  the  relief  of  poverty,  which  the  modern  mind  con- 
ceives as  a  correlative  idea. 

Elsewhere  we  have  noticed  his  monitions  as  to  the  distribution 
of  wealth.   Here  we  shall  view  them  more  amply. 

He  interprets  the  property  right  in  a  manner  to  attain  the 
advantages  of  public  ownership  without  incurring  the  demerits. 
His  thoughts  on  external  goods,^^-"-  around  which  the  modern 
storm  of  socialism  is  raging,  are  distinctive.  He  does  not  deny 
that  man  has  a  right  to  possess  them ;  could  they  be  used,  unless 
one  had  them  to  use  ?  But  he  does  insist  that  they  be  possessed 
not  as  one's  own,  but  as  common,  so  far  as  the  use  of  them  is 
concerned.  In  other  words,  the  possessor  ought  to  be  ready 
to  share  them  with  others  in  need.  The  modem  mind  has 
grasped  this  advice  not  as  an  ordinary  and  normal  solution  of 
the  problem  of  want,  but  as  an  extraordinary  and  occasional 
one.  But  Aquinas  teaches  that  men  ought  not  wait  till  misery 
waxes  strong  and  stalks  through  the  land,  before  they  open  their 
heart  and  extend  their  hand.  Besides,  he  recognizes  that  our 
common  humanity  gives  each  of  us  a  certain  right  to  a  saving 
portion  of  the  world's  goods,  and  indicates  that  there  is  no 
shame  in  one's  accepting  one's  due.  As  for  benefactors,  he 
deprives  them  of  a  too  selfish  and  ill-merited  glow,  by  teaching 
that  the  goods  which  they  share  with  others,  in  real  need,  are, 
in  a  sense,  as  much  the  property  of  those  others  as  of  them- 
selves."^^ 


loO  gum  ma  Tfieoh,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLVI,  a.  2,  ad  1. 

751  Such  as  food,  clothing,  houses,  etc.  See  Dr.  Henry  Ignatius 
Smith's  classification,  quoted  in  Ch.  VI. 

752  Bumma  Theol,  2a  2a€,  qu.  LXVI,  a.  7,  el  a.  8. 


234     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


He  divides  his  doctrine,  in  another  part  of  the  Summa,  into 
three  points :  first,  that  there  should  be  private  possession ;  sec- 
ondly, that  the  use  of  the  things  possessed  should  be  partly  com- 
mon thirdly,  that  they  should  be  partly  granted  to  others  by 
the  good  will  of  the  possessors.  Therefore  we  can  see  that  he 
would  not  care  to  have  the  fist  of  the  State  contantly  poised  over 
a  man  to  force  him,  as  needs  be,  to  share  his  larder  with  his 
neighbor.  He  still  saves  a  decent  amount  of  freedom  for  the 
individual.  But  it  is  for  us  to  remember,  that  he  was 
writing  in  a  period  when  the  Church  enjoyed  the  influence 
which  the  State  lacked  and  ecclesiastical  charity  was  more 
efficient  than  any  other  kind  of  organized  charity  has  been  since. 
So  that,  even  without  civil  interference,  the  poor  were  properly 
provided  for.  It  is  apparent  that,  in  the  present  constitution 
of  society,  w^ith  the  Church  shorn  of  her  medieval  prestige  and 
opportunities,  the  Saint  would  advocate  a  greater  intervention 
of  the  State  in  the  matter  of  social  service  and  relief. 

He  reverts  to  Holy  Scripture  for  guidance  in  solving  this 
elusive  problem  of  poverty,  and  finds  more  enlightenment  there 
than  a  modern  would  derive  from  Das  Kapital.  He  does  not  fear 
to  turn  from  the  pages  of  the  pagan  Aristotle  to  those  of  the 
inspired  writer,  being  confident  that  truth  cannot  contradict 
truth.  And  he  finds  that  the  principles  of  the  Politics  (Ch.  II) 
have  already  received  a  practical  application  in  the  Book  of 
NumhersJ^ 

While  the  Hebrews,  according  to  divine  direction,  stood  by 
the  right  of  private  property,  Aquinas  notes  that,  according 
to  custom,  possessions  might  not  be  alienated  forever,  but 
that  after  a  certain  lapse  of  time  they  should  return  to  their 
former  owner."^^  And  he  remarks  that  a  regulation  of  pos- 
sessions wmild  lend  much  to  the  preservation  of  a  state  or 
nation.'^^^  One  cannot  but  discern  that  he  is  not  friendly  to 
the  principle  of  unbridled  accumulation  which,  reigning  in 


753  Of.  Aristotle's  assertion  that  "to  have  nothing  in  common  is  evi- 
dently impossible,  for  the  socail  state  itself  is  a  species  of  community" — 
Politics,  II,  1. 

754  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  2. 

755  Ibidem. 

756  Ibid,  ad  3. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  235 

modern  times,  has  piled  up  luxury  and  indigence  in  our  states. 
He  holds  that  poverty  is  better  obviated  not  by  injuring  the 
right  of  property,  but  by  prudently  directing  its  exercise.  The 
seventh  book  of  the  Commentary  proposes  a  system  v^hich  com- 
bines the  vim  of  modern  progressive  theories  of  property-regula- 
tion with  a  very  satisfactory  degree  of  conservatism.  Briefly, 
the  plan  is  that,  in  the  best  state,  the  land  should  be  divided: 
the  one  part  for  common  purposes  and  expenses,  the  other  for 
private  ownership  and  for  objects  that  are  at  least  as  much  to 
the  private  advantage  as  to  the  public.  Each  of  these  sections, 
in  turn,  must  be  subdivided.  Of  the  first,  the  one  portion  will 
supply  revenues  to  sustain  religious  worship  and  its  accompany- 
ing necessities;  the  other  will  defray  the  cost  of  public  meals. 
Of  the  second  section,  the  first  half  should  yield  each  individual 
his  private  necessities ;  the  other,  the  revenues  for  the  needs  of 
the  State,  such  as  arms,  defense,  and  ornation.'^^^ 

This  plan  must  have  been  close  to  the  heart  of  Aquinas,  for 
it  appears  to  answer  best  his  ever-present  political  purpose  of 
the  common  good,  and  to  ask  least.  He  realized  from  his  own 
reason,  as  well  as  from  Aristotle,  that  the  six  essentials  of  the 
State,  without  any  one  of  which  society  would  be  abject, 
were:  food,  artisanship  (work),  defense,  revenue,  religion,  and 
courts."^  Though  he  w^ould  hardly  have  acceded  to  the  item 
of  public  meals,  which  were  possible  in  the  Philosopher's  city- 
state  but  would  be  vast  inconveniences  in  the  medieval  order, 
he  must  have  perceived  how  well  the  great  Greek's  semi-social- 
istic plan,  so  to  speak,  covered  and  promised  to  secure  these 
several  requirements. 

But,  on  this  interesting  matter,  we  must  content  ourselves 
only  with  indications.  The  part  of  the  Commentary  in  which 
this  old,  yet  novel,  plan  of  distribution  is  sketched,  was  not 
written  by  the  Doctor's  owm  hand.''^^^  And  there  is  a  possibility 
that  the  artificiality  of  the  idea,  which,  though  much  less  than 
that  of  Plato,  nevertheless  was  evident  to  Aquinas,  somewhat 


757  Com.  Polit,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  8. 

758  Aristotle's  Politics,  VII,  ch.  8. 

759  See  Introduction. 


236     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


repelled.  But  this  is  certain :  that  he  believes  some  things  should 
be  in  public  possession  and  control.  And  his  second  unmistak- 
able tenet  is  that  private  ownership  should  not  be  so  hard  and 
fast  as  to  occasion  dire  want.  It  is  not  exj^edient  in  a  State,  the 
Commentary  asserts,  that  any  person  should  lack  food  or  any 
other  necessity  of  life.^^  He  holds  with  St.  Ambrose  that  ''to 
spend  more  than  enough  is  to  take  by  violence,"  and  that  "no 
man  should  call  his  own  that  which  is  common"  (Senn.  LXIV., 
de  temp.),  so  far  as  the  use  of  things,  which  should  be  general, 
is  affected. He  recalls  the  familiar  manner  of  possession  of 
goods  among  the  Jews :  that  all  alike  were  allowed  on  entering  a 
friend's  vineyard  to  eat  of  the  fruit,  though  not  to  take  any  of  it 
away;  that  especially,  with  regard  to  the  poor,  it  was  prescribed 
that  the  forgotten  sheaves  and  clusters  of  grapes,  should  be 
relinquished  to  their  fingers  (Lev.  XIX.  9)  (Deut.  XXIV.  19)  ; 
and  that  all  the  fruit  of  the  earth  in  the  seventh  year  was  com- 
mon property.  He  goes  on  to  answer  an  objection  against  this 
free  and  easy  possession,  which  the  Jews  practiced.  Men  cannot 
live  together  peaceably,  the  difficulty  ran,  if  one  takes  what 
belongs  to  another;  but  this  appears  to  have  been  approved  by 
the  Law  (Deut.  XXIII,  24)  ;  therefore  the  Old  Law  did  not 
acceptably  provide  for  peace.  And  the  Saint  responds  in  the 
voice  of  Christianity  and  the  Church,  ''He  that  loveth  his 
neighbor  hath  fulfilled  the  Law"  (Rom.  XIII,  8).  And  love, 
he  insists,  has  a  practical  social  bearing.^^^  "He  that  .  .  . 
shall  see  his  brother  in  need,"  he  quotes,  "and  shall  shut  up  his 
bowels  from  him :  how  doth  the  charity  of  God  abide  in  him  ?" 
(1  John  III,  17)  ;  and  also  the  positive  text  of  St.  Paul  in  the 
first  epistle  to  Timothy  (VI,  18),  commanding  the  rich  "to  give 
easily  and  to  communicate  to  others."  He  reveals  what  an 
integral  part  of  human  life  charity  is  and  must  be,  and  indicates 
its  value  as  a  power  of  self-develoj^ment  and  a  form  of  self- 
expression,  for  it  gives  to  the  giver  that  which  is  inestimably 
more  valuable  than  that  which  is  given :  the  sense  of  duty  done 


760  Com.  Polit.,  Dib.  VII,  lec.  8.  Cf.  Mgr.  de  Concilio,  Doctrine  of  St. 
Thomas  on  the  Right  of  Property,  p.  48. 

761  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  LXVI,  a.  2,  ad  3. 

762  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  2,  ad  1. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  237 


and  of  closer  kinship  with  Christ.  But  charity,  he  maintains, 
does  not  consist  alone  in  giving.  It  could  and  should  be  prac- 
tised also  in  a  passive  way,  which  is  more  delicate  and  much  less 
liable  to  the  evil  and  censure  of  patronage  which  often  robs  one 
of  the  ghostly  merit  of  a  good  deed  and  makes  the  beneficiary 
feel  that  he  has  paid  for  it  at  extortionate  rate.  A  man  does  not 
give  easily  to  another,  as  Holy  Writ  demands  and  Aquinas 
reiterates,  if  he  will  not  suffer  another  man  to  take  some  little 
thing  from  him  without  any  great  injury  to  himself. "^^^  And, 
for  that  matter,  the  Doctor  asserts,  the  taking  of  a  little  does  not 
disturb  the  peace,  among  a  well-behaved  people,  but  rather  con- 
firms friendship  and  accustoms  men  to  give  to  one  another."^^^ 
In  such  a  view  he  expresses  the  spirit  of  his  own  native  Italy, 
with  her  sunny  hospitality  and  decent  liberty  from  the  thrall 
of  things ;  but,  more  especially,  he  breathes  the  spirit  of 
the  Gospel.  When  things  are  too  rigorously  possessed,  they 
possess  the  possessor;  they  are  his  master  and  he  is  their  slave. 
And  for  this  reason  the  Savior  warned  of  the  difficulties  which 
wealth  offered  to  salvation,  and  with  a  realization  of  which 
Aquinas  is  imbued  and  would  have  men  equally  so.  He  knows 
that,  if  permitted,  Christianity  could  solve  the  problem  of  pov- 
erty, by  drawing  men  together  in  mutual  regard  and  saving  the 
best  of  their  energy  and  effort  from  a  consecration  to  the  coarser 
possessions  of  life. 

For  him,  Catholicism  is  not  only  an  asset  to  social  welfare 
but  the  best  assurance  of  it ;  and  of  all  the  "isms"  which  may  be 
preferred  to  solve  and  dissolve  the  problem  of  poverty,  spiritual 
and  material,  he  would  place  it  first. 

He  proclaims  man's  right  to  work  and  the  duty  of  society 
to  ease  the  financial  circumstances  of  his  life.  The  wealthy 
must  be  willing  to  lend  and  unwilling,  ordinarily,  to  exact  in- 
terest. They  ought  not  accept  the  necessities  of  life  in  security, 
and  should  not  be  importunate  in  exacting  payment.  Too,  debts 
should  cease  altogether  after  the  lapse  of  seven  years;  for,  as 


763  Ibidem. 

7M  Sumvia  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  2,  ad  1. 
7QoSumma  Theol,  2a  2ae.  qu.  CLXXXVII,  a.  3. 


238     ST.  THOAIAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Thomas  remarks,  it  is  probable  that  those  who  could  conveniently 
meet  their  obligations  would  have  done  so  before  the  seventh 
year  and  would  not  defraud  the  lender  without  cause;  and  if 
they  are  altogether  insolvent,  there  is  the  same  reason  for  remit- 
ting the  debt  from  love  of  them,  as  there  was  for  renewing  the 
loan  on  account  of  their  needJ^  He  is  of  the  conviction  that 
the  old  Hebrew  regTilations  suitably  direct  human  interrelations ; 
but  he  is  conscious  that  this  would  not  be  so,  unless  religion, 
which  is  an  essential  element  of  his  political  thought,  were  in 
men's  lives.  The  necessity  of  the  Church  and  its  influence  is 
axiomatic  in  his  doctrine.  To  forget  this,  would  be  to  smile  at 
his  monitions,  which  are  so  alien  to  the  hard  business  wisdom  of 
the  world.   But  to  remember  it,  is  to  ponder. 

In  fine,  we  may  sum  up  his  solution  of  the  problem  of  spir- 
itual and  temporal  want  in  the  State  in  two  words :  the  Church 
and  justice.  The  former  holds  aloft  the  latter  as  a  light  to  the 
world ;  to  speak  with  authority ;  and  to  advise  how  the  principle 
may  be  best  realized  in  the  practical  affairs  of  life ;  to  save  the 
individual  and  his  rights  from  unnatural  theory;  to  teach  him 
to  live  and  let  live,  to  give  and  to  receive,  to  help  and  be  helped, 
to  rejoice  and  be  glad,  to  suffer  and  be  patient,  to  realize  the 
liberty  of  law,  the  equality  of  our  common  nature,  and  the  fra- 
ternity which  is  founded  on  the  paternity  of  God  and  the  catholic 
redemption  of  His  Son.  The  Doctor's  first  service  consists  in 
the  fact  that  he  not  only  prescribes  justice,  but  also  tells  us 
where  and  how  it  is  to  be  found ;  his  second,  in  the  further  fact 
that  his  doctrine,  far  from  injuring  democracy,  like  our  theories 
of  relief  today,  truly  advances  it.  Whereas  the  individual,  the 
sacred  symbol  of  democracy,  would  be  wholly  absorbed  in  the 
socialistic  sea,  he  rises  full-formed,  efficient  and  panoplied  with 
natural  rights,  from  the  brow  of  the  medieval  scholar-saint. 


766  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CV,  a.  2,  ad  4. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  239 


3. — Nationality  and  Self-determination 

Now  that  we  have  inspected,  not  only  the  complete  State  of 
Aquinas'  planning,  but  also  the  remedies  against  its  maladies,  it 
would  be  pertinent  briefly  to  consider  the  elemental  question 
underlying  every  civil  society:  what  makes  it  a  distinct  nation 
and  why  ? 

The  subject  of  nationality  looms  large  as  a  result  of  the  war. 
The  task  of  readjustment  of  boundary  lines,  before  the  Peace 
tribunal ;  the  case  of  Fiume,  and  the  thrice-piteous  plea  of  Ire- 
land: these  invest  an  interrogation  which  is  answered  in  St. 
Thomas'  Commentary  or  Aristotle's  Politics,  with  a  living  inter- 
est. The  Doctor  is  psychological,  and  approves  of  no  merely 
external  and  materialistic  standard  of  making  and  judging  a 
nation.  Walls  of  brick — or  pacts  on  paper,  for  that  matter — do 
not  make  a  state.^^'  Hence  he  believes  that  one  should  look 
deeply  into  the  people  for  the  principle  of  nationality,  rather 
than  into  geography,  expedience,  or  any  other  externality.  If  a 
people  are  a  distinct  race,  they  ought  to  have  a  distinct  state,  for 
many  reasons.    First,  they  constitute  a  moral  personality,^^ 


767  C'owi.  Polit.,  Lib.  Ill,  lec.  2:  "non  potest  dici,  quod  homines  in- 
habitantes  civitatem  conservant  identitatem  civitatis  propter  muros 
eosdem."  It  must  be  recalled  in  interpreting  this  sentence,  however, 
that  St.  Thomas,  commenting  Aristotle,  is  speaking  of  the  Philosopher's 
supreme  city-state.  He  adds  that  a  circumvallation  of  the  Peleponnesus 
would  not  make  a  single  state,  no  more  than  did  the  walls  of  Babylon, 
which  enclosed  such  an  area  and  population  that,  not  until  three  days 
after  the  down-fall,  did  some  of  the  very  inhabitants  receive  the  news. 
Such  an  expansiveness  exceeded  the  political  ken  of  Aristotle  who  be- 
lieved that  a  state  should  be  small.  But  Aquinas  did  not  teach  such  a 
necessity  (See  Ch.  I);  in  fact,  he  regarded  the  kingdom  as  more  self- 
suflScient  than  the  city-state.  He  would  see  a  nation  within  Babylon's 
walls  (though  not  because  of  the  walls  themselves)  where  Aristotle 
would  behold  only  a  discrete  collection  of  city-states  (in  qua  magis 
comprehenditur  una  gens,  quam  una  civitas).  So  that  his  thoughts  on 
nationality  are  more  akin  to  the  modem-mind,  to  which  the  city-state 
is  a  legend,  than  are  the  Philosopher's. 

(2)  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  LXXXI,  a.  1:  "in  civilibus  omnes 
homines  qui  sunt  unius  communitatis  reputantur  quasi  unum  corpus 
et  tota  communitas  quasi  unus  homo."  Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5: 
"  'mens  quidem  est  sui  juris'  "  (Seneca,  De  Benef.,  Ch.  XX).  See  Chap- 
ter VII  on  Rights. 

l^Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  HI,  cap.  2;  et  Summa  Theol..  la  2ae,  qu.  LXXXI, 
a.  1. 


240     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

and  accordingly  have  rights,  among  which  are  life,  liberty,  self- 
preservation,  and  determination.  (Though  Aquinas  does  not 
exploit  this  idea  of  civil  personality  to  the  degree  favored  by 
Spencer,  Bluntschli,  Schaeffle,  Fouillee  and  Es23inas.)  Sec- 
ondly, their  manners  and  customs  are  the  same,  assuring  a 
unified  personality  and  hence  enhancing  its  rights.  Thirdly, 
the  people  are  bound  together  by  affection  and  tradition,  which, 
in  themselves,  ought  not  be  violated.  Fourthly,  hate  and 
wrangling  are  the  result  of  a  greater  state  swallowing  a  lesser 
one,  which  naturally  and  rightly  refuses  to  be  digested.  The 
inference  is  legitimate  that  the  imperial  policies  of  modem 
times,  in  so  far  as  they  have  opposed  the  personalities  of  capable 
small  nations,  could  not  be  justified  on  Thomistic  grounds,  and 
that  the  restrained  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  terri- 
torial acquisition  is  in  accord  with  Aquinas'  teaching. ''^^ 
While  rising  above  Aristotle's  petty  idea  of  the  city-state,  he 
avoids  the  fallacy  of  the  super-state  and  would  no  more  have  the 
identity  of  a  nation  sunk  in  an  empire,  than  the  human  indi- 
vidual lost  in  the  civil  sea ;  though,  to  be  sure,  he  is  not  and  could 
not  be  adverse  to  an  amicable  alliance  between  the  countries  for 
the  common  good  of  each  and  all.  The  rights  of  small  nations 
are  of  as  much  importance  to  him  as  those  of  the  large ;  for  they 
all  rest  on  the  common  and  sacred  basis  of  the  natural  law.  He 
saves  the  individual,  the  family,  and  lastly  the  State,  from  the 
top-heavy  political  concepts  which  crush,  and  considers  each 
predecessor  in  this  civil  series  as  superior  to  the  successor, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  a  source.  His  democracy,  therefore,  rings 
true,  through  the  State  and  around  it. 

Different  nations  there  must  be,  as  there  are  different  indi- 
viduals, temperaments,  and  aspirations.  The  lack  of  sameness  is 
natural  and  necessary  to  a  richness  of  world  achievement.  But 
all  can  and  ought  to  be  united  at  least  in  the  "one  necessary 
thing" :  the  service  of  the  Father  of  all,  which  implies  fealty 


769  Poole,  Illustrations  of  the  History  of  Medieval  Thought,  p.  246: 
"the  express  preference  which  Thomas  displays  for  nationality  as  the 
basis  of  the  state,  shows  that  he  had  learned,  what  the  civilians  re- 
mained ignorant  of,  that  the  world  had  outgrown  the  imperial  concep- 
tion." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  241 


and  adoration  in  the  Church  of  His  Divine  Son.  Aquinas  saw, 
six  hundred  years  ago,  that  the  old  Catholic  faith  had  made  a 
kind  of  unit  out  of  the  vigorous  ethnic  varieties  of  the  times,  and 
presumed  that  religion  alone  would  be  capable  of  such  a  service 
throughout  the  future.  It  alone  could  fully  promise  the  inner 
unity  without  which  all  external  expedients  would  be  brittle. 

4. — Individuality  and  Individual  Concerns 

From  the  broadest  ideals,  the  politics  of  Aristotle  and  Aquinas 
can  and  do  contract,  easily  and  naturally,  to  the  concern  of  the 
individual.  The  characteristics  of  their  doctrine  are  expansive- 
ness  and  pointedness :  a  combination  of  qualities  which  generally 
signifies  truly  great  thought.  Aquinas  began  his  political  phil- 
osophy with  the  instincts  of  the  human  individual;  it  is  fitting 
that  we  draw  our  treatise  to  a  close  with  certain  Thomistic  ideas 
of  which  the  individual  in  relation  to  civil  life  is  again  the  direct 
subject.  The  seventh  book  of  Aristotle's  Politics,  replete  with 
practical  civil  advices,  must  have  made  a  deep  impression  on 
Aquinas ;  for  he  borrows  heavily  from  it  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
authentic  portion  of  his  De  Regimine,  We  are  led  to  believe 
that  he  made  its  thoughts  peculiarly  his  own,'*^^^  and  hence  we  do 
not  hesitate  to  present  Lesson  XII  of  the  Seventh  Book  of  the 
Commentary  as  an  expression  of  his  o\vn  political  acceptation 
and  conviction. 

The  particular  reference  of  civil  life  to  man's  material  condi- 
tion is  again  emphasized.  Though  the  things  of  the  spirit  are 
certainly  superior  in  their  own  order,  the  fact  remains,  from 
which  Thomas'  sanctity  could  not  deter  him,  that  the  body  comes 
first  in  some  very  important  respects.  Man's  life  is  to  be  ration- 
ally directed;  but,  first  of  all,  we  must  have  the  man  and  have 
him  as  a  fit  and  normal  subject  for  rational  existence.^^^ 


770  For  example,  cf.  Bk.  VII,  ch.  XI,  with  the  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  II. 
The  latter  uses  the  thoughts  of  the  former  on  health,  water-supply,  etcs. 
Also  cf.  Bk.  VII,  ch.  V,  and  the  De  Reg.,  Lib.  II,  cap.  Ill:  the  latter 
borrows  the  advice  of  the  former  on  the  necessary  self-dependency  for 
provisions,  which  a  state  should  have. 

771  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  12. 


242     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


Aquinas  does  not  approve  of  the  civil  policy,  which  has  too  long 
been  modem,  of  dealing  only  with  the  individual  failures  in 
society.  He  believes  that  society,  insofar  as  possible,  should 
forestall  failures.  The  work  of  prevention  should  exceed  the 
task  of  cure.''-  Constructive  of  good  lives  even  more  than 
punitive  of  bad,  the  civil  endeavor  should  be. 

Elsewhere  we  reviewed  the  education  of  the  individual  accord- 
ing to  the  Aristotelian-Thomistic  schema.  But  now  the  Doctors 
thought  reaches  behind  education  to  an  earlier  and  deeper  duty. 
Farther  back  even  than  the  cradle,  the  beneficent  service  of  civil 
society  to  the  individual  should  extend.  The  child  has  a  right 
to  be  well  born.  And  the  State  should  strive  to  supply  the  con- 
ditions requisite  to  a  realization  of  the  right. 

The  principle  which  the  Commentary  offers  is  that  practical 
necessity  deals  with  means  rather  than  ends ;  details  and  stages, 
rather  than  totalities  and  results."''^  The  child  feels  before  he 
thinks ;  eats  before  he  talks ;  sleeps  before  he  walks ;  he  is  more 
sense  than  soul  before  his  rational  life  begins. 

The  body  is  more  important,  because  the  mind  is  not  yet 
awakened.  But  the  body  of  the  child  being  primarily  referable 
to  the  parents,  the  assurances  of  good  birth  are  to  be  sought  in 
them.'"^  Without  injuring  individual  rights,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  St.  Thomas  considered  inviolable,  when  they  appertain  to 
the  soul  of  the  individual  or  to  the  nature  of  his  body,  the  pru- 
dent State  can  and  should  lay  down  some  regulations.  For  the 
individual,  in  certain  circumstances,  involving  harm  to  others, 
lacks  the  right  to  exercise  his  rights.  Wherefore  the  Commen- 
tary considers  the  age  of  the  contracting  parties,  the  time  of 
marriage,  and  kindred  topics,  as  possible  subjects  for  civil  con- 
cern and  provision. 

The  parties  should  not  be  too  young,  nor  too  old,  nor  of  too 
great  disparity  in  years.  This  question  of  parental  age  has 
much  to  do  with  the  bodily  welfare  of  the  child.  The  average 
duration  of  sex-potency  in  a  man  being  seventy  years  and  in  a 


~T2  Ibidem. 

773  Ibidem. 

774  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  12. 

775  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  243 

woman  fifty,  marriage  regulations  should  be  made  within  these 
periods.  The  time  of  the  latter  is  less  than  the  former,  the  Com- 
mentary explains,  because  woman's  nature  is  more  delicate  and 
less  aggressive  than  man's. 

The  baneful  effects  of  youthful  marriages  on  offspring  are 
emphasized.  The  imperfect  and  immature  cause  means  the  same 
manner  of  effect.^^^  Undersized  and  weak  are  the  children  of 
such  ill-advised  unions ;  to  say  nothing  of  the  peril  to  the  mother 
and  the  deleterious  result  to  both  parents  of  a  too  early  taste  of 
the  secrets  of  life."^^^  According  to  Aristotle,  the  proper  age  for 
the  wife  would  be  about  eighteen  years,  and  for  the  husband 
about  thirty-seven ;  for  then  their  physical  perfection  is  attained. 
But  the  Scholastic  regard  for  individual  rights  here  asserts  itself 
in  a  sort  of  opposition  to  the  Philosopher's  stand.  While 
Aquinas  freely  admits  and  approves  a  limited  degree  of  civil 
interference,  he  holds  that  it  should  always  be  directed  along 
natural  lines.  To  set  the  minimum  age  for  marriage  at  seven- 
teen and  thirty-seven,  would  be  an  arbitrary  and  artificial  pro- 
cedure. Individuals  differ  so  much  in  their  intimate  concerns, 
capabilities,  and  tendencies  that,  to  force  a  common  rule  upon 
them  in  a  matter  so  personal  as  to  call  for  a  large  degree  of  free- 
dom, would  be  unseemly.  Aquinas  would  present  as  advice  what 
Aristotle  would  make  a  law.  He  believes  that  nature  determines 
the  time  of  marriage  more  suitably  than  the  Philosopher,  and 
that  her  rulings,  as  far  as  man's  rights  are  concerned,  are  to  be 
followed;  but  that  the  Philosopher  better  determines  the  best 
time  for  the  alliance.^^  As  we  have  seen  before,  he  does  not 
think  that  civil  law  should  command  a  man  to  do  everything 
good  nor  forbid  him  to  do  anything  bad.  So  long  as  the  indi- 
vidual's autonomy  does  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  others, 
he  has  a  right  to  be  unmolested  by  civil  power.  But  when  a 
youth  and  maiden  marry  at  the  time  of  their  desire,  know  their 
own  minds  and  are  qualified  by  nature  for  the  step,  there  will 
hardly  be  serious  harm  to  the  fruit  of  the  womb,  or,  at  least,  not 

776  Ibidem. 

777  Ibidem. 

778  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  7.  N.  B.  But  Aquinas  teaches  that 
marriage  'before  the  age  of  puberty  is  invalid.  See  Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu. 
CLXXXIX,  a.  5. 


244     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


sufficient  to  warrant  the  trepidation  of  the  State.  Their  parents 
have  no  right  to  stop  them,^''^  much  less  the  law.  There  is  per- 
haps, too,  a  prudential  trend  in  the  Doctor's  thought.  I^ature  is 
stronger  than  statutes.  The  sex  instinct  will  assert  itself  out- 
side the  law,  if  it  may  not  within.  The  law  must,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, be  in  accord  with  nature,  and  not  counter  to  it ;  else  it  lays 
an  intolerable  burden  on  the  people,  discredits  the  government 
in  their  eyes,  and  is  fore-doomed  to  failure. 

However,  from  the  general  Aristotelian  principle  that  care 
should  be  taken  that  the  bodies  of  the  children  may  be  such  as 
will  answer  the  expectations  of  the  legislator,"^^  we  may  infer 
that  Aquinas  favored  every  reasonable  precaution  which  the 
State  should  see  fit  to  take.  He  believes  that  the  contracting 
parties  ought  to  be  in  good  health;  and  the  expedience  of  a 
doctor's  certificate  to  that  effect  appears  in  harmony  with  his 
trend  of  thought.  The  Commentary  states  plainly  that  prospec- 
tive parents  should  consult  the  physician  and  abide  by  his 
advice."^^^  But  the  greater  probability  is  that  Aquinas,  more 
zealous  of  individual  rights  than  the  Philosopher,  would  still 
ward  off  the  encroachment  of  the  State  and  have  the  safety  of 
the  unborn  assured  by  a  reign  of  intelligence,  religion,  and 
common  decency  in  society.  If  these  are  present,  law  may  well 
be  absent ;  if  they  are  not,  law  will  be  only  nominal.  For,  even 
if  it  ought,  the  State  could  not  reach  deeply  enough  into  personal 
lives  to  heal  a  situation  which  is  so  far  from  superficial.  isTot  to 
permit  marriage,  is  not  to  prevent  intercourse.  Evidently  ap- 
peal would  have  to  be  made  to  higher  sanctions  than  the  State 
can  boast.  Aquinas  supplies  them  in  the  religious  citadel  of  his 
politics.  Still,  if  the  influence  of  the  Church  fails,  as  is  today 
so  evidently  the  case  in  districts  where  neo-paganism  is  rising 
and  peculiar  varieties  of  Christianity  are  preached,  there  is  little 
doubt  that  Aquinas  would  approve  of  a  civil  enactment  to  assure 
parental  fitness.  Here  there  would  not  really  be  a  violation  of 
individual  right;  for  the  individual  naturally  loses  his  right  to 

779  Sumrna  TUeol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5:  "non  tenentur  nec  servi 
dominis,  nec  filii  parentibus  ohcdire  de  matrimonio  contrahendo,  vel 
virginitate  servanda,  aut  aliquo  alio  hujusmodi.'* 

TSOPoUtica,  VII,  16. 

781  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  12. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  245 

matrimony,  if  he  is  disqualified  for  it.  Again,  however,  an 
amendment  must  be  made  in  adjudging  the  mind  of  St.  Thomas 
in  this  matter.  He  would  not  regard  it  just  for  the  State  to  be 
excessive  in  its  ruling.  No  poetic  plan  of  producing  a  race  of 
supermen  and  a  consequent  legislation  to  the  effect  that  mar- 
riage be  permitted  only  to  the  physically  perfect,  would  receive 
his  approval.  Only  when  a  person  is  unfit  for  the  marriage  state 
beyond  peradventure  of  a  doubt,  as  in  such  cases  as  venereal 
disease  or  impotency,  could  he  be  restrained,  on  Thomistic  prin- 
ciple, by  civil  force. 

The  Commentary  teaches  that  the  State  should  have  special 
concern  for  women  in  pregnancy.  They  should  be  assured  of 
proper  nourishment  and  competently  directed.'''^^  Aristotle  sug- 
gests that  discreet  exercise  be  imposed  on  them  by  a  civil  com- 
mand that  they  repair  once  a  day  to  the  worship  of  the  gods  of 
matrimony.^^  The  Commentary  repeats  this  advice,  leaving  it 
to  be  accepted,  if  at  all,  in  a  Christian  sense. 

The  treatment  which  the  State  should  exercise  toward  defec- 
tive children  is,  according  to  Aristotle  and  his  paganism,  drastic. 
Let  it  be  a  law,  he  writes,  that  nothing  imperfect  or  maimed 
be  brought  up.^^*  The  Commentary,  however,  to  be  sure, 
is  too  Christian  to  acquiesce.  It  seeks  whatever  element  of 
reason  there  may  be  in  the  Philosopher's  injunction  and  ac- 
credits it.  It  is  only  natural  that  the  more  perfect  should  be 
more  prized  than  the  less  perfect.  They  are  of  more  significance 
to  the  State,  for  they  are  a  decided  asset;  while  the  imperfect 
are  doubtless  a  liability.'^  And  in  a  political  theory  like  Aris- 
totle's, in  which  the  State  is  less  than  Plato's  indeed,  but  more 
than  St.  Thomas',  it  would  be  at  least  cold  logic  to  thrust  aside 
all  hampers  to  civil  progress.  ISTature  herself  is  more  solicitous 
for  her  well-endowed  children  than  for  her  minus  hahentes. 
There  is  the  virtue  of  naturalness  to  the  Philosopher's  view ;  but 
this  fact,  from  a  Thomistic  viewpoint,  would  be  the  defect.  The 


782  Com.  Pout.,  Dib.  VII,  cap.  12. 

783  Politics,  VII,  16. 

784  Ibidem. 

785  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  cap.  12. 


246     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Doctor's  politics  leads  to  the  supernatural  and  is  conceived  in 
its  light.  The  hard  Aristotelian  monition  is  intolerable  of  itself ; 
and  Aquinas  is  patient  with  it  only  because  of  the  pre-Christian 
period  of  the  Philosopher,  and  its  relative  reasonableness  on 
naturalistic  premises.  The  Commentary  is  careful  to  mention 
that  whatever  justification  it  offers  for  Aristotle's  view  is  based 
on  a  consideration  of  the  present  life  and  man's  natural  end 
alone.'^^^  The  supernatural  facts  of  Christianity  give  an  entirely 
new  complexion  to  the  problem. 

But  in  spite  of  the  obvious  attempt  at  fairness  to  the  Philoso- 
pher, we  find  Aristotle's  idea  considerably  toned  down. 
Whereas  he  maintained  that  defectives  ought  not  be  fostered,  the 
Commentary  declares  that  care  should  indeed  be  taken  of  them, 
though  not  to  the  extent  with  which  the  perfect-born  are 
tended.''^^^  The  idea  of  exposing  the  unfortunates  is  not  even 
mentioned.  It  is  too  alien  to  Christianity  even  to  be  couched. 
And,  in  his  own  right,  rather  than  in  the  capacity  of  a  commen- 
tator on  Aristotle,  we  know  that  Aquinas  would  have  the  State 
care  the  more  tenderly  for  the  less  favored  children  who  would 
require  it  the  more;  and  that  he  would  regard  as  a  duty  to  be 
embraced,  that  which  the  Philosopher  spurns  as  a  civil  stumb- 
ling-block. A  saint,  he  could  not  forget  the  request  of  the 
Master :  ^^Suffer  the  little  children  to  come  unto  Me."  'Eo  mat- 
ter how  ill-equipped  for  the  struggle  of  life  the  child  may  be, 
he  would  give  it  a  Christian  chance,  and  not  tear  the  fragile  ten- 
drils of  its  fingers  from  the  life  which  God  Himself  inscrutably 
saw  fit  to  bestow.  He  would  guard  the  individual  in  the  helpless- 
ness of  infancy  from  the  sophisticated  procedures  of  paganism. 
In  this,  his  democracy  is  true  to  a  detail  which  only  religion 
could  assure. 

The  stormy  question  of  birth-control,  which  lulled  during  the 
war,  when  the  call  for  men  was  so  loud  and  the  fallacy  of  any 
theory  for  stopping  the  source  of  them  was  most  felt,  is  again 
with  us  today.  It  was  with  Aristotle  and  Aquinas.  The  latter 
responded  with  Christianity.  But  Aristotle  holds  that  the  State 
should  check  population  and  that,  if  any  parents  are  in  the  way 


786  Ibidem. 

787  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  247 

of  having  more  children  than  the  number  allowed,  an  abortion 
must  be  committed  before  life  and  sensation  begin  in  the 
foetus  while  the  modern  idea  would  press  back  the  impossi- 
bility of  births  so  far  that  the  State  need  not  be  solicitous  at  all. 
'NoWy  though  Aquinas  is  as  vehement  for  individual  rights  as 
anybody,  he  realizes  that  nature  has  some  rights  too,  and  that,  if 
the  individual  begins  by  perverting  it,  he  will  end  by  wrong- 
ing himself.  He  would  save  the  individual  from  selfish  as  well 
as  from  civil  aggression.  But  the  Commentary  strives  to  pre- 
sent the  Philosopher's  position  gracefully  and  condone  it  insofar 
as  it  can  be  condoned.  Since  a  state  is  a  self-sufficient  com- 
munity, it  is  fitting  that  there  be  no  poor  citizens  and,  therefore, 
that  any  condition  which  would  make  for  poverty  should  be  dis- 
pelled.'^^ But  to  this,  the  Saint  could  retort  with  the  Gospel 
with  which  he  was  imbued :  ^'Consider  the  lilies  of  the  field." 
He  knew  of  a  Providence  to  which  the  brilliant  mind  of  the 
Philosopher  was  blind.  God  supplies  enough  for  all;  poverty 
should  be  traced  to  human  causes  and  not  divine.  Its  remedy 
should  be  natural  and  not  unnatural,  moral  and  not  immoral. 
Normally  there  is  enough  for  all,  if  all  are  willing  to  refrain 
from  hoarding  and  to  grant  each  his  share.  Christ  spoke  with 
greater  authority  than  His  minister  Malthus,  when  He  told  of 
the  care  which  His  heavenly  Father  has  for  mankind.  Aquinas 
knew  that  nature  was  not  the  great  cause  of  paupers,  but  ex- 
ternal circumstances ;  and  that  these,  not  nature,  should  be  the 
civil  and  individual  target.  He  was  not  the  one  to  solve  a  prob- 
lem by  canceling  the  subjects  of  it. 

Besides,  to  meddle  in  the  processes  of  generation,  was,  to 
Aquinas,  a  direct  action  against  God,  the  Author  of  those  pro- 
cesses, i^ature  is  far  too  sacred  in  his  opinion  to  be  profaned  by 
the  clumsy  fingers  of  the  State.  It  has  its  ways ;  it  is  reasonable 
to  accede  to  them.  And  any  law,  in  defiance  of  them,  would  be 
unreasonable  and  in-eligious.^^  Not  fulfilling  the  definition  of 
law  as  an  ordinatio  rationis,  such  a  measure  could  not  be  a  law 


788  Poiitica,  VII,  16. 

789  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  12.  Cf.  Albertus  Magnus,  Com.  Polit., 
Lib.  VII,  cap.  14. 

790  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  12,  ad  1. 


248     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

at  all.  It  might  be  a  temporary  expedient ;  but  it  would  surely 
be  a  boomerang.  It  is  obvious  to  Aquinas  that  there  can  be  no 
real  gain  when  and  where  the  civil  enactment  loses  sight  of  either 
God  or  of  His  reflection  in  nature. 

There  are  sentences  in  the  Summa  to  answer  the  flippant  birth- 
control  propaganda  which  we  plentifully  hear  and  see  today.  It 
is  amusing,  we  are  informed  by  our  ultra  moderns,  any  longer 
to  hold  that  infants  arrive  as  necessarily  as  rain-drops  and  that 
we  have  no  more  command  over  their  coming  than  over  the 
clouds  in  the  sky.  In  still  deeper  sophistication,  it  is  hinted 
that  the  sex  function  is  on  a  level  with  eating  and  drinking. 

But  Aquinas  teaches  that  the  order  of  reason  requires  means 
to  be  employed  for  the  manifest  and  good  purposes  of  nature, 
and  that  means  may  be  used  and  enjoyed  only  in  view,  explicit 
or  implicit,  expressed  or  tacit,  of  their  proper  end.^^-  If  made 
to  be  absolute  aims  in  themselves,  they  fall  short  of  the  natural 
plan,  and  amount  to  perversions  of  it.  It  is  good  that  the  body 
of  the  individual  be  preserved ;  it  is  better  that  the  race  be  per- 
petuated. Just  as  food  is  the  means  of  saving  the  body,  so  is 
sexual  intercourse  the  method  of  saving  the  race.  Thomas  uses 
St.  Augustine's  observation,  exactly  to  express  the  truth :  ^'What 
food  is  to  the  body,  so  sexual  intercourse  is  to  the  race"  (in  lib. 
de  Bono  Conj.,  cap.  16).  And  the  Angelic  Doctor  adds,  sex- 
indulgence  may  indeed  be  as  sinless  as  eating,  provided  it  be 
exercised  in  due  manner,  conformably  to  its  object  of  human 
generation.^^  But  he  emphatically  asserts  that  there  is  no  com- 
parison between  an  excessive  gratification  of  the  appetite  for 
food,  and  a  deordinate  satisfaction  of  sex.  For  the  potentiality 
of  the  latter  act  is  great;  a  new  life  could  be  the  result  of 
it,  if  nature  were  not  thwarted.  Aquinas  sees  two  glaring  guilts : 
opposition  to  nature,  and  inordinate  concupiscence.  Thus  he 
views  the  subject  from  an  angle  which  the  modern  birth-con- 
troller has  forgotten  or  ignored :  ethics. 

The  points  which  he  scores  are  these : 

(1)  The  interference  with  nature  which  birth-control  involves 

791  Summa  Theol,  la  2ae,  qu.  XCV,  a.  2. 

792  Summa  Theol.,  la  2ae,  qu.  CLIII,  a.  2. 

793  Idem..,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  2,  ad  6. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  249 


means  dishonor  to  nature  itself  and  especially  to  its  Author. 

(2)  It  depraves  the  purpose  of  sexual  intercourse  to  a  selfish 
satisfaction  of  concupiscence. 

(3)  It  sacrifices  the  common  good. 

(4)  It  is  economically  inspired  by  a  disregard  for  God's 
Providence  which  is  one  of  the  great  messages  of  Christianity. 
There  is  enough  in  the  world  for  all,  if  there  were  enough  energy, 
enterprise,  justice  and  charity.  And  these  should  be  sought  and 
stimulated ;  nature  ought  not  and  need  not  be  sacrificed. 

(5)  The  individual  has  no  right  to  counterpose  himself  to 
nature,  accepting  the  pleasures  and  refusing  the  responsibilities 
and  effects  of  intercourse.  Much  less  has  the  State  the  right  to 
tell  the  individual  how  many  children  he  may  have.  Man  is 
and  must  always  be  free  in  such  a  private  interest,  with  an  ac- 
countancy which  is  only  to  his  Maker.''^*  In  other  words,  if 
ever  there  is  to  be  a  limit  to  the  land  of  infancy,  the  individual, 
and  not  the  law,  must  make  it ;  and,  in  the  making,  life  is  not 
to  be  profaned.  Self-control  is  the  constant  insistence  of  Chris- 
tianity. 

Aquinas  teaches  an  ideal  of  sex-life  which  yields  not  a  jot  to 
the  pseudo-ethics  of  expedience,  but  is  reasonable  and  natural  to 
the  noblest  degree.  He  believes  that  the  higher  faculties  of  man 
should  rule  the  lower.'^^  He  was  doubtless  impressed  by  the 
expressive  teaching  of  Albertus  Magnus  that  God  once  destroyed 
the  earth  by  water  to  quench  the  flaming  lust  which  leaped  in 
the  souls  of  the  children  of  men.  The  Maker  intended  man's 
reason  to  govern  his  appetitive  life  and  not  be  its  slave.  The 
cross  was  the  symbol  of  the  triumph  of  the  Logos — the  divine 
Reason — over  the  flesh.  St.  Paul,  like  the  Nazarene,  chastised 
his  body  and  brought  it  into  subjection.  Aquinas  likewise,  in 
the  troubled  days  of  his  youth,  strenuously  fought  and  conquered 
concupiscence  once  and  for  all.  He  could  not  coolly  take  it  for 
granted  that  men  would  and  must  be  sexually  excessive.  The 
teaching  of  Christianity  and  the  endless  examples  of  the  saints 
who  exercised  not  only  temperance  but  preserved  absolute  vir- 
ginity, were  against  such  an  uncomplimentary  view  of  human 

7M  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CIV,  a.  5. 
795  Cf.  Plato,  Laws,  VI,  782. 


250     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

strength.  Besides,  he  possessed  a  Catholic's  regard  for  the 
wealth  of  sacramental  life  in  the  Church  and  the  long  stream  of 
graces  flowing  from  Calvary  and  its  unbloody  repetition  in  the 
Mass.  The  Redemption,  for  him,  was  not  a  remote  execution 
on  Golgotha  or  a  chapter  in  a  book.  It  was  a  tremendous  event 
of  significance  to  the  whole  race  for  all  time.  It  affected  every 
phase  of  human  life ;  it  empowered  every  individual ;  it  opened 
up  a  new  world,  a  new  sense  of  values,  and  a  new  hope.  What 
was  impossible  to  pagans,  was  a  sweet  yoke  and  a  light  burden 
to  the  followers  of  Christ.  And  so  Aquinas  could  not  for  an 
instant  admit  the  darkling  presumption  on  which  the  Aristote- 
lian advice  with  regard  to  race-limitation  seemed  to  turn.  He 
respected  the  individual  too  sincerely  to  injure  him  even  in 
thought.  His  democracy  was  as  genuine  in  the  ideal  order  as 
in  the  political  and  practical. 

But  to  turn  from  religious  considerations.  St.  Thomas  ad- 
verts to  the  subject  of  sex  from  a  socio-political  angle.  He  re- 
marks its  intense  relation  to  the  public  good  for  what  could 
be  more  immediate  import  to  civil  society  than  the  perpetuation 
of  itself?  And  therefore,  Aquinas  infers,  all  the  restraints  of 
reason  should  be  thrown  by  the  individuals  in  the  State  around 
their  tendency  to  sexual  excess.  Whatever  exceeds  reason  is 
wrong,  he  contends ;  and  what  is  wrong  has  no  right  to  be  en- 
acted. Depraved  concupiscence,  which  seeks  gratification  with- 
out reference  to  the  natural  purpose  of  generation  is  opposed  to 
reason."^^^  It  has  no  justification.  Hence  Aquinas  believes  that 
not  a  limitation  of  the  list  of  births,  but  an  inspiration  of  the 
virtues  of  temperance  within  the  marriage  state,'^^^  would  be  the 
solution  of  a  condition  which  Aristotle  and  the  moderns  are 


796  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIII,  3  a. 

7&7  Idem.,  qu.  CLV,  a.  1,  ad  2;  et  Supplementum,  qu.  XLIX,  a.  5. 

N.  B.— JThe  Saint  distinguishes  between  the  false  reasoning  of  the 
world  and  the  true  reasoning  which  looks  above  for  its  standards;  be- 
tween expediency  and  ethics.  When  man  obeys  the  commandments  of 
Grod,  he  cannot  act  contrary  to  reason,  although  he  may  appear  to  be 
counter  to  the  ordinary  course  of  it.  (Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  2, 
ad  2.) 

798  By  continence  (in  his  second  meaning  of  the  word)  he  signifies  a 
resistence  of  reason  to  unseemly  desires  (resistentiam  rationis  ad  con- 
cupiscentias  pravas).  Temperance,  he  teaches,  is  even  a  greater  virtue 
than  this  kind  of  continence.    (Summa,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLV,  a  IV.) 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  251 

pleased  to  deem  a  problem.  Again,  the  State  would  have  to  join 
hands  with  the  Church. 

But,  as  we  have  already  mentioned,  the  Commentary  tries 
hard  to  erase  the  stigma  of  unnaturalness  in  its  interpretation  of 
the  Aristotelian  thought;  and  so  it  strains,  if  indeed  it  does  not 
quite  sacrifice,  the  truth  of  the  text.  A  correct  and  direct  trans- 
lation of  the  Philosopher's  sinister  sentence  would  be :  '^But  if 
any  parents  have  more  children  than  the  number  prescribed,  be- 
fore life  and  sensation  begins,  an  abortion  must  be  brought 
about ;  for  what  is  right  and  contrary  to  right  in  such  a  case  is 
determined  by  sensation  and  life."^^  The  Commentary,  then, 
appears  to  err  by  charity  when  it  declares  that  Aristotle  did  not 
express  his  own  personal  convictions  in  the  matter.  Still  more 
80  when  it  essays  the  opinion  that  he  did  not  prescribe  abortion 
absolutely,  but  only  held  that,  if  it  must  be,  it  ought  to  be  prior 
to  the  development  of  sentient  life  in  the  womb.  That  is  to  say, 
the  lesser  of  two  evils  should  be  chosen.^  The  Thomistic  doc- 
trine is  all  the  more  evident,  for  partly  reading  itself  into  the 
writing  of  the  Philosopher.  It  is  strong  with  a  conviction  which 
comes  from  sound  ethics.  And  it  saves  the  individual  from  the 
very  instant  of  his  actual  and  even  possible  existence,  just  as 
the  sublime  religious  truths  to  which  the  Saint's  politics  leads, 
would  secure  the  salvation  of  the  individual  for  all  eternity. 
And  surely  a  political  theory  which  is  broad  and  detailed  enough 
both  to  proclaim  the  common  good,  and  still  champion  the  single 
member  of  society  in  every  reasonable  respect ;  whose  stand  for 
right  and  justice,  from  w^omb  to  tomb,  is  unfaltering;  which 
would  stimulate  civil  society  to  yield  abundant  aid  and  advan- 
tage to  the  individual:  cannot  but  be  democratic  in  the  best 
sense  of  the  word. 

There  is  a  connection  between  the  question  of  eugenics  and 
that  of  divorce.  Sound  births  can  hardly  result  from  loose  mar- 
riage-ties. 

The  sacredness  and  indissolubility  of  the  marriage  bond  form 
a  strong  part  of  the  Doctor's  teaching.    On  principle  he  would 


799  Walford's  translation,  The  Politics  and  Economics  of  Aristotle,  p. 
267. 

800  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  VII,  lec.  12. 


252     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

deplore  the  fact  of  divorce  in  modem  civil  society,  and  the 
facility  with  which  it  is  granted. 

For  Aquinas,  marriage  is  an  institution  of  three-fold  pur- 
pose :  first,  the  generation  of  children ;  secondly,  the  education  of 
them,  and  thirdly,  the  joys  of  the  home.^^  Divorce  evidently 
injures  all  three  of  these  aims.  It  shatters  the  most  sacred  of 
human  pledges.^^  Cruder  than  death,  it  tears  children  alive 
from  either  parent,  and  robs  them  of  the  ennobling  influence  of 
a  real  home;  it  encourages  silly  alliances  by  promising  ready 
relief;  it  stimulates  further  folly  by  fulfilling  its  promise;  it 
causes  sex  to  degenerate  by  furthering  folly;  it  opens  the  way 
to  crime  by  removing  the  obstacle  of  honor.  And  thus,  describ- 
ing a  sordid  circle,  it  frequently  ends  at  the  point  where  it 
began :  the  law.  And  so  law  punishes  in  the  blossom  what  it 
promotes  in  the  seed :  an  inconsistency  which  is  no  weak  indica- 
tion of  the  soundness  of  St.  Thomas'  acceptance  that  civil  ruling 
has  no  ordinary  right  to  make  the  dissolution  of  matrimony  its 
subject  at  all.  The  civil  law  in  its  positive  measures  must  be 
based  on  the  natural  law,  else  its  foundation  is  injustice;  and 
the  natural  law,  Aquinas  teaches,  is  against  the  gregariousness 
which  divorce  fosters.    His  reasons  are  as  follows: 

1.  In  all  cases  where  the  offspring  is  naturally  delicate  and 
requires  the  care  of  both  the  male  and  the  female,  transient 
relationship  (vagus  concuhitus)  is  not  practiced.  Should  man 
be  less  human  than  the  very  brutes,  and  law  more  brutal  than 
naked  instinct 

2.  It  is  plain  that  the  child  needs  not  only  its  mother  to 
nurse  it,  but,  even  more  so,  its  father  to  protect  and  provide  for 
it.  Thomas  would  be  bitter  against  the  modern  parental  lacka- 
daisical attitude  whereby  the  son  and  sire  are  either  strangers 
to  each  other  or  remote  acquaintances.  He  holds  that  their  souls 
should  be  knit  in  the  closest  intimacy,  and  that  the  heart  of  the 
boy  must  be  an  open  book  to  the  loving  and  experienced  eye  of 


801  Summa  Theol,  Supplementum,  qu.  XLIV,  a.  1. 

802  Marriage,  according  to  Aquinas,  is  not  only  of  bodies,  but  of  souls. 
"Conjunctio  autem  corporum,  et  animorum  ad  matrimonium  consequi- 
tur."— Sup.,  qu.  XLIV,  a.  1. 

803  Cf .  Hume,  Essays  and  Treatises,  Vol.  II,  p.  244. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  253 

the  father.^  With  the  superior  knowledge  of  the  evils  and 
ways  of  the  world  which  his  advanced  contest  with  life  has 
afforded  him,  the  father  must  forestall  the  indiscretions  of  the 
young  life  opening  under  his  care.  The  inference  is  that  today 
we  should  not  need  sex-hygiene  in  our  schools,  if  we  had  Thom- 
istic  principles  in  our  parents.  For  the  Angelic  Doctor,  the 
father  cannot  for  one  moment  be  the  supernumerary  in  the 
education  of  the  child,  into  the  role  of  which  modem  civiliza- 
tion has  allowed  him  to  slip.  The  paternal  direction  is  more 
important  to  youth  even  than  the  maternal  milk  to  infancy. 

3.  Therefore  it  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  man  that  he 
should,  or  should  be  permitted  by  positive  law  to,  indulge  a 
romantic  wanderlust  and  reckon  his  wives  by  his  fancies.  He 
must  be  true  to  the  mother  of  his  children.  Even  if  his  wife 
is  without  child,  the  implication  is  that  he  is  to  be  faithful  to 
the  sacred  potentiality  within  her.  And  even  if  he  makes  some 
provision  for  the  education  of  his  family,  he  is  not  free  to  seek 
another  mate;  for  his  paternal  duties  are  essentially  personal 
and  cannot  be  transferred.^ 

It  is  seen  that  St.  Thomas  views  monogamy  in  its  masculine 
aspect;  but  it  is  plain  that  his  doctrine  secures  fairness  for  the 
feminine  side  too.  It  does  not  provide  for  that  bane  of  '^incom- 
patibility''  which  is  a  monotony  in  our  court-records  today; 
for  it  considers  that  the  children  are  more  important  concerns 
than  the  petty  psychologies  of  the  parents.  And  perhaps  it 
rises  on  an  astute  premise  that  ''incompatibility"  is  apt  to  be 
absent  when  the  husband  and  wife  have  present  the  musical 
coo,  the  pink  appeal,  the  warmth  and  innocence  of  the  infant, 
that  is  the  product  of  marriage  and  the  proof  of  its  success.^ 
The  fact  is  overt  in  modern  life  that  childless  marriages,  which 
are  voluntarily  so,  turn  sour.  The  sweetness  of  a  child  and, 
better  by  far,  of  children,  is  the  remedy  with  which  Thomistic 
teaching  on  Matrimony  is  instinct.  For  him,  the  whole  institu- 
tion revolves  around  the  figure  which  the  Savior,  to  lead  back  a 
world  to  peace,  sanity,  and  salvation,  assumed.    For  him,  the 


804  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  2. 

805  Summa  Theoh,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  2. 

806  Cf.  Egidius  Colonna,  Li  Livres  du  Gouvernement  des  Rots,  II,  3. 


254     ST.  THOMAs'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

fashionable  and  fatal  modem  union  which  is  deaf  to  the  tiny 
fingers  of  the  unborn  knocking  at  the  door  of  Life  for  admit- 
tance, would  be  ugliness  topped  by  falsehood ;  prostitution  with 
a  license  in  one  hand  and  a  wedding-ring  in  the  other.  Again, 
the  Saint,  with  a  doctrine  which  the  wisdom  of  modern  thought 
would  consider  archaic,  unprogressive,  intolerant,  and  unsuited 
to  present-day  exigency,  but  which  the  modern  conscience  would 
secretly  approve,  strives  to  protect  the  individual  from  the  error 
which  decreases  his  worth  and  makes  him  less  a  factor  for  his 
own  and  the  common  good;  and  likewise  from  a  civil  sanction 
which  would  rouge  the  complexion  of  divorce  into  a  fresh  but 
false  attractiveness.  We  have  recurrently  seen  his  idea  that  the 
State  ought  not  be  assumptions,  and  should  tolerate  much ;  but 
in  its  explicit  enactments,  it  must  always  harmonize  with  the 
moral  law.  If  it  cannot,  it  ought  to  be  silent;  for  its  voice  is 
not  fit  to  be  heard.  He  grants  that  civil  laAv  is  quite  within  its 
province  when  it  prohibits  the  more  flagrant  and  unspeakable 
violations  of  the  marriage  right.^  But  his  insistence  is  that 
law  cannot  legitimatize  what  is  intrinsically  immoral. 

Aquinas  cautions  that,  if  the  gate-way  of  divorce  is  opened  at 
all,  a  torrent  of  abuse  will  pour  into  society.  It  will  be  as  easy 
to  find  reasons  to  shake  off  the  hymeneal  fetters  as  to  breathe; 
for,  as  he  observes,  rare  is  the  case  in  which  both  husband  and 
wife  are  quite  impeccable  ;^^  an  observation,  the  shrewdness  of 
which  is  attested  by  the  tangled  state  of  connubial  affairs  in  our 
own  country  today. 

While  decrying  divorce,  however,  he  recognizes  separation, 
which  does  not  preclude  future  reunion,  but  invites  it  rather. 
Yet,  he  would  have  no  trivial  matter  tamper  w^ith  the  marriage 
bond  at  all,  and  would  permit  separation  only  as  an  extremity ; 
and,  even  then,  he  would  prefer  that  it  be  neither  total  nor  per- 
manent.^® He  believes  that  recourse  should  be  had  to  the 
Church,  which  possesses  a  tribunal  of  her  own  in  which  matri- 
monial difficulties  are  investigated  with  quiet  dignity  and  earn- 


807  Summa  TheoL,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLIV,  a.  9. 

808  Summa,  Sup.,  qu.  LIX,  a.  6. 

809  Summa  Theoh,  Sup.,  qu.  LXII,  a.  3. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  255 

estness.^-^^  Of  course,  he  was  writing  for  an  age  in  which  the 
Church  was  duly  recognized;  but  his  thought  causes  a  wistful- 
ness  today.  Why  should  the  most  intimate  secrets  of  souls  be 
aired  to  the  public,  and  the  right  of  the  individual  to  privacy  so 
wantonly  ignored  ?  Aquinas  could  point  to  a  capable  institution 
which  could  see  more  deeply  into  human  lives  than  the  State, 
and  much  more  delicately.  He  makes  us  conscious  of  the  mod- 
ern lack  of  a  fitting  tribunal,  and  the  agonizing  dependence  on 
a  court-room  filled  with  prurient  reporters  and  vulgar  titterers. 

From  the  foregoing,  we  must  admit  that  the  Doctor  deals  pru- 
dently toward  misalliances,  advocating  the  separation  of  individ- 
uals when  they  should  not  be  bound,  keeping  them  bound  when 
they  ought  to  be,  and,  in  either  event,  preserving  intact  the 
strength  and  beauty  of  the  matrimonial  ideal,  and  calmly  ans- 
wering the  heated  nonsense  of  such  as  Voltaire  who  wrote  that 
the  indissolubility  of  the  Catholic  marriage  is  highly  beneficial 
to  certain  couples  who  cannot  agree,  "for  thus  they  are  enabled 
to  toi-ment  each  other  for  the  Avhole  length  of  their  lives,  and  to 
obtain  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 

Ellwood  proposes  several  remedies  for  the  divorce  evil,  all  of 
which  but  two,  depend  on  law.^-^^  But  the  cures  of  Aquinas  are 
more  in  accord  with  democratic  propensity ;  for  they  appeal  more 
and  force  less.  The  first  measure  which  Ellwood  advocates  is 
"that  there  might  be  a  uniform  divorce  and  marriage  law"  all 
over  the  country.  St.  Thomas  stands  for  the  uniform  policy  of 
a  unified  Church,  leading  all  men  alike  by  the  same  principles, 
instead  of  compelling  them  ab  extern o  by  the  same  policy. 

The  second  of  the  sociologist's  suggestions  is  "a  reform  in 
judicial  procedure  in  trying  divorce  cases."  Haste,  insufficiency 
of  evidence,  flagrant  fraud  and  collusion:  all  these  are  apt  to 
be  characteristic  of  the  modern  trial,  in  our  free  and  easy  system. 
And,  therefore,  Ellwood  goes  so  far,  in  fact,  as  to  recommend 
that  the  matter  of  divorce  should  be  consig-ned  to  special  Courts 
of  Domestic  Relations.  Whereas  Aquinas  would  entirely  take 
it  out  of  the  domain  of  civil  authority,  which  is  hardly  a  sphere 
for  the  sacred  and  intimate  concerns  which  Matrimony  and  all 


810  Ibidem. 

811  Op.  cit,  159-166. 


256     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRIXE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


that  is  relative  to  it  signify.  He  would  have  a  distinctly  spirit- 
ual tribunal  examine  naked  souls,  and  not  a  bar  of  justice  whose 
specialty  is  mere  externality  and  whose  associate  is  sensational- 
ism. 

Thirdly,  Ellwood  believes  that  the  number  of  legal  grounds 
for  absolute  divorce  should  be  lessened.  Aquinas,  more  astutely, 
perceives  that  here  is  a  case  where  any  means  many,  for  nearly 
all  possible  cases  could  be  readily  assimilated  into  the  legitima- 
tized few.^-*^  He  quotes  the  Master:  "But  I  say  to  you,  that 
Avhosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  excepting  for  the  cause  of 
fornication,  maketh  her  to  commit  adultery"  (Matt.  V,  32). 
And  he  holds  that  even  the  exception,  which  Christ  makes,  means 
divorce  not  in  the  sense  of  permission  to  marry  again,  but  rather 
in  the  sense  of  separation.^-^^  He  grants  that  the  State  may  nod 
to  much;  but,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  he  would  deny  its 
power  to  furnish  '4egal  grounds"  in  the  strict  sense  for  that 
which  ''from  the  beginning  was  not  so."  In  this  he  would  free 
the  individual  from  the  false  philosophy  of  irrational  civil  meas- 
ures and  lead  him  in  the  pure  ethical  light  of  the  Savior's  teach- 
ing.^^'* 

Fourthly,  Ellwood  prescribes  ''restrictions  on  remarriage  of 
divorced  parties."  Catholicism  and  Aquinas  are  more  positive 
and  definite,  in  teaching  that  remarriage  is  out  of  the  question 
in  any  and  every  case,  while  either  party  to  the  separation  is 
alive.^^^  This  is  not  harsh  to  the  present  individual,  so  much  as 
it  is  considerate  of  the  future.  It  aims  at  fostering  the  domestic 
life  which  means  for  the  child  his  earliest  and  noblest  associa- 
tion, stimulation,  and  education.  As  for  the  husband  and  wife 
themselves,  it  compliments  them  by  accepting  as  the  simple  truth 
the  solemn  promise  which  they  make  in  wedlock  to  cleave  to  each 
other  until  death  parts  them.    The  modern  State,  on  the  other 


S12  Summa,  Sup.,  qu.  LIX,  a.  6. 

813  Ibidem. 

814  Cf.  Costa-Rossetti,  PhilosopMa  Moralis,  p.  440:  "Haec  sententia 
est  S.  Thomae  (4  dist.  33,  q.  2,  a.  2.  c.)  et  aliorum  Theologorum  gravis- 
simoriun  auctoritate  comprobata,  quae  minime  rejicitur  in  prop.  67  in 
Syllabo  Pii  IX  rejecta:  'Jure  naturae  matrimonii  vinculum  non  est  In- 
dissolubile,  et  in  variis  casibus  divortium  proprie  dictum  auctoritate 
civili  sanciri  potest.'  " 

S15  Summa,  Sup.,  qu.  LXII.  a.  5. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  257 

hand,  refuses  to  take  this  marriage  pledge  seriously  and,  there- 
fore, underestimates  the  individual  to  a  very  unflattering  degree. 
But  Aquinas  and  his  Church  treat  both  man  and  v^oman  as  re- 
sponsible entities,  capable  of  making  and  keeping  a  real  promise. 
They  inspire  the  proper  spirit  by  expecting  it ;  the  State  incites 
the  absence  of  it  by  providing  for  it.  There  is  as  much  differ- 
ence between  the  two  attitudes  as  between  a  rare  principle  and 
a  common  resource.  It  is  easy  to  see  which  of  them  appraises 
the  individual  more  highly :  the  doctrine  which  looks  for  him  to 
keep  his  word,  or  the  law  which  counts  on  him  to  break  it. 
When  it  is  recalled  that  the  parties,  on  their  honor  and  in  the 
presence  of  witnesses,  promise  in  marriage  to  rise  above  all  the 
possible  troubles  of  life  and  cling  to  each  other  until  the  very 
end,  it  is  evident  that  no  injustice  is  done  in  expecting  them 
not  to  forget  the  troth  they  plighted  when  the  very  difficulties, 
which  their  promise  anticipated,  appear.  In  claiming  a  fitting 
response  from  the  individual,  Aquinas  grants  him  a  noble  credit. 

Fifthly,  the  marriage  evil  is  behind  the  divorce  problem.  The 
wiser  the  weddings,  the  fewer  the  disasters.  But  this  manner 
of  personal  wisdom  is  evidently  beyond  the  power  of  the  State 
to  procure.  Marriage  laws,  says  Ellwood,  ''can  prevent  to  some 
extent  unwise  marriages,  but  can  do  but  little  to  secure  wise 
ones."^-'^^  Here,  then,  the  logic  of  the  Doctor's  reference  to  the 
spiritual  society  which  touches  souls,  shines.  Catholicism  has 
worked  out  the  solution  which  Ellwood  seeks,  in  its  doctrine  on 
espousals.  Aquinas  taught  a  period  of  engagement  prior  to  the 
marriage  step  f^'^  and  the  Church  requires  that  the  banns  of  the 
approaching  nuptials  be  published  for  three  consecutive  Sun- 
days, in  order  that  any  existing  obstacles  to  the  validity  or  bless- 
-edness  of  the  union  may  appear.  Then  she  has  the  Sacraments 
of  Penance  and  Holy  Eucharist,  in  which  the  spirits  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  are  cleansed  and  strengthened  for  the  solemn  re- 
ception of  a  further  Sacrament.  Her  system  is  dignified,  and 
does  not  admit  of  the  hasty  modern  tempo  which  is  the  prelude 
to  ''repentance  at  leisure."  Too  often  the  State  marries  mere 
emotions ;  but  the  Church,  accordingly  with  Aquinas,  provides 


816  Op.  cit.,  p.  163. 

817  Summa,  Sup.,  qu.  XLIII,  a.  1. 


258     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 

that  the  individual  be  at  his  freest  and  best  to  undertake  the 
serious  and  momentous  obligations  of  married  life.  For  this 
reason,  Catholic  marriages  are,  for  the  most  part,  pure,  happy, 
fruitful,  and  assets  to  the  commonwealth. 

Sixthly,  public  opinion  should  be  enlightened  on  the  subject 
of  wise  marriages.  Aquinas  could  and  does  bespeak  an  institu- 
tion especially  designed  to  help  the  individual  (and  hence  the 
State)  by  stirring  up  the  noblest  sentiments  within  him,  by  open- 
ing his  mind  to  the  truth,  and  by  bringing  the  experience  of  cen- 
turies into  relation  with  his  affairs. 

Seventhly,  moral  education  is  absolutely  necessary.  Thomas 
heartily  agrees  with  this  democratic  advice,  which  places  the 
possibility  of  reform  back  where  it  belongs:  in  the  individual. 
He  believes  that  we  cannot  have  present  in  the  State  what  is 
quite  lacking  in  the  individualities  of  which  the  State  is  com- 
posed. And  so  he  gTasped,  over  six  centuries  ago,  what  is  being 
realized  through  sad  experience  today :  that  the  condition  of  civil 
society  and  of  the  individual  is  directly  relative  to  that  of  the 
home.  Over  and  over  again  in  his  Sumiim,  he  mentions  the  edu- 
cation of  the  children  as  a  prime  duty  of  parents.  He  declares 
that  this  loving  task  is  life-long.  And  so  he  would  have  the  old 
nest  remain  even  after  the  young  have  developed  a  sort  of  self- 
sufficiency;  for  he  is  impressed  that  a  person  really  ought  not, 
and  cannot,  outgrow  his  parents,  and  should  be  guided  through 
life  by  their  moral  influence.^-^^  ]^o  matter  how  far  sons  and 
daughters  may  roam,  Aquinas  would  have  the  scene  of  their 
childhood  and  the  old  father  and  mother,  hand  in  hand,  waiting 
to  receive  them  back:  tireless  in  heart  until  death  stops  the 
throbbing,  beautiful  in  their  example  of  faith.  The  individual 
who  is  fortunate  enough  to  begin  life  in  a  home  of  Thomistic 
planning,  would  prize  its  purity  and  charm  too  highly  ever  to 
be  inveigled  by  divorce.  He  would  be  strongly  inclined  to  grant 
his  own  children,  all  that  his  own  parents  gave  him.^^^ 


818  Summa,  Sup.,  qu.  LXVII,  a.  1. 

819  Ibidem. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  259 


6. — Woman 


Saint  Thomas  appreciates  that  the  home  and  woman  are  a9> 
correlative  terms  as  husband  and  wife.  So,  let  us  turn  to  a  con- 
sideration of  his  doctrine  in  regard  to  a  topic  which  has  become 
intense  in  our  day  and  is  styled  Feminism.  We  may  expect  little 
enthusiasm  from  the  monk-scholar,  whose  bias,  if  he  had  any, 
was  against  the  allurements  of  the  sex  and  whose  historical  en- 
counter with  a  depraved  female  in  the  days  of  his  youth  was  one 
of  the  painful  spots  of  his  life.  But  he  presents  much  which  the 
impartial  would  have  to  recognize  as  good  sense.  If  we  bring  his 
thoughts  into  relation  with  our  modern  ^'Woman's  Movement," 
however  we  find  that  he  could  hardly  be  reckoned  among  the  sup- 
porters. Proof  would  he  be  against  the  claim  of  the  Feminists 
that  the  success  of  their  campaign  would  mean  the  transforma- 
tion of  woman  from  a  drudge  to  a  partner,  a  plaything  to  a 
friend,  a  servant  to  an  equal ;  knowing,  as  he  does,  that  Chris- 
tianity, if  anything  could,  would  secure  these  blessed  advan- 
tages of  the  sex  and,  in  fact,  has.  He  believes  that  woman  has 
her  sphere  and  that  it  is  not  man's.  If  she  assumes  the  duties  of 
a  larger  life  in  addition  to  those  of  domesticity,  she  would  be 
more  of  a  "drudge"  than  ever.  While  he,  of  course,  admits  that 
woman  is  intended  to  be  man's  help-mate,  he  guards  against  the 
magnified  estimation  which  Feminists  make  of  this  fact.  Prop- 
erly interpreted,  the  sentence  from  Genesis,  according  to 
Aquinas,  means  that  woman  is  man's  co-partner  in  generation ; 
certainly  not  his  aid  in  every  other  operation,  since,  the  Doctor 
significantly  remarks,  man  is  more  conveniently  helped  by  other 
men  in  aught  else.^^^  And  so  he  concludes  that  woman  has  her 
own  sphere  of  activity  and  should  remain  in  it.  He  cannot  well 
conceive  of  her  as  breaking  into  the  outside  world,  ante-dating 
the  era  of  industrialism  as  he  does,  and  believing  that  by  nature 
she  has  a  right  to  be  exempt  from  the  sterner  demands  of  the 
struggle  for  existence.  'No  doubt  he  pondered  too,  if  the  ques- 
tion arose  in  his  super-active  mind  at  all,  that,  if  woman  should 
tu  rn  from  the  home  to  the  forum,  she  would  be  less  efficient  as  a 


820  Summa  Theol.,  1  a.  qu.  XCII,  a.  1. 


260     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

wife  and  mother ;  if  she  should  turn  from  the  forum  to  the  home, 
her  value  in  the  political  world  would  depreciate ;  or  turning  to 
both,  she  would  excel  in  neither,  and  the  world  and  herself  would 
be  little  the  loser  if  she  stayed  where  she  was.  At  any  rate,  he 
submits  that  she  is  most  superior  when  she  is  subject  to  her  nat- 
ural circumstances;  for  the  subjection  which  he  prescribes  for 
her  is  really  the  kind  that  elevates. 

Reviewing  his  doctrine  on  woman,  her  nature,  and  her  rela- 
tive inferiority  and  superiority,  we  may  adjudge  what  political 
significance  it  holds.  First  of  all,  he  expresses  the  broad  scrip- 
tural characterization  of  her  as  man's  ''help-meet  like  unto  him- 
self."^--"^.  And  so  he  tacitly  concedes  that,  being  like  man,  she 
may  be  capable  of  much  of  his  spirit  and  many  of  his  acts.  But 
the  point  for  him  is  one  of  ''ought"  and  not  of  "able."  I^ot, 
could  she  advance  into  the  masculine  sphere?  but,  should  she? 
is  the  question  which  interests  him.  His  reasons  for  a  negation 
are: 

1.  Her  physical  inferiority.  Man  is  better  helped  in  the 
struggle  for  existence  by  his  own  sex  than  by  hers.^^^  Here  the 
Doctor  does  not  foresee  the  gauche  modern  transformation  in  in- 
dustry which  would  draw  woman  from  the  home  and  often  place 
her  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  her  mate,  in  a  manner  to  prove 
her  physical  inferiority  not  so  pronounced  after  all.  Abnormal 
times  have  placed  her  in  an  abnormal  situation,  and  she  has 
shown  herself  capable  of  responding  lightly  to  heavy  demands. 
Still  it  is  as  true  today,  as  when  Thomas  wrote,  that  women  as 
a  class  are  naturally  intended  for  something  better  than  the 
masculine  daily  grind,  and  that  they  have  certain  physical  limi- 
tations which  are  periodically  increased  by  the  advent  of  mother- 
hood. 

2.  Her  biological  inferiority.  Aquinas,  prescinding  from 
all  higher  considerations,  grants  that  man  is  a  more  perfect 
product  of  generation  than  woman,  inasmuch  as  he  contains  the 
active  principle  of  reproduction.  But,  as  regards  the  universal 
plan  of  nature,  the  Doctor  is  careful  to  attest  that  woman  is  no 


821  Ibidem. 

822  Vide  supra. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  261 


incidental,  but  is  of  essential  importance  in  the  great  life-func- 
tion, God-willed  and  given  from  the  beginning. Yet,  since  the 
passive  is,  in  a  metaphysical  sense,  always  less  than  the  active, 
Aquinas,  from  the  abstract  point  of  view,  holds  man  superior. 

3.  Her  origin  in  man,  who  is  indeed  the  principle  of  the 
whole  species.  All  things  come  from  God,  but  He  permitted  the 
whole  human  order  to  come  from  Him  through  His  Own  image 
and  likeness — man. 

4.  Her  inseparability  from  man.  x\quinas  holds  that  the 
love  and  faithfulness  which  man  owes  woman  is  dependent  on 
the  fact  that  he  is,  in  a  sense,  her  source  and  she  is  his  care,  and 
both  are  each  other's  complement.^^ 

5.  Her  amenability  to  his  domestic  headship.  Thomas  can- 
not admit  of  a  two-headed  home.  He  declares  that  man  does  not 
relinquish  his- identity  as  an  active  principle,  nor  woman  hers 
as  a  passive,  outside  of  generation.  Their  characters  as  such  re- 
main throughout  their  mutual  life.  Woman  has  her  duties ; 
man,  his.  His  may  be  superior  in  one  regard ;  hers  in  another. 
She  is  supreme  in  her  own  sphere,  and,  by  moral  influence,  she 
may  rule  also  in  his.  To  all  appearances  and  purposes,  though, 
he  is,  and  should  be,  normally  the  head.^^^ 

6.  Aquinas  sees  in  the  Sacrament  of  Matrimony  a  beautiful 
figure  of  the  '^union  of  Christ  and  His  Church."^^^  The  latter, 
sweetly  submissive  to  the  Savior,  expresses  His  doctrine  and 
spirit,  and  reigns  in  glory  as  the  mother  of  His  children.  The 
exalted  nature  of  this  simile  discovers  in  the  Angelic  Doctor  a 
deep  regard  and  reverence  for  the  sex,  and  hope  for  its  advance- 
ment. He  would  not  have  the  Church  lead  a  cramped  and  crip- 
pled life.  ^Neither,  we  judge,  would  he  have  woman,  whom  he 
compares  to  the  Church,  socially  impoverished.    But  just  as  he 

823  Summa  Theol,  la,  qu.  XCII,  a.  1,  ad  2.   Also,  Quodliheta,  3-11-25. 

824  Suninia  Theol.,  la,  qu.  XCII,  a.  1. 

825  Ibidem.    Of.  Aristotle's  Ethics,  VIII,  12. 

826  Summa  Theol.,  I  a.,  qu.  XCII,  a.  1.  Cf.  Cato's  famous  remark: 
"all  men  rule  over  women,  we  Romans  rule  over  all  men,  and  our  wives 
rule  over  us." 

827  Ibidem.  Figgis  observes  with  as  much  pertinence  as  point:  "If 
Blunchli's  much  canvassed  statement  that  the  State  is  male  and  the 
Church  female  be  accepted,  we  must  regard  the  Middle  Ages  as  the 

period  par  excellence  of  woman's  rights  "    From  Gerson  to 

Grotius,  p.  81. 


262     ST.  THOMAs'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

sees  the  Church  advanced  by  Christ,  its  Head,  so  would  he  have 
woman  improved  by  him  to  whom  she  is  a  help-meet.  This 
would  not  mean  that  woman,  of  herself,  would  have  nothing  to 
do  toward  her  own  success ;  but  whatever  she  does,  ought  not  to 
be  in  opposition  to  man,  any  more  than  what  the  Church  does 
should  be  in  opposition  to  its  Founder.  Man  must  work  for 
woman;  woman  for  and  with  man.^^^  The  progress  of  both 
sexes  would  then  be  better  assured. 

7.  Her  comparative  lack  of  hardihood  in  temptation.  As  an 
indication,  Aquinas  naturally  points  to  the  error  of  Eden,  and 
applies  its  circumstances  to  a  general  idea  of  temptation.^-^ 
Psychologically,  his  thought  would  be  that  woman  is  weaker  in 
the  sense  of  being  more  emotional  and  impulsive  than  man ;  more 
generous  too,  perhaps,  and  less  inclined  to  reckon  the  cost.^^^. 
She  succumbs  too  readily  to  suggestion.  If  so,  however, 
Aquinas,  with  a  mind  which  always  turned  in  many  directions, 
must  have  seen  that  here  was  a  truth  which  would  work  both 
ways :  capable  of  failures,  woman  would  also  be  equally  capable 
of  achievement.  He  seems  to  grant  this ;  but  he  still  holds  that 
she  requires  the  more  prosaic  direction  of  the  male. 

8.  Her  power  to  inflame  the  worst  in  man,  as  well  as  the 
best.  Thomas  states  the  fact,  but  does  not  blame  her  for  it.  She 
may  be  quite  unconscious  of  her  effect  on  man,  and  her  beauty 
and  charm,  independently  of  her,  may  be  used  by  the  arch- 
tempter  to  ensnare  the  male.^-*^  The  point  is  well  chosen  by  the 
Saint,  and  would  appear  to  be  especially  serviceable  for  consider- 
ation today  when  women  are  jostling  men  in  exposed  careers. 
The  necessary  inference  from  the  Doctor's  idea  is  that,  propor- 
tionally as  women  should  become  common-place  and  lose  their 
appeal  on  men's  ideals,  they  would,  wittingly  or  not,  unleash  his 
brute  passions.  Then  equality  would  violently  pass  into  infer- 
iority.   Stirring  up  the  volcano  of  man's  lower  nature,  women 


828  Summa  Tlieol.,  1  a.,  qu.  XCII,  a.  3. 

829  Summa  Theol,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLXV,  a.  2;  et  ibid.,  ad.  1. 

830  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CXLIX,  a.  4. 

831  For  he  describes  the  first  temptation  thus:  "in  actu  tentationis 
diabolus  erat  sicutprincipale  a  gens:  sed  mulier  assume  batur  quasi 
instrumentum.  .  .  .  (Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLXV,  a.  2, 
ad  1).   See  also  2a  2ae,  qu.  CLXVII,  a.  2. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  263 

would  have  to  suffer  from  the  ensuing  eruption.  Only  by  being 
as  true  to  their  sex  as  possible,  apparently  does  Thomas  believe 
that  they  can  be  safe  from  man,  worshipped  by  him,  and  helpful 
to  him ;  not  by  being  politically  equal.^^^  Modem  equality  would 
likely  mean,  to  his  medieval  mind,  a  considerable  step  back  to 
ancient  inferiority. 

But  he  is  careful  to  express  just  what  kind  of  subjection 
woman  should  tolerate.  And  it  is  not  at  all  the  kind 
which  could  be  called  outrageous  even  by  the  advanced  repre- 
sentative of  the  sex  today.  Far  from  slavish  is  the  docility  he 
describes  and  prescribes.  He  would  have  woman  no  more  a 
minion  to  her  household  and  her  husband,  than  a  free  citizen  to 
his  government.  He  distinctly  draws  the  line  between  servitude 
and  wifehood.  Woman's  correct  submission  is  the  kind  which 
really  assures  the  best  benefit  and  the  most  advancement ;  for  it 
is  akin  to  the  civil  subjection  by  which  the  ruler  uses  his  sub- 
jects for  their  own  advantage  and  good.^^  Aquinas  remembers 
what  it  would  not  be  well  for  the  modern  woman  to  forget :  that 
the  masculine  brain  has  done  the  bulk  of  the  world's  business 
thinking  for  centuries,  is  capable  of  doing  so  for  centuries  more, 
and  consequently,  though  it  may  not  be  exempt  from  the  charge 
of  bias  and  much  else,  there  is  strong  probability  that  its  judg- 
ments in  social,  civil,  and  economic  matters,  may  be  a  whit  more 
beneficial  than  woman's.  Flatly  Aquinas  declares  that  man  has 
a  greater  stock  of  rational  discretion.^^*  If  experience  teaches, 
man  indeed  should.  But  the  Angelic  Doctor  is  merely  express- 
ing a  fact.  He  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  woman's  attain- 
ing the  masculine  amount  of  practical  wisdom;  though  the  im- 
probability of  it,  if  she  remains  faithful  to  domesticity,  as  she 
should,  is  certainly  one  of  his  impressions.  The  home  and  woman 


832  Com.  Polit.,  Lib.  II,  lec.  5:  "vita  oeconomica,  in  qua  quidem  vita 
mulieres  habent  quaedam  propria  opera,  quibus  oportet  eas  intendere, 
et  abstinere  semper  ab  operibus  civilibus.''  It  may  be  worthy  of  note 
here,  however,  that  the  Saint  does  not  deny  the  right  of  woman  to 
mingle  in  civil  affairs,  but  emphasizes  the  inadvisability.  Besides, 
suffrage  is  a  civil  right,  not  a  natural.  The  grant  of  it  is  always  sub- 
ject to  prudence. 

S33  Siimma  Theol,  1  a.,  qu.  XCII,  a.  1,  ad  2. 

834  Ibidem  :  Cf.  Li  Livres  du  Gouvernement  des  Rois,  Bk.  II,  part  I, 
chs.  XI-XII. 


264     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

thrive  better,  he  believes,  when  man  keeps  guard,  and  himself 
alone  weathers  the  tempests  without,  in  order  that  his  loved  ones 
may  be  exempt  from  doing  so  and  able  to  develop  the  more  deli- 
cate and  beautiful  phases  of  civilization.  Saint  Thomas  does 
not  over-estimate  man  in  giving  him  the  prose  of  Life,  nor  un- 
derestimate woman  by  allotting  her  the  poetry.  Modern  exist- 
ence, with  its  ruthless  exactions,  has  perhaps  turned  his  prescrip- 
tion back  into  an  ideal ;  or,  again,  what  was  ideal  for  the  Middle 
Ages,  may  in  these  new  and  cogent  circumstances  of  today,  fall 
foul  of  the  distinction.  Still,  the  Thomistic  doctrine  has  an  in- 
sistent appeal,  which  suggests  merit.  The  Saint  does  not  admire 
the  qualifications  of  the  sex  the  less,  because  he  perceives  the  fit- 
ness of  men  for  the  duties  of  political  life  the  more.  He  is  not 
really  unkind  to  w^oman,  because  he  is  keen  to  her  psycholog}^ 
and  honest  in  his  opinion.  His  is  a  doctrine  which  should  stim- 
ulate woman  to  her  best ;  for  it  is  frank  enough  to  show  her  her 
worst,  and  Christian  enough  to  accredit  her  dignity  and  tender 
powers.  That  she  should  not  have  her  place  in  the  State,  Aquin- 
as is  far  from  contending;  but  he  is  convinced  that  that  place 
is  in  the  all-important  unit  of  society,  the  cradle  of  its  hope,  and 
the  measure  of  its  success :  the  home.  She  gives  most  to  the 
State,  when  she  gives  all  to  the  home. 

Is  the  Doctor's  opinion  on  woman's  political  position,  or  lack 
of  it,  a  mark  against  his  democracy  ?  Hardly.  Or,  at  least,  not 
formally.  For  his  earnest  belief  is  that  her  best  advantages  and 
her  truest  individuality  are  developed  within  the  domestic  and 
not  the  political  circle.  She  is  not  the  less  free  in  being  wholly 
faithful  to  her  peculiar  duties.  An  up-to-date  contention,  which 
would  antagonize  Aquinas,  is  that  woman  could  not  be  free  un- 
der feudalism,  patriarchism,  nor  priestcraft,  but  only  in  an  era 
of  democracy.  Yet  Aquinas,  when  he  wrote,  was  conscious  that 
the  sex  was  not  being  exactly  retaded.  Woman's  step  from  ser- 
vile inferiority  to  gleaming  stardom,  perfected  in  his  own  day, 
was  decidedly  more  important  than  her  trip  from  domesticity  in- 
to the  humdrum  world,  accomplished  in  our  modern  period  of 
cheap  schemes  and  expensive  failures.  Aquinas'  doctrine  is  an  im- 
plicit expression  of  her  right  to  be  relieved  of  the  necessity  of 
encountering  the  coarser  aspects  of  life  with  which  man  is  nat- 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  265 

urallj  more  able  and  fitted,  and,  therefore,  ought,  to  cope.  He 
would  keep  her  hands  free  from  the  outside  world,  that  they  may 
be  better  prepared  to  serve  in  the  sheltered  domain  where  she 
is,  in  her  own  peculiar  right  and  duty,  indisputably  superior. 
He  would  enshrine  her  in  the  homes  of  the  State  as  his  Church 
has  enshrined  the  Blessed  Mother  in  the  hearts  of  the  faithful. 
He  would  have  her  dear  and  precious  to  man  as  the  Church  to 
Christ,  and  man  beneficent  and  tender  to  her,  as  Christ  to  the 
Church.  The  Angel  of  the  Schools,  he  is  also  the  Angel  of  the 
Home.  He  planned  more  brilliantly  for  the  woman  of  all  times, 
than  the  modern  woman  has  succeeded  in  planning  for  herself. 

Thomistic  principle  stimulates  political  measures  to  ease  wom- 
an's conditions.  Through  no  fault  nor  desire  of  their  own,  mil- 
lions of  modem  women  are  compelled  to  toil  outside  the  home. 
Now  the  Angelic  Doctor  teaches  that  the  State  should  help  each 
of  its  children  to  secure  a  sufficiency  of  life-necessities.  Decent 
salaries  for  men,  widows'  pensions,  and  all  kindred  plans  to  re- 
lieve the  economic  stress  and  free  woman  from  baneful  necessity, 
would  be  quite  in  line  with  his  doctrine  and  are  its  implicit  sug- 
gestion. Only  that  Aquinas  does  not  depend  too  much  on  laws 
written  on  paper ;  he  sets  more  store  on  those  which  are  lived 
and  loved  in  hearts.  Again,  his  great  specific  is  Christianity ; 
and  his  great  confidence  is  in  its  administrator,  with  whom 
Christ  promised  to  be  all  days,  even  to  the  consummation  of  the 
world :  the  Church. 


266     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


CONCLUSION 

Thomistic  politics  begins  with  the  individual  and  its  scope 
IS  commensurate  with  the  natural  expansion  of  his  sympathies 
and  needs.  Macksey  harks  back  to  Thomistic  thought  when 
he  writes,  "society  implies  fellowship,  company,  and  has  always 
been  conceived  as  signifying  a  human  relation,  and  not  a  herd- 
ing of  sheep,  a  hiving  of  bees,  or  a  mating  of  wild  animals.  The 
accepted  definition  of  a  society  is  a  stable  union  of  a  plurality 
of  persons  co-operating  for  a  common  purpose  of  benefit  to  all. 
The  fullness  of  co-operation  involved  naturally  extends  to  all 
the  activities  of  the  mind,  will,  and  external  faculties,  commen- 
surate with  the  common  purpose  and  the  bond  of  union ;  this 
alone  presents  an  adequate,  human  working  together. "^^^  Aqui- 
nas finds  the  individual  not  as  an  egotist,  nor  an  altruist,  nor  a 
solitary  with  the  ''desolate  freedom  of  the  wild  ass,"  but  as  a  be- 
ing together  with  others  of  his  kind  to  whom  humanhood  and 
society  relate  and  obligate  him. 

To  the  native  rights  of  the  individual,  the  Angelic  Doctor 
adds  civil  rights  for  some  of  the  people  and  civil  advantages  for 
all.  As  regards  natural  rights,  his  teaching  amounts  to  this: 
that  the  state  in  no  wise  assists  at  their  birth,  cannot  legislate 
them  away,  must  not  attempt  to  do  so,  and  should  ever  seek  to 
protect  them.'^^^  Still,  because  of  the  close  relation  of  individual 
to  individual  in  society,  and  the  consequent  and  constant  dan- 
ger of  misunderstanding,  selfishness,  and  turmoil,  a  reasonable 
limitation  of  the  exercise  of  natural  right  is  necessar^^  and  may 
be  the  subject  of  civil  enactment.^'  Aquinas  demands  a  "full" 
life  for  the  individual  in  the  State ;  but  not  one  full  of  discords, 
such  as  a  continual  and  unregulated  encounter  with  other  in- 


^i'^Cath.  Ency.,  XIV,  p.  74:  Art.  on  Society. 

836  Cf.  John  A.  Ryan's  Distributive  Justice,  p.  56:  "Since  a  natural 
right  neither  proceeds  from  nor  is  primarily  designed  for  a  civil  end, 
it  cannot  be  annulled,  and  it  may  not  be  ignored,  by  the  State." 

837  Cf.  Williamson,  Art.  Democ.  and  Revolution.  Irish  Ecclesiastical 
Record,  Jan.,  1921,  p.  55:  "The  crux  of  the  discussion  today  is  as  to  the 
possibility  of  restriction  of  individual  liberty  leading  untimately  to  lib- 
erty all  round." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  267 


dividuals  would  mean.  Even  Fichte,  with  all  his  ''ego,"  taught 
that  the  individual's  liberty  should  be  so  limited  that  others 
might  be  free  along  with  him.  The  individual  is  enlarged  by 
his  social  relations.  This  is  the  compensation  for  whatever 
limitation  civil  society  may  be  compelled  to  impose.  And  the 
individual,  despite  Kropotkine,  has  obviously  the  better  part 
of  the  bargain. 

As  regards  civil  rights,  e.  g.  voting  or  holding  office,  the  Doc- 
tor would  have  the  State  grant  them  to  those  who  are  intellect- 
ually, ethically,  and  otherwise  fitted  to  exercise  them.  He  saw 
slaves  withheld  from  such  rights  because  of  their  mental  or 
moral  lack;  women,  because  of  their  domestic  encumbencies. 
But  civil  rights  are  only  accidental  perfections  of  the  individual ; 
and  Aquinas  escapes  blame  because  of  his  consistent  claim  for 
essential,  i.  e.  natural,  rights  for  all.  He  does  not  stultify  the 
value  of  civil  society  like  Rousseau ;  for,  even  though  it  places 
certain  circumscriptions  on  all  its  members  and  denies  civil 
rights  to  some,  on  the  other  hand  it  supports  the  natural  rights 
of  all  and  affords  inestimable  opportunity  for  the  development 
of  each  with  its  discipline,  peace,  aid,  economy,  and  purpos- 
iveness , 

The  power  in  the  State  rests  in  no  individual  but  is  primar- 
ily an  attribute  of  the  whole  body,  and  derivatively  the  posses- 
sion of  the  ruler.  Thus  the  people  as  the  corpus  communitatis 
are  highly  reputed  in  Thomistic  politics;  and  in  this  appraise- 
ment, the  subject  is  enriched  as  an  integral  part  of  a  powerful 
whole,  while  the  ruler  is  seen  to  be  but  the  official  and  trusted 
servant  of  the  body  politic,  the  ultimate  power. 

The  right  of  revolt,  within  rational  and  prudential  confines, 
is  championed ;  in  suggestion  that  power,  despite  alienation,  is 
ever  related  to  the  people,  and,  if  arrogant  sovereigns  stret<^h 
it  too  far,  it  may  snap  back  to  its  source.  Power  rightly  shifts 
to  the  side  of  justice ;  otherwise  it  is  illegitimate  force  or  tryan- 
ny 

838  Quaestiones  Disputatae,  Be  Caritate,  qu.  I,  a.  4,  a.  2 :  "Est 
quoddam  bonum  proprium  alicujus  hominis  in  quantum  est  singularis 

persona;  est  autem  quoddam  bonum  commune  quod  pertinet  ad 

hunc  vel  ilium  in  quantum  est  pars  alicujus  totius:  sicut  ad  militem  in 
quantum  est  pars  civitatis."  Cf.  Kropotkine,  Uanarchie,  sa  philosophie 
son  ideal,  pp.  58-59, 


268     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

Right  is  might.  The  people  are  mightiest  when  most  guided 
by  the  principles  of  morality  which  are  founded  on  man's  ra- 
tional nature  and  reflect  the  nature  of  the  God  of  all  power. 

The  amount  of  popular  morality  is  but  the  total  of  individual 
morality.  St.  Thomas  did  not  see  society  mechanically  drift- 
ing into  the  millenium.  It  must  be  propelled  from  within ;  and, 
within,  there  are  only  individuals.  The  success  of  the  State 
therefore,  lies  with  them ;  and  these  are  no  better  nor  worse  than 
their  morals.  Whatever  beauteous  mantles  of  law,  project,  or 
theory  the  St-ate  chooses  to  fling  around  herself,  she  will  be,  un- 
derneath, much  the  same  as  before.  ^'Planning  a  perfect  State," 
declares  Dr.  E.  T.  Shanahan,  ''is  not  so  much  like  novel-writ- 
ing that  one  may  manage  the  characters  at  will,  and  make  all 
the  future  citizens  of  Altruria  automatically  good  and  moral, 
merely  by  the  literary  expedient  of  arranging  all  the  circum- 
stances to  that  end  beforehand,  and  by  killing  off  the  marplots 
and  imdesirables  before  the  last  and  crowning  chapter  is  reached. 
 Morality  is  not  transferred  to  the  individual  from  the  ex- 
ternal conditions  under  which  he  lives.   It  does  not  exist  ready 

made  in  any  surroundings  Custom  and  circumstances 

may  indeed  modify  morality  for  good  or  ill,  but  it  is  beyond 
their  power  to  create  it.  Character  is  something  we  have  to  work 
for  in  any  institution,  not  a  magically  bestowed  gift.  And  until 
the  social  optimist  of  the  day  can  show  that  custom  and  cir- 
cumstance may  create  morality,  as  well  as  modify  it,  he  has  not 
advanced  a  single  step  in  the  direction  of  proving  his  Utopian 
thesis."^  Aquinas  would  approve  this  modern  expression  of 
his  own  conviction. 

The  external  form  of  government  is  not  nearly  so  important 
as  the  spirit  within.  Every  polity,  to  be  just,  must  grant  civil 
rights  to  all  who  qualify  for  them.  The  greater  the  number 
of  able  and  active  citizens,  the  less  powerful  personally  the  pre- 
siding officials  need  be,  and  the  nearer  would  be  the  approach  to 
popular  rule.^^    Accordingly  as  the  members  of  civil  society 

S39Art.,  The  Unconsidered  Remainder,  Catholic  World,  Feb.,  1914. 
p.  585. 

840  Cf.  Hooker,  Laics  of  Ecclesiastical  Polity.  Bk.  VI,  ch.  18:  "Auth- 
ority is  a  constraining  power;  which  power  were  needless,  if  we  were  all 
such  as  we  should  be,  willing  to  do  the  things  we  ought  to  do  without 
constraint." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  2G9 


reach  the  degree  of  perfection  which  ensures  the  same  amount 
of  benefit  to  all  from  "liberty"  as  was  erstwhile  secured  by  re- 
straint, restrictive  law  may  pass.  The  flow  of  virtue  is  to  be  the 
ebb  of  force.^'*^  However,  directive  legislation  will  always  be 
more  or  less  necessary  in  even  the  most  democratic  state,  and 
the  potentiality  of  coercion  will  ever  have  to  be  implicit  in  it: 
the  difference  from  the  non-democratic  regime  being  that  coer- 
cion will  be  exercised  less,  the  laws  themselves  will  be  fewer,  and 
the  observance  of  them  better.  The  more  morality  takes  defin- 
ite shape  in  the  consciousness  and  affection  of  the  people,  the 
less  it  will  have  to  be  deposited  in  an  extrinsic  law  which  whips 
until  it  subdues. 

All  these  views  of  Aquinas,  explicit  in  his  writings  or  logical- 
ly deducible,  constitute  a  trove  of  democratic  principle.  They 
discover,  criticize,  and  stimulate  the  individual  in  the  State. 
They  exalt  him  as  the  symbol  of  politics,  and  measure  the  com- 
mon good  by  his  contribution  to  it.  They  teach  with  Herbert 
Spencer  that  ''while  each  individual  is  developing,  the  society  of 
which  he  is  an  insignificant  unit  is  developing  too."^*-  Without 
making  him  all  or  the  State  all,  they  give  due  credit  to  each 
person  and  a  meet  share  of  both  responsibility  and  power. 
"They  are  called  wise,"  runs  the  first  sentence  of  the  Contra 
Gentiles,  "who  put  things  in  their  right  order."^*^  This  Aqui- 
nas endeavors  to  do  with  regard  to  the  individual  and  the 
State ;  and  who  may  deny  that  he  has  done  so,  to  the  complete 
satisfaction  of  true  democracy?  His  is  not  the  individual  of 
Hobbes'  and  Rousseau's  hypothetical  State  of  nature,  but  the 
individual  as  solidary  with  his  fellows. 

The  conclusion  which  the  appraisal  of  his  politics  relatively 
to  democracy  thrusts  upon  us  is  interesting  and  significant: 
there  can  be  no  true  democracy  without  morality ;  there  can  be 


841  Cf.  Montesquieu,  op.  cit.,  Livre  III:  "II  ne  faut  pas  beaucoup  de 
probite  pour  qu'un  gouvernement  monarchique  ou  une  gouvernement 
despotique  se  maintiennent  ou  se  soutiennent.  La  force  des  lois  dans 
Tun,  le  bras  du  prince  toujours  leve  dans  I'autre,  reglent  ou  contennent 
tout. 

"Mais,  dans  un  Mat  populaire,  il  faut  un  ressort  de  plus,  qui  est  la 
vertu." 

S^2  First  Principles,  p.  559. 
843  Proemium. 


270     ST.  THOMAS^  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

little  consistent  morality  without  religion ;  but  religion  finds  its 
highest  expression  and  assurance  in  the  Church.  In  his  own 
way,  Aristotle,  the  pagan,  realized  this.  Strongly  he  asserted 
that  the  chief  necessity  of  the  State  was  the  care  of  the  sendee 
of  the  gods.^  Cicero  was  of  similar  opinion.^^  A  Chistian 
country  and  era  ought  concede  no  less.  The  proposition  is  of 
evident  truth  to  those  who  think  more  than  they  feel.  And,  too, 
even  from  a  purely  natural  view-point,  it  has  a  sentimental  ap- 
peal as  well  as  the  ring  of  reasonableness.  If  all  the  churches  of 
as  well  as  the  ring  of  reasonableness.  If  all  the  churches  of  the 
land  were  closed  and  all  religion  erased  from  the  hearts  and 
minds  of  people  to-day,  the  amount  of  beauty  and  wholesome- 
ness  Life  would  lose  would  be  exceeded  only  by  the  horror  it 
would  find.  Even  with  all  the  spiritual  helps  at  hand,  the  race 
is  often  a  dark  ethical  spectacle ;  what  would  it  be  if  the  Star  of 
Bethlehem  were  indeed  extinguished  and  the  gospel  of  peace 
and  good  will  lost  forever?  Only  a  cord  of  religion  kept  the  pa- 
gan world  from  falling  apart  through  sheer  rottenness,  centur- 
ies before  the  end ;  and  when  decay  finally  ate  into  the  cord  it- 
self, disintegration  was  rapid.  Greece  began  to  be  lost  when  its 
intellectuals  laughed  at  Olympus ;  or  earlier  still,  when  Hellen- 
ic irreverence  made  Zeus  and  his  divine  household  aesthetic 
exponents  of  vice.  Yet  poets  and  philosophers  tried  to  nail  the 
shadow  of  religion  to  the  floor  of  the  State;  for  even  that  had 
beauty  and  healing,  and  Hellenicism  could  not  bear  to  see  it  go. 

Could  the  Christian  world  stoop  to  a  measure  which  Paganism, 
even  in  its  giddiest  moments,  somehow  saw  as  folly?  Should 
Christ  be  obtruded  from  the  momentous  deliberations  across 
the  sea?  Should  the  thousands  of  churches  in  our  country  con- 
stitute but  a  cob-webbed  corner  of  our  nation,  and  claim  a 
wearied  attention  only  on  Sundays?  Our  independence  was 
claimed  on  a  religious  basis.  The  illustrious  document  of  1776 
contains  four  references  to  the  Deity  as  Creator,  Pro\ddence, 


844  Politica,  VII,  8. 

Though  Aristotle  places  it  as  fifth  in  his  list  of  state-needs,  he  consi- 
ders it  first  in  intrinsic  importance, 

845  De  Natura  Deorum,  I,  2:  "Hand  scio  an  pietate  adversus  deos 
sublata,  fides,  etiam,  et  societas  humani  generis,  et  una  excellentissima 
virtus,  justitia,  tollatur." 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  271 

Supreme  Judge,  God.  Washington  kissed  the  bible  on  which 
he  swore  fealty  to  his  country.  From  him  to  Mr.  Harding,  the 
words  of  Holy  Writ  have  consecrated  the  lips  of  our  leaders,  on 
the  day  of  their  entrance  to  high  office.  A  paragraph  from  our 
present  President's  inaugural  address  still  lingers  in  memory: 
"I  accept  my  part  with  single-mindeness  of  purpose  and  hu- 
mility of  spirit  and  implore  the  favor  and  guidance  of  God  in 
His  heaven.  With  these  I  am  unafraid  and  confidently  face 
the  future."  W^e  have  been  able  to  preserve  a  goodly  degree  of 
democracy,  because  we  have  not  been  altogther  wriggled  out 
of  the  bond  of  brotherhood,  and  respect  for  each  other's  rights, 
which  Christianity  inspires  and  "the  divine  inspiration  of  the 
founding  fathers"  expressed.  But  how  much  higher  that  de- 
gree can  and  will  be,  when  we  fully  awake  again  to  the  message 
of  the  churches!  Every  church,  insofar  as  it  is  at  all  true  to  the 
teaching  of  Christ,  must  be  beneficial  to  virtue  and  democracy. 
But  Aquinas  spoke  for  one  that  dated  back  to  apostolic  times, 
was  buffeted  by  Roman  Emperors,  survived  Arianism  (which 
comparatively  surpassed  modern  Protestantism  as  a  blow),  and 
civilized  Europe.  It  never  occurred  to  him  to  doubt  the  effici- 
ency and  divinely  appointed  mission  of  the  barque  of  Peter. 
His  eyes  were  fully  open  to  the  unw^orthiness  of  many  ecclesias- 
tics in  high  places ;  but,  for  him,  their  demerits  were  no  more 
an  argument  against  Catholicism  than  Iscariot  was  a  syllogism 
against  Christ.  The  Savior  did  not  make  men  saints  auto- 
matically. He  democratically  helped  them  to  bestir  them- 
selves. He  wished  the  individual  to  be  conscious  of  his  own  cap- 
abilities and,  in  correspondence  with  grace,  to  exercise  them. 
He  respected  human  nature.  He  developed  character.  And  so 
a  regenerate  Magdalen  and  a  sad-eyed  Peter  appear  as  eloquently 
human  passages  in  His  divine  story.  His  Church,  as  Himself, 
was  to  have  experience  wdth  sin.  His  mystical  body  could  be 
lacerated  and  crucified;  but  its  resurrection  was  eternal.  Not 
in  their  religion,  but  in  themselves,  St.  Thomas  saw  the  cause 
of  the  acts  of  medievalists  who  associated  the  Church  with  shame. 
His  words  on  scandal  and  holiness,  if  read  and  pondered  by  the 
monk  of  Wittenburg,  might  have  tended  tO  prevent  the  misfor- 
tune which  has  kept  modern  Christianity  nailed  to  a  cross. 
Those  who  are  truly  good  and  perfect,  the  Angelic  Doctor 


272     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

taught,  firmly  cleave  to  the  Rock  of  Ages ;  and  if  they  adhere  to 
their  superiors,  it  is  only  inasmuch  and  insofar  as  these  sup- 
eriors are  friends  and  followers  of  the  Savior .^^  ''Be  ye  follow- 
ers of  me,"  quotes  the  Saint  from  the  first  Epistle  to  the  Corin- 
thians (IV,  16),  "as  I  also  am  of  Christ."  For  the  faithful, 
the  Redeemer  is  always  the  same — perfect,  immovable,  God. 
No  breath  of  human  vice  can  tarnish  his  lustre.  The  unworthi- 
ness  of  His  minister  but  manifests  the  beauty  of  His  patience 
or  the  quality  of  his  meekness.  Hence,  with  those  who  perfectly 
trust  in  the  Master,  the  Saint  asserts,  no  scandal  is  to  be  found. 
Furthermore,  according  to  Aquinas,  the  person  who  is  easily 
scandalized  will  often  find  that  the  cause  is  not  so  much  in  the 
offending  instances  as  in  himself:^'''  an  observation,  to  the  vali- 
dity of  which  the  honest  and  discerning  mind  will  readily  as- 
sent. Thomas  peers  behind  the  mask  of  piety  which  scandal 
ordinarily  wears  and  finds  pruriency  or  some  other  personal 
weakness.  From  his  doctrine,  we  should  infer  that  he  would 
view  the  Reformation  mainly  as  the  issue  of  the  psycho- 
logies of  its  leaders,  so  far  as  scandal  figured  as  a  projective. 
As  such,  it  could  not  in  the  least  injure  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
old  Church.  Modern  thought  is  coming  to  appreciate  that  per- 
sonalities swayed  the  great  religious  movement  more  elementally 
than  principles,  and  that  there  really  never  was  anything  in 
the  Catholic  doctrine  itself  to  arouse  fear,  resentment,  or  dis- 
edification,  much  less  revolution.  While  the  study  of  St. 
Thomas  reveals  that  there  was  much  indeed  in  the  old  Faith  to 
incite,  sanction,  and  inspire  the  very  best  of  modern  achieve- 
ment, especially  in  the  political  order.  This  must  at  least  be 
granted  by  the  critics :  that  the  thought  of  the  Angelic  Doctor, 
so  characteristically  Catholic,  is  abundantly  democratic  in  the 
C[uiet  and  reasonable  manner  which  our  present-day  thinking 
too  often  lacks,  and  our  best  thought  seeks.  His  devotion  to  the 
ecclesiastical  institution  did  not  diminish  his  estimation  of  the 
individual  or  the  people  at  all,  but  heightened  it.  He  beheld 
the  Church  as  the  powerful  guide  to  individual  perfection, 
which  is  the  prelude  to  fitness  for  a  place  in  a  free  state;  and 


846  Swmma  Theol.,  qu.  XLII,  a.  5. 

S^T  Summa  Theol.,  2a  2ae,  qu.  XLIII,  a.  6,  ad  1. 


ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy  273 

to  the  best  Christian  ideals,  without  which  democracy  would 
mostly  be  trying  to  raise  itself  by  its  own  petards.  Athens, 
with  its  little  religion,  and  that  mostly  naturalistic,  was  able 
to  be  democratic  because  of  its  small  size:  one  citizen  could 
watch  the  other,  and  each  all.  But  the  large  representative 
democracies  of  to-day  depend  very  heavily  on  faith  and  trust, 
which  do  not  and  cannot  widely  reign,  when  moral  principle 
is  known  to  be  absent,  or  not  known  to  be  present.  Religion 
is  the  best  security  the  world  knows  of,  for  its  presence.  The 
promoter  of  religion  would  obviously  be  the  Church  founded  by 
Christ  Himself;  and  that  for  Aquinas  was  unquestionably  the 
Roman  Catholic. 

Despite  the  hopeless  difficulties  of  getting  it  into  the  heads  of 
antagonists  of  the  Faith,  Catholics  really  do  restrict  their  alle- 
giance to  the  Pope  to  spiritual  matters.  What  they  bring  of 
their  belief  into  civil  affairs  is  the  purity  of  intention  and  the 
virtue  which  it  inspires;  and  these  are  positive  assets  to  democ- 
racy. Pope  Pius  VII,  even  before  he  achieved  the  eminence  of 
Peter,  expressed  the  service  of  religion  to  democracy  perfectly, 
just  at  the  junction  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries, 
which  were  so  fraught  in  political  significance.  ''The  form 
of  democractic  government,  adopted  by  you,"  he  declared  to  the 
Cisalpine  Republic,  which  was  recognized  in  1797,  "is  not  in  op- 
position to  the  maxims  which  I  am  going  to  express  to  you ;  it 
is  not  repugnant  to  the  Gospel.  On  the  contrary,  it  demands 
those  sublime  virtues  which  are  acquired  only  in  the  school  of 
Jesus  Christ.  If  you  practise  them  religiously,  they  will  be  the 
pledge  of  your  happiness,  your  glory,  and  the  splendor  of  your 

Republic  Virtue,  the  need  of  which  is  indicated  to  us 

by  natural  light  and  completely  manifested  by  the  Gospel,  is 
alone  capable  of  perfecting  man,  of  conducting  him  to  supreme 
happiness.  It  alone  should  be  the  firm  foundation  of  our  demo- 
cracy. The  moral  virtues  which  consist  in  the  love  of  order  will 
render  us  good  democrats,  but  of  that  pure  democracy,  which 
redounds  incessantly  to  the  common  good,  and  which,  abjuring 
hates,  perfidies,  ambition,  is  also  as  quick  to  respect  the  rights 
of  others  as  to  fulfil  the  duties  of  one's  own.  In  such  wise  will 
equality  be  confirmed,  which  in  its  just  acceptation,  manifests 
the  law,  rising  above  all  the  members  of  the  social  body,  to  di- 


274     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

rect,  protect,  punish ;  which,  ordered  after  the  plan  of  the  divine 
and  human  laws,  preserves  to  each  the  faculties  necessary  to  the 
accomplishment  of  duty,  and  which,  a  guarantee  of  the  happi- 
ness of  the  indi\'idual,  as  well  as  the  happiness  of  all,  traces 
for  each  interger  of  the  democratic  state  the  just  measure  of 
that  which  he  owes  to  God,  himself,  and  his  fellow-men. 
Civil  equality,  derived  from  natural  law  and  enriched  by 
the  moral,  makes  a  harmonious  polity,  when  each  works  for 
the  common  good  according  to  his  physical  and  moral  ability, 
and^  in  return,  receives  from  social  protection  all  the  advantages 

which  he  has  a  right  to  receive  from  it  Make  yourself 

attain  the  very  height  of  virtue,  and  you  will  be  true  democrats ; 
faithfully  fulfill  the  gospel  precepts,  and  you  will  be  the  joy  of 

the  Republic  Christian  obedience  to  those  in  authority, 

accomplishment  of  duty,  zeal  for  the  common  good,  will  be, 

wdth  divine  grace,  a  new  source  of  merit  Be  all  Christians, 

and  you  will  be  excellent  democrats.  These  thoughts  and 
sentiments  are  no  less  Thomistic  than  dew  is  water.  They  ex- 
press the  Church  in  her  true  role  and  service :  as  the  purifier  of 
the  forces  behind  politics,  but  not  a  meddler;  as  a  positive  help, 
and  by  no  means  a  hindrance,  to  equity ;  as  an  internal  agent, 
whose  effect  on  civil  society  could  at  most  be  only  indirect  and 
must  always  be,  if  successful  at  all,  for  the  best.  Littlejohn 
construes  Aquinas  incorrectly  in  offering :  "He  did  not  conceive 
of  a  Christian  politics  or  a  Christian  state,  on  parallel  lines  with 
a  Christian  theology  and  a  Christian  Church,  each  equally  in- 
dependent. His  politics  becomes  a  department  of  theology, 
and  his  state  a  part  of  the  Church. As  well  accuse  a  pupil 
of  being  a  portion  of  his  teacher ;  or  mark  the  moon,  reflecting 
the  light  of  the  sun,  as  a  bit  of  the  blazing  body  itself.  The  Doc- 
tor plainly  expressed  the  spheres  of  Church  and  State  as  distinct 
in  themselves ;  but  he  did  not  and,  in  the  interest  of  ethics,  could 
not  withold  the  influence  of  the  former  from  the  latter.  Neither 
does  Littlejohn,  despite  his  criticism ;  since  he  goes  on  to  say, 
"Had  he  (Thomas)  adopted  the  idea  of  a  Christian  State  puri- 
fied as  the  Church  from  ancient  errors,  of  a  Christian  politics  ele- 

848  Tr.  from  the  quotation  in  R.  P.  Maumus,  USglise  et  la  Democra- 
tie.  pp.  1-3. 

849  The  Political  Theories  of  the  Schoolmen  and  Grotius,  pp.  198-199. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  275 

vated  above  partisanship,  tyranny  and  bigotry,  and  made  social- 
ly, as  well  as  morally  just,  without  transferring  these  in  toto 
to  the  sphere  of  religion  and  the  Church,  his  view  would  have 
been  complete.  "^^^  Yet  as  the  foregoing  pages  show,  Aquinas 
prescribed  such  a  state  as  the  gentleman  describes  and  did  not 
deluge  it  in  ecclesiasticism.  His  politics  would  have  been 
an  elaborate  uselessness,  if  he  regarded  the  Church  as  the  only 
institution ;  and  no  one  had  a  much  better  sense  of  the  value  of 
time  than  this  medieval  monk  who  lived  only  about  half  a  cen- 
tury and  wrote,  in  his  Summa  alone,  three  thousand  articles  and 
answ^ered  ten  thousand  objections.  A  religious  and  an  intimate 
friend  of  the  papacy,  he  would  have  wasted  no  energy  nor  ink 
on  the  subject  of  the  State,  if  he  believed  that  the  Church  alone 
mattered.  And  when  he  expressly  disclaims  any  such  extrava- 
gance of  thought,  his  reviewers  ought  to  pay  him  the  courtesy 
of  believing  him.  Sounder  thinker  than  John  of  Salisbury  before 
him  and  Tommaso  Campanella  after  him,  he  merely  means  that 
the  Church,  as  an  institution  spiritually  superior  to  the  State, 
should  be  its  light  and  leader  in  distinctly  ethical  and  religious 
concerns.  Neither  he  nor  his  theory  was  to  blame  that  it  took 
both  these  great  societies  a  long  time  to  adjust  their  claims,  and 
that  bickering  and  bitterness  were  betimes  occasioned.  These 
facts  are  incidents  and  accidents  which  do  not  affect  the  validity 
of  his  idea  in  the  least,  and  only  denote  the  effort  which  human- 
kind must  always  exercise  to  gain  a  correct  realization  of  values. 
Adverse  cirtics  like  Little john  might  advert  with  profit  to  the 
simple  but  significant  truth,  which  Aquinas  apprehended,  that 
the  same  men  and  women  in  a  truly  Christian  nation  belong  to 
the  Church  and  the  State.  And  so  the  two  societies  meet  in  the  in- 
dividual. The  one  arouses  virtue  in  him ;  the  other  seeks  the  com- 
mon welfare,  which  is  conditioned  on  his  virtue.  Unless  we 
should  be  willing  to  eliminate  this  rather  essential  detail  of  vir- 
tue, we  must  have  a  certain  union  between  religion  and  civics, 
and  hence  between  the  institutions  which  are  the  embodiment 
of  them — the  Church  and  the  State. 

From  the  preceding  pages,  no  one  can  doubt  the  democracy 
of  Thomistic  principles;  and  His  Holiness,  Leo  XIII,  by  con- 


850  Op.  cit.,  p.  199. 


276     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY  ' 

stituting  Aquinas  the  prime  representative  of  Catholic  thought, 
manifests  how  favorable  the  Church  is  to  prudent  popular  gov- 
ernment and  how  little  she  believes  in  power  as  an  end  in 
itself.  She  would  have  the  State  attend  to  temporalities  and 
externalities,  while  she  devotes  herself  to  spiritualities  and 
interior  regeneration.  As  to  those  of  her  duties  which 
lap  over  into  the  civil  province  and  those  of  the  State's 
obligations  which  turn  into  hers,  she  would  make  them 
the  subject  of  a  concordat.  She  would  diffuse  ''the  glow  of  su- 
pernatural sanction"  through  civil  society,  but  no  more  possess 
the  State  than  the  breath  of  spring  possesses  the  meadow  on 
which  it  blows,  the  star  the  sky  in  which  it  shines,  or  the  flower 
the  air  which  it  perfumes.  Aquinas  does  not  betray  his  politics 
for  silver  pieces  of  ecclesiastical  praise ;  nor  does  the  Church  dis- 
honor him  by  thinking  so.  He  but  perfects  it  with  religion, 
which;  after  all,  is  the  best  emollient  of  human  passions,  which 
are  the  worst  enemies  of  any  political  theory.  He  renders  demo- 
cracy more  possible,  by  making  virtue  more  probable.  He  sug- 
gests to  us  moderns  that  we  have  sought  to  silence,  and  succeeded 
in  ignoring,  our  best  teacher  of  ethics ;  even  as  frivolous  Athens 
exiled  its  Anaxagoras  and  slew  its  Socrat^,  to  continue  the 
pseudo  pesice  of  a  narrow  mind  and  a  closed  heart.  The  State 
with  a  clean  canscience,  an  active  sense  of  justice,  an  inclin- 
ation "to  live  the  truth,"  to  bend  the  knee,  and  to  make  the  sign 
of  the  Cross :  that  is  the  Thomistic  Utopia,  which  is  as  ideal  as 
any  which  lesser  scholars  have  conceived,  but  much  more  prac- 
tical. The  world  of  wishes  must  always  float  far  above  men,  if 
the  very  means  by  which  they  try  to  grasp  it  push  it  away.  Who 
would  be  so  fatuous  as  to  pursue  a  toy-baloon  with  a  pitch-fork  ? 
Aquinas  was  not.  He  knew  that  godless,  materialistic  methods 
could  never  gain  such  spiritual  prizes  for  the  State  as  justice, 
peace,  and  mercy.  He  did  not  place  the. worse  half  of  man, 
the  body,  above  the  better,  the  soul.  Much  less  did  he  indulge 
the  modern  intellectual  pastime  of  ripping  the  soul  altogether 
out  of  psychology  and  sewing  up  ethics  without  a  heart.  His 
politics,  by  favoring  the  religious  element,  made  an  appeal  to 
the  bosom  as  well  as  to  the  brain,  and  so  doubly  prepared  the 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  277 

individual  for  his  political  birth-right.^^  Dunning  has  mot  be- 
gun to  understand  the  Saint,  when  he  dismisses  the  latter's 
doctrine  on  religion  in  politics  as  "the  long  familiar  case  for 
ecclesiastical  hegemony,  thinly  veneered  with  Aristotle." 

Seeing  that  Europe  succeeded  in  progressing  from  savagery 
to  civilization  through  the  Church  of  Christ,  Aquinas  also  saw 
every  reason  to  conclude  that  she  could  and  would  ascend  from 
culture  to  social  and  political  perfection,  if  she  remained  spirit- 
ually true  to  the  traditions  which  raised  her  from  the  mire; 
and  so  he  built  a  fair  and  slender  Gothic  steeple  on  his  politics 
to  point  to  the  supernatural.  The  Catholicism  of  Aquinas  gave 
humanity  wings ;  the  modern  spirit,  locomotives.  We  have  in- 
deed gone  fast  without  the  Church  which  the  Angelic  Doctor 
thought  so  essential ;  but  has  not  our  travelling  been  in  a  circle, 
leaving  us  still  on  earth  with  the  creeping  things?  Instead  of 
soaring  above  our  modest  little  globe,  we  have  been  skimming 
the  surface,  learning  about  the  many  things  of  creation  but 
unlearning  the  things  of  creation's  God.  Matter  has  meant 
more  to  us  than  morals.  There  is  little  wonder  that  modern 
life  is  so  intensely  "of  the  earth,  earthly,"  teeming  with  mater- 
ial questions  and  concerns,  which  make  socio-political  regenera- 
tion more  imperative  than  possible.  Souls  are,  for  political 
theory,  ultimate.  Panaceas  throw  a  covering  about  them ;  but 
the  restlessness  of  immorals  is  practically  certain  to  throw  it  off. 
If  calmed  with  religious  sentiments  and  schooled  in  religious 
truth  and  practise,  souls  are  plastic  to  idealistic  planning ;  and 
the  millenium  would  be  aeons  nearer — though  its  orthodox 
location  will  always  be  across  the  "great  divide,"  where  the  One 
who  knew  most  about  it  placed  it.  If  men  would  take  up  the 
thread  of  religion  at  the  point,  not  where  a  certain  fiery  friar 
four  centuries  ago  broke  off,  but  where  the  reverent  fingers  of 
a  son  of  St.  Dominic  and  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  were 
forced  by  the  end  of  a  brief  but  devout  and  devoted  life  to  leave 


851  Cf.  Bossuet,  Exhortation  aux  nouvelles  catholiques. 

Also  Schwalm,  Legons  de  philosopMe  sociale,  t.  I,  p.  191:  "ce  n'est 
pas  I'Eglise  catholique  qui  a  donne  aux  Franks  de  la  conquete  I'amour 
de  la  vie  rurale  et  de  I'independence,  ni  aux  Yankees  I'initiative  per- 
sonelle.  Mais  c'est  elle  qui  a  donne  aux  Franks*  plus  de  respect  pour 
le  colon  et  le  serf,  et  qui  pent  empecher  rindividualisme  american  de 
se  tourner  en  egoisme  dur." 


278     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 

off  ,  they  would  have  something  to  guide  them  out  of  their  dis- 
tress, social,  spiritual,  and  political.  Clasping  the  hand  of 
Christ;  heedful  of  His  voice  sounding  through  His  one,  holy, 
catholic,  and  apostolic  Church ;  filled  with  the  reverence  which 
Plato  called  the  special  gift  of  a  philosopher  aquiver  to  con- 
quer self  first  and  then  help  others  to  do  the  same :  they  would  be 
well  qualified  for  the  democracy  they  crave.  For,  as  Croiset  re- 
marks, if  democracy  differs  from  other  regimes,  it  does  so  in  the 
fact  that  it  demands  more  virtue  in  individuals,  since  it  supplies 
each  of  them  a  grander  role  in  communal  activity .^^^ 


852  Theaetet.,  155.  D. 

853  Les  democraties  antiques,  pp.  333-334 


ST.  THOMAs'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  279 


INTRODUCTION 

7. — Idea  of  Democracy. 

II.  — Rise  of  Modern  Democracy  in  Catholic  Sources. 

III.  — Thomistic  Significance. 

IV.  — Political  Works  of  Aquinas. 


CHAPTER  I 

ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  SOCIETY  AND  STATE 

/. — The  Philosophical  Explanation: 

1.  Psychological: 

a.  Conscious  Isolation  of  the  Individual ; 

b.  Conscious  Lack  of  Self-Sufficiency ; 

c.  Urge  of  Instinct; 

d.  Work  of  Reason. 

2.  Teleological: 

a.    God  the  Ultimate  End; 
&.  Providence; 

c.    Relations  of  Creatures  to  Creator  and  of  Creatures  to 
one  another. 

3.  Ethical: 

a.  Necessity  of  Men  congregating,  because  of  common 

Duties  toward  God  and  each  other; 

b.  Elementary  Conscience. 

II.  — The  Acual  Rise  of  Society: 

1.  Subjective: 

a.  Consent : 

a)  Naturalness  of  it  in  Primitive  Society; 

b)  Its  more  pronounced  Character  in  civil  Asso- 

ciation; 

c)  Opinions  contrary  to  St.  Thomas',  considered. 

2.  Objective: 

b.  Gathering  of  Families: 

a)  Home; 

b)  Village; 

c)  City; 

d)  Kingdom. 

III.  — Democratic  Elements  in  St.  Thomas'  Theory: 

1.  The  State  for  Man; 

2.  The  Priority  of  the  Individual; 

3.  The  Dignity  of  the  Individual; 

4.  The  Finality  in  the  Angelic  Doctors  Doctrine  which  refers 

the  Individual  through  the  State  to  highest  Purposes. 

IV.  — Contrast  with  other  Theories: 

1.  Ancient: 

a.  Ancient; 

b.  Plato; 

c.  Aristotle; 

d.  Lucretius; 

e.  Polybius; 

f.  Cicero. 


280    ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 


2.  Earlier  Christian: 

a.    St.  Augustine; 
6.    Gregory  the  Great. 

3.  Modern : 

a.  Hobhes; 
1).  Grotius; 

c.  Suarez; 

d.  Locke; 

e.  Rousseau; 

f.  de  Bonald. 

4.  Present-day : 

Oppenheimer. 


CHAPTER  II 

POWER 

7. — Ethical  Aspect. 

II.  Law : 

1.  Aims: 

a.  Justice; 
h.  Love; 
c.  Order. 

2.  Necessity. 

3.  Character: 

a.  Reasonable; 

b.  Distinctive; 

c.  Coercive; 

d.  Consonant  with  Liberty: 

a)  Conducive; 

b)  Gradual; 

c)  Limited. 

e.  For  the  Common  Good; 
/,    By  Public  Authority; 
g.  Promulgated. 

4.  Democracy  of  Concept. 

0.  Kinds  of  Law. 
6.  Mutability. 

III.  — Source  of  Authority: 

1.  God. 

2.  Man: 

a.  Directly  to  Rulers  or  mediately  through  the  People? 

b.  Arguments: 

a)  From  Thomistic  Principles: 

aa)    Principle  of  Civil  Contract; 
bb)    Principle  of  Man's  Rationality; 
cc)  Texts. 

b)  Custom; 

c)  Fitness; 

d)  Conservation  of  Individuality; 

e)  Testimony  of  Suarez; 

f)  Doctrine  of  St.  Thomas  on  Revolt. 

3.  Crahay's  Opinion  on  the  Sainfs  Teaching  on  Popular  Sover- 

eignty criticized. 
Jf.    Effect  of  Evolution  on  the  Idea  of  popular  Sovereignty, 
o.    Four  Explanations  of  Authority. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  281 


IV.  — Title  to  Authority: 

1.  — In  Rulers: 

a.  Merit; 

h.    Election  of  People: 
b)  Ordinarily; 

h)  Extraordinarily  the  right  Man  may  assume  the 
Place  to  which  he  has  a  Right;  since  the 
People  cannot  rationally  be  unwilling. 

2.  In  People: 

a.  Rational  Life; 

b.  Civil  Formation. 

V.  — Election: 

1.  St.  Thomas'  Approval. 

2.  His  Warnings. 

3.  Democracy  of  his  Idea. 

VI.  — Miscellaneous  Indications  of  St.  Thomas'  Belief  in  Popular  Sov- 

ereignty. 

VII.  — Later  Doctrine: 

1.  Medieval: 

a.  Engelbert; 

b.  Durandus; 

c.  William  of  Ockam. 

2.  Modern : 

a.  De  Maistre  and  de  Bonald; 

b.  Taparelli; 

c.  de  Vareilles-Sommi&res. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  PEOPLE 

I.  — Meaning  of  the  Term: 

1.  With  Aristotle: 

a.  The  Exclusiveness  of  his  Concept; 

b.  Reason  therefor. 

2.  With  Aquinas: 

a.  Christian  Influence  on  his  Idea; 

b.  His  Choice  of  Israel  as  a  political  Model; 

c.  Significance  of  the  Thomistic  Concept  to  Democracy. 

3.  With  Moderns: 

Opprobrium  and  Limitations  of  the  Concept. 

II.  — Equality  and  Inequality: 

1.  Order: 

a.  Men,   metaphysically  alike;   in   the  Physical  Order. 

different; 

b.  Difference  in  Degrees  of  Ability ;  hence  a  social  Scale; 

c.  Natu7'al  Existence  of  Leaders; 

d.  Necessity  of  Subordination  along  with  Freedom. 

2.  Order  applied  to  Life  of  Community: 

a.  Its  Existence  in  the  Unit  of  Society — the  Family; 

b.  In  the  State; 

c.  Its  Advantages. 

3.  Terrestrial  Order  as  a  Reflection  of  Celestial. 


282     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AXD  DEMOCRACY 


4.  Practical  Reasons  for  esteeming  Order: 

a.  It  means  a  strong  middle  Class; 

b.  It  is  a  Form  of  Justice;  meaning  each  Person  i?i  his 

proper  Place; 

c.  It  means  the  common  Good  of  the  State. 

III.  — Virtue — the  essential  Requirement  for  civil  Eminence: 

1.    St.  Thomas'  Meaning: 

a.  Interpretations; 

b.  The  Teaching  of  the  Summa: 

a)  Elements  of  the  Concept; 

b)  Virtue,  a  practical  Habit; 

c)  Virtue,  a  good  Habit; 

d)  Political  Virtue: 

aa)    St.  Thomas  Concept  deeper  than  Aris- 
totle. 

bb)    Its  democratic  Significance. 

IV.  — Slavery — lack  of  Virtue: 

1.  Moderation  of  Saint's  View. 

2.  Corollary  of  Inequality. 

3.  Aquinas  speeds  the  Passing  of  the  Systein  by  teaching: 

a.  Slavery  is  vs.  the  initial  Decree  of  Nature; 

b.  It  is  tolerable  only  in  its  Advantages,  not  only  to  the 

Master,  but  to  the  Slave  himself.  These  lacking, 
the  System  is  irrational. 

c.  Amenability  of  the  System  to  human  Progress; 
d.    The  Slave  Class,  not  rigidly  set. 

Jf.    He  does  not  exclude  Slaves  from  civil  Rights,  so  much  as 
their  own  Incompetence. 

5.  Teaches  that  Men  are  ahvays  intrinsically  Free. 

6.  Difficulties  in  the  word  "servus".   Different  Significations. 


CHAPTER  IV 

RULERS 

I.  — AHstotle's  Opinions: 

1.  Whether  Law  should  Rule. 

2.  Whether  there  should  be  a  Ruler  besides  the  Law. 

3.  Whether  there  should  be  One  Ruler  or  Many. 

II.  — St.  Thomas'  Views  (affected  by  Aristotle  and  Medievalism  ) : 

1.  Qualifications  for  Rulers: 

a.  Religion; 

b.  Love  for  Polity  and  Interest  in  it; 

c.  Democracy; 

d.  Intelligence ; 

e.  Character; 

f.  Authority. 

2.  Duties  to  secure: 

a.  Peace; 

b.  Prosperity ; 

c.  Comfort; 

d.  Defense: 

a)  General; 

b)  Particular: 

aa)  Spiritual; 
bb)  Economic. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  283 


III.  — Relation  of  St.  Thomas'  Views  to  Democracy. 

IV.  — Comparison  of  them  with  later  Doctrines: 

a.  Calvin; 

b.  Machiavelli; 

c.  Grotius; 

d.  Hobbes; 

e.  Locke. 


CHAPTER  V 

FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

7. — Governments : 

A.  — Division: 

1.  — Ancient  Meaning  of  Democracy. 

2.  — Thomistic  Indifference  to  Governmental  Form: 

a.  Exposition  of  all  Forms; 

b.  Their  Corruptions. 

B.  — Criticisms  of  Division: 

1.  — Passy. 

2.  — Laveleye. 

3.  — Blunchli. 

II. — Monarchy  according  to  St.  Thomas: 

A.  — St.  Thomas'  Belief  in  the  civil  Nee:d  of  a  central  Personality, 

whose  office  is 

B.  — Non-hereditary  and  elective: 

1.  Pros  and  cons  for  Arguments  for  and  against  Election; 

2.  — Thomistic  Idea  of  Democracy  even  in  Form  of  heredi- 

tary Monarchy. 

C.  — Should  the  sovereign  Power  be  limited? 

1.  — Caution  in  adjudging  the  Saint  Thomas'  Opinion: 

a.  Difficulty  from  Etymology ; 

b.  From  Concession  to  Sovereign; 

c.  Feugueray's  Difficulty: 

a)  Its  Inconsistency  vnth   Thomistic  Prin- 

ciples. 

b)  Its  Answer  in   Thomistic  Circustanccs 

and  Doctrine. 

2.  — Democracy  of  St.  Thomas'  Response: 

a.  Evinced  especially  by  his  Doctrine  on  Tyranny; 

b.  On  Limitation  of  Power; 

c.  Non-binding    Character    of   Mis-enactments  of 

rulers. 

3.  — Difficulties  in  Commentary  explained. 

4.  — Reasons  for  St.  Thomas'  Laud  of  Monarchy. 

5.  — Doctrine  of  the  Commentary  on  Monarchy; 

a.  The  Idea  behind  it  as  Compared  with  the  Spirit 

of  Modern  Civil  Society; 

b.  The  Varieties  of  Monarchy: 

a)  Spartan; 

b)  Extreme  hereditary; 

c)  Eclective  (aesymneteia) ; 

d)  Limited; 

e)  Absolutism. 


284    ST.  Thomas'  political  doctrine  and  democracy 


c.    Their  tioo-fold  Division  into: 
a)    Monarchy  accd.  to  Law; 
&)    Monarchy  accd.   to   personal    Virtue  of 
Ruler; 

c)    The  Thomistic  synthesis. 

III.  — Aristocracy — Rulership  by  the  Feio: 

A.  — Introduction: 

1.  Disadvantage. 

2.  Advantage. 

3.  — Expedience  in  a  given  Case. 

B.  — Three  Types  or  Aristocracy. 

IV.  — Democracy — Rulership  hy  the  Many: 

A.  — The  Polity. 

B.  — Pure  Democracy. 

C.  — Five  Species  of  Democracy. 

V.  — St.  Thomas'  favored  Form  of  Government : 

A.  — His  monarchical  Interest: 

a.    Based  on  his  Piety  hut  tempered  hy 

h.    His  Knowledge  of  Human  Fact,  and  democratized  hy 

.c.    His  Concept  of  God  and 

d.  His  civil  Concern. 

e.  His  Catholicim  not  necessarily  causal  in  his  monarch- 

ical Favor. 

B.  — The  mixed  Form: 

a.    Apparent  Inconsistencies  in  the  Saint's  Teaching  ex- 
plained; 

h.    His  Advance  on  Aristotle's  Idea; 

c.  Elements  in  his  Theory; 

d.  Critique; 

e.  Other  Doctrines  of  mixed  Government: 

a)  Plato; 
h)  Aristotle; 

c)  Polyhius; 

d)  Cicero. 

C.  — Sources  of  St.  Thomas'  Idea: 

a.  Scriptural; 
h.  Profane. 

D.  — Idea  of  mixed  Government  in  modern  Age: 

a.  Gerson; 
h.  Fortescue; 

c.  Bellarmine; 

d.  Althusius; 
c.  Harrington; 

f.  Bodin  and  Hohhes; 

g.  Bossuet; 

h.  Fenelon; 

i.  Locke; 

j.  Montesquieu. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PURPOSE  OF  STATE 

7. — Introduction — The  Limitation  of  civil  Scope  hy: 

1.  Individuality. 

2.  Rights  of  the  Individual,  pai^ticularly : 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  285 


a.    Liberty  of  conscience; 

J).    The  Right  of  the  Parents  over  the  Child. 

-1.  The  General  Mission  of  the  State.    The  State  must  aid  in  the 
Securing  for  its  Subjects  of: 

a.  Goods  of  the  Mind; 

b.  Goods  of  the  Body; 

c.  External  Goods. 

2.  The  particular  Mission,  based  on  the  Thomistic  Classification 
of  human  Desires,  is  social,  economic,  ethical,  and  to  a 
Degree,  ultramundane. 

A.  — Social  Purpose: 

a.  Prerequisites: 

a)  Peace; 

b)  Unity. 

b.  Assurance  of  Life-Necessities: 

a)  Health: 

aa)  Good  Air; 

bb)  Decent  Water-Supply ; 

cc)  Houses. 

b)  Food: 

aa)  Agriculture; 
bb)  Commerce: 

1.  Necessity  of; 

2.  Arguments  against. 

c.  Wholesomeness  and  Beauty  of  Life: 

a)  State  should  see  that  the  Beauties  of 

Nature  are  not  destroyed; 

b)  It  should  guard  against  Indiscretion  and 

Excess  in  public  Spectacles. 

d.  Indigence  to  be  dispelled: 

a)  By  aiding  the  Individual; 

b)  By  withholding  the  Climbers  from  out- 

raging the  Rights  of  others. 

B.  — Economic  Purpose: 

a.    Work : 

a)  Its  Necessity; 

b)  Its  relation  to  Virtue; 

c)  Its  restraining  Power; 

d)  It  yields  the  Laborer  the  Means  not  only 

of  securing  his  own  Good  but  of  helping 
others. 

a)  Reasons  for  Coinage: 

aa)    It  represents  the  Government ; 

b  b )    Convenience  ; 

cc)    Surety  against  Fraud. 

b)  Just  Price. 

c)  Fraud: 

aa)  Adulteration; 
bb)    False  Measure; 
cc)  Misrepresentation. 

d)  Interest: 

aa)  Legitimacy  and  Illegitimacy  of  it; 
bb)    State  Action  vs.  it. 

e)  Taxes: 

aa)    Justice  and  Injustice  of  them; 
bb)  Moderation. 


286     ST.  THOMAS*  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


C.  — Ethical  Purpose: 

a.  Education: 

a)  Necessity; 

&)    How  it  is  within  the  Province  of  the  State; 
c)    Character  and  Program  of  Education. 
7).    Christianity  and  Democracy  in  Thomistic  Idea 
of  Education. 

D.  — Ultramundane  Purpose: 

a)  The  Inexpediency  of  the  Ethics  of  Ex- 

pediency; 

b)  The  Instability  of  Civil  Society  without 

Principle; 

c)  The  Necessity  of  a  great  Ideal; 

d)  The  Insufficiency  of  merely  natural  Virtue 

in  the  Face  of  Man's  super-terrestrial 
Destiny. 

b.  The  Church  as  the  Guide  to  the  True  End — God: 

a)  Aids    to    Democracy,    of    this   part  of 

the  Saint's  Teaching; 

b)  The  Thomistic  Theory  on  Church  and 

State  need  not  be  repugnant  to  modern 
Sense. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THOMISTIC  AND  AMERICAN  RIGHTS  AND  LIBERTIES 

I.  — Parallel  of  St.  Thomas'  Teaching  with  the  Virginian  Bill  of  Rights 

on: 

1.  Equality,  Life,  Liberty,  Property; 

2.  Popular  Sovereignty ; 

3.  Common  good; 
If.  Fairness; 

5.  Separation  of  Civil  Powers; 

6.  Free  Election  and  Suffrage; 

7.  Taxation; 

8.  Speedy  Trial  by  Jury; 

9.  Exemption  from  Excessive  Punishment ; 

10.  Sanctity  of  Home; 

11.  Freedom  of  Thought; 

12.  Popular  Militia; 

13.  Uniform  Government ; 

14.  Civil  Virtue; 

15.  Liberty  of  Conscience. 

II.  — Parallel  of  St.  Thomas'  Teaching  with  the  Massachusetts  Declara- 

tion of  Rights: 

1.  Civics  and  Religion; 

2.  Amenability  of  Governors  to  the  Governed; 

3.  Right  of  Individuals  to  Protection; 

4.  Self-defense ; 

5.  Judicial  Procedure: 

6.  Redress  of  Grievance; 

7.  Deposition  of  Ruler; 

8.  Adjustment  and  Remedy  of  Law; 

9.  Taxation  without  Representation; 

10.  Retroactive  Law; 

11.  Court-Martial. 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  287 


///. — Parallel  of  8t.  Thomas'  Teaching  with  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 


pendence '. 

1. 

Equality; 

2. 

The  Creator  and  inalienable  Rights; 

3. 

Government ; 

i 

Consent; 

5. 

Revolt; 

6. 

ReconstruQtion  ; 

7. 

Endurance; 

8. 

Freedom. 

lY. — Parallel  of  St.  Thomas'  Teaching  with  the  projective  Principles 
behind  our  Constitution: 

1.  Civil  power; 

2.  Limitation  without  Loss  of  Dignity  and  Efficacy; 

3.  Alienation  of  petty  State-power. 
V. — Conclusion. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CIVIL  MENACES  AND  PROBLEMS 

7. — External  Evil:  War: 

1.  Justification  in  se: 

a.    Final  Cause; 
J).  Conditions: 

a)  Declaration  by  proper  Authority; 

b)  Just  cause; 

c)  Right  Intention. 

2.  Just  in  Method: 

a.  vs.  Objectors ; 

b.  Fright  fulness. 

II. — Internal  Evils;  Sedition,  Vice,  Poverty: 

1.  Sedition: 

a.  Difference  from  War  and  Strife; 

b.  Culpability; 

c.  Unwarrantableness ; 

d.  Condemnation  on  democratic  Basis. 

2.  Vice : 

a.  Limitations  of  State  in  its  Regard; 

b.  Supplementary  Service  of  Church; 

c.  Instances; 

d.  Democratic  Significances. 

3.  Poverty : 

a.    Solution  in  Commentary  on  Aristotle: 

a)  Negative — vs.  Plato  and  Communism: 

aa)    Necessity  of  Variety; 

bb)    Necessity  of  Classes; 

cc)    Necessity  of  Rulers  and  Ruled; 

dd)    Necessity  of  civil  S elf- Sufficiency ; 

ee)  Inconsistencies; 

ff)     Democracy  of  the  Contention. 

b)  Positive: 

aa)    Let  natural  Ownership  prevail; 
bb)    Let  Morals  and  Law  remedy  the  Abuses; 
cc)    Injuries  to  the  Individual  of  opposite 
Course : 


288     ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


1.  Prevention  of  best  Self-Expression ; 

2.  Incitation  of  Worst. 

dd)    Training  of  the  Inidvidual  to  the  true 

Course; 
ee)  Objections: 

1.  To    brute    Models    in  sociological 

Theory ; 

2.  To   Unnaturalness  in  Theory;  In- 

stances of  this  Quality  in  Com- 
munistic Plan. 

b.    Solution  in  Summa: 

a)  Vindication  of  Rt.  of  Property: 

aa)    Property  as  a  Motive; 
bb)    Cominon  Good; 
cc)    Civil  Calm. 

b)  Limitation: 

aa)  Possessors  of  External  Goods  should  be 
ready  to  share; 

bb)  Scriptural  Source  of  St.  Thomas'  Doc- 
trine— Moses; 

cc)    Profane — Aristotle. 

c)  Chrstianity  in  St.  Thomas'  Solution: 

aa)    In  itself; 

bb)    In  its  sociological  Significances. 

III.  — Nationality  and  Self -Determination: 

1.  Psychological  Criteria  and  Warrants. 

2.  Moral  Personality  of  a  State. 

IV.  — Individuality  and  individual  Concerns:  , 

1.  Marriage: 

a.  Limitations  of  Civil  Action  in  its  Regard; 

b.  Field  of  civil  Action  in  its  Regard. 

2.  Children : 

a.  Defectives: 

a)  Aristotle's  Doctri^ie  on  Treatment  of  them; 

b)  St.  Thomas'. 

b.  Birth-Control: 

a)  Aristotle's  Teaching; 

b)  St.  Thomas': 

aa)    Unnaturalness  of  Practise; 
bb)    Ideal  of  Sex-Life; 
cc)    Religious  Fact; 
dd)    The  Common  Good. 

c)  Quasi-Justification  by  Aristotle. 

3.  Divorce : 

a.  In  Modern  Society; 

b.  In  Thomistic  Doctrine: 

a)  Purpose  of  Marriage; 

b)  Reasons  for  Permanency  of  Bond; 

c)  Unnaturalness  and  Danger  of  Divorce; 

d)  Recognition  of  Separation. 

c.  Remedies: 

a)  Modern; 

b )  Thomistic. 

4.  Woman: 

a.  Her  Place; 

b.  Her  Powers: 


ST.  THOMAS'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY  289 
a)    Dependency  on  Man; 

ft)    Relative   Inferiority   in   some   Respects,  and 
Equality  and  Superiority  in  others; 

c)  The  Manner  of  her  Subjection; 

d)  The  Doc.  of  St.  Thomas  on  Woman  not  un- 

democratic. 


CONCLUSION 

7. — Vindication  of  the  Individual  in  St.  Thomas'  Politics: 

1.  Politics  based  on  Psychology. 

2.  Rights  of  Individ,  championed. 

II.  — Vindication  of  the  People: 

1.  Mediate  Source  of  Power. 

2.  Right  of  Revolt. 

3.  Popular  Foundation  of  Virtue  in  the  State. 

4.  The  Spirit  of  the  People  more  significant  than  the  Form  of 

Government. 

III.  — The  Political  Message  of  Aquinas: 

No  true  Democracy  without  Religion: 

1.  Intrinsically  Religion  awakens  the  Individual  and  the  Race  to 

a  Knowledge  and  a  Sense  of  Justice. 

2.  Extrinsically  it  prevents  Rulers  from  Excesses  against  the 

People. 


290     ST.  THOMAs'  POLITICAL  DOCTRINE  AND  DEMOCRACY 


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VITA 

Edward  Francis  Murphy  was  born  in  Salem,  Mass.,  July  21, 
1892.  His  early  studies  were  pursued  in  St.  Mary's  Paroehical 
School  of  that  city.  In  1907,  he  entered  the  Society  of  St. 
Joseph  of  the  Sacred  Heart  for  the  Conversion  of  the  Colored 
People  of  America;  following  the  classical  course  in  Epiphany 
Apostolic  College,  Walbrook,  Md.,  and  the  philosophical  and 
theological  lectures  at  St.  Joseph's  Seminary  and  St.  Mary's 
Seminary,  Baltimore,  Md.  From  St.  Mary's,  he  received  the 
degrees  B.  A.,  M.A.,  and  S.  T.  B.  Ordained  to  the  priesthood 
in  1917,  he  entered  the  graduate  school  of  the  Catholic  Uni- 
versity in  1918.  His  instruction  was  in  the  History  of  Philoso- 
phy, under  the  Rt.  Rev.  William  Turner,  S.  T.  D. ;  Thomistic 
Philosophy,  under  the  Rev.  H.  I.  Smith,  0.  P.,  Ph.,  D. ;  Social 
and  Genetic  Psychology,  and  the  Philosophy  of  Evolution, 
under  the  Very  Rev.  Edward  A.  Pace,  Ph.  D.,  S.  T.  D.,  and 
LL.  D. ;  Sociology,  under  the  Rev.  William  J.  Kerby,  S.  T.  L., 
LL.  D. ;  and  Educational  Psychology,  under  the  Rev.  Leo  Mc- 
Vay.  To  these  professors,  and  to  the  Rev.  James  J.  Fox,  A.  B., 
S.  T.  D.,  the  writer  expresses  sincere  gratitude  and  appreciation. 


Date  Due  , 

